



**ISA Delhi Section**

*Setting the Standard for Automation™*


# Secured & Safe Plant Automation

By Phoenix Contact

ISA-D: “Fertiliser , Food and Pharma Symposium-2022”

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**May I introduce myself?**



**Valmik Suryavanshi**

**Business Development Head**

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**Mobile: +91 – 9158000672**



# Headquarters and Competence Center



Headquarters Blomberg/Germany



Group Center of Competence, Harrisburg/USA



Innovation Center Electronics, Bad Pyrmont/Germany



Group Center of Competence, Nanjing/China


# Many years of experience

# Development from 1923 to today

**1923**  
Foundation in Essen




**1966**  
Company headquarters established in Blomberg



**1981**  
Onwards: First foreign subsidiaries



**Today**  
Located all over the world



**1928**  
The RWE terminal block



**1967**  
Strip terminal blocks



**1977, 1982 und 1983**  
Plug-in relay terminal  
PCB terminal blocks  
Surge protection



**1987**  
INTERBUS –  
serial fieldbus  
system



**2005**  
Safety



**Push-in Technology**  
Designed by PHOENIX CONTACT


**PLCnext Technology**  
Designed by PHOENIX CONTACT

# Current Trends & Challenges

## Connected Devices





APL



IEC 62443



NOA



Cloud Computing

ISO 27001



## Cyber attacks have arrived in reality



**#1** Corporate risk (worldwide)

Source: Allianz AG risk barometer

**68%** of industrial companies in Germany have already fallen victim to cyber attacks.


Source : VDMA

**59%** of these attacks lead to production losses

Source : VDMA

## Cyber attacks as corporate risk #1

„68% of industrial companies in Germany have already fallen victim to cyber attacks.“ (VDMA)




### TOP 3 threats in the ICS environment:

1. Infiltration of malware via removable media and external hardware
2. Infection with malware via the Internet and intranet
3. Human misconduct and sabotage

# Threat situation

Online cyber attacks ([Kaspersky Cyberthreat real-time map](https://www.kaspersky.com/cyberthreat-real-time-map))



Source: [www.sicherheitstacho.eu](http://www.sicherheitstacho.eu)

Can you access my control via the www?

<https://www.shodan.io/>

entry

185.43.16.53  
185.43.16.53 ip2095.fastwebnet.it  
Arpitel s.r.l.  
Added on 2021-02-15 06:14:07 GMT  
Italy, Foggia

HTTP/1.0 200 OK  
Server: Phoenix-Contact/1.02 (powered by SpiderControl TH)  
X-HitCounter: 397468  
Connection: close  
Content-Type: text/html  
Content-Length: 3957

84.151.237.92

p5497edbc.dip0.kipconnect.de  
Deutsche Telekom AG  
Added on 2021-02-15 15:32:37 GMT  
Germany, Lemgo


HTTP/1.0 404 Not Found  
Server: Phoenix-Contact/1.02 (powered by SpiderControl TH)  
X-HitCounter: 40642  
Cache-Control: no-cache  
Pragma: no-cache  
Expires: Mon, 01 Jan 1990 00:00:00 GMT  
Connection: close  
Content-Type: text/plain

## SANS ICS Cyber Kill Chain

Adaptation / extension of the Cyber Kill Chain <sup>TM</sup>  
SANS Institute (SysAdmin, Networking, Security)

Two main stages

- Intrusion:  
Typically, an attack on classic IT, analogous to the Cyber Kill Chain <sup>TM</sup>
- ICS Attack:  
Targeted to OT / IACS systems and components, usually requiring in-depth knowledge of the target IACS environment



Source: SANS

## Effects of a security incident on automation systems

### Production stops

What are the recovery costs?

### Loss of know-how & sensitive data

Can the damage be quantified economically?


### Loss of image

Is your reputation being questioned by partners and customers?

### Blackmail with ransomware

What are the costs of reconstructing the data?





## DIGITAL FACTORY NOW

# The Digital Factory toolbox

Data collection,  
storage & evaluation

Data  
security

- Securely networked production
- Secure machine/ SKIDs integration
- Security evaluation
- Manipulation detection

Data  
transportation

Data  
usage

# The differences between information (IT) and operation technology (OT)

## Information Technology



Confidentiality



Integrity



Availability

≠

## Operation Technology




Availability



Integrity



Confidentiality



ISO 27000

Information security management systems – Requirements

Factory backbone network

Production network


Machine network

IEC 62443

INDUSTRIAL NETWORK AND SYSTEM SECURITY

# ICS-Security<sup>1</sup> vs. IT-Security

Different priorities of the protection goals



<sup>1</sup> ICS Security = Industrial Control Systems Security

# IIoT meets Security meets Functional Safety!



- PLCnext Control: AXC F 1152, 2152 and 3152
- PLC extension modul: AXC F XT SPLC 1000
- Safety Controller: RFC 4072S

"The example of PLCnext Control shows how safety and security goals can be achieved in one product by cleverly dovetailing safety- and security-related tasks in the development process. Therefore, the product can be certified for both safety and security," adds Enrico Seidel, Senior OT-Security Expert at TÜV SÜD.



# Security evaluation

## Plant shutdown

- What are the downtime and recovery costs?

## Loss of know-how & sensitive data

- Can the damage be quantified economically?

## Loss of image

- Is your reputation being questioned by partners and customers?

## Blackmail with ransomware

- What are the costs of reconstructing the data?



Start now with the implementation of a holistic security concept according to IEC 62443 from Phoenix Contact.

Digital Factory | Data Security | Security evaluation

## **Security evaluation – Benefits for everyone**

- ✓ Secure your production against unauthorized access and cyber attacks
- ✓ By creating a holistic concept in form of a blueprint you will learn more about industrial communication in your production
- ✓ By Implementation and Verification of the concept you are not longer careless.
- ✓ The blueprint can be used as a template for future production expansion



# Design of a security concept for automation solutions

**Starting point:**  
customer system information

**Procedure:**  
Design of a security strategy for automation solutions


**Result:**  
Holistic security strategy



## The procedure in detail (1/9)

### Activities

- Determination of the operational environment
- Determination of the assets with all the information necessary to create an asset list
- Definition of the network infrastructure
- Determination of the processes in the production plant.
- Definition of which information / data and communication relationships are worth protecting



# PLCnext Technology

Designed by PHOENIX CONTACT



PLCnext Control



PLCnext Engineer



PLCnext Store



PLCnext Community



Brief overview



Competitive Advantages



PLCnext Control



OPC UA



Redundancy



Functional Safety



Edge Computing



Artificial Intelligence



Security



PLCnext Engineer



PLCnext Store



PLCnext Community

# PLCnext Technology Slides Pool

PLCnext Technology – Status November 2022



Brief  
overview

Competitive  
Advantages

PLCnext  
Control

OPC UA

Redundancy

Functional  
Safety

Edge  
Computing

Artificial  
Intelligence


Security

PLCnext  
Engineer


PLCnext  
Store

PLCnext  
Community

# The open ecosystem for limitless automation




**Safety**  
with PLCnext Control




PLCnext Control

Discover flexible automation

# The open ecosystem for limitless automation




**Safety**  
with PLCnext Control



PLCnext Control

Discover flexible automation

# PLCnext Control Extension SPLC 1000



The image shows a yellow PLCnext Control Extension SPLC 1000 device. The device is a vertical, rectangular unit with a yellow casing. It features a top section with a display and buttons, and a bottom section with a terminal block. The text on the device includes "PLCnext Control Extension AXC F XT SPLC 1000", "Safety", "Old No. 1198911", and "P C RUN PS". To the left of the device are three white chevrons pointing right. To the right of the device are six icons representing technical specifications: a heart for core, a tree for number of devices, a thermometer for temperature, a horizontal line for width, a ribbon for approvals, and a 'C' for C functions.

| Core          | # of Profisafe devices | Temperature  |
|---------------|------------------------|--------------|
| 2 x Cortex M4 | 32                     | -25°C - 60°C |
| Width         | Approvals              | C Functions  |
| 45mm          | UL, CUL, etc           | Reloadable   |

PLCnext Extension AXC F XT SPLC 1000

# PLCnext Control RFC 4072S




The image shows the PLCnext Control RFC 4072S device, a compact industrial PLC. It features a color touchscreen display with a graphical user interface showing various control elements like 'Safety PLC', 'DPC I/O', 'PW Controller', and 'PW Device'. The device has a rugged, grey metal enclosure with various ports and connectors on the front panel.

| Core   | Random Access Memory  | Temperature  |
|--|---|--|
| <br><b>Intel i5 6300U 2 x 2,4 GHz processor</b>      | <br><b>4 GB DDR 4 dual channel RAM</b>                   | <br><b>0°C up to 55°C with fan</b>            |
| <b># control tasks (IEC 61131)</b><br><br><b>32</b> | <b>Min. cycle time (IEC 61131)</b><br><br><b>0,5 ms</b> | <b>Security</b><br><br><b>TPM integrated</b> |



# PLCnext Control BPC 9102S



|   |  |  |
|---|--|--|
| <br><b>Core</b><br><b>Octa-Core Intel Core i7-10700TE</b> | <br><b>Random Access Memory</b><br><b>16 GB DDR 4 RAM</b> | <br><b>Temperature</b><br><b>-20°C up to 60°C</b> |
| <br><b># control tasks (IEC 61131)</b><br><b>128</b>     | <br><b>Min. cycle time (IEC 61131)</b><br><b>0,5 ms</b>  | <br><b>Security</b><br><b>TPM integrated</b>     |

## PLCnext Safety Extension AXC F XT SPLC 1000


- Scalable PLCnext Safety Control
- Reloadable C-Functions, e.g.
  - Complex safety algorithm
  - Safety Machine Learning
  - Automatic certification
- Adaptable Safety Communication, e.g.
  - OPC UA Safety (M2M)
  - PROFIsafe (M2D)
  - Vendor specific
- Approvals
  - SIL3, PL<sub>e</sub>
  - UL (Hazloc), CUL
  - IEC Ex, ATEX



- Scalable PLCnext Control
- Open ecosystem for limitless automation
- IEC 61131-3, C, C++, C#, Matlab
- OPC UA, MQTT, ...
- Open communication standards
- Security by design
- Built-in cloud connectivity

PLCnext Technology - Scalable Safety PLC


## AXC F XT SPLC 1000 – Modular Safety PLC



- Decentralized Small Safe PLC
- Connectable to PLCnext Controls as extension Modul
- Supported Safety Protocols:
  - PROFIsafe V2.61 (32 instances)
- Connectable to higher-layer SPLC as F-Device and via new OPC UA Safety Protocol



# Safety and Standard communication in one Network




## Fully integrated Safety programming

- TÜV Rheinland certified according to IEC 61508
- Editor with common behavior as known from standard FBD or LD editors
- Low Variability Language support
- Network granular CRC checksums
- PROFIsafe Support




# Safety integrated



# Functional Safety Integration

## Safety Integrated




### Fully integrated Safety

- Safety integrated (programming, hardware configuration)
- Consistent usability
- SIL 3 / PL e
- Separate Safety PLC
  - 2 channel architecture
- Profisafe Host/ / Device integrated



Standard and safety programming in one engineering software

# PLCnext Engineer




## Fully integrated Safety programming

- TÜV Rheinland certified according to IEC 61508
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- PROFIsafe Support



Standard and safety programming in one engineering software

## PLCnext Engineer




### Fully integrated Safety programming


- Individual safety functions can be protected by a verification function
- Background signal path analysis
- Background safe semantic analysis
- Diversely-redundant code generator



# PLCnext Control according to the standard IEC 62443



## Effects of Security Incidents on Production Facilities



### Plant downtime

Due to security problems, production has to be stopped for hours or days. What are the costs of such a production downtime?

### Loss of know-how

A competitor can access your sensitive data (design, engineering,...). Can you quantify the damage economically?

### Data loss

Suddenly all data is lost. What would be the cost of reconstructing this data?

### Standing

What happens if your reputation for the reliability and security of your company's data is compromised by your partners?

# Brief Overview of the Most Important Laws & Standards

## Security Laws (What must be done?)



### IT Security Act (2015)

Asset owner of critical infrastructures must establish and certificate an **ISMS** (Information **S**ecurity **M**anagement **S**ystem) as well as fulfill a set of minimum technical requirements

Version 2.0 in preparation



### EU Cybersecurity Act (3/2019)

A comprehensive set of regulations, technical requirements, standards and procedures for certification or conformity assessment of products

## Recommendations (What should be done?)



### BSI IT Basic Protection Catalogs (asset owner / device manufacturer)

## Basic Security Standards (How to implement?)



### IEC 62443 Security for industrial automation (asset owner / device manufacturer)



### ISO/IEC 2700X Information Technology (asset owner)



Applicable Security Laws and Standards

## Sector-specific Security Standards

| Standard             | Target Group  | Main Purpose   | Geographical / Industry Focus      | Certification possible? |
|----------------------|---|--|------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| <b>BDEW</b>          | Device manufacturers / system integrators                   | Security requirements for suppliers                                      | D, A, CH<br>Energy & water sectors | No                      |
| <b>WIB</b>           | Device manufacturers / system integrators                   | Device manufacturer certification  | Oil & Gas sector                   | Yes                     |
| <b>ISO/IEC 27019</b> | Asset owners / plant operators                              | IT security for control systems  | Energy sector                      | Yes                     |
| <b>NIST 800-82</b>   | Asset owners / plant operators                              | Technical security recommendations                                       | USA                                | No                      |
| <b>NERC CIP</b>      | Asset owners / plant operators                              | Increasing reliability of energy supply infrastructure                   | USA, Canada                        | Yes                     |
| <b>IEC 62443</b>     | Device manufacturers / system integrators / plant operators | Requirements for secure products, secure solutions, and secure operation | General industry sector            | Yes                     |



# IEC 62443: IT-Security for Industrial Automation Control Systems



**CERTIFICATE**  
 No. Q4B 029429 0007 Rev. 00

Holder of Certificate: **PHOENIX CONTACT GmbH & Co. KG**  
 Fachmarktstr. 8  
 32825 Blumberg  
 GERMANY

Factory(ies): **PHOENIX CONTACT Electronics GmbH**  
 Industry Management and Automation  
 Business Unit Control Systems  
 Dingensauer Strasse 30, 31812 Bad Pyrmont, GERMANY

**PHOENIX CONTACT Software GmbH**  
 Langenbrunn 6, 32067 Lemgo, GERMANY

Certification Mark: 

Scope of Certificate: **Secure Product Development Lifecycle**

Applied Standard(s): IEC 62443-4-1:2018  
 PPP-15002A:2018 (IEC 62443-4-1 Full Process Profile)

The Certification Body of TÜV SÜD Product Service GmbH certifies that the company mentioned above has established and is maintaining a management system which meets the requirements of the listed standards. The results are documented in a report. See also notes overleaf.

Report No.: 18CR015007  
 Valid until: 2021-07-29

Date: 2018-08-01  
  
 (Andreas Barwald)

Page 1 of 1  
 TÜV SÜD Product Service GmbH - Certification Body - Ridlerstraße 65 - 80339 Munich - Germany

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**CERTIFICATE**  
 No. IITS2 029429 0027 Rev. 00

Holder of Certificate: **PHOENIX CONTACT GmbH & Co. KG**  
 Fachmarktstr. 8  
 32825 Blumberg  
 GERMANY

Certification Mark: 

Product: **IACS components**

Model(s): **PLCnext Control**  
 (Configuration: Security Profil active)  
 AXF F 1152, AXF F 2152, AXF F 3152

Tested according to: IEC 62443-4-1:2018  
 IEC 62443-4-2:2019  
 PPP-15003B:2018 (IEC 62443-4-1: Full ML3 Process Profile)

The secure development lifecycle and the resulting product(s) were assessed on a voluntary basis and complies with the essential requirements. The certification mark shown above can be affixed on the product. It is not permitted to alter the certification mark in any way. In addition, the certification holder must not transfer the certificate to third parties. See <http://www.tuv-sud.com/ppc> for details.

Test report no.: 21CR035047  
 Valid until: 2024-10-20

Date: 2021-11-19  
  
 (Nadia Patricia Stefan)

Page 1 of 1  
 TÜV SÜD Product Service GmbH - Certification Body - Ridlerstraße 65 - 80339 Munich - Germany



**IEC 62443**  
**Industrial Automation**  
**Basis Standard**



# IEC 62443: IT-Security for Industrial Automation Control Systems



The diagram features a central illustration of an industrial control system (ICS) rack with a padlock icon to its left. The text 'IEC 62443' is positioned below the padlock. Two large white chevrons point from the central illustration towards the 'Confidentiality' and 'Availability' sections.

**Authentication**

- User accounts
- Authentication of credentials
- Authorization

**Confidentiality**


- Use of secure protocols
- Secure remote maintenance
  - Cryptography
- Protection of expertise

**Integrity**

- Principle of least privilege
- Defense of depth
- Network segmentation

**Availability**

- Monitoring and attack detection
- Tamper protection




The logo consists of a stylized white hexagonal shape with a central cutout, resembling a double-headed arrow or a hexagon with a smaller hexagon inside it.

# IEC 62443


*Industrial Automation  
Basis Standard*

# The “Automation Pyramid”



Terminology, Roles, and Tasks in Security Processes


# IEC 62443 Structure and Systematics



## Basic Roles & Purposes of the IEC 62443 Standard

| Role                                   | Focus  | Interest         |
|--|--|------------------|
| Asset owner /<br>plant operator        | Operation & maintenance<br>of automation solutions               | Secure operation |
| System integrator /<br>Machine builder | Design & commissioning<br>of automation solutions                | Secure solution  |
| Device manufacturer                    | Design & management<br>of components<br>for automation solutions | Secure devices   |


Companies can check their automation technology for potential weaknesses and develop protective measures





Terminology, Roles, and Tasks in Security Processes

# Role Distribution in a Value-added Chain according to IEC 62443



Example: Planning & implementation of a new production plant



# IEC 62443-3-3: Security Level Def

| Functional requirements |                                     |           |               |          |
|-------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------|---------------|----------|
| Attacker capabilities   |                                     |           |               |          |
| Security Level          | Means                               | Resources |               |          |
| SL - 0                  | no protection requirements          |           |               |          |
| SL - 1                  | casual or coincidental manipulation |           |               |          |
| SL - 2                  | simple                              | low       |               |          |
| SL - 3                  | sophisticated                       | moderate  | IACS specific | moderate |
| SL - 4                  | sophisticated                       | extended  | IACS specific | high     |

**Protection against the abilities of...**


**SL-1**  
...any Internet user

**SL-2**  
... interested individuals and companies with generic security knowledge

**SL-3**  
... experts and companies that develop and deploy effective, yet cost-oriented attack scenarios with clear goals

**SL-4**  
... governmental organizations which focus on achieving the specifically selected target at almost any price

# IEC 62443-4-1: Product Development & Lifecycle



## Security Features Summary



[Home \(plcnext.help\)](http://plcnext.help)

- Security Architecture: Configurable Linux based on Yocto Build System
- Hardware design with: TPM -> IEEE 802.1 AR (Secure Device Identity)
- Network segmentation for Zones and Conduits management AXC F XT ETH 1TX Extension module integrated in the firewall
- Integrity check during boot process
- Secure Communication: TLS, SFTP, VPN, HTTPS, .....
- User Management with enhanced complexity rules and central AD (LDAP)
- Linux nftables Firewall with netload limiter
- VPN IPSec IKEv1/2 Strongswan and Open VPN file configuration
- SYSLOG for security message management and central storage on server
- OPC UA security signed & encrypted with certificate management via GDS
- SD card activation / deactivation / encryption
- Device and Patch Management / OPC UA FW Update




# Digital Factory | Data transportation | Smart automation network

## Network products



**FL Switch 2000**  
Managed switches

- Gigabit and fibre optic
- Redundancy protocols
- Diagnostic features
- Security functions
- Usability



**FL Network Manager**  
Software

- Scan existing network
- Device configuration
- Firmware update
- Graphic topology overview




**Optional: FL MGuard**  
Security


- Hardware based protection
- VPN router
- NAT routing
- Integrity monitoring of windows file system

# Network design

— Ethernet  
- - - VPN connection




# Blueprint: Remote monitoring and control



# Keep the control over your industrial network


## Requirement



### Keeping the control over the industrial network

- Build a **sustainable and resilient** network infrastructure
- Reduce **network errors and downtimes**
- Simplify **network maintenance**
- Efficient connection between **office and production network**

## Solution



### „Smart automation network“

- Powerful **network products**
- Structured and intelligent **network design**
- Focus on:
  - **Bandwidth**
  - **Redundancy**
  - **Diagnostics**
  - **Security**

## Result



### Higher **network availability**

Combining the right network design with powerful components **prevents system failures and downtimes** leading to a **higher system availability and cost reduction**



