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Jameson's Fatal Error

John Hays Hammond's Side of the Transvaal Plot

Although Thrice Warned Back by the Reform Committee, Jameson Persisted in Descending on the Boer Republic Before the Conspirators Were Ready for Him—He Thought They Were Afraid and Wished to Have the Sole Glory of a Grand Victory—Thus He Placed the Reformers in Far More Danger Than Ever Threatened Him—Their Lack of Arms—No Expectation that They Would Reinforce Him Half Way—Threats of Lynching—Hammond's Resolution

On the day that Dr. Jameson and his officers were found guilty of infringing the Foreign Enlistment act, and sent to Holloway prison, Mr. John Hays Hammond, the American engineer, who was a most active member of the Reform Committee in Johannesburg at the time of the raid, was staying in London at the Savoy Hotel. I happened to hear this, and remembering that Mr. Hammond had been one of those who invited Jameson to enter Johannesburg, and who had then left him to fight his way there unsupported, said that if I had to choose, I would rather be in Holloway with Jameson than in the Savoy with Hammond,

This remark was carried to Mr. Hammond by a mutual friend, a classmate of Hammond's at Yale, who asked me to keep my opinion in abeyance until I had heard Hammond's side of the story. The same mutual friend then invited me to dine with Hammond and himself, and for the first time I heard the story of the Jameson raid told in a manner which convinced me that the charges of cowardice laid against the Reform Committee were unmerited. The story has never been made public but it is full of interest, putting many things in a new light, adjusting the blame more evenly, and in my mind at least, removing the charge of lack of faith under which the members of the Reform Committee and the people of Johannesburg have been resting in silence. That they have been silent for so long is because they did not wish anything to appear in print while Dr. Jameson was awaiting trial which might deprive him of the popular sympathy he enjoyed during that period, and which, they hoped, might help to lessen the severity of his sentence. That sentence has now been passed, without much regard having been shown for the point of view of the populace, and Dr. Jameson is paying for his adventure like a man. And in time, having paid for it in full, he will come out again, as picturesque a figure and, with a great mass of the British public, as popular a hero as he was when he won Matabeleland and administered that troublous territory in the interests of the Chartered Company, and later made his ill-considered and ill-starred invasion of the Transvaal.

As he has had his turn, it seems only right now that he should give place in the public eye to those who have suffered as well as himself, and through his action, whose plans he spoiled and whose purposes his conduct entirely misrepresented to the world. For these other men of the

Reform Committee have lain, owing to Jim, in a far worse jail than Holloway, and some still lie there, some have been sentenced to death, while others have been fined fortunes, and, more than all else besides, they have had to bear the odium of having been believed, both in the United States and in England, to have shown the white feather in deserting a comrade, and of failing to keep the promises of help they had held out to him.

I am not holding a brief for Mr. Hammond or for his friends, who are business men as well as reformers, and quite able to take care of themselves. But while they have not the least desire to pose as fighting men, they have a most natural dislike to being pointed out as cowards. And they have given me their side of the story, and Hammond has asked me to tell it, because he fears that his friends on this side of the water, those who petitioned Secretary Olney in his behalf when he was in the Praetoria jail, misunderstand his part in the matter as I did, when I said in my ignorance that I thought of the two, Jameson was the one deserving of the greater consideration.

Jameson Did Not Speak

On the other hand, I do not want to put Hammond or his friends in the light of turning on a man when he is down, or making a scapegoat of Dr. Jameson at a time when it is impossible for him to give reply, although the answer to that is an obvious one. Dr. Jameson could have cleared them from all responsibility for his act before going to jail, and he did not. He could have said then that he entered the Transvaal not only at his own risk, but against their expressed wishes and entreaties, and, though they wrote to him before he went to jail and pointed out to him that they were lying under a heavy burden of blame which he could remove if he wished, he did not answer their letters.

My authority for what I am now relating does not come only from members of the Reform Committee, but from friends of Dr. Jameson's also; those who rode at his side when he made his armed invasion of the Transvaal and those who knew him in London and who visit him now that he is in prison. I have also had access to the green book of the South African Republic, and to the blue book of the Cape Colony; I was present both at the proceedings against Dr. Jameson and his officers at the Bow Street Police Court and at the formal trial before the Lord Chief Justice; I have seen the cipher dispatches the dally papers published at Johannesburg at the time of the raid, and I have been told the story again and again from every point of view, and heard it told to others by the men who were the leaders in the revolution.

The Reform Committee of Johannesburg was organized with the object of obtaining certain reforms for abuses which had grown so serious that the position of the Uitlanders in the Transvaal had become unbearable. There is an objection which is instantly raised whenever the condition of the Uitlanders is described as I have just stated it, and it is this: "If the Uitlanders did not like the laws of the Transvaal why did they not leave it and go somewhere else, the world is large enough for everybody? Why did they instead plot to upset the government of the Boers who had sheltered them, and who only asked to be left to breed their cattle and to farm their ranches in peace?" The answer to that very fair question is that the laws to which the Reform Committee objected did not exist when the majority of its members had entered the Transvaal eight years before.

Where the Outlanders Stood

At that time the revenue of the country was barely able to support it, and emigrants were warmly welcomed. The law as it then stood was that an Uitlander could obtain full rights of citizenship after a residence of five years, and with this understanding many Americans and Englishmen bought land in the Transvaal, built houses, and brought their families to live in the, invested their capital in mines and machinery, and gradually severed the ties that had bound them to the rest of the world. But when the gold seekers grew into a majority, the Boer, who still retained his love for pastoral and agricultural pursuits, passed a new law, which declared that the Uitlander could not obtain the franchise until he had first renounced his allegiance to any other country, and then, after a lapse of eight or fifteen years, he could, if it pleased the government, become a burgher, with a right to vote, but that if it did not please the government he could never hope to become a citizen of the Transvaal. In other words, the Uitlander was asked to give up what rights he had as a citizen of the United States or of Great Britain on the chance that in fifteen years he might become a citizen of the country, toward the support of which he paid eighteen-twentieths of the revenue, in which his children had been born, and in which he had made his home, but in the mean while he would be a man without a country and with no government to which he could turn for help or to which he could look to redress a wrong. This uncertainty of obtaining the franchise was the chief grievance.

There were many other grievances, and though Mr. Hammond has refused, on account of his pledge to the Boer government, to discuss them with me, other members of the Reform Committee have spoken and written of them freely, and they are so well known that they are described as the "admitted grievances." When the Uitlander first came to the Transvaal, the revenue of the country was \$375,000; it is now \$10,000,000, and, as I have said, the Uitlander finds eighteen-twentieths of that total revenue, and yet it has been practically impossible for him to obtain even an education for his children in the state schools which his money supported. The sale of monopolies by the government to different companies made his expenses excessive beyond reason, and the mismanagement of the railroads led to delay in the transportation of machinery and of perishable goods, which robbed legitimate business of any profit. Another evil arose from the Liquor Trust, which gave the complete control of all the liquor sold on the Rand into the hands of one firm, which manufactured a poisonous quality of whiskey and sold it without restriction to the natives, upon whom the mines depended for labor, and who for half the time were incapacitated from attending to the work they were paid to do. Land which had been sold to the Uitlanders for mining purposes was not regarded by the Boer government as their private property. This being the case, the Polish Jews, who handled most of the liquor sold on the Rand, were able to place their canteens where they pleased, at the very mouth of a shaft if they wished to do so, with the result that the kaffir boys were constantly drinking, and in consequence as constantly falling into open shafts, fighting amongst themselves, and suffering from the most serious accidents.

Grievances of the Foreigners in the Transvaal

Edgar P. Rathbone, late mining inspector of the east and central districts of the Witwatersrand under the Boer government, said in a recent interview of this grievance: "Every Monday morning, when the natives have to go to work after their pay day, one-third of the men are laid off drunk. If they are apparently sober enough to be able to travel down the main ladderways and to go into the cages, as soon as they get underground the different atmosphere utterly unfits them for work. The white miner runs a risk under the mining regulations in having

a drunken kaffir at work in the mine, and he is forced to send such a man to the surface again In my own experience I have frequently had to order natives out of the mines because they were quite unfit to be intrusted with drilling or any other work. You must also remember that it is impossible to examine, or even to distinguish ever case of drunkenness among some hundreds or thousands of kaffirs, and thus men who are at least partially under the influence of drink are allowed to go about their work in the mine I have no hesitation in saying that a large proportion of the many fearful accidents which happen on the Rand are due, directly or indirectly, to this cause”

Another monopoly under the protection of the government was the sale of dynamite, which gave one man the exclusive right to manufacture that most essential part of a miner’ supplies on the condition that he would manufacture it in the Transvaal. He did not manufacture it in the Transvaal, but bought a low quality of dynamite in Germany, changed the wrappers in his so-called manufactory, and sold the stuff at any price he pleased. It is said that the accidental explosions which have occurred in the Rand are largely due to the low quality of this dynamite, which was the only brand the miners were allowed to use.

Burdensome Freight Rates on Coal

The government’s method of protecting the Netherlands Railroad is also interesting; the coal deposits run parallel with the gold mines, but at a distance of some ten to thirty miles. This coal could be bought at the mouth of the shaft by any one for 7s 6d., but the Netherlands Railroad charged from 3d to 1s a ton per mile for carrying it over the few miles intervening between the gold fields and the gold mines. So that the coal which originally sold for 7s. 6d, cost, when delivered at the mines, from 15s to 30s. The average charge for freight per mile in the United States is one-half cent per mile, in England it is three-quarters of a cent, which throws a lurid light on what the earnings must have been for the Netherlands Railroad when it charged from six to twenty-four cents per mile. There was so very little profit in this for the gold mines that the different companies purchased strips of land, and, giving each other permission to use the land already owned, they mapped out a railroad over which they proposed to carry what coal they needed When the Boers heard of this they passed a law forbidding them to build this railroad, and later, when the miners attempted to carry the coal in ox carts, with traction engines, they were forbidden to do that also Freight can be sent from the Cape in almost a direct line by an English railroad which stops at the border of the Transvaal, the rest of the haul being made over the system of the Netherlands company This point of the border is only forty miles from Johannesburg. Or it can be taken in a more roundabout way from a point much further east If it comes from this direction, it travels 300 instead of 40 miles

In order to make the Uitlanders use the longer distance, and so bring more money into the coffers of the government railroad, the Netherlands Company allowed the freight to congest at the point forty miles from Johannesburg, and kept it there for three or four weeks, and subjected it to such delay and to such treatment on the way up as they hoped would finally drive the Uitlanders into abandoning the use of the more direct route from the Cape Sooner than do this the Uitlanders organized a system of ox carts and started to carry their freight overland in that slow and cumbrous fashion. To prevent their doing this the government closed the “drifts,” as the fords of the rivers are called, and so prevented their crossing. It required an ultimatum from Great Britain to open them again.

There are few instances of the laws and customs of a government which has been seeking sympathy as a free and enlightened republic, and which compares, and not unfavorably, with the free and enlightened republics of Central America.

Beginnings of the Fateful Movement

The spirit of discontent caused by these grievances grew slowly and showed itself when it first found expression in the form of perfectly constitutional agitations. In May, 1894, 13,000 Uitlanders petitioned the Volksraad for the rights of the franchise, and it is on record in the minutes of that legislative body that this petition was received with jeers and laughter. That in itself was not soothing to the petitioners, especially as it came from the representatives of those of the inhabitants who were in the minority, for even at that time the Uitlanders greatly outnumbered the original settlers of the Transvaal. Two months later another petition, signed this time by 32,500 inhabitants, was received by the Volksraad in the same manner, one of its members, indeed, going so far as to rise and say: "If you want the franchise why don't you fight for it?"

His invitation was accepted later, when the inhabitants of Johannesburg, finding there was no help to be obtained through the "sacred right of petition," organized the Reform Committee and prepared themselves to take what they wanted by a revolution and the use of arms. I am not pretending here to defend the revolutionists; I only wish to tell what led up to the Jameson raid, and to show that, no matter what the Reform Committee have done or wished to do as revolutionists, they were at least not faithless to Jameson, who became one of their own party, and who was one of their friends.

No one denies that their purpose was to change the laws of the country, or that they smuggled arms into Johannesburg to accomplish that purpose if it could not be accomplished by any other means. But that they intended to upset the republic I do not believe any more than I believe that they intended to turn the Transvaal into a British dependency or to raise the British flag, as it was repeatedly stated at the time they had meant to do

One difficulty in dealing with the history of this revolution lies in the fact that, while the men in it had the same end in view, they were working toward that end with different motives. There were a great many men in our war of the rebellion who fought for the dollars they received for fighting, as they today fight for pensions, and there were a great many contractors who made money out of the war, but no one would argue from that that all the other men in it held low motives, or that the cause for which they fought was not a great one.

Cecil Rhodes's Shadow

There is an element in the affair of the Transvaal which can only be described as the unknown quantity, and that element is of course, Mr. Cecil Rhodes. That he would have been benefited by a reform in the laws of the Transvaal is well understood, but so would have every one else who was interested in the mines there, and who was hampered by the restrictions, taxes, and monopolies, which added a burden of expense to every ton of ore that was taken out of the ground. Cecil Rhodes, as one of those most largely interested, was proportionately interested in seeing labor made cheaper, transportation made easier, and those in office who were interested in the mines, instead of the Boers, who were not. As a matter of fact, Mr. Cecil Rhodes's interest in the Consolidated Gold Fields was but one-fifteenth of its profits, so it was

not money, but the development of his cherished plan for a combination of all the South African republics, that moved him. What he hoped from the revolution we can imagine; that he would have looked at a change of government in the Transvaal as another step toward the unification of all the republics in South Africa is most probable, and he knew that to such a union the Boers of themselves would never consent. But that the whole revolution was a plot to seize the Transvaal for the sake of its gold mines and for the aggrandizement of Great Britain, and that the men of the Reform Committee who risked their lives in the cause of revolution were the puppets of Rhodes, moving at his bidding, is absurd. There were other big men in the revolution besides Cecil Rhodes, and it was perfectly well agreed among these men that no flag but that of the Transvaal Republic was to be raised when the revolution began, and whatever the Englishmen may have wished, the Germans, Afrianders, and those of the Boers who were in sympathy with the revolution, and the Americans, which latter composed one-sixth of the Reform Committee, formed a majority which certainly had no intention of turning the country over to the Queen, and, as a matter of history, the Transvaal flag floated over the Gold Fields building, which was the headquarters of the revolutionists from the first to the last. Personally, I am convinced, after having talked with the men who were at the head of this revolution, that the greater part of them as honestly believed that they were acting for the best good of the country in trying to overthrow the Boer government as did the revolutionists of 1776 in our own country, or as do the rebels in Cuba at the present day.

The Reform Committee's Plan

Six weeks before the Jameson raid the Reform Committee had mapped out their plan of action. They had spent £70,000 (\$350,000) in provisions, which they expected would outlast a two months' siege; they had arranged that the water supply of Johannesburg could not be cut off from the outside, and they had ordered rifles and Maxim guns and were smuggling them across the border. This was the most difficult part of their work, for guns are as strictly prohibited to Uitlanders in Johannesburg as are public meetings, and everyone who owned a rifle was a marked man in consequence. It is well to remember this, for it is not as though Johannesburg in that respect resembled some of our own mining towns, where weapons are sometimes as plentiful as pickaxes and where a call to arms would merely mean the reading of the pay rolls at the shafts of the different mines.

It was while these guns for defence were slowly coming in that Dr. Jameson, the administrator of the Chartered Company's affairs, was told of the movement of the revolutionists, and asked by them if he would, in case they needed his assistance, come across the border to the aid of his fellow countrymen, bringing with him his mounted police and 1,500 extra guns, which they would send him to Mafeking. The gentlemen of the Reform Committee were Dr Jameson's personal friends; they had trekked with him all over the surrounding country, hunting, prospecting, and exploring; they knew he was a man ready for adventure, and that in the easy spirit of the unsettled country about them it would not be difficult for him to gather around him a body of men ready to go wherever he led

Jameson gave his consent readily, and agreed to the conditions under which he was to enter the Transvaal. These conditions were exceedingly important and exceedingly explicit. He was to move only when the reformers gave the signal for him to do so, and they, as the chief moves in the plot and the men having most at stake, were to be allowed to judge exactly when that time had come, or if he should come at all; that when he came he must bring 1,500 men with

him, and the extra 1,500 guns on which they counted. This he promised to do, and asked in return that they should write him a letter inviting him to cross the border, which he could show later as his justification for his action.

The Call Upon Jameson

The situation at this time was stretched geographically in the form of a triangle, with three bases of action, all working to the same end. The members of the Reform Committee, who were preparing to demand certain reforms and concessions, and ready, if they failed to get them peaceably, to fight for them, were at Johannesburg: Dr. Jameson, with his filibusters who were to rush in, but only when they were wanted and if they were wanted, was at Mafeking, and Cecil Rhodes, the unknown quantity, was at the Cape, aiding and advising them all.

The letter to Jameson was signed by five men, and the date was purposely omitted. These five men were Charles Leonard, a British subject born in the Cape Colon, educated at Cambridge, and a prominent lawyer of Johannesburg where he had a practice which amounted to \$50,000 a year; Col. Francis Rhodes, a brother of Cecil Rhodes and an officer in the English army who has seen service in India and in the Soudan; John Hays Hammond, who, as a mining expert, now commands a salary just twice as large as that of the president of the United States; Lionel Phillips, the largest individual property owner in the Transvaal, and George Farrar, an importing merchant. These men, who, with the exception of Leonard, who escaped to England, were afterward tried by the government and sentenced to be hanged, were properly described by Jameson as "leading citizens of Johannesburg," as they would have been leading citizens in any community in which they chanced to live.

The contents of their letter to Jameson are well known. As a literary effort intended to plead a certain cause, it does not strike one as a very successful performance, as it does not sound sincere; it shows on its face that it was written for publication, and it has none of the simplicity which as a factor in the conversation of the men who signed it is their most convincing argument. It described the critical state of affairs in Johannesburg, and asked Jameson, "should a disturbance arise," to come to the aid of that city, and expressed fears as to the safety of the "unarmed men, women and children of our race" who were there, in the event of a conflict. It was of this line that Jameson made use when he told his men they were going to protect "women and children," and which the poet laureat embodied in his absurd verse when he wrote:

There are girls in the gold reef city,
And mothers and children, too,
And they cry, "Hurry up, for pity,"
So what could a brave man do?

As this letter was handed to Jameson by the signers six weeks before he made his raid, the idea of the girls of the gold reef city crying "Hurry up, for pity!" during that length of time and his not heeding them has its humorous side.

During the six weeks which intervened between the delivery of this letter and the raid the Reform Committee continued actively in its preparations for the defence of the city. Its plan was to declare itself on the 6th of January. By that time it hoped to have 5,000 rifles, a sufficient number of Maxim guns, and 1,000,000 cartridges hidden away within the limits of Johannesburg and in the surrounding mines; it also counted with reason on having control of the forts which

covered the city, and which were at that time guarded by a few Boer soldiers, who could have been driven out by assault. The committee relied confidently on the immediate services of at least 20,000 of the inhabitants of Johannesburg, and on the help of many who would join them when they saw that it was safe to do so. With these men fully armed, with the town provisioned for a two months' siege, they felt they would be in a position by the 6th of January to send their ultimatum to the government at Pretoria. The conditions of this ultimatum were to be that unless the Boers gave them the reforms for which they had petitioned without success they would, at the end of three days, set up a provisional government and defend Johannesburg against all comers.

Jameson Gives Signs of Overhaste

It was, then, at this point, when the minds of half the people in the country would be wavering as to whether it was better to join the reformers or to uphold the old regime, that Dr. Jameson was to have come in with his 1,500 police, like a "flying wedge," and bring the wavering ones, both Uitlanders and Boers, from ranches, farms, and villages, and deliver this triumphant addition to his own well-organized force into the hands of the provisional government at Johannesburg. That is what was to have happened. What did happen was this:

On the 25th of December one of the Reform Committee was sent in great haste to the Cape to arrange some final details and to hurry up the arms, which were slow in coming, an without which the revolution was as formidable in appearance, but as absolutely impotent in fact, as an empty dynamite can. When at the Cape this member discovered a hitch in their plans, and so informed the Reform Committee, and this caused Samuel Jameson at Johannesburg to send the following telegram to his brother at Mafeking:

"It is absolutely necessary to postpone flotation through unforeseen circumstances here altogether unexpected. * * * You must not move until you have received instructions to."

This was on the 26th day of December, just two days before the raid. On the 27th of December a telegram was received in Johannesburg by Jameson's brother to the following effect:

"Dr. Jameson says he cannot give extension of refusal for flotation for December, as Transvaal Boers opposition."

This telegram was the first intimation the Reform Committee received that Dr. Jameson had some idea of taking the bit between his teeth, of dragging the reins out of their hands, and bolting. Such a contingency had not occurred to them. They knew he was perfectly well acquainted with their helpless condition; they knew that he had been strictly enjoined not to appear on the scene until Hammond gave him the signal. And at once, in the greatest possible alarm at the possible failure of their long-matured plans, they sent two messengers post haste to warn him not to move from where he was. Major Heany, an American, a graduate of West Point, and a soldier who has seen service in the Portuguese and Kafir wars, was dispatched by Hammond on a special train, and Edward Holden was sent to Mafeking on horseback. So well did Holden understand the necessity of reaching Jameson in time to head him off that he made the 150 miles between Johannesburg and Mafeking in seventeen hours, changing his saddle to five different horses. He arrived outside the Jameson headquarters at 4 o'clock on Saturday morning, the 28th of December, where he was met by his friend, Lieut. Grefell of the Guards, who conducted him to Jameson, to whom he delivered Hammond's message. On the day

previous the following telegram had arrived from Hammond: "Wire just received. Experts report decidedly adverse. I absolutely condemn further developments at present"

Jameson Thrice Warned Back

This was on Saturday morning, so before Jameson left Mafeking, and long before he had crossed the border of the Transvaal, and long before he had been ordered back by a commissioner of the Transvaal Republic, and later by the representative of the High Commissioner for Great Britain, he had received two special messengers from his friends, tell him he was not wanted, and a telegram from the man who was to give him the signal to start, begging him to stay where he was.

In spite of this, on Sunday, Dec. 29, Dr. Jameson started on his ride to Johannesburg against the wishes of Cecil Rhodes and against the entreaties of the Reform Committee, and instead of bringing with him the 1,500 men and the 1,500 extra rifles agreed upon, he came with only 504 men and carried no extra arms.

The first intimation that the people of Johannesburg received that Jameson had started was when they read of his having done so in the newspapers which came out on Monday afternoon, twenty-four hours after he had left Mafeking. The government, at Pretoria, had, of course, heard of it at the same time, and at once sent a deputation down to Johannesburg, inviting the Reform Committee to send a deputation to Pretoria to meet the president and the executive council, and to consider what was to be done in the light of Dr. Jameson's invasion. The committee went to Pretoria, and there Lionel Phillips, as its Chairman, offered himself and the rest of the deputation as hostages for Jameson and his force, if the Boers would allow them a safe conduct out of the Transvaal. At that time, it must be remembered, no news had been received of any hostile demonstration having been made by Jameson, or by the Boers against him. The joint deputations came to no decision, however, beyond agreeing to invite Sir Hercules Robinson, the high commissioner of Great Britain, to come from the Cape and act as mediator on the question of the grievances. The deputation from the Reform Committee then returned to Johannesburg to report what it had done.

The Unpreparedness of the Reformers

The position of the Reform Committee was now, owing to the precipitate action of Dr. Jameson in disobeying orders, and in forcing them to show their hand, a most difficult one. They had, all told, but 1,000 rifles in the town, while the Boer government had under arms and within call 8,000 burghers, each of whom was a fighting man. When Hammond asked Heyman, Dr. Jameson's military representative in Johannesburg, how long he thought they could hold out should they attempt to defend the town with the thousand rifles in their possession, Heyman answered, "About twenty minutes."

This, then, was the position in which Dr. Jameson had placed his friends and fellow revolutionists. They were without arms to make a stand, and owing to his act the fact that they had meant to do so was no longer a secret, their purpose was exposed, and as would-be revolutionists they were justly at the mercy of the Boer government. On Tuesday night 1,400 more rifles were smuggled hurriedly across the border, but in the confusion which had continued from the moment it was known that Jameson had precipitated the revolt, many of these were lost

and any more were distributed to the wrong people, and at least 500 fell into the hands of the Boers themselves. Those men who did not know how to handle a gun were armed with what rifles there were, and sent out into the streets to act as policemen to protect the town from the Boers without and from rioting within, the Boer police having entirely withdrawn from Johannesburg

Another circumstance, which at the same time added greatly to the difficulties of the Reform Committee, was the fact that the inhabitants of Johannesburg knew that the inhabitants of Johannesburg knew that they had invited Jameson to come to their assistance, and they were now wondering why no preparations were being made to meet him on his way, but the Reform Committee knew, to its sorrow, that if it took the guns away from its policemen and went to Jameson, it would take every gun there was in the city out of it, leaving it absolutely unprotected from the Boers, who were gathering in large bodies at different points surrounding Johannesburg.

But the people of the city did not know this, and the Reform Committee could not tell them how helpless it was without the Boers knowing it also, and at that time almost their only safeguard against the Boers lay in the fact that the Transvaal government believed that there were from 20,000 to 30,000 rifles hidden away in the town of Johannesburg.

Jameson "Coming on Easily in Two Hours"

It was stated at the time of the raid by many different people that Jameson had been promised a force of 2,000 men to meet him at Krugersdorp. No such promise was ever made to Jameson by the Reform Committee, and, even had it been made, Jameson knew when he left Mafeking that by coming in before his friends were armed he could not expect any assistance from them.

Nor, to be quite fair to both Jameson and the Reform Committee, did he expect such assistance, nor did the Reform Committee think he needed it.

One of Jameson's troopers reached Johannesburg early on Thursday morning at about the same time that Jameson was being surrounded at Doornkorp, and at once reported to Col. Rhodes and Hammond. The man said he had been sent on in advance by the doctor to tell them that he and his force were coming in easily, and would follow the messenger in "two hours," but that he wanted them to send a committee of citizens to meet him at the outskirts of the town in order that his act might not look like that of a something the name of which the trooper could not remember. Rhodes suggested "filibuster" and "adventurer," but the trooper shook his head until someone ventured "pirate," when he exclaimed "Yes, that was the word." Rhodes laughed and said "And I'll wager the doctor said d—d pirate." "Yes, sir, he did," the trooper answered, and then curled up, completely exhausted, on the floor under the table in the committee room, and slept there for five hours.

The Raiders Expected No Reinforcements

After this message was received, the committee was so confident that Jameson was coming in safely that the women of the town gathered flowers together and rode out along the highway to Krugersdorp to meet him and his conquering heroes. Another message from Jameson which shows he did not expect any assistance, in spite of what statements he may have made to his men before starting, is a letter sent by him to Col. Rhodes in reply to one which had been

brought him from Rhodes by a bicycler, who reached Jameson on Wednesday night, some twelve hours before the surrender of the following morning.

In this letter Rhodes told him that there had been no massacre or uprising in Johannesburg, and added that he would have a drink with him that night when he got in, and to this Jameson replies that he is coming in all right, and needs no help, but that if they can spare 200 men he would be glad if they would send them out to meet him, as it would cheer up his troopers, who are tired with their long ride.

This letter never reached Rhodes until three months later, as the bicycler was stopped by the Boers on his way back, and his machine was thrown into the shaft of one of the mines. He escaped from the Boers, and three months after the raid fished his machine out of the shaft and found the letter from Jameson, which he had hidden under the seat of his bicycle. It is now in the possession of Col. Rhodes.

This message, sent the night before the surrender, and the one brought by the trooper who had left the column only five hours before the surrender, shows that even at the eleventh hour Jameson had no idea, but that he was coming straight into Johannesburg, and was neither expecting aid nor asking for it

On the night previous to the surrender, when it was proposed in Johannesburg to go out and meet him, the Military Committee, which was composed of Col Rhodes and Heyman, Franz White, and Jameson's brother, the last three being Jameson's own representatives in Johannesburg, the men who had been sent there by him to look after his interests, refused for an instant to entertain the idea that he needed help Frank White had two brothers, Col the Hon Henry White and the notorious "Bobbie" White, serving under Jameson as officers, and Rhodes and Heyman were the doctor's oldest friends, and Jameson's own brother would naturally be supposed to have taken an interest in his welfare But all of these men declared that sending a force to him meant leaving the city open for instant occupation by the Boers, and they insisted also that Jameson did not need help, even if it had been in their power to send it to him. They supposed, then, that he had with him 1,000 men, cannon, and three Maxims, and they thought that there were not more than 360 Boers between him and the city, and Frank White expressed the general opinion when he said: "The Doctor is coming in with two columns of 500 men each, and he can walk through 10,000 Boers." This, then is why the citizens of Johannesburg did not go out to meet Dr. Jameson.

The Walk Through 10,000 Boers

In the first place, they had never intended to do so, nor had they ever made any promise to do so. It was Jameson who was coming to help them, and, in the second place, in spite of the fact that they had not guaranteed him any aid, even if they had thought that he needed it, they had no means of conveying it to him unless they chose at the same moment to hand the city over to their mutual enemy, the Boer. But what is more important to remember than all else besides is that there was no suspicion in the minds of any one in Johannesburg that Jameson was in need of assistance at any time during his ride.

As one of Jameson's officers expressed it to me in talking over the raid a few weeks since in London, "We thought," he said, "that we would go through the Transvaal like a glittering Lord Mayor's show"

Many different reasons are given to explain why Jameson started when he did, against orders, knowing the helpless condition of Johannesburg and, with such an inadequate force, but

the reason that probably is nearest the truth is suggested by a remark he made just before he rode out of Mafeking

“Those men are funking it,” he said. “I’m going to stir them up.” That speech undoubtedly is the real explanation for his remarkable action. He wanted to lay the part they had assigned to him, and he thought the others were afraid to play theirs, and that the whole expedition would come to nothing. He wanted the acclaim which would follow his invasion of the Transvaal, and he thought that the chance of his doing so was slipping from him through the half-heartedness of the men of Johannesburg.

None of the men whose plans he wrecked assigns any motive to him other than the love of a fight the desire to be in the center of whatever is going forward, and the increased reputation that would have come to him. They describe him as a man who has no care for money. They say he could have made himself rich in Mashonaland had he wished to do so, and that in the daily routine of life he is unselfishness itself, but that in this case he failed because he undervalued his friends and overvalued his own strength. The men whom he considered were “funking it” were in much greater danger for months than was Jameson during the three days of his ride. Their offer to go to jail as hostages for his safe conduct out of the country he had entered against their entreaties required much more courage on their part, knowing as they did that the Boers were only too anxious to get them there on any count than it would have taken to have dashed across the veldt, gun in hand, to attempt an Adelphi melodrama rescue.

Jacobus De Wet's Perfidy

On the night Jameson was marched a prisoner to Pretoria the Reform Committee was all but lynched for not having gone to his rescue, and even then it could not tell the excited people that there were not over 1,500 guns in the whole city of Johannesburg. It was not until Jameson's brother stepped out on the balcony of the Gold Fields building and assured the mob that he had been acquainted with all that was going forward during the ride, and that even had he known that his brother's life was at stake, he was satisfied that it would have been impossible to have helped him, that the people were quieted and dispersed. Three days later the Reform Committee was placed in jail, contrary to the promise made by Sir Jacobus De Wet, the agent of the English Commission, that if it agreed to armistice it would not be molested. This promise he now denies having made, and Mr. Joseph Chamberlain is attempting to support him in his denial in the face of published cablegrams which testify to the contrary. The matter will be finally cleared up when the Parliamentary Committee meets next fall.

In the meanwhile the testimony of Capt. J.F. Younghusband, the author of “Where Three Nations Meet,” as to the conduct of the Reform Committee after it went to jail is interesting as coming from one who was on the spot as a spectator only and in no way interested in the revolution. In the London *Times* of May 2 he writes:

“And certainly of cowardice the four leaders cannot be accused, for I can show that they did not fear to face death, even in the terrible form to which they were sentenced two days ago. One of those critical days after Jameson had surrendered they were told that the Boers were clamoring to have them seized and shot a once, and it was suggested to them that they should quietly slip away from the country while they still could. I was myself present on the occasion, and heard Col. Rhodes and Mr. George Farrar say at once that even if they were to be shot they at least intended like men to stay where they were. The others agreed with them, and, with one or

two exceptions, the entire committee gave themselves up when the warrants were issued without any attempt to escape.

No Cowardice on the Committee's Part

“May I therefore ask their countrymen to remove the stigma of cowardice which has been cast upon them? To face any lawful punishment they are prepared. They did not flinch to face even death. But there in prison in a foreign land to have to hear the taunts of cowardice from their fellow-countrymen they feel is the cruelest blow that could be inflicted on them—cruel to them and cruel to their children after them. And now, when the severest sentence that can by law be given has been pronounced against them, will not Englishmen show their justice by repealing the sentence of cowardice they so hastily passed upon Johannesburg and give the reformers in their hour of trouble the sympathy they deserve?”

There is one story of Mr. Hammond which was told me by others of the Reform Committee, and which, while it will not surprise those who know the man, will give an idea of his character to those who do not. Hammond was very ill during his imprisonment, and in consequence permitted to go to the Cape for his health under a heavy bail. He was at that time under sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment, and the bail was not so heavy as the fine he had still to pay, which amounts to \$175,000. He did not give his parole to return to jail, and his failing to have done so would have meant nothing more than the forfeiture of his bail, the amount of which he could have very well afforded to have paid. And when he had once crossed the border of the Transvaal every man he met was his friend. He could on reaching the Cape have stepped upon the first outbound steamer and shaken the dust of the Transvaal from him forever.

Hammond Faced the Music

“That is the last you will see of Jack Hammond,” someone said to Kruger. “I think not,” the president answered, “and even if Mr. Hammond would wish to escape, I know Mrs. Hammond, and she is too fine a woman to let him think of it.” Two days before his leave had expired Hammond came back to Pretoria and knocked at midnight at the door of the jail for admittance to what, for all he then knew, meant fifteen years of his life in prison, and the jailers were so amazed to see his face through the wicket that when he threw his valise, which he had carefully packed with whiskey and cigars for his three fellow prisoners, at one of them, the Boer picked it up without examining it and carried it to the cell which Hammond, Rhodes, Phillips, and Farrar shared in common. Hammond had gained his temporary liberty because he was ill, and he did not take advantage of that act of kindness on the part of the Boers to fly the country, and so leave his fellow conspirators to suffer a punishment which, if deserved by one, was deserved by all. It was a case of conscience and of moral as well as physical courage.

And when people accuse the Reform Committee of cowardice and of being men who failed to keep their word they should put before them these two pictures, the one of the Englishman Jameson, surrounded by his 500 troopers, saying: “Those men at Johannesburg are funkling it. I am going to stir them up,” and three days later raising the white flag; and the other of the American Hammond, when still shaking with fever, he returned to serve out his sentence and stood alone at midnight, knocking for admittance at the gate of the Pretoria jail.

(Source: *Chronicling America*, <http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83030272/1896-09-06/ed-1/seq-1.pdf>)