

**"A Matrix Approach to Comparing and Contrasting  
Some Differing Perspectives on  
the Federal Government's Role in Hurricane Katrina and  
in Potential Catastrophic Events in the Future "**

**by**

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(with newly added references and resources)

In this presentation I will be trying to shed some light on the current status of homeland security and emergency management in this country since 9/11 and since Katrina. I shall be touching on some of the major challenges facing those in roles of responsibility for homeland security and emergency management at the Federal, State, and local levels of government. I will be identifying different perspectives concerning what the role of the Federal, State, and local governments was in Katrina and what it could or should have been and what that role could or should be in catastrophes that might occur in the future. I will also be offering some possible explanations concerning the existence of such widely varying perspectives. Included will be some suggestions concerning where we might go from here.

First I will make some introductory remarks about a range of differing perspectives that are impacting the current status of homeland security and emergency management. Then I will be introducing a variety of concepts, tools, and typologies that might prove useful in helping explain how so many differing perspectives have evolved. I will also be noting some key documents or work that may also shed light on these differing perspectives. Most notably these include the December 2005 Washington Post series of articles on DHS and FEMA, Michael Brown's February 11, 2006 Deposition, the status of the National Response Plan, and videotaped presentations by Michael Brown, General Honore, and Stephen Flynn.

Armed with a common set of concepts, tools, and typologies, and a common familiarity with the references just mentioned, we will then be able to

~ **explore** in greater detail the basis of the different perspectives and

~ **better understand** the implications that these differences in perspective currently seem to hold for the future of homeland security and emergency management in this country.

To help achieve these aims, I have developed a seven page matrix. The matrix is designed to aid in characterizing and contrasting a variety of perspectives of different actors and analysts. Thirteen different parameters are used in this analysis.

This matrix should serve as a means of rapidly comparing and contrasting the perspectives of these actors and analysts. Individuals using the matrix are free to consider their own way of characterizing the various perspectives. In this way, each person may well deepen his or her own individual and unique understanding of the perspectives and of the implications these perspectives have for homeland security and emergency management, now and in the future.

The matrix may also help those who use it glean a few insights into

- some impediments to the nation's homeland security and emergency management efforts and
- some possible ways of improving these efforts.

## **Some Thoughts About Homeland Security and Emergency Management Post 9/11 and Post Katrina**

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, a wide array of government documents, after action reports, books, articles, investigative reports by journalists, and other materials have become available. These have included, drawn on, or referred to research, testimony, position statements, first-hand accounts, interviews, presentations, and media reports.

Government entities releasing reports have included

- the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina in the House of Representatives,
- the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee,
- the White House,
- the Department of Homeland Security, and
- the Government Accountability Office.

Speeches, Congressional testimony, depositions, and interviews have been given by persons who were in key roles of responsibility before, during, and after Hurricane Katrina. Many have focused on what went

wrong and what went right, what lessons were learned, and what actions are needed to help ensure that mistakes made are not repeated in preparing for or responding to possible disasters or catastrophes in the future.

Based on study of open source materials, including media coverage, reports, articles, testimony, and speeches; one might well conclude that perspectives vary widely concerning

- what happened and what should have happened, as well as
- what could have happened.

Indeed to many outside observers, as well as many inside participants, these variations in perspectives and different views of the "facts" seem at times to differ inexplicably. For instance the former FEMA Director Michael Brown has spoken of a "cultural divide" that has separated DHS and FEMA. Few individuals in government, including DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff, seem to be cognizant of what Brown means when he speaks of such a "cultural divide".

Another example of a difference in perspective can be found in the varying views concerning what the missions of FEMA and DHS are, might be, and/or should be. Key "actors" seem to be defining their missions in very different ways.

Major differences in perspective can also be found concerning the field of emergency management. What Michael Brown understands when he has talked about the emergency management cycle and its stages

of prevention, preparedness, mitigation, response, recovery, and continuity of operations can be viewed as being much different from Secretary Chertoff is talking about when the Secretary speaks as he did on at the February 13, 2006 NEMA Conference of the cycle that involves "protection, prevention, response, and recovery." While similar words may be used, the meaning that persons with different backgrounds give to those words can be extremely different. The way in which the different elements or phases of the emergency management relate to one another or should relate to one another can be viewed in very different ways as well.

### **The "Cultural Divide"**

Let's take a closer look at one of these instances in which an obvious difference in perspective can be found. What might Michael Brown be referring to when he has spoken of a "cultural divide" between FEMA and DHS? From my perspective, the "cultural" differences between FEMA and DHS that Brown has alluded to can be traced in part to differences in the experience, training, knowledge base, and understanding, skills and capabilities relating to the field of emergency management. The backgrounds of those in FEMA have tended to differ greatly in the past with the backgrounds of those in DHS. This is in part owing to the fact that prior to Katrina, the primary focus of DHS seemed to be on other aspects of homeland security that did not necessarily involve individuals with a background in emergency management. Perhaps, individuals with a background in emergency management should have been selected to deal with these other aspects of homeland security. For whatever reasons, the individuals

selected tended not to have such a background. Herein lies a basis for the culture gap that Brown has identified.

What can happen when individuals find themselves with major responsibilities in a field in which they have little or no background? Conscientious individuals will try their best to bring to bear in their new roles of responsibility any background that is remotely germane.

Many individuals in DHS have professional backgrounds in the military or in criminal justice. Such backgrounds tend to differ substantially from a background in emergency management. Even armed with the best of intentions, persons new to a field may make simplistic judgments concerning a field of endeavor that is new or even quite foreign to them. The people who have spent years in the field of emergency management, who are steeped in the lore surrounding the field, who have had first-hand experience of dealing with all facets of emergency management, who have engaged in collaborative inter- and intra-governmental efforts, and who have a hands on approach to public service may well find themselves at odds with those who have come to emergency management from other fields where few if any of these characteristics may apply. The result can be that the backgrounds of those in emergency management and those in homeland security may simply end up being distantly removed from one another.

When individuals who come from other fields are placed in positions of authority over individuals whose background is in emergency management, a somewhat difficult situation can result. A comparable situation might be in a hospital where medical doctors who specialized

in emergency medicine, were having to report to individuals who not only lacked a background in emergency medicine, but who also lacked a background in the general field of medicine. Difficulties can be compounded when those in positions of authority or leadership do not realize how great the gulf of knowledge, background, and experience is between themselves and those whose efforts they are now responsible for overseeing or leading. Even if those in such roles of authority or leadership are aware of the gulf that separates themselves from those whose efforts they are charged with overseeing or leading, they may not understand why the gulf exists or how it might be bridged. It is understandable that some individuals jump to the conclusion that the apparent tension and conflict that has been evident between DHS and FEMA officials is a result of organizational power plays and "turf battles". The root causes of the tension and conflict, however, may well extend far beyond either power plays or turf battles and reside in a great gulf of knowledge, background, and experience.

If the "cultural divide" that separates homeland security from emergency management were not enough, there are also additional factors contributing to already existing challenges involving the field of emergency management. These have to do with the increasingly multi-faceted nature of the field of emergency management and the diversity of viewpoints concerning what how emergency management should evolve. The fact is that the field itself is in a state of transition and there are major differences of opinion concerning how the field should evolve and what the relationship of emergency management and homeland security should be.

There has been relatively little thought given to weapons of mass destruction by those in the field of emergency management for the past thirty years or more. There has also been relatively little realistic thought until recent years given by those in the field of emergency management to planning and preparing for truly catastrophic events, events that can potentially affect millions of people and involve the simultaneous failure of all major elements of the critical infrastructure. By the same token, there has been relatively little realistic thought given by those concerned with weapons of mass destruction to events that are truly catastrophic in nature.

A picture should be becoming clearer: What we have is on the one hand a field of emergency management that had not focused on catastrophes and on the other, a newly evolving field of homeland security that is absent with few exceptions any foundation in emergency management or any realistic focus on catastrophic events. The fledgling field of homeland security is composed of many individuals who have had no substantial background in emergency management and no experience in coordinating inter- and intra-governmental efforts, both of which are integral to emergency management. Those in emergency management are being challenged to develop expertise in a rarified specialty area involving weapons of mass disruption and mass destruction and those in homeland security are being challenged to assimilate decades of knowledge, experience, and understanding of a field that is foreign to them, the field of emergency management. They are also being challenged to develop a sufficient understanding of catastrophic events. This cannot be accomplished in a few weeks or months or even a few years. Indeed, the need for in-service training and education has only recently begun

to be acknowledged and addressed. Compounding the challenges is the fact that those involved in these efforts have not tended to have backgrounds in emergency management.

The difference in knowledge, experience, and understanding is also noticeable when those with a background in emergency management and those without a background in emergency management speak of an "all hazards approach". Those whose specialization is in emergency management in general mean one thing when they speak of an "all hazards approach". Those whose specialization is in weapons of mass destruction and who have no grounding in the field of emergency management may attribute a very different meaning to the same words.

Another way of looking at the differences between those with backgrounds in emergency management and those without such backgrounds is the time frame that they focus on when they think about emergency management. Those with backgrounds in emergency management may well use an approach that reflects a long term time frame also referred to by Bertram Gross as "broad rationality,"<sup>i</sup> a concept that will be discussed shortly. This proclivity for long term time frames can help explain why those in emergency management would be more likely to give importance to such matters as mitigation and planning and preparedness for contingencies and continuity of operations. It would explain why some feel so strongly that emergency management efforts have been negatively affected when responsibilities for addressing different aspects of the emergency management cycle have been drastically separated from each other. It would also help explain why some "veterans" in the field of

emergency management are so concerned when emergency management responsibilities are placed in the hands of individuals who are not driven by the same sense of mission that drives veterans in the field.

Now with these introductory remarks about a range of differing perspectives that are impacting the current status of homeland security and emergency management, I will introduce a variety of concepts, tools, and typologies. These should provide a common frame of reference that may help us analyze and discuss the range of differing perspectives concerning homeland security and emergency management that can be found.

It will be helpful in presenting the matrix to introduce a few concepts, tools, and typologies.

### **Some Concepts, Tools, and Typologies to Consider**

Nathan Leites' Operational Code Mode of Analysis. <sup>ii</sup>

This analytic tool has served as an inspiration for a great deal of the analytic writing that I have done. Leites' Operation Code Mode of Analysis can be used to analyzing the way in which individual decision makers "operate" using and approach.

Decisionmakers have different approaches to decision making depending on

- Emphasis on narrow or broad rationality
- Values, morals, ethics

- Assumptions concerning the nature of man (rational man/economic man model as opposed to self-actualized man model)
- Assumptions concerning the ability of humankind to shape destiny
- Perspectives concerning change
- Perspectives concerning purpose and meaning
- Approaches to knowing
- Perspectives concerning freedom and democracy

### Bertram Gross' Concepts of Narrow and Broad Rationality<sup>iii</sup>

In his book, **Organizations and Their Managing**, Bertram Gross suggested two different approaches to rationality: narrow rationality and broad rationality.<sup>iv</sup> Approaches to defining and solving problems may be rooted in narrow rationality. The preeminence of "narrow rationality" can seriously impede efforts to recognize and address problems that involve scientific and technological complexity. Narrow rationality approaches to analysis, decision making, and problem solving tend to be stressed in both academic and professional training and reflected in public as well as private sector endeavors.

	<b>Narrow Rationality</b>	<b>Broad Rationality</b>
<b>Scope horizon</b>	Focus on short time horizon	Focus on longer time
	Greater emphasis on analytic abilities	Greater emphasis on synthetic abilities
<b>Rationality Dimensions</b>	Concerned in a major way with feasibility	More inclined to take risks and entertain uncertainties
	Concerned with consistency	Less inclined to emphasize consistency
<b>Learning Dimensions</b>	Conducive to a specialized approach to knowing and action	Conducive to a generalist approach to knowing and action
	Conducive to working within a constricting methodological framework	Not conducive to working within a constrictive methodological framework

(Based on a typology developed by Bertram Gross in **Organizations and Their Managing**. New York: The Free Press. 1968.)

A new mind set is needed that incorporates both narrow and broad rationality. Examples of such a mindset can be found the approach taken by the leadership of the Apollo 13 ground crew. The same can be said of the team that rescued the nine miners in the Que Creek Mine Disaster in Pennsylvania.<sup>vi</sup> A melding of narrow and broad rationality is also needed in addressing other problems that involve scientific and technological complexity, including infrastructure problems and vulnerabilities.<sup>vii</sup>

This typology can help shed light on some very different mind sets that can be found, including amongst individuals in government and academia. It can be helpful to understand that different people may

favor one type of rationality over another, or that some individuals may be comfortable using both types of rationality. It can also be helpful to understand these distinctions when thinking about problem solving and outside the box thinking.

In my article on "Transforming and Leading Organizations, I cited examples of unprecedented situations in which individuals were able to bring extraordinary capabilities. These included the role that Verizon employees played in the recovery efforts after the attacks on the World Trade Center, the ad hoc teams that helped quell the California wildfires, the successful retrieval of the near disastrous failed moon mission of Apollo 13. As I noted in that article, such approaches simply cannot be pre-scripted. They all require "out of the box" thinking. The success of such efforts required the exercise of on the spot ingenuity, creativity, and initiative and liberal amounts of common sense, knowledge, and wisdom. They also required that the individuals involved had a deep sense of responsibility and a sense purpose and mission. <sup>viii</sup>

Too often planners have developed plans based on the unrealistic assumption that large scale emergencies or even catastrophic events can be micromanaged. It may not be possible to "manage" let alone micromanage events of such magnitude. There are simply too many possible eventualities to consider. Such plans may also have little or no relevance to what might actually transpire. There is a tendency among planners, however, to proceed as if it were possible to manage and control even events that are unprecedented in scale. There is a tendency to try to maintain at least an illusion of control. Indeed there is also a tendency to try to fix blame to individual when it has not been possible to control a situation that was essentially uncontrollable.

## Groupthink, Social Pressure, and Flawed Decision Making

Some factors that can be involved in flawed decision making and planning efforts can be found in the work of Irving Janis<sup>ix</sup>, Solomon Asch<sup>x</sup>, and Felix A. Nigro and Lloyd G. Nigro <sup>xi</sup>. Denial and scapegoating are two flaws that can be found. Abundant examples can be found in incident debriefings, Congressional Hearings, and after actions reports.

## Bureaupathology<sup>xii</sup>

Bureaupathology can also play a role in decision making, planning, and implementation efforts. Any or all of the following characteristics of bureaupathology can be found in an unhealthy organizational culture and in flawed approaches to such efforts. James Thompson's definition of this concept as conveyed by Gerald E. Caiden is as follows:

Process is more importance than purpose;

Authority is more important than service;

Form is be more important than reality; and

Precedence is more important than adaptability.<sup>xiii</sup>

## A Typology of Emergencies<sup>xiv</sup>

A typology that is referred to in one of the parameters in the matrix is the Typology of Emergencies Some key points here are that most planning does not go beyond the level of "Major Scale Emergency". Few planners ever seriously consider the possibility that all major elements of the critical infrastructure will be in a state of failure. Such

a scenario, for whatever reason, has rarely been seriously considered. Yet in the immediate aftermath of Katrina, this is exactly what happened. Very few individuals in our list of actors and analysts, including the authors and contributors to the after action reports on Katrina seem to get the fact that Katrina was a true catastrophe. Many do not seem to be able to understand to this day the extent of the damage left in the wake of Katrina. And many do not seem to have grasped the significance of the fact that all major elements of the critical infrastructure were in a state of failure. To this day, many do not seem to comprehend either the extent of the impacts or the amount of resources and effort that will be required for recovery. They also don't seem to understand the quagmire of red tape and litigation that can surround insurance claims. They don't seem to understand why the recovery process can be such a exceedingly slow and difficult process. They don't seem to understand the extent of the red tape, the planning restrictions, and bureaucratic impediments to the decision-making process. They don't seem to understand the difficulties that governments can have in arriving at making and carrying out decisions than need to involve every level of government from neighborhoods to local government to the state and Federal government. When, as is the case of the levees in New Orleans, there are technological and scientific dimensions involved in the planning and recovery efforts, the process can be all the more slowed down and complicated.

**TABLE 1: TYPOLOGY OF EMERGENCIES\*\*xv**

<u>Size of Emergency</u>	<u>Numbers of Dead &amp; Injured &amp; Extent of Damage and Destruction</u>	<u>Roles of Government</u>	<u>General Approaches</u>	<u>Capacity for Providing Care</u>	<u>Kinds of Skills and Training Needed</u>
Small Scale	Scores with minimal damage	Local	Surging of capabilities	Adequate capacity for providing care	Focus is on meeting needs of a small scale emergency

Medium Scale	Hundreds with minimal to moderate damage	Local, state, regional	Surging of capabilities and providing for makeshift capabilities	Capacity for providing care is taxed but not overwhelmed	Focus is on meeting needs of a medium scale emergency
Large Scale	Thousands with moderate damage and destruction	All levels of government	Surging of capabilities and taking extraordinary steps to provide for makeshift capabilities	Capacity for providing care is taxed and verging on being overwhelmed	Focus is on meeting needs of a large scale emergency
Catastrophic Scale	Millions with major catastrophic damage and destruction	All levels of government	Augmenting whatever is in place and with makeshift capabilities	Capacity for providing care is overwhelmed	Focus is on developing improvisational skills and meeting needs in an emergency of catastrophic scale
Mega-Catastrophe	Multi-millions plus with unprecedented catastrophic damage and destruction	Elements of government remaining intact	Augmenting whatever is left in place with largely makeshift capabilities	Capacity for providing care is totally overwhelmed	Focus on meeting the needs of a worst case catastrophe which require reliance on improvisational skills

\*Adapted from a Typology of Emergencies in a "**Manual for Local Level Emergency Management Coordinators**" by Paula D. Gordon, April 1984 (Available through Inter-Library loan from the FEMA Library, 500 C St SW, Washington, D.C.)

### The Homeland Security Impact Scale<sup>xvi</sup>

This impact scale was originally developed and used by the WDCY2K group. I have since adapted it for homeland security. The Scale is useful for the purposes of our matrix in that it provides a common frame of reference to use in trying to determine how people think about impacts from disasters as well as how people might think about actions that can be take to mitigate the impact of disasters or to reverse them once they have occurred.

**Table 2. Homeland Security Impact Scale**

- 0** -- No real impact on national security, economic security, or personal security
- 1** -- Local impact in areas directly affected
- 2** -- Significant impact in some areas that were not directly affected
- 3** -- Significant market adjustment (20% + drop); some business and industries destabilized; some bankruptcies, including increasing number of personal bankruptcies and bankruptcies of small businesses, and waning of consumer confidence;
- 4** -- Economic slowdown spreads; rise in unemployment and underemployment; accompanied by possible isolated \*disruptive incidents and acts, increase in hunger and homelessness
- 5** -- Cascading impacts including mild recession; isolated supply problems\*; isolated infrastructure problems\*; accompanied by possible increase in \*disruptive incidents and acts, continuing societal impacts
- 6** -- Moderate to strong recession or increased market volatility; regional supply problems\*; regional infrastructure problems\*; accompanied by possible increase in disruptive incidents and acts, worsening societal impacts
- 7** -- Spreading supply problems\* and infrastructure problems\*; accompanied by possible increase in disruptive incidents and acts, worsening societal impacts, and major challenges posed to elected and non-elected public officials
- 8** -- Depression; increased supply problems\*; elements of infrastructure crippled; accompanied by likely increase in disruptive incidents and acts; worsening societal impacts; and national and global markets severely impacted
- 9** -- Widespread supply problems\*; infrastructure verging on collapse with both national and global consequences; worsening economic and societal impacts, accompanied by likely widespread disruptions
- 10** -- Possible unraveling of the social fabric, nationally and globally, jeopardizing the ability of governments to govern and keep the peace

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\* "Supply problems" and "infrastructure problems" may include food shortages; availability of potable water; degradation of water purity, water distribution and/or waste management; fuel/heating oil shortages, disruptions in utilities (power, gas, telecommunications), disruption in the financial sector, disruptions in transportation (airlines, trains, trucking, ports, ships); pharmaceutical shortages; disruption of health care services or emergency medical services; disruption of fire and public safety services; disruptions or inadequacies, or overwhelming of public works operations and services.

"Disruptions" and "incidents" can include demonstrations, work stoppages, strikes, organized or spontaneous vandalism, looting, and riots. Also included are sabotage and terrorist acts and attacks. (These notations have been adapted in part from notations used in the Y2K Impact Scale in 1998 by WDCY2K. See also Bruce F. Webster, 1999. This scale is an adaptation of the WDCY2K Scale.)

## Approaches to Emergency Management and Homeland Security<sup>xvii</sup>

The approaches to emergency management and homeland security can be useful in comparing and contrasting the perspectives of the different actors and analysts. For instance, Steven Flynn and I have views that most in alignment with the third approach.

### **Table 3. Some Perspectives Concerning Emergency Management and the Role of Homeland Security Concerns in Emergency Management**

- Is the focus of emergency management solely on natural hazards?
- Does the focus on emergency management include an all-hazards approach that encompasses terrorism and homeland security threats and challenges?
- Does the focus on emergency management encompass both an all-hazards approach and attention to catastrophic events?
- Does the focus on emergency management encompasses a goal of helping individuals develop the knowledge base, skill sets, and capabilities needed to assume and more effectively carry out their roles of responsibility relating to an all-hazards approach to emergency management?<sup>xviii</sup>

Stephen Flynn has addressed the topic of addressing disasters in his work.<sup>xix</sup>

Ruth David at the Homeland Security Advisory Council meeting in January of 2006 provided an excellent overview of the concept of resilience as it pertains to critical infrastructure.<sup>xx</sup>

**TABLE 4: APPROACHES TO FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY ( INCLUDING PREPAREDNESS FOR NATURAL DISASTERS, WMD AND TERRORIST ATTACKS AND OTHER CATASTROPHIC EVENTS)<sup>xxi</sup>**

<u>Options</u>	<u>Nature of Approach</u>	<u>Basic Stance</u>	<u>Feasibility</u>	<u>Likely Outcomes</u>
Status Quo Approach	Fragmented	Not an all hazards approach	Resources diluted	Large potential attack impacts
All-Hazards Approach	Building on National Response Plan	Dual use emphasis	Resources better used	Improved approach to minimizing potential impacts
A Tiered All-Hazards/Critical Infrastructure Protection and Resilience Approach to Civil and National Security*	Building on the evolving National Response Plan and catastrophic annex and adding a proactive all-hazards/critical infrastructure protection and resilience focus	Multiple use emphasis, including a focus on all aspects of the emergency management cycle**	Resources optimally used	Greater stability/greatest likelihood of minimizing impacts

\* Reflecting a need for planning and implementation that takes into consideration the different requirements for differing levels of severity of emergencies. This approach would including a strong focus on critical infrastructure protection, reliability, resilience, and continuity; societal and economic stability; and civil and national security.

\*\* Including a stronger more comprehensive focus than at present to prevention, mitigation, protection, preparedness, and contingency planning and continuity of operations planning, as well as response and recovery.

**Todd Stewart's Model<sup>xxii</sup>**

Todd Stewart's model is helpful in depicting a comprehensive approach to preventing and responding to potential terrorist-related events. It is also a good model to consider when looking at the traditional emergency management cycle.

## **Paula Gordon's All-Hazards Emergency Management Cycle<sup>xxiii</sup>**

This model is adapted from Todd Stewart's model.

It is also interesting to note that both models would include mitigation.

It is also helpful to note here the landmark study that was completed in December 2005 that demonstrated for the first time using empirical methods acceptable to social scientists that every dollar spent on mitigation resulted in a savings of nearly \$4.<sup>xxiv</sup> Also of note is recent work on the cost/benefit of preparedness.<sup>xxv</sup>

### **The Matrix**

I will be using a kind of comparative analysis to look at wide variety of perspectives that can be found post Katrina. In this analysis, I have tried to identify some key ways in which these perspectives can be seen to differ. A purpose of this analysis is to help shed some possible light on what is behind the differences of perspective and what are the implications of such differences for the future of homeland security and emergency management in this country.

## **I. Comparing and Contrasting Some Differing Perspectives of a Few Actors and Analysts with Regard to a Variety of Parameters**

### **A. The Views of Actors and Analysts**

- Don Kettl's views (as found in Chapter 4, "The Federalism Jumble" of his book **System under Stress ~ Homeland Security and American Politics<sup>xxvi</sup>**)
- The common view points found in the major government after action reports<sup>xxvii</sup>

- Michael Brown's views, including his February 11, 2006 Deposition<sup>xxviii, xxix</sup>
- General Honore's views <sup>xxx, xxxi</sup>
- Stephen Flynn's views (**The Edge of Disaster ~ Rebuilding a Resilient Nation**<sup>xxxii</sup>)
- Paula Gordon's views (see items in the list of recommended readings at the end of this presentation and in the endnotes.)

#### B. Some Parameters to be Used in Comparing and Contrasting the Views of These Actors and Analysts

- 1) Characterization of the individual's general perspective;
- 2) Stance with regard to Paula Gordon's Typology of Emergencies in and assumptions concerning the level of severity of Katrina and what constitutes a catastrophe;
- 3) Stance with regard to Paula Gordon's Homeland Security Impact Scale and perceptions concerning the impacts of Katrina on all key elements of the critical infrastructure near term and long term;
- 4) Capabilities and skills needed by those in various levels of public responsibility and assumptions concerning the capabilities and skills of those involved in Katrina<sup>xxxiii</sup>;
- 5) Views concerning what went wrong and who or what was responsible for what went wrong<sup>xxxiv</sup>,
- 6) Degree of realism in assessing the capacity of any or all levels of government to deal with Katrina;
- 7) Recognition of the existence of a cultural divide between homeland security and emergency management and DHS and FEMA;

- 8) Understanding of the evolving and current status of DHS/FEMA problems;
- 9) Perceptions concerning the nature of the intergovernmental challenges in Katrina;
- 10) Perspectives concerning the suitability of the National Response Plan at the time of Katrina and the suitability of presently planned approaches to a revised NRP to potential catastrophic events in the future;
- 11) Perspectives concerning whether or not the NRP was applicable at the time of Katrina, understanding of the extent to which the NRP was ignored or worked around;
- 12) Assumptions concerning who's in charge or who should be in charge; and
- 13) Views concerning lessons learned and where we go from here.

## **Some Relevant Passages from Don Kettl's Book**

The following quotes are from Don Kettl, in his chapter on "The Federalism Jumble" in **System Under Stress ~ Homeland Security and American Politics**<sup>xxxv</sup>:

### **First Passage:**

"Some analysts decided that the problem was the sheer scale of the storms. It was impossible, they concluded, for any government to prevent it from occurring and, when it caused enormous damage, it was understandable it would take the government some time to respond. There was surely some truth in this argument, but no one found it acceptable. Everyone believed that government could --and should--do better." (from page 78)

### **Second Passage:**

"...Even though FEMA was then (in 2000) an independent agency, problems surfaced in TOPOFF 2000: identifying who was in charge of producing results; ensuring adequate communication; clarifying uncertainty over decisions; and creating effective coordination between federal, state, and local officials. Many of those problems returned in the wake of Katrina. The problems found in TOPOFF 2000 were all fundamentally based in process, not structure. Their roots did not lie in FEMA's structure; changing the structure would not, in itself, have solved them." (from page 77.)

### **Third Passage:**

In many ways, we face a fundamental choice. We can continue to try to force problems into poorly designed organizations. Or

we can try to build organizations nimble enough to respond to a wide variety of problems. If we attempt to force our problems to fit our organizations, the problems will always win. We will face more Katrina-like failures. Our hope lies in building nimble organizations capable of flexible response. We need organizations that can rise to the challenges of the problems we face. (from page 80)

#### **Fourth Passage:**

(Thad Allen) became the coordinator-in-chief of the government's recovery operations, and things began happening. He did not manage by command, although with his military position, his presidential charge, and his bulldog-like demeanor he could have done just that. Rather, he worked hard to establish partnerships among the players to define the mission that had to be met; to identify the contributions of each organization to that mission; and to motivate everyone to contribute their part. That approach quickly began to pay off; it was how the things that got done, in fact, got done. Allen later called this a focus on "unity of effort," instead of "unity of command." (Kitfield, 2006) Results, not control, mattered most. He built the partnerships on the results the region needed, and results were what he got. (from page 81)

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## The Matrix

<b>Actors &amp; Analysts</b>	<b>1) General Perspective</b>	<b>2) Stance re Typology of Emergencies</b>
A) Don Kettl's views	Wide-ranging assessment of DHS/FEMA and Katrina featuring historical and organizational analysis with some emphasis on lessons learned and recommendations concerning some current challenges	Katrina viewed in part as a Large Scale Emergency and in part as an Emergency of Catastrophic Scale
B) Common viewpoints in reports	Less wide-ranging assessment than Kettl's based on a more limited problem definition with less attention to historical and organizational analysis and with different prescriptions for change	Similar to Kettl
C) Michael Brown's views	Realistic assessment of emergency management challenges rooted in comprehensive all hazards approach to emergency management and the emergency management cycle and an understanding of the evolution of emergency management challenges since 9/11	Katrina was an unprecedented Emergency of Catastrophic Scale impacting millions in a 92,000 square mile area
D) General Honore's views	Extremely realistic assessment of emergency management challenges presented by natural catastrophes	Similar to Brown's stance with even greater emphasis on the impact of the failure of all major elements of the critical infrastructure
E) Stephen Flynn's views	An all hazards approach to homeland security and emergency management with a particular emphasis on protection, preparedness, and mitigation	Similar to the stances of Brown and Honore
F) Paula Gordon's views	A comprehensive all hazards approach to homeland security and emergency management based on an analysis of the evolution of emergency management efforts and an analysis of major dimensions of current challenges	Similar to the stance of Brown and Honore
G) Other viewpoints (TBD)		

<b>Actors &amp; Analysts</b>	<b>3) Stance re Homeland Security Impact Scale</b>	<b>4) Capabilities and Skills</b>
A) Don Kettl's views	Likely rating of near term impacts: 5-6 Likely rating of long term impacts: 3	Focus on improving processes, developing capabilities useful for large scale emergencies and "building nimble organizations capable of flexible response" that are needed for larger scale emergencies
B) Common viewpoints in reports	Likely rating of near term impacts: 5 Likely rating of long term impacts: 1-3	Focus on improving logistics coupled along with the need to improve capabilities (primarily those best suited to Large Scale Emergencies)
C) Michael Brown's views	Possible rating of near term impacts: 5-10 Possible rating of long term impacts: 3-5	Focus on the need to improve skills and capabilities across the board, including those involving planning and preparedness
D) General Honore's views	Possible rating of near term impacts: 5-9 Possible rating of long term impacts: 3-4	Honore's Eleven Quick Fixes focus on problem solving skills and proactive approaches that would mitigate impacts
E) Stephen Flynn's views	Likely rating of near term impacts: 7+ Likely rating of long term impacts: 3	Focus on problem solving skills and proactive approaches that would enhance protection and preparedness, mitigate impacts and provide for resiliency
F) Paula Gordon's views	Rating of near term impacts: 7 - 10 Rating of long term impacts: 3 - 6	Focus on the need to enhance capabilities and skills and help increase understanding of challenges and a common sense of mission
G) Other viewpoints (TBD)		

<b>Actors &amp; Analysts</b>	<b>5) What went wrong and who or what was responsible</b>	<b>6) Realistic assessment of govt's capacity</b>
A) Don Kettl's views	Focus on correctable failures of government at all levels and the need for government to improve processes and develop a capability for "flexible response"	More realistic than most
B) Common viewpoints in reports	Focus on the failure of government at all levels, particularly the Federal government, and the need to make organizational changes and significantly improve technology and emergency management processes	Somewhat realistic, but rooted in a definition of the nature and scope of the challenges and of what is needed that is somewhat limited
C) Michael Brown's views	Recognition well before Katrina of the government's failure to be adequately prepared and belief that far more adequate preparation for potential catastrophic events along with a far more viable FEMA pre-Katrina could have made a difference	Far more realistic than most
D) General Honore's views	Recognition of the catastrophic nature of Katrina and focus on dealing as effectively as possible with future challenges	Extremely realistic
E) Stephen Flynn's views	Recognition that the government was not prepared to deal with a catastrophic event and belief that far more adequate preparation and mitigative measures would have made a major difference in dealing with Katrina	Somewhat realistic
F) Paula Gordon's views	Recognition before Katrina of the government's lack of preparation and capabilities needed to deal with catastrophic events and sense that even with more adequate preparation and a more viable FEMA pre- Katrina, government capabilities would still have been overwhelmed owing to the failure of all major elements of the critical infrastructure	Very realistic
G) Other viewpoints (TBD)		

<b>Actors &amp; Analysts</b>	<b>7) Cultural divide between HS &amp; EM, DHS &amp; FEMA</b>	<b>8) Current DHS/FEMA Efforts</b>
A) Don Kettl's views	Some recognition of some aspects of the cultural divide	Appears to be only somewhat aware of the nature and extent of the cleavages within DHS and between DHS and FEMA
B) Common viewpoints in reports	Little recognition of the nature and scope of the cultural divide and how it might be bridged	Far less aware than Kettl of the nature of the cleavages within DHS and between DHS and FEMA
C) Michael Brown's views	Considerable insight into the basis for and the manifestations of the cultural divide (See especially the testimony of Michael Brown and his February 11, 2006 Deposition)	Not apparent the extent to which he may be following current efforts
D) General Honore's views	Far more focused on doing what needs to be done than on analyzing organizational and professional cultural challenges	Not apparent what his interests might be in such matters
E) Stephen Flynn's views	Only some apparent recognition of the nature and implications of the cultural divide	Appears to be only somewhat aware of the nature of the cleavages within DHS and between DHS and FEMA
F) Paula Gordon's views	Significant concurrence with Michael Brown's assessment of the cultural divide with an additional focus on professional and organizational cultures and differences in backgrounds, experience, orientations to public service and knowledge bases	Deep concern about the need to understand and address the cleavages within and between DHS and FEMA and deal with the multiple and conflicting definitions of homeland security as well as an all hazards approach to homeland security
G) Other viewpoints (TBD)		

<b>Actors &amp; Analysts</b>	<b>9) Intergovernmental challenges of Katrina</b>	<b>10) Suitability of the National Response Plan (NRP) for Katrina</b>
A) Don Kettl's views	Viewed largely in terms of the need to make significant changes in process	Not addressed in his book, only mentioned in passing on page 69
B) Common viewpoints in reports	Reflective of varying views concerning what the nature of relations should be between Federal, State, and local entities, particularly in a worst case catastrophe	The NRP was not sufficient (The relevance to catastrophes of the yet to be completed revised version remains to be seen.)
C) Michael Brown's views	Unable using best efforts to develop effective working relationships with State and local governments in Louisiana	The NRP was not suitable for Katrina.
D) General Honore's views	Was freer than Michael Brown to develop effective working relationships in that he was not constrained in the same ways that Brown was	Not a matter addressed directly but some recommendations for changes can be found in his list of Eleven Quick Fixes
E) Stephen Flynn's views	Only addressed in a general way	While the NRP does not appear to be a major focus of Flynn's concerns. the NRP would need to be revised if his recommendations were to be implemented.
F) Paula Gordon's views	Multi-dimensional challenges noted including the need for all levels of government to recognize the significance of a catastrophic event; to define the roles of different levels of government in a catastrophic event; to recognize and address the unresolved organizational and professional cultural clashes, including at the Federal level; to develop a clear understanding of the responsibility of the Federal government when other levels of government are effectively overwhelmed; and develop good working relationships amongst all levels of government	The NRP was not sufficient; the catastrophic annex which had not been implemented during Katrina was not likely to have been sufficient had it been implemented. How relevant the revised version of the NRP will be to catastrophes remains to be seen.
G) Other viewpoints (TBD)		

<b>Actors &amp; Analysts</b>	<b>11) The NRP at the time of Katrina &amp; the extent to which it was used</b>	<b>12) Who's in charge &amp; who should be</b>
A) Don Kettl's views	Kettl does not appear to recognize that the version of the NRP in place at the time of Katrina was "worked around" and not fully implemented and that it would have been impossible to implement that version of the NRP since it is not possible to "manage" an emergency the magnitude of Katrina using prescriptions that are inapplicable to catastrophic events	Dealt with in very general terms
B) Common viewpoints in reports	The authors of the earliest published reports do not appear to recognize that the version of the NRP in place at the time of Katrina was "worked around" and not fully implemented and that it would have been impossible to implement that version of the NRP since it is not possible to "manage" an emergency the magnitude of Katrina using prescriptions that are inapplicable to catastrophic events	Question of when the military should be involved in catastrophic events raised and discussed. Plans concerning how potentially catastrophic events are to be handled in the future are as yet unclear
C) Michael Brown's views	Brown decided to work around the NRP based on his perception that the August 2005 version of the NRP was inapplicable in a catastrophic event (For specifics see Michael Brown's February 11, 2006 Deposition)	The military should be called out to deal with a catastrophic event
D) General Honore's views	The NRP was not apparently a primary concern of General Honore's perhaps owing to the fact that he had considerable flexibility to do what needed to be done to save lives and protect property	Apparent recognition that the military should be called out to deal with a catastrophic event
E) Stephen Flynn's views	The NRP and the role that it played (or failed to play in Katrina) does not appear to be dealt with in Flynn's book	Need for the assumption of responsibility at all levels including the grassroots level
F) Paula Gordon's views	Gordon sensed that Brown did what he felt he had to do and that sticking to the letter and spirit of the NRP would have undermined rather than assisted his efforts and the efforts of the Federal government in dealing with Katrina	The need to engage the military in preparing for and responding to catastrophic events while using the general guidelines noted in the Typology of Emergencies
G) Other viewpoints (TBD)		

<b>Actors &amp; Analysts</b>	<b>13) Views concerning lessons learned and where we go from here</b>	
A) Don Kettl's views	Kettl notes some lessons learned, but does not appear to be fully cognizant of the constraints to progress that exist or the strategies that might prove helpful in dealing with those constraints	
B) Common viewpoints in reports	While many lessons learned have been noted in the reports, many lessons appear to have been missed, possibly owing in part to the failure of the authors to recognize how a major catastrophe differs from a major disaster or "Large Scale Emergency." In addition the authors do not seem to be fully cognizant of the constraints to progress or of the strategies that might prove helpful in dealing with those constraints.	
C) Michael Brown's views	Brown's chief lessons learned which he noted in a January 18, 2006 presentation are that he should have been totally up front with the public concerning gravity of Katrina and that he should have demanded that the military be brought in far earlier than he did.	
D) General Honore's views	General Honore's list of "Eleven Quick Fixes" was incorporated in the White House after action report on Katrina. His views are potentially very helpful, but would be more helpful if more individuals understood what he is saying about the differences between a major disaster and a catastrophe.	
E) Stephen Flynn's views	Flynn is extraordinarily insightful concerning the lessons that need to be learned and applied especially concerning protection, prevention, preparedness, and mitigation. His arguments for the need to increase the resilience of the critical infrastructure have the potential for being extremely persuasive if small "p", political considerations were to give way to a revised national agenda that gives due importance to preparedness, resilience and homeland security.	
F) Paula Gordon's views	Gordon largely concurs with Flynn regarding the need for a comprehensive set of strategies that need to be implemented to help ensure a prepared and resilient nation.	
G) Other viewpoints (TBD)		

## **Some Questions to Consider**

- 1) Using the matrix described in the presentation, what are the most notable ways in which Kettl's perspectives and the perspectives of others differ?
- 2) Using Gordon's Typology of Emergencies, how would you characterize the impact of Hurricane Katrina and how would you characterize Kettl's perspective and the perspectives of others?
- 3) Using Gordon's Homeland Security Impact Scale, how would you characterize the immediate impacts of Katrina? How would you characterize the long term impacts of Katrina? How do Kettl and others appear to characterize the immediate and long term impacts of Katrina?
- 4) Of the perspectives of the actors and analysts described in the presentation, which come the closest to your own? How would you characterize your own perspective using a similar set of parameters?

I have shared with you a newly developed matrix that examined a variety of different perspectives of these different actors and analysts in light of thirteen different parameters. My intent in creating this matrix was to develop a way of readily comparing and contrasting the

perspectives of a variety of actors and analysts. In this way, we may well be able to deepen our own individual and unique understandings of these different perspectives and of the implications of these perspectives for the future. We can do this whether we agree or not on the depiction of the various perspectives. At the same time this approach to comparative analysis may help those studying it glean some insights into some impediments to the nation's homeland security and emergency management efforts. The matrix may also suggest some possible ways of improving these efforts. The analysis also suggests a way of helping those in roles of responsibility at all levels of government develop their understanding along with the capabilities and skills that they need to contribute in the most useful ways possible to the nation's homeland security and emergency management efforts.

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## Recommended Materials for Reading and Viewing

- 1) Michael Brown Keynote Address before an annual meteorological conference at Mammoth Lakes, California, January 18, 2006. Video can be viewed at <http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/id/153798>
- 2) Michael Brown's February 11, 2006 Deposition before the US House of Representatives Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Washington, D.C. You can find this deposition online at <http://katrina.house.gov/> . Click on "Michael Brown Deposition" which appears as a part of the following entry midway down the page: Thursday, March 16, 2006, Select Committee releases February 11, 2006 transcript: Michael Brown Deposition.
- 3) General Russel L. Honore, the Commander of Joint Task Force Katrina, presentation before the Houston Forum on "Hurricane Katrina Military Response" on February 13, 2006. View at <http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/id/155435>.
- 4) Susan B. Glasser and Michael Grunwald, "Department's Mission Was Undermined From Start" by **Washington Post** Staff Writers, December 22, 2005 ([http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/21/AR2005122102327\\_pf.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/21/AR2005122102327_pf.html) ) .
- 5) Michael Grunwald and Susan B. Glasser, "Brown's Turf Wars Sapped FEMA's Strength: Director Who Came to Symbolize Incompetence in Katrina Predicted Agency Would Fail" by, **Washington Post** Staff Writers, December 23, 2005 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/22/AR2005122202213.html?nav=hcmodule> )
- 6) Paula D. Gordon, "Comparative Scenario and Options Analysis: Important Tools for Agents of Change Post 9/11 and Post Hurricane Katrina," **Homeland**

**Security Review**, Vol. 1 No. 2, 2006. See <http://gordonhomeland.com> or <http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/optionsAnalysis.html>.

- 7) Paula D. Gordon, Typology of Emergencies (in "Comparative Scenario and Options Analysis: Important Tools for Agents of Change Post 9/11 and Post Hurricane Katrina," **Homeland Security Review**, Vol. 1 No. 2 , 2006. See <http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/optionsAnalysis.html> or see link at <http://gordonhomeland.com> .
  
- 8) Paula D. Gordon, "Thoughts about Katrina: Responses to Two Questions about Hurricane Katrina and America's Resilience" December 1, 2005 (The Forum on Building America's Resilience to Hazards, held December 19-21, 2005, was sponsored by The American Meteorological Society in collaboration with The Space Enterprise Council of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. All invited attendees were asked to submit responses to any or all of four questions prior to the Forum. These are the author's responses to two of the questions.) <http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/katrina.html> or see link at <http://gordonhomeland.com>
  
- 9) Paula D. Gordon, Part 6 of "Improving Homeland Security & Critical Infrastructure Protection and Continuity Efforts": "The Homeland Security Impact Scale: An Alternative Approach to Assessing Homeland Security and Critical Infrastructure Protection Efforts and a Frame of Reference for Understanding and Addressing Current Challenges" See <http://gordonhomeland.com> or <http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/hscipreport.pdf> . For Part 6, see <http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/thehomelandsecurityimpactscale.htm> .
  
- 10) Paula D. Gordon, "Capabilities and Skills Needed by Those in New Roles of Responsibility for Homeland Security at the State and Local Levels of Government." See link at <http://gordonhomeland.com> or see <http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/CapabilitiesAndSkillsNeeded.html> . Also published in the **PA TIMES**, Vol. 28, Issue 3, March 2005 (a publication of the American Society for Public Administration).

- 11) Paula D. Gordon, "Transforming and Leading Organizations," **Government Transformation**, Winter 2004-05 issue. (Also posted at <http://gordonhomeland.com> and [http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/transforming\\_orgs.pdf](http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/transforming_orgs.pdf) .)
- 12) Stephen Flynn, **The Edge of Disaster: Rebuilding a Resilient Nation** Random House, New York, 2007.
- 13) Stephen Flynn speaking on his book **The Edge of Disaster** at the Houston World Affairs Council, March 27, 2007. See video at <http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/197358-1> .
- 14) May 2010 National Security Strategy  
( <http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/homeland-security> and [http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss\\_viewer/national\\_security\\_strategy.pdf](http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf) ).
- 15) John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, "Securing the Homeland by Renewing American Strength, Resilience, and Values," CSIS Statesmen's Forum video OR transcript: Wednesday, May 26, 2010 ( [http://csis.org/files/attachments/100526\\_csis-brennan.pdf](http://csis.org/files/attachments/100526_csis-brennan.pdf) or see event transcript at the same URL ).
- 16) Newt Gingrich: [America at Risk: Camus, National Security, and Afghanistan](#) , on the threat of radical Islamists. American Enterprise Institution, Thursday, July 29, 2010 ( <http://www.aei.org/audio> or <http://www.aei.org/video/101267> ). (URL for the Resources that Newt Gingrich quoted from and some of the quotes in his presentation: <http://www.aei.org/docLib/America%20at%20Risk%20-%20July%2029-%202010%20Event%20Materials.pdf> .)
- 17) Walid Phares, author of **The War of Ideas: Jihadism against Democracy** and **Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies against the West**, presentation at the Heritage Foundation, February 27, 2007. A copy of the video on "The War of Ideas" can be viewed online at <http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/197185-1> .

- 18) Walid Phares, "Education Versus Jihad". This article provides a discussion of radical extremism and how it has come to be that this subject has not been adequately taught in institutions of higher learning in America. See [www.basicsproject.org/reports/education\\_versus\\_jihad\\_by\\_walid\\_phares.pdf](http://www.basicsproject.org/reports/education_versus_jihad_by_walid_phares.pdf) .
- 19) Obsession the Movie: <http://www.obsessionthemovie.com>
- ~ The trailer for "Obsession the Movie" at <http://www.obsessionthemovie.com/clips.html>
  - ~ The Culture of Jihad (1:26) How Jihad is taught and praised in Arab classrooms.
  - ~ The Media Of Terrorism (1:33)  
How a pervasive, propaganda-based Arab media teaches hatred to adults and children alike.
  - ~ Hitler & The Mufti (0:56)  
The historic links between the Nazi leader and radical Islamic ideology.
  - ~ "The War Against The West (1:40)  
Radical Islam is waging a war against western culture and Judeo-Christian values.
- 20) Randall J. Larsen speaking at the National Defense University about his book **Our Own Worst Enemy ~ Asking the Right Questions About Security to Protect You, Your Family, and America**, published by Grand Central Publishing January 28, 2008 ( <http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/203311-1> ).
- 21) Claire B. Rubin, President, Claire B. Rubin & Associates, 4/9/08 Transcript of Forum Presentation: **Emergency Management: The American Experience, 1900 – 2005** ( <http://www.emforum.org/vlibrary/all.htm> ).
- 22) Paula D. Gordon, "Pre- and Post-9/11 Perspectives: Understanding and Teaching about Differences in These Perspectives," Presentation, 4th Annual Homeland Defense and Security Education Summit, Washington, DC, February 24 -25, 2010. (<http://GordonPost9-11.com> ) .

- 23) Donald F. Kettl, " in **System under Stress ~ Homeland Security and American Politics**, CQ Press; 2 edition (January 1, 2007) See especially Chapter 4, "The Federalism Jumble."
- 24) Lt. Gen. Russel Honoré (U.S. Army Ret) and Ron Martz, **Survival: How a Culture of Preparedness Can Save You and Your Family from Disasters**, Simon & Schuster, May 5, 2009, ISBN-10: 1416599002 ISBN-13:978-1416599005. (Any chapter.)
- 25) Paula D. Gordon, "Recommendations for Presidential Candidates for Improving the Nation's Homeland Security Efforts," an interview for the public radio program "Homeland Security: Inside & Out" aired April 29, 2008. Posted at <http://gordonhomeland.com>.
- 26) Paula D. Gordon, "The Different Nature of Terrorism and Terrorist Threats Post 9/11 and the Implications of These Differences": <http://gordonhomeland.com> or <http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/thedifferentnatureofterrorism.htm> .
- 27) Meher Baba, "Violence and Non-Violence" in the **Discourses**, 6th Edition Accessible online on page 100 of Volume 1 at <http://discoursesbymeherbaba.org/v1-100.php> .

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### Endnotes

<sup>i</sup> See slide on Bertram Gross' concepts of narrow and broad rationality in Paula D. Gordon, "Recognizing and Addressing Problems of Scientific and Technological Complexity" at <http://gordonhomeland.com> .

<sup>ii</sup> For a fuller discussion of this analytic tool, see Alexander George "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decisionmaking." *International Studies Quarterly* 13 (June 1969):190-222.

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<sup>iii</sup> Based on a typology developed by Bertram Gross in **Organizations and Their Managing**. New York: The Free Press. 1968. Also see Paula D. Gordon, "Recognizing and Addressing Problems of Scientific and Technological Complexity," Poster presentation prepared for the Association for Enterprise Integration (AFEI) Enterprise Integration EXPO 2003 (September 23-25, 2003). See <http://gordonhomeland.com> .

<sup>iv</sup> Bertram Gross, **Organizations and Their Managing**. New York: The Free Press. 1968

<sup>v</sup> Ibid.

<sup>vi</sup> These matters are also discussed in Paula D. Gordon, "Transforming and Leading Organizations," **Government Transformation**, Winter 2004-05 issue. (Also posted at <http://gordonhomeland.com> and [http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/transforming\\_orgs.pdf](http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/transforming_orgs.pdf) .

<sup>vii</sup> Paula D. Gordon, "Recognizing and Addressing Problems of Scientific and Technological Complexity," [http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/problems\\_scientific.html](http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/problems_scientific.html) or use link at <http://gordonhomeland.com> .

<sup>viii</sup> Paula D. Gordon, "Transforming and Leading Organizations," ob.cit.

<sup>ix</sup> Irving Janis' concept of Groupthink (including how to prevent groupthink) [http://www.valuebasedmanagement.net/methods\\_janis\\_groupthink.html](http://www.valuebasedmanagement.net/methods_janis_groupthink.html) .

<sup>x</sup> Solomon Asch's "Opinions and Social Pressure" at <http://www.panarchy.org/asch/social.pressure.1955.html> .

<sup>xi</sup> Felix A. Nigro and Lloyd G. Nigro, "Seven Common Errors in Decision Making" in **Modern Public Administration** (Harper Collins, New York, 1984). Also see James Thompson's Definition of Bureaupathology as discussed in Paula D. Gordon, "Transforming and Leading Organizations," **Government Transformation**, Winter 2004-05 issue. (Also posted at <http://gordonhomeland.com> and [http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/transforming\\_orgs.pdf](http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/transforming_orgs.pdf) .

<sup>xii</sup> James Thompson as discussed by Gerald E. Caiden, **The Dynamics of Public Administration**, New York, Holt, Reinhart, and Winston, Inc. 1971, p. 8.

<sup>xiii</sup> Ibid.

<sup>xiv</sup> Paula D. Gordon, "Comparative Scenario and Options Analysis: Important Tools for Agents of Change Post 9/11 and Post Hurricane Katrina," **Homeland Security Review**, Vol. 1 No. 2, 2006. See <http://gordonhomeland.com> or <http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/optionsAnalysis.html>.

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<sup>xv</sup> Ibid.

<sup>xvi</sup> Paula D. Gordon, Part 6: "The Homeland Security Impact Scale: An Alternative Approach to Assessing Homeland Security and Critical Infrastructure Protection Efforts and a Frame of Reference for Understanding and Addressing Current Challenges"  
<http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/thehomelandsecurityimpactscale.htm> (from Paula D. Gordon, **Improving Homeland Security & Critical Infrastructure Protection and Continuity Efforts**. See <http://gordonhomeland.com> or <http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/hscipreport.pdf>.)

<sup>xvii</sup> Paula D. Gordon, An Expanded Version of a June 5, 2008 Presentation Given at the FEMA Higher Education Conference, Emmitsburg, Maryland As Modified July 12, 2009 "Integrating Homeland Security into Emergency Management Courses: Some Grounding Concepts and Some Suggested Materials and Approaches." See <http://gordonhomeland.com> .

<sup>xviii</sup> Ibid.

<sup>xix</sup> Stephen Flynn, **The Edge of Disaster**, Random House, New York, 2007. Also see presentation on his book at the Houston World Affairs Council, March 27, 2007. See video at <http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/197358-1> .

<sup>xx</sup> Critical Infrastructure Task Force Report. Washington, DC: Homeland Security Advisory Council, January 2006 (50 pages). Accessed at: [www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/HSAC\\_CITF\\_Report\\_v2.pdf](http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/HSAC_CITF_Report_v2.pdf)

<sup>xxi</sup> From Paula D. Gordon, "Comparative Scenario and Options Analysis: Important Tools for Agents of Change Post 9/11 and Post Hurricane Katrina," ob.cit.

<sup>xxii</sup> Todd Stewart's model (as adapted) can be found in Paula D. Gordon, An Expanded Version of a June 5, 2008 Presentation Given at the FEMA Higher Education Conference, Emmitsburg, Maryland As Modified July 12, 2009 "Integrating Homeland Security into Emergency Management Courses: Some Grounding Concepts and Some Suggested Materials and Approaches." See <http://gordonhomeland.com> .

<sup>xxiii</sup> Paula D. Gordon's model can be found at Paula D. Gordon, An Expanded Version of a June 5, 2008 Presentation Given at the FEMA Higher Education Conference, Emmitsburg, Maryland As Modified July 12, 2009 "Integrating Homeland Security into Emergency Management Courses: Some Grounding Concepts and Some Suggested Materials and Approaches." See <http://gordonhomeland.com> .

<sup>xxiv</sup> Mitigation Cost/Benefit Analysis: Natural Hazard Mitigation Saves: An Independent Study to Assess the Future Savings from Mitigation Activities. "On

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December 19, 2005, the National Institute of Building Sciences (NIBS) released a ground-breaking report on mitigation and its benefits. A major finding of the report is that for every dollar that FEMA spent in mitigation grants over a several year period ending in 2003, there was a nearly 4 to 1 savings for every dollar spent. In addition to savings to society, the federal treasury can redirect an average of \$3.65 for each dollar spent on mitigation as a result of disaster relief costs and tax losses avoided". A conclusion in the report was that by focusing more attention on mitigation communities will be more "physically, socially, and economically resilient in coping with future hazard impacts." The report can be found at [http://www.nibs.org/MMC/MitigationSavingsReport/natural\\_hazard\\_mitigation\\_saves.htm](http://www.nibs.org/MMC/MitigationSavingsReport/natural_hazard_mitigation_saves.htm) (Or use <http://www.nibs.org/> and click on Multihazard Mitigation Council. That will take you to active links to the report.)

<sup>xxv</sup> Preparedness Cost/Benefit Analysis: Andrew Healy and Neil Malhotra (2009). "Myopic Voters and Natural Disaster Policy," **American Political Science Review**, 103(3) 2009 Abstract: Do voters effectively hold elected officials accountable for policy decisions? Using data on natural disasters, government spending, and election returns, we show that voters reward the incumbent presidential party for delivering disaster relief spending but not for investing in disaster preparedness spending. These inconsistencies distort the incentives of public officials, leading the government to under invest in disaster preparedness, thereby causing substantial public welfare losses. We estimate that a dollar spent on preparedness is worth about fifteen dollars in terms of the future damage it mitigates. By estimating both the determinants of policy decisions and the consequences of those policies, we provide more complete evidence about citizen competence and government accountability. (For further information, contact Andrew J. Healy: [ahealy@lmu.edu](mailto:ahealy@lmu.edu).)

<sup>xxvi</sup> Donald F. Kettl, " in **System under Stress ~ Homeland Security and American Politics**, CQ Press; 2 edition (January 1, 2007) See especially Chapter 4, "The Federalism Jumble."

<sup>xxvii</sup> Major after action reports included **The White House Report: The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned** was released on February 23, 2006. The report identifies 17 key lessons learned, 125 specific recommendations for the Administration and 11 critical action steps that should be taken before the start of the 2006 Hurricane Season. A full summary of the report can be accessed at <http://library.stmarytx.edu/acadlib/edocs/katrinawh.pdf> . Other reports of note were also forthcoming from the Government Accountability Office, the Congressional Research Service, major committees of Congress, DHS, and FEMA.

<sup>xxviii</sup> Michael Brown Keynote Address before an annual meteorological conference at Mammoth Lakes, California, January 18, 2006. Video can be viewed at <http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/id/153798>

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<sup>xxix</sup> Michael Brown's February 11, 2006 Deposition before the US House of Representatives Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Washington, D.C. You can find this deposition online at <http://katrina.house.gov/> . Click on "Michael Brown Deposition" which appears as a part of the following entry midway down the page: Thursday, March 16, 2006, Select Committee releases February 11, 2006 transcript: Michael Brown Deposition.

<sup>xxx</sup> Lt. Gen. Russel L. Honore, the Commander of Joint Task Force Katrina, presentation before the Houston Forum on "Hurricane Katrina Military Response" on February 13, 2006. View at <http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/id/155435>.

<sup>xxxii</sup> Lt. Gen. Russel Honoré (U.S. Army Ret) and Ron Martz, **Survival: How a Culture of Preparedness Can Save You and Your Family from Disasters**, Simon & Schuster, May 5, 2009, ISBN-10: 1416599002 ISBN-13:978-1416599005. (Any chapter.)

<sup>xxxiii</sup> Stephen Flynn, **The Edge of Disaster**, Random House, New York, 2007. Also see presentation on his book at the Houston World Affairs Council, March 27, 2007. See video at <http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/197358-1> .

<sup>xxxiiii</sup> Paula D. Gordon, "Capabilities and Skills Needed by Those in New Roles of Responsibility for Homeland Security at the State and Local Levels of Government." See link at <http://gordonhomeland.com> or see <http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/CapabilitiesAndSkillsNeeded.html> . Also published in the **PA TIMES**, Vol. 28, Issue 3, March 2005 (a publication of the American Society for Public Administration).

<sup>xxxv</sup> See the following:

- Donald F. Kettl, " in **System under Stress ~ Homeland Security and American Politics**, ob.cit.;
- Michael Brown Keynote Address before an annual meteorological conference at Mammoth Lakes, California, January 18, 2006, ob.cit.
- Michael Brown's February 11, 2006 Deposition before the US House of Representatives Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Washington, D.C., ob.cit.
- Lt. Gen. Russel L. Honore, the Commander of Joint Task Force Katrina, presentation before the Houston Forum on "Hurricane Katrina Military Response" on February 13, 2006, ob.cit.

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- Lt. Gen. Russel Honoré (U.S. Army Ret) and Ron Martz, **Survival: How a Culture of Preparedness Can Save You and Your Family from Disasters**, ob.cit.
  - Stephen Flynn, **The Edge of Disaster**, Random House, New York, 2007. Also see presentation on his book at the Houston World Affairs Council, March 27, 2007. See video at <http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/197358-1> .
  - Paula D. Gordon, "Thoughts about Katrina: Responses to Two Questions about Hurricane Katrina and America's Resilience" December 1, 2005 (The Forum on Building America's Resilience to Hazards, held December 19-21, 2005, was sponsored by The American Meteorological Society in collaboration with The Space Enterprise Council of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. All invited attendees were asked to submit responses to any or all of four questions prior to the Forum. These are the author's responses to two of the questions.) <http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/katrina.html> or see link at <http://gordonhomeland.com>, ob.cit.

<sup>xxxv</sup> Donald F. Kettl, " in **System under Stress ~ Homeland Security and American Politics**, ob.cit.