madeiramessenger.com

October 21, 2016

My letter, sent to the Cincinnati Enquirer, included in this posting, addresses, Mayor Adrien's intimidation effort. To understand, my law suit, referenced by Adrien, I have included the entire trial transcript. The transcript will be the basis for the appeal, as the legal proceedings move through the Hamilton County Courts. Many legal proceedings are moved forward or settled in the Appeals court, including at least two other legal proceedings involving the City of Madeira that I am familiar with. The city of Madeira lost both of those proceedings.

After scrolling through and reviewing the trial transcript, please read the letter authored by Businessman James Tepe. Mr. James Tepe, is days from filing a Lawsuit against our city that will threaten, for good reasons, the development of Railroad Avenue, (The Swingline Grill) Mr. Tepe, in his letter lays out in detail, the role that our city manager and many elected, and appointed Madeira officials have played in the continuing effort to enrich developer, Thomas Powers, at the expense of Madeira tax payers. The ongoing plot will rob our schools of thousands of dollars indefinitely, because of Mayor Adrien, and City Manager Moeller's phony "Public Parking Lot". This is only the beginning!

Scroll Down Please......

Cincinnati Enquirer Letter to the Editor

October 19, 2016

It is imperative, that comments expressed by Madeira Mayor, Melisa Adrien, in the October 15, 2016 Enquirer, news story, titled, "Lawsuit against Madeira dismissed", be addressed. Mayor Adrien would have you believe that one resident, unelected, and holding no appointed position, has the power to expend Madeira Tax Payer dollars. Not so, and in fact Mayor Adrien, and six council members always determine, how tax dollars will be spent and for what purpose, (mostly behind closed doors). Recently, a local Businessman, James Tepe, has publicly leveled allegations of "Collusion and Political Favors", regarding six years of dealings with local land, and restaurant developer, Mr. Thomas Powers. Those allegations have merit, and the attempt to sell off a portion of the Madeira Historic District, reeked with the stench of "collusion and Political Favors".

My Lawsuit was filed when Adrien, and six council members passed Resolution number 15-30, a resolution that can only be construed as an attempt at destroying the Madeira Historic District, while enriching Developer Powers, at the expense of Madeira Taxpayers. The Lawsuit could have been dismissed, shortly after April 25<sup>th</sup> of this year, the day that Adrien repealed Resolution 15-30, but Adrien's attorneys, took no action, asking for a dismissal. Maybe that's because Adrien and her city attorneys had "orchestrated a shell game".

Here is how the scheme developed. Mayor Adrien presented, at the April 25<sup>th</sup> City Council meeting, ordinance number 16-03, repealing resolution 15-30, that included a contract with Powers, to "buy and sell", involving the vacant B&B Mower property, and the sale of Historic District property, (the cause for my Lawsuit). Immediately, at the same April 25<sup>th</sup> council meeting, Adrien brought forth a new resolution, number 17-16, identical to 15-30, except for one important section in the "new" contract, section E. Section E stated that if my

Lawsuit were to be dismissed, or if the city wins the suit, the city would than revert back to the contract associated with resolution 15-30, thus "the shell game" created by our Mayor. The game was created to fool the court, and the residents of Madeira. My Lawsuit was justified, just as the appeal is justified. This is all about political power, favors, and six years of collusion, and irresponsible decisions, made by Mayor Adrien, former Mayors, City Lawyers, City Manager Moeller, various City Council members, and Planning Commission members. This is all about, misappropriating and spending more than \$700,000.00 of Madeira tax payer dollars. This kind of political behavior should never be tolerated, and intimidation coming from Mayor Adrien will not be tolerated.

Douglas Oppenheimer

240-4348 / consultdoug@cinci.rr.com

7431 Mar Del Drive

Madeira Ohio 45243

1 COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 2 HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO 3 4 CITY OF MADEIRA, ex rel. OPPENHEIMER. 5 Plaintiff. 6 Appeal No. C1600762 VS. Case No. A1506891 7 CITY OF MADEIRA, et al., 8 9 Defendant. 10 11 12 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 13 14 APPEARANCES: CURT HARTMAN, ESQ.,
On behalf of the Plaintiff. 15 16 KEVIN MCDONOUGH, ESQ., On behalf of the Defendant. 17 18 19 20 BE IT REMEMBERED that upon the motions hearing in this cause, heard on 21 22 Tuesday, February 23, 2016, before the 23 Honorable Patrick T. Dinkelacker, a said Judge of the Court of Common Pleas, the following 24 25 proceedings were had, to wit:

1 MORNING SESSION - Tuesday, February 23, 2016 2 MR. MCDONOUGH: Kevin McDonough, 3 City of Madeira. One of the motions set 4 today for hearing is a motion to dismiss 5 Mr. Powers. We called his office and 6 they can't seem to locate him, and we were wondering if, for some reason, he 7 8 doesn't have it on his calendar. I notice the listing only lists me and Mr. 9 Hartman on this case, for some reason. 10 11 Has anyone heard from Mr. Goodin on 12 this case? 13 THE COURT: He is real good about 14 showing up. 15 MR. MCDONOUGH: Yes, he is. I have 16 a feeling that for some reason maybe he 17 thought March 8 -- if you want to set 18 this over for another date. 19 MR. HARTMAN: I am fine submitting 20 on the paper. I can check with Mr. 21 Goodin and see if he is fine. Not a 22 complex issue. 23 THE COURT: Do you want to argue 24 the other motion, then? 25 MR. HARTMAN: I am fine with it on

1	paper. We both kind of agreed there is
2	no case law out there indicating
3	MR. MCDONOUGH: There is nothing
4	directly on point regarding, under a
5	taxpayer action like this, whether the
6	Respondent can actually counterclaim
7	against, technically. Basically, we will
8	submit.
9	THE COURT: Let me talk to you in
10	chambers for a second.
11	(Discussion was held off the
12	record in chambers.)
13	(End of proceedings.)
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## CERTIFICATE

I, Ann Marie Stowers, RPR, the undersigned, an Official Court Reporter for the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, do hereby certify that at the same time and place stated herein, I recorded in stenotype and thereafter transcribed the within 3 pages, and that the foregoing Transcript of Proceedings is a true, complete, and accurate transcript of my said stenotype notes.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my hand this 11th day of October, 2016

Ann Marie Stowers, RPR Official Court Reporter Court of Common Pleas Hamilton County, Ohio



1	COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
2	HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
3	
4	CITY OF MADEIRA, ex rel.
5	OPPENHEIMER,
6	Plaintiff, Appeal No. C1600762
7	VS. Case No. A1506891
8	CITY OF MADEIRA, et al.,
9	Defendant.
10	
11	
12	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
13	
14	APPEARANCES:
15 16	CURT HARTMAN, ESQ., On behalf of the Plaintiff.
	KEVIN MCDONOUGH, ESQ., STEVEN GOODIN, ESQ.,
17	On behalf of the Defendant.
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19	
20	BE IT REMEMBERED that upon the
21	motions hearing in this cause, heard on
22	Thursday, March 10, 2016, before the Honorable
23	Patrick T. Dinkelacker, a said Judge of the
24	Court of Common Pleas, the following
25	proceedings were had, to wit:

1 MORNING SESSION - Thursday, March 10, 2016 2 THE COURT: For the record, City of 3 Madeira, ex rel Douglas Oppenheimer versus City of Madeira, Case Number 4 5 A1506891. 6 Mr. Goodin, you showed up today. 7 MR. GOODIN: Thank you, Judge. I 8 apologize for the last time. I don't 9 know how we messed that up. We are 10 honored to be here. 11 THE COURT: I do apologize for the 12 delay. We are here today in response to 13 the motion filed on behalf of Mr. Powers; 14 is that correct? 15 MR. GOODIN: Yes, Judge. 16 THE COURT: Okay. I have read that 17 and you have responded to the Memorandum 18 in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. 19 Is there anything you want to say in 20 regards to it? 21 MR. GOODIN: Judge, 30 seconds. 22 think from our standpoint, this was a 23 taxpayer lawsuit basically filed between 24 Mr. Oppenheimer and the City of Madeira. 25 My client, at one point, had a

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contract to buy the property that was in question. That contract is dead. option has expired. Our view is, we are not in this anymore, basically. There is really no relief that can be sought for my client. He is the only guy here that lost money. He lost \$10,000 and different options he put on the property that are now gone.

His concern, just being very frank, was facing an attorney fee award at the end of this if Mr. Hartman's client were to be successful. I know Mr. Hartman doesn't intend to seek fees against him but that's his primary concern.

We feel this is really a matter between Mr. Oppenheimer and the City of Madeira. My client supports the City of Madeira's position, but we don't see a road for us going forward.

MR. HARTMAN: And as I indicated in our response, I think Mr. Powers is included because of that interest in that existing contract. I would indicate to Mr. Goodin right off the bat that if we

were successful, the attorney fees under the fee shifting statute would be against the City, not against his client.

In terms of the existence or non-existence of a contract, I kind of just came up here actually in the hallway earlier here so that may have put a wrinkle into it. Our concern was, I didn't want to be told Mr. Powers was a necessary party that should have been in, and without him, the Court could not issue --

THE COURT: You complied with the service aspect?

MR. HARTMAN: Exactly. Yes.

Whether or not he gets out, I suggested
to Mr. Goodin, just have him default. We
won't take a default judgment. He just
lives with the final judgment of the
Court was another option. His presence
is not significant. Again, whether or
not it is still necessary, I am not sure.

MR. GOODIN: A potential way out might be for the Court to hold the claim in abeyance in regards to Mr. Powers. He

1 doesn't want to be in a default 2 situation, but he doesn't want to pay me 3 to come here in a matter, so that's where 4 we are. 5 THE COURT: There is a lawsuit 6 hanging over his head. He is not on that 7 contract anymore. He has no legal 8 connection right now other than maybe he 9 lives in Madeira but within the City of 10 Madeira. 11 I would be inclined to sign an 12 entry granting the Motion to Dismiss. 13 you want to come up with some alternate, 14 that's fine. But I think he deserves to 15 be out. You have done your job. I think 16 it is time for Mr. Powers to move on. 17 MR. GOODIN: We will figure 18 something out. 19 THE COURT: A week from today? 20 MR. GOODIN: That's perfect. 21 MR. MCDONOUGH: I don't need to say 22 much. On behalf of the City of Madeira, 23 Kevin McDonough. We certainly don't 24 oppose the motion to dismiss Mr. Powers

out, number one.

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Number two, there certainly is an issue regarding whether this entire case is moot at this point because Mr. Powers' contract is gone with the prospective sellers. It is my understanding the contract, there is no reason for him to enter into a contract with Madeira any longer for the sale of that small portion of the piece of property that's located in the historic district.

As we discussed when we were last here and Mr. Hartman stated that I was seeking an advisory opinion of the Court and my counterclaim has been dismissed by the Court. This case may be moot. We need to look into that.

MR. HARTMAN: I think we just need a little bit more evidence just in terms of what the current status is, what future plans are. It may become a moot issue. Of course, there are always the exceptions in terms of great general public interest. That is an exception and may be applicable here. We can visit that down the road; not today.

1	THE COURT: I want to keep it
2	moving, obviously. If we set it out for
3	30 days for something/CMC because if you
4	don't work it out, so to speak, then we
5	need to pick dates to keep this thing
6	moving.
7	MR. HARTMAN: I would argue even in
8	the next 30 days, try to work out what
9	the factual record is. If we have to do
10	counter-motions in the meantime, nothing
11	prevents us from filing those motions
12	before the 30 days.
13	THE COURT: That's an arbitrary 30
14	days, but that's just my way of keeping
15	it moving.
16	MR. GOODIN: Judge, in fairness, I
17	think the contract ran since we were last
18	here.
19	MR. MCDONOUGH: It has expired.
20	MR. GOODIN: But I don't think that
21	was known to anyone when I was last here.
22	MR. MCDONOUGH: It wasn't.
23	THE COURT: I appreciate that.
24	Okay. Talk with Emily. Thanks for your
25	patience.

1	(Proceedings concluded.)
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## CERTIFICATE T Ann Mario Stowers

I, Ann Marie Stowers, RPR, the undersigned, an official Court Reporter for the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, do hereby certify that at the same time and place stated herein, I recorded in stenotype and thereafter transcribed the within 9 pages, and that the foregoing Transcript of Proceedings is a true, complete, and accurate transcript of my said stenotype notes.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my hand this 11th day of October, 2016

Ann Marie Stowers, RPR Official Court Reporter Court of Common Pleas Hamilton County, Ohio



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                  COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
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                   HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
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     CITY OF MADEIRA, ex rel.
     OPPENHEIMER,
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                Plaintiff.
 6
                                Appeal No. C1600762
     VS.
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    CITY OF MADEIRA, et al.,
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                Defendant.
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                 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
13
14
    APPEARANCES:
15
    CURT HARTMAN, ESQ.,
               On behalf of the Plaintiff.
16
    STEVEN GOODIN, ESQ.,
17
    BRIAN FOX, ESQ.,
18
               On behalf of the Defendant.
19
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               BE IT REMEMBERED that upon the
    motions hearing in this cause, heard on
21
22
    Tuesday, September 6, 2016, before the
    Honorable Patrick T. Dinkelacker, a said Judge
23
    of the Court of Common Pleas, the following
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25
    proceedings were had, to wit:
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1 AFTERNOON SESSION - Tuesday, September 6, 2016 2 THE COURT: For the record, City of 3 Madeira, ex rel Oppenheimer versus City of Madeira, Case Number A1506891. 4 5 Mr. Fox, Mr. Goodin, you represent 6 the City of Madeira as well as Tom 7 Moeller; is that correct? 8 MR. FOX: We do, Your Honor. 9 MR. GOODIN: Yes, Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: Thank you. 11 And, Mr. Hartman, you represent 12 Mr. Oppenheimer; is that correct? 13 MR. OPPENHEIMER: That's correct. 14 THE COURT: Thank you. 15 Matter is on the docket today 16 regarding Respondent's Motion For 17 Judgment on the Pleadings. I have read 18 that motion as well as Relator's 19 Memorandum In Opposition to Motion for 20 Judgment on the Pleadings, as well as 21 Respondent's Reply to Relator's 22 Memorandum In Opposition to Motion For 23 Judgment on the Pleadings, as well as the 24 other things that I needed to read. 25 am ready to proceed.

Mr. Fox, Mr. Goodin, is there anything you wanted to say in regards to your motion?

MR. GOODIN: Your Honor, if I might address the Court for a few moments.

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. GOODIN: Judge, we appreciate the Court's time in hearing us on these motions. I know the Court's time is limited. I know you get these motions all the time. This case is a big deal to the City of Madeira and we appreciate you letting us be heard on this. Judge, we will cut right to the point.

We are not trying to be cute by filing this motion or waste anyone's time. We believe this matter is ripe for decision now without any additional discovery. We feel the rule in Ohio in these kinds of cases is very simple.

Basically, it is this. A piece of legislation, a law, charter amendment, anything that has been adopted by a municipality, if that language is not ambiguous, the Court must give it its

plain meaning.

Judge, in this case, the charter amendment which Mr. Oppenheimer apparently drafted, it doesn't even mention public ownership or any kind of prohibition of transfer of the property or against selling any portion of any of the parcels involved.

It clearly only applies to the structures of the building, ask that they be deemed historic and the buildings themselves be allowed to stand. And that's something Madeira simply does not argue or contradict.

Judge, we would argue that even if somehow the language were contradictory or ambiguous, it would still have to be construed against Mr. Oppenheimer as the drafter.

Now, what we think the Court is faced with and what Madeira is faced with here is this. Mr. Oppenheimer apparently wants to depose current former City Council members kind of in hopes that they will give some sort of contrary

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interpretation and I don't believe that's going to be the case but we think that is the concern here. We believe that decision, how this works, under Ohio law, he is stuck with the words that he drafted and put before the voters and that the voters approved and those words, Judge, they are in the materials. It is short and sweet. City of Madeira "was deeded and assumed ownership of Hosbrook House located at 7014 Miami Avenue and Muchmore House located at 7010 Miami Avenue.

In addition to these two
properties, the City also has ownership
of historic Railroad Depot located at
7701 Railroad Avenue. These three
important historic properties are to be
preserved, protected and left standing on
the same ground these structures were
built on. These three historic
structures would be included in the,
quote, unquote, historic district.

That's it. This isn't a typical historic preservation code with pages of

detailed regulations. It is one paragraph. That's what Mr. Oppenheimer's group put out, approved by the voters and that's what we stand by.

Factually, Judge, how we got here,

I believe this is in the pleadings, we
are not speaking outside the pleadings,
is that we got an individual who came
forward and wanted to buy a parcel, a
small parcel that was adjacent to or part
of one of these pieces of land, did not
want to buy the structure, take away from
the structure. This lawsuit was filed.

That deal has since fallen apart, as the Court knows, but we would still argue there is controversy here because this is something that is capable of repetition. We have the feeling we will be back in court, even if the City were to try to sell these.

Again, we are not trying to argue that the properties aren't historic or that the properties can be torn down or anything of the sort. But like most historic properties, they can be

transferred to public hands with certain restrictions that are required by the charter.

So, in terms of relief, Judge, we do believe we are here properly. We don't believe further discovery is necessary. We believe the language is clear. If these folks, voters had intended to prescribe or cut off or prohibit any kind of public ownership, and we put the plain language in here, we believe it did not, so we maintain declaratory judgment can be rendered now as a matter of law for the City of Madeira.

THE COURT: This contract, Article 16, was voted on and in ordinance 15-30, they are meant to counteract each other, whatever, in a way. 15-30 is really no longer applicable because at least as far as this lawsuit is concerned, Mr. Powers, that contract which was attached to that ordinance is done, gone, over; is that correct?

MR. GOODIN: That is correct, Your

Honor.

THE COURT: And in the Complaint, the Complaint is asking, in part, under the first cause of action, the declaratory judgment aspect that, in part, preclude the City of Madeira from proceeding forward with the contract authorized by Ordinance Number 15-30. That contract is gone.

Is there any basis for declaratory judgment in regards to that?

MR. GOODIN: In regards to that specific contract, no, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

As far as the second cause of action, which is the injunction against Madeira and Thomas Moeller as the manager, in part, and I quote from part of it, "This is to order the City of Madeira as far as an injunction from executing or performing any other acts whatsoever in furtherance of any contract or prospective contract authorized by ordinance number 15-30."

MR. GOODIN: In regards strictly to

that ordinance, Your Honor, no. That ordinance is dead. You are absolutely correct.

THE COURT: So what is, in your opinion, if you would help me with that, the justiciable with why is this lawsuit still here, then? I understand that you want me to move on and make it a further order regarding future thing. I am just talking about this lawsuit, the language of this lawsuit, what's before the Court?

MR. GOODIN: That is the key question. I will tell you what our position on that is, very straightforward. The Court is correct, the contract that brought this issue to a head is dead. It is not happening. It has been withdrawn. Ordinance was never enacted. It was never acted upon, I should say.

The City's concern is this, is that the issue underlying it, though, is one that is capable of repetition. It is kind of an exception to the mootness doctrine via the standard of the Ohio and

Federal law that if you have a situation, that appellate review, court review is capable of repetition, this is a classic case.

Our understanding, Judge, is if they ever tried to sell one of these pieces of land again, we will be right back in front of this Court or another court on the exact same issue, which is, does Article 16 prohibit public ownership.

So we are, essentially, Judge, trying to call the question. We believe that we found this exception to the mootness doctrine that allows us to do that.

Our view was that, later it was moved for declaratory judgment so, therefore, declaratory judgment could be appropriate either way under the Ohio law, so that's what we are trying to do here, Judge.

So in terms of, the Court is absolutely correct, the contract really at issue is gone. We believe there is a

1	broader issue as to whether another
2	contract could be entered into. And
3	that's what we are asking the Court, in
4	its discretion, to take up.

its discretion, to take up.

THE COURT: If, in fact, I was to rule that because there is no basis for this Court to enter any type of declaratory judgment, there is no basis for this Court in this particular lawsuit as it is right now to issue any injunctive order, I issue that order, I believe you can help me with it. Let's do it this way. Do I have jurisdiction to do anything further in regard to this case?

MR. GOODIN: In regards to, if you deny the declaratory judgment as written and don't take up the other issue --

THE COURT: Right. What you are asking me to do in addition to what's before me. If I say, you know what, your motion is correct. I am granting the motion on the pleadings, there is nothing for me to decide, it is over, what jurisdiction do I have then to extend any

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other type of ruling? I am done.

MR. GOODIN: You do not. Judge, it would effectively end the case. It would be tantamount to a 12(b)(6) dismissal of pleadings or dismissal as a matter of law. So, it would have the effect of ending the case. We would leave with an entry stating the Court's interpretation of the ordinance or the charter as written.

The way we see it, Judge, under
Ohio law, the Court has two choices, or
three choices. One would be to rule for
the relator and issue declaratory
judgment saying that there is some sort
of public ownership, people are required
to comply here, which we strongly
disagree with.

Secondarily, the Court could find the matter to be moot because the contract is dead and simply dismiss the case.

Or, third, we could issue a declaratory judgment in Madeira's favor saying that there is no public ownership

1 requirement and dismiss the case that way. So we think there are really three 2 paths under Ohio law the Court could go 3 4 down. THE COURT: Thank you very much, 5 6 Mr. Goodin. I appreciate your responses. 7 MR. GOODIN: We would like to 8 reserve a couple moments for Mr. Fox to 9 reply. 10 THE COURT: It is your motion. 11 always give the movant another chance. 12 Mr. Hartman, I know I have read 13 everything you have brought before me and 14 you always do a good job of laying out 15 what you want the Court to read. I guess 16 I am back to the, you know, what is still 17 here? 18 MR. HARTMAN: I think there is 19 still a live controversy actually with 20 respect to Ordinance 15-30. 21 With all due respect, Mr. Goodin's 22 representation that that is over, dead 23 and done with, I don't believe that's 24 accurate. 25 THE COURT: Tell me why.

1 MR. HARTMAN: May I approach? 2 THE COURT: Yes, sir. 3 MR. HARTMAN: This, Your Honor, is 4 a copy of a resolution from the Madeira 5 City Council. It is 17 there -- 16, that 6 was passed this year. This was actually 7 to approve a contract related to the 8 development that's at issue in 15-30 9 ordinance. 10 In light of this lawsuit, they look 11 to do some other things not involving 12 these historic properties. 13 THE COURT: Before you go on, am I 14 allowed to consider this in regards to a 15 12(c)? 16 MR. HARTMAN: I believe you are for 17 two reasons. One, questioning mootness. 18 Mootness actually becomes an evidentiary. 19 Mr. Goodin simply getting up here and 20 saying, it is over and done with is not 21 sufficient evidence to find a case moot. 22 THE COURT: I am not considering it 23 I am considering moot, if I grant 24 their motion and the case is over, then I 25 certainly consider their request for me

to make a further ruling moot.

Go ahead with your argument.

MR. HARTMAN: First issue, the Court has to say is the case moot. If it doesn't, it lacks any case or controversy by which to make any further ruling or decision.

And so like I said, with mootness, the party claiming mootness, which is usually the defendant, has to come in and establish factually that the case is moot, that there is no likelihood that the ordinance will be adopted, et cetera. So Mr. Goodin coming in here and simply saying it is over and done with, the deal has fallen apart, is not evidence, is not sufficient to make it moot.

Resolution 17-16, which isn't public record of the City of Madeira. I believe it is available on their website. So, therefore, the Court can take judicial notice of it both in terms of the 12(c) motion or otherwise.

And if you look at this contract,

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City Council of the City of Madeira authorized on the recital page of this contract they approved, paragraph E talks about this lawsuit and the contract at issue in 15-30.

It says, "A lawsuit has been filed that refences this lawsuit" and then it goes on "which attempts to prevent the seller hereunder and the purchaser hereunder to enter into another contract captioned the first contract for sale. That is the contract at issue in 15-30.

It then goes on, "This recital states that the parties hereto intended to enter into the first contract, but based upon the filing of the lawsuit" -this lawsuit -- "the parties were temporarily prevented from doing so pursuant to the agreed preliminary injunction."

This is the key phrase in this recital.

"If a lawsuit is dismissed or decided in favor of the purchaser, the parties intend to enter into the first

contract."

The parties, the City of Madeira has declared by this contract their intentions to proceed forward with the contract authorized by 15-30. The case is not moot. They have not totally disavowed any interest to pursue that contract. They have actually declared the opposite. So I believe that clearly establishes and repudiates any claim that the case is moot. So, therefore, there is a live justiciable controversy.

Mr. Goodin talks about this case as capable of repetition yet in danger of review. That concept requires fact-specific issues. Simply saying the issue of the charter may come up again is not enough to be, if the case is moot, to be capable of repetition yet in danger of review. It has to be the same or similar factual scenario that has to arise.

And this factual scenario, and the issue really becomes, what is the scope of the authority of the City of Madeira to do with these historic properties, the

properties designated by address, i.e., by parcel, and declaration in the City charter, not only that the three historic properties are to be preserved, protected and left standing on the same ground and that the historic structures will be included in this historic district.

Simply trying to give a broad declaration as to what that means is not the proper role of the Court. The Court must make that ruling based on specific facts, specific instances before it. We brought that to this Court in the context of Resolution 15-30 where the City of Madeira sought to sell, to transfer free and clear a portion of those historic properties without any restrictions whatsoever.

As we indicate in our reply, it is not a question of who owns the property. It is a question of what is done and must be done in order to allow for those properties to be preserved, protected and left standing on the same ground.

We believe the case is ripe and

should adjudicated. It is ripe for adjudication. The question becomes, it is not ripe for motion -- judgment on the pleadings with the declaratory judgment of some declaratory judgment that I don't know what they want.

All this Court can declare, based upon the facts in the case presented, is whether the proposed contract under Resolution 15-30 violates or does not violate that charter provision.

That's all the Court can do. It can only make the ruling and declaratory judgment based on the facts and the issues presented by those facts.

So, at this stage, I don't believe the Respondents are entitled to their judgment on the pleadings. I think we need to develop, really, the scope and the intent of that thing. It is interesting and it is not in the record, but we have come across the legal opinion from the Madeira City Hall director where he opined that the parties -- he says, there is no prohibition against selling

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the property but it should be noted that any party acquiring the property would be subject to the restriction that the properties be preserved, protected and left standing.

Our whole issue has been that Resolution 15-30 provided no such requirement upon the purchaser.

The charter provision is not going to be in the chain of title. Whether or not they do it by restrictive covenant or whatnot, that's what we need at any sale, at any deed transferring any portion of those properties. The properties themselves have to be preserved, protected and left standing on the same ground. How they do that, that's discretionary to the City. But to simply give a fee simple removal or dividing of the property in fee simple with no restrictions whatsoever, that's the issue. 15-30 had no such restrictions, no such limitations upon the purchaser. That's the issue. It is a live issue. And the Court can rule on that live

issue.

I indicated the City charter is akin to a constitution. Courts, in adjudicating constitutional questions rule on the issues that are presented to them and from that, people can start learning and garnering what the constitution means, doesn't mean.

Courts don't open up the door or broadly say, here is what the constitution means, theoretically. Here are the facts. Here is the ruling. And over time, the people learn what the First Amendment means, the 14th and in this case, it will over time based on the specific facts. I believe we need to present the case to the Court probably by cross-motions for summary judgment as to what the scope is and the permissibility or not of the contract authorized by 15-30.

If the Court has any further questions on that, on the mootness question, et cetera --

THE COURT: I go through these

March 24th, the Court put on an cases. entry granting Defendant Thomas Powers' Motion to Dismiss. He is out. So it is not a question of fact where that stands and not just because Mr. Goodin or somebody stood up and said, Judge, it is over and done with. He is out of this lawsuit. If he is out of the lawsuit and the two causes of actions that you filed on behalf of your client, there is nothing I can do about them, I am back to, why does this lawsuit need to continue at all? He is out. That's not a fact issue anymore. There are no facts to be determined, developed, in regards to that. He is out. That's what the cause of action was brought to this Court on, injunctive declaratory relief. went through it again last night. Why am I doing this?

MR. HARTMAN: Because the question is really, this comes up as a taxpayer in an action challenging an abuse of corporate power. Mr. Powers is in only because he may or have claimed interest

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in that contract. Mr. Goodin came in representing Mr. Powers at the time saying, he doesn't need to be in there, so whether or not Mr. Powers is or is not in this lawsuit is irrelevant because the impression is it is an abuse of corporate power. Has the City or is the City exceeding or threating to exceed its corporate powers by entering into the contract authorized by 15-30. And that the Court can say, City, you cannot do that.

whether or not Mr. Powers is in the case doesn't matter. We believe 15-30 is still reliable based upon the recitals in the most recent contract and, therefore, the Court can declare whether or not the contract proposed by 15-30 does or does not preserve, protect and leave standing on the same ground the property at issue.

THE COURT: I appreciate the argument.

Mr. Fox.

MR. FOX: Thank you, Your Honor.

You were correct in identifying for

purposes of this motion today the Court is really constrained to the pleadings under Rule 12(c). Rule 12(c) motions are to be treated just like a Rule 12(b)(6) would, so the Court is really constrained to what was actually pled here. If you look at what's actually pled here, this case is really relatively simple.

If you look at the Complaint,
paragraphs 8, 15, 16, there is the
request by the relator that the Court
prevent the City from transferring this
property because there was some sort of,
I would argue, erroneous belief the local
governments, municipalities under home
rule are not allowed to transfer property
where there is a charter amendment
stating that certain properties are to be
preserved and protected.

Nowhere in the pleadings, either in the Complaint, either in the motion for preliminary injunction is there any sort of connection between the argument that the diminution in value is actually violative of the charter amendment. The

charter amendment is not a work of art.

The City didn't write it. Counsel didn't cause it to be written. The charter amendment is not a work of art. But it is unambiguous inasmuch as it does nothing to constrain or prevent the City from disposing of this property whether it be a sliver or whether it be the whole property, the whole address.

What is of paramount importance with the charter amendment is that so long as these properties exist, they are to be preserved and protected.

Mr. Powers was dismissed out, so the new resolution that we just saw has no bearing or effect on this Court. It is the City's argument that there are really only two options in this case.

One is to dismiss this case for mootness.

The other option is that the Court would grant our motion for judgment on the pleadings and construe this charter amendment such that it acknowledges that the City does have the power to dispose

of this property, that the City does have the power and that there is nothing contained in that charter amendment that would prevent or limit the City's ability to dispose of the property.

THE COURT: Thank you very much, Mr. Fox.

I have read everything I am supposed to read. I thought about this. Interesting arguments from both sides. I appreciate that. It is a 12(c) motion. The standard for a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Civil Rule 12(c) is similar to a standard for evaluating Civil Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

Under Civil Rule 12(c) dismissal is appropriate where the Court, number one, construes the material allegations in the Complaint with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in favor of the nonmoving party as true and finds beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claim that would entitle him to relief. I cite as authority, State ex rel Midwest Pride,

IV, Inc. versus Pontious, 75 Ohio St. 3d 565. It is a 1996 Ohio Supreme Court case. Civil Rule 12(c) motion presents on the questions of law. It may be granted only when no issues of material fact exist and the movement is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The Respondent is asking for three things in the motion.

Number one, their motion be granted in its entirety. That relator's Complaint be dismissed on the merits and the prejudice and that a ruling for future possible lawsuits coming from Article 16 do not prohibit the City from selling any property in its possession.

I have already done a little bit of the complaint situation. Declaratory judgment, from the outset, this lawsuit was brought to preclude the City of Madeira from proceeding forward with the contract authorized by 15-30. That is a contract which is attached as part of the pleadings with regards to Mr. Powers.

According to Mr. Powers being dismissed

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from this lawsuit on March 24th, that is no longer pending before the Court.

The second cause of action was the injunction against Madeira and Thomas Moeller, in part, from executing or performing any other acts in furtherance of any contract or prospective contract authorized by Ordinance Number 15-30.

Again, 15-30 is not something that is pending before the Court. There is no contract pending. There is no deed transfer pending. There is nothing with Mr. Powers. He is out of this case pursuant to the filings in this case. So the Court has trouble with finding what justiciable issue is pending at this point. I think I know which way I have to go on that.

As far as the Respondent's further motion asking the Court for the issuance of a declaratory judgment because, in part, and I am quoting, in part, which is the property in question is in limbo. I understand that.

Drawing a part from my days in the

Court of Appeals, there is no pending issue before this Court. There is no agreed party left. If I, in fact, grant the motion, there may be a grievance in the future, and it certainly looks like it is heading that way, but I don't believe the Court is empowered with the authority or the jurisdiction maybe even to decide the case at this point.

What I have before me, I am persuaded that the motion -- Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is appropriate. I will grant that motion. Relator's Complaint is dismissed on the merits and with prejudice at this point.

I find the other request because there is no justiciable issue before the Court, the Court is not in the business of and should not be in the business of making preemptive anticipatory ruling so I am not going to rule on that.

The case is dismissed. Cost to plaintiff. I would ask for an entry within two weeks.

Anything further for the record at

1 this point, Mr. Fox, Mr. Goodin? 2 Nothing, Your Honor. MR. FOX: 3 MR. GOODIN: No, Your Honor. 4 THE COURT: Mr. Hartman. 5 MR. HARTMAN: If I can seek 6 clarification on your ruling. I was a 7 little lost. You indicate the Motion to 8 Dismiss is granted on the merits and as 9 otherwise stated. I am a little bit lost. If the case is moot --10 11 THE COURT: You are absolutely 12 right. It is dismissed, but I am not 13 ruling on the merits. The merits could 14 be construed to be some type of factual 15 situation. There are not facts I am 16 ruling on because the party that's 17 subject -- that's a good point. If you 18 are providing the Court with an entry, I 19 asked both counsel to provide it to me, 20 but if you are providing it to me, please 21 do not put in there on the merits because 22 I think Mr. Hartman is absolutely 23 correct, it is not on the merits. 24 MR. FOX: Dismissed with prejudice? 25 MR. HARTMAN: You are saying 15-30

is no longer applicable. There is no longer controversy. It is not a disposition on the merits, not with prejudice because if the issue rearises again, with prejudice would be on the merits. There is a res judicata effect. If they reenact the ordinance --

THE COURT: I have to admit, I did not recently look up what prejudice means. I apologize to everybody.

Perhaps the Court should know that. I do not. I do not want to grant this on the merits. I actually took that language, which I wrote out, from your suggested entry.

It will be dismissed. I am dismissing the case based upon the granting of the motion. There is nothing there for me to do. It is over. Help me with the prejudice.

MR. FOX: We will work it out. It was before the Court on motion for judgment on the pleadings so as a matter of clarity, you are granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings as to

points one and two of our attached order, but not to three?

THE COURT: That's correct. I am not ruling on three. You are just asking the motion be granted, which I am doing, and second, the case is dismissed because there is nothing left.

MR. FOX: That's what we are asking for.

THE COURT: The prejudice, you want to take the prejudice out? I don't have a problem. I did not do my homework but I appreciate him bringing that up.

MR. FOX: I think the concern he has with respect to some sort of collateral effect or res judicata effect I think is not something to be concerned about but I will check. We will work on it together.

THE COURT: I appreciate that. If it needs to come back, come on back and I can do my homework. I have done it before. Off the top of my head, I didn't think to do my research on that. Good point.

MR. FOX: Hopefully, we will work it out and won't need to approach the Court. THE COURT: Two weeks? Put the appropriate language on there. If you need to do what you got to do, just let me know. I appreciate the professionalism, the way it was presented. We will see what happens. Thank you very much. (Proceedings concluded.) 

## CERTIFICATE I, Ann Marie Stowers, RPR, the undersigned, an Official Court Reporter for the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, do hereby certify that at the same time and place stated herein, I recorded in stenotype and thereafter transcribed the within 34 pages, and that the foregoing Transcript of Proceedings is a true, complete, and accurate transcript of my said stenotype notes. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my hand this 11th day of October, 2016 Ann Marie Stowers, RPR Official Court Reporter Court of Common Pleas Hamilton County, Ohio

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                   COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
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                   HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
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     CITY OF MADEIRA, ex rel.
     OPPENHEIMER,
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                 Plaintiff.
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                                 Appeal No. C1600762
     VS.
                                 Case No. A1506891
 7
     CITY OF MADEIRA, et al.,
 8
 9
                Defendant.
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                  TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
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14
    APPEARANCES:
    CURT HARTMAN, ESQ.,
On behalf of the Plaintiff.
15
16
    STEVEN GOODIN, ESQ.,
17
    BRIAN FOX, ESQ.,
18
               On behalf of the Defendant.
19
20
               BE IT REMEMBERED that upon the
    motions hearing in this cause, heard on
21
    Tuesday, September 20, 2016, before the
22
    Honorable Patrick T. Dinkelacker, a said Judge
23
    of the Court of Common Pleas, the following
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    proceedings were had, to wit:
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		2
1	EXHIBIT INDEX	
2	COURT'S RECEIVED	
3	1 Entry Dismissing Action Page 13, Line 14 Without Prejudice	
4	without Prejudice	
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MORNING SESSION - Tuesday, September 20, 2016

THE COURT: Anybody here on

Oppenheimer versus City of Madeira?

Come up, gentlemen. We may have a little problem here. It is on the docket for hearing. But in checking my notes, the docket, I am not sure what it is here for.

MR. GOODIN: We had a hearing and you asked us to kind of figure out the entry how this case has gone.

We took the prejudice out. What we did, we have dueling entries, I guess, unfortunately.

Basically, what we understood Your Honor to say was, we had three prongs. Our motion is granted, case dismissed and then a third thing about declaratory judgment. We took three out and then we went to the second prong, said prejudice, and we took that out, which is what we thought the Court wanted.

THE COURT: That's what I said.

 $$\operatorname{MR}$.$  GOODIN: So that's what we proffered.

Mr. Hartman has a different take.

MR. HARTMAN: Gets into the, on the merits, not on the merits, et cetera, because is there going to be res judicata effect to this entry.

The entry that the Respondents tendered indicate firstly, the motion for the judgment on the pleadings is granted, but then the Complaint is dismissed, which is legally incompatible. You can't dismiss a Complaint and then grant a judgment. You either grant a judgment, which is an adjudication on the merits or you dismiss the case.

And under Rule 41(b)(3), and I have got a copy of the rules for the Court on that, Rule 41(b)(3) says that dismissal under division B of this rule, which doesn't apply, and any dismissal not provided for in this rule except as provided below, which isn't applicable, operates as an adjudication upon the merits unless the Court, in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies.

Therefore, I think that it is

1 critical that the entry indicate that it is without prejudice. I have a few cases 2 I pulled that I can show the Court. 3 4 THE COURT: You are okay with their 5 entry if I put without prejudice on it? 6 MR. HARTMAN: No, I don't think --7 I don't think, in essence, legally what 8 the Court did do, it did not grant their motion for judgment on the pleadings. 9 10 you granted their motion for judgment on 11 the pleadings, you are entering judgment 12 in their favor. 13 THE COURT: I thought that's what I 14 did. 15 MR. HARTMAN: But I think 16 substantively -- because if you grant 17 judgment on the pleadings, you can't dismiss the Complaint. 18 19 THE COURT: But I thought granting 20 the motion for judgment on the pleadings in their favor, then the Complaint needs 21 22 to be dismissed. 23 MR. HARTMAN: What you really did 24 substantively is you accepted their 25 arguments, which is the entry I tendered

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which basically says that having considered the briefing oral arguments, Court finds that in light of the City having proceeded in a manner no longer involving the sale of the real estate as authorized by the Ordinance 15-30, there is no longer a live case or controversy. There is no longer a justiciable issue. It is no longer, in essence, a ripe case anymore. You accepted their arguments in the motion for judgment on the pleadings. I just don't want a judgment entered that becomes an adjudicatory thing. Otherwise, I have to take it up on appeal. Without prejudice, it is not even an appealable order.

MR. GOODIN: Judge, if I could address this. Another option that we offered which seems to me the simplest way out of it, if you were inclined to go down this path, we have tendered an order that just says, the case is hereby dismissed, period. No prejudice either way. Nothing about a judgment. Nothing about anything, which struck us as the

1 easiest way out of this thing. If they try to move this property, there will be 2 3 a refiling. 4 MR. HARTMAN: You will argue res 5 judicata. You look at Court of Appeals 6 decisions. There are cases where the 7 Court of Appeals bemoan that trial courts did not say whether or not the dismissal 8 9 was with or without prejudice and then 10 the Courts of Appeals are going through 11 machinations trying to figure out was it 12 with or without prejudice. We know 13 that's a potential issue. 14 THE COURT: I thought if you did 15 not put with prejudice, the law presumes 16 that it was done without prejudice. 17 MR. GOODIN: That was my 18 understanding. 19 MR. HARTMAN: If I may refer you to 20 Rule 41(b)(3). 21 I have a copy for the Court. 22 THE COURT: 41(b)(3). 23 MR. HARTMAN: When the party 24 voluntarily dismisses its Complaint, that 25 it is without prejudice, Rule 41(A)(1).

That's where the default is without prejudice.

paragraph 11.

I have a case, Deutsche Bank National Trust versus Eddington, 2014 Ohio 1769 from the Fourth District,

"It is generally true that under Rule 41(b)(3) when a trial court dismisses a complaint, but the entry is silent about whether the dismissal is with or without prejudice, the dismissal is with prejudice. The presumption that when a dismissal is without prejudice is only under 41(A) when a plaintiff files a notice of dismissal voluntarily.

My concern is without the entry, the argument for dismissal is with prejudice because the entry doesn't indicate such under (b)(3).

THE COURT: All I know is my attempt was to grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings, which I believe then results in the Complaint being dismissed and I am not dismissing it on the merits or with prejudice per

the entry.

That's what I meant to do. That's what I am telling the Court of Appeals, which will take a look at this and that's fine. That is what I am saying to the Court of Appeals. That was my intention. And I think the entry that you have reflects that. Is that correct?

MR. GOODIN: Judge, we didn't say prejudice either way. We are not trying to be funny or pull any trick here. We originally had in there with prejudice so we took that out, and I thought what the Court, I think, thought which that means it is a junk ball, effectively, if it is refiled.

MR. HARTMAN: And if we agree on that conclusion, why not state it?

MR. GOODYEAR: Well, candidly, we also don't want to get beat up with this back and forth. Judge, this may seem like kind of a silly case, but over in Madeira, it is a big deal. Sometimes it has that --

THE COURT: Taking a lot of my

time.

 $\ensuremath{\mathsf{MR}}\xspace$  . GOODIN: I do apologize for that.

Judge, all I can say is, we proffered an order that we thought was to the "T" what you asked for. We can have it reviewed.

MR. FOX: It was consistent, when I confirmed at the hearing, you are granting one, two, but not three? Yeah. So that's what we did. We included within the order that language.

MR. HARTMAN: Part of the problem,
I think, is what City of Madeira is being
told because the City manager reports to
City Council that Judge Dinkelacker
granted our Motion for Summary Judgment.
This is in court, in the case involving
the City's legal ability to sell a
portion of the property within the
historic district. They are viewing it
as a win.

MR. GOODIN: There was never summary judgment. I don't know where he got that.

1 THE COURT: I don't care what the 2 guy says. 3 MR. HARTMAN: We agree that it is not an adjudication on the merits, that 4 5 there is no res judicata effect. Why not 6 have language? We are all on the same 7 page there. That's what I understand the 8 Court's rule is. 9 THE COURT: I am going to go with 10 this. What would you want me to pencil 11 in here to make it part of this hearing? 12 MR. HARTMAN: I think the 13 clarification, basically, that this entry 14 does not constitute an adjudication on the merits and is, therefore, without 15 16 prejudice. If I get that entry, I have 17 to appeal it to preserve my rights. 18 Otherwise, res judicata. 19 THE COURT: I learned as a trial 20 judge, appeal what you want. 21 MR. HARTMAN: I am trying to 22 promote judicial economy, though. We all 23 agree it is not on the merits. 24 THE COURT: Doesn't mean they are 25 It just means they got the last right.

1	say. I know all about the Court of
2	Appeals.
3	MR. HARTMAN: But we all agree it
4	is not on the merits and without
5	prejudicial effect. Why not put it in
6	the entry? That's what I want. We all
7	agree on it.
8	MR. FOX: We don't all agree.
9	MR. HARTMAN: You do think there is
10	prejudicial effect. See, that's my
11	problem.
12	MR. GOODIN: Judge, we submit it to
13	the Court.
14	MR. HARTMAN: If I can tender mine
15	as an alternative.
16	THE COURT: I will tell you what.
17	Mark it as we will make it a part of
18	the record.
19	I am not going to second-guess
20	myself. I understand you are doing your
21	job as an attorney. Good for you. You
22	always do. This is what I said. And,
23	you know what, maybe for clarification,
24	you have a Fourth District case there. I
25	didn't hear our First District. I would

religiously follow what the First District did.

MR. HARTMAN: I got that entry last evening so I didn't have much time.

THE COURT: No problem.

I signed the order that was proffered by the defendants. I do want to make part of the record, Ann Marie, Mr. Hartman's Entry Dismissing Action Without Prejudice, so if this goes to the Court of Appeals, they have a chance to look at that and see what they have to say.

(Court's Exhibit 1 was marked and received into evidence.)

MR. HARTMAN: That raises then a second issue of a stay pending appeal. We did have the agreed injunction in place during the course of this case with the Court entering the entry disposing of the case that would vacate that injunction. I will be asking then for that stay or similar injunction pending appeal.

MR. GOODIN: That goes to the Court

1 of Appeals? 2 MR. HARTMAN: Goes to trial court 3 first. 4 MR. GOODIN: I am unaware of any --5 MR. HARTMAN: Not to belabor this 6 case any further for you. 7 THE COURT: I try to get it right. 8 Once I dismiss the case, especially when 9 and if you file your Notice of Appeal, I 10 have lost all jurisdiction to do 11 anything. 12 MR. HARTMAN: Except for a stay 13 pending appeal. 14 MR. GOODIN: I think that's right. 15 He can file a stay before the appeal goes 16 Then he has to renew it up there. on. 17 MR. HARTMAN: If you deny it, then 18 I go to the Court of Appeals. 19 MR. FOX: We will most certainly 20 object to any preliminary injunction on the merits based on the arguments that we 21 22 set forth in our motion. 23 MR. HARTMAN: I want to give you a 24 heads up. I will file that motion, then. 25 I have to file the Notice of Appeal first

1	and then I file the motion for stay.
2	MR. GOODIN: We will talk again.
3	THE COURT: You could ask them
4	first over there, couldn't you?
5	MR. HARTMAN: No, trial court
6	first. Rule requires got to go to the
7	trial court first.
8	THE COURT: I know on the motion
9	docket, we did that after asking the
10	trial court.
11	MR. HARTMAN: I had that with the
12	abolishment of registered land.
13	THE COURT: Thank you, gentlemen.
14	MR. HARTMAN: Do we need to set a
15	hearing date or tentative hearing date
16	for the stay pending appeal?
17	MR. GOODIN: We'll have an
18	additional conversation.
19	THE COURT: Call Emily. She will
20	take care of you.
21	Thank you.
22	(Proceedings concluded.)
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## CERTIFICATE

I, Ann Marie Stowers, RPR, the undersigned, an Official Court Reporter for the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, do hereby certify that at the same time and place stated herein, I recorded in stenotype and thereafter transcribed the within 16 pages, and that the foregoing Transcript of Proceedings is a true, complete, and accurate transcript of my

said stenotype notes.

hand this 12th day of October, 2016

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my

Ann Marie Stowers, RPR Official Court Reporter Court of Common Pleas Hamilton County, Ohio

## James R. Tepe 7450 Baywind Drive Cincinnati, Ohio 45242 Home: 513-791-0378

October 21, 2016

HAND DELIVERED

Page 1 of 5

Mr. Thomas Moeller, Madeira City Manager, and,
Members of the Madeira City Council,
and,
Members of the Madeira Planning Commission
City of Madeira
7141 Miami Avenue
Madeira, Ohio 45243

Subject: A CLEAR DISPLAY OF UNBRIDLED ARROGANCE BY THE MADEIRA CITY MANAGER

Dear Mr. Moeller, and, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Madeira City Council and Madeira Planning Commission:

During the Public Hearing on October 17, 2016, the Madeira City Manager Mr. Thomas Moeller was asked to explain how he could completely ignore the words — "and other operations which serve alcoholic beverages." — which are printed in Section 150.24, page 33 of the Madeira Zoning Code. Mr. Moeller responded that — "It was his interpretation that Swing Line Grill will be a "Restaurant". Further supporting his interpretation, Mr. Moeller said: "most restaurants today serve alcoholic beverages." "Its a matter of interpretation, Mr. Tepe."

Supporting Mr. Moeller's newly exposed interpretation, the City Law Director Mr. Brian Fox interrupted the conversation between Mr. Moeller and myself and stated that Mr. Moeller's interpretation was properly based on the Ohio Revised Code Section 4301.01. Mr. Fox's statement is totally incorrect. I will address this misrepresentation later in this letter. I believe five City Council Members, Chris Hilberg, Scott Gehring, Melisa Adrien, Traci Theis, and Tom Ashmore were present and witnessed the above described conversations.

Neither Mr. Moeller or Mr. Fox are stupid men. In general, I would give them the proverbial "benefit of the doubt" in normal situations because they are both quite intelligent. However, in this case Mr. Moeller has taken upon himself the authority as Madeira City Manager and has "interpreted" and declared that the very clear and decisive words, "and other operations which serve alcoholic beverages." which are printed in the Madeira Zoning Code, are to be totally disregarded and ignored because he, the powerful City Manager, has interpreted otherwise. The absolutely "scary" situation here is that Mr. Moeller actually believes that he has the authority to override the written words of the Zoning Code.

This display of unbridled arrogance begs one simple question: either the understandable language of the Madeira Zoning Code speaks for itself, or, Mr. Moeller has somehow been granted the authority and ultimate control of "interpreting" the Zoning Code as he sees fit regardless of the Code's written words.

I believe Mr. Moeller's "interpretation" that the Swing Line Grill is to be classified as a "Restaurant" is clearly and intentionally wrong. It is no secret that Mr. Moeller and Mr. Powers have been working together to make this Swing Line Grill evolution a reality for more than five years. The impact of Mr. Moeller's "interpretation" favors Mr. Powers and his Swing Line Grill by reducing the Zoning Code's parking requirement calculation from 87 spaces down to 68 spaces — an improper reduction of the parking requirement by 19 parking spaces.

To: Mr. Thomas Moeller, Madeira City Council, and, Madeira Planning Commission

From: James R. Tepe

As available parking in the immediate area of the Swing Line Grill / B & B Mower property, is and will be in very short supply and is of considerable importance, this serious misinterpretation amounts to a 28% increase in required parking and 19 additional required parking spaces that have not been rightfully considered by the Planning Commission during their June 20, 2016 Granted Zoning Variance.

The Granted 100% 'off-site" Parking Variance for Shared Parking, previously based on 68 required spaces, must now be somehow corrected, or the Approved Variance Request Denied, based on 87 spaces so to adjust for the 19 additional required spaces. What would the Planning Commission have done on June 20, 2016 if they knew that the Madeira Code accurately required 87 parking spaces for this project rather that the 68 spaces they were told by Mr. Moeller? It is common knowledge that the Planning Commission is only permitted to consider information submitted to them by "Staff" and the ARO when considering requested variances. Can everyone see the ongoing problem now? Does this error result in the striking down of the validity of the Planning Commission's misguided Approval?

The Madeira Zoning Code, as well as all other Laws, Codes and Ordinances are to be fully respected and enforced, unless or until these Laws, Codes and Ordinances are repealed or altered by due process. The City Council is fully responsible for all operations and actions of all employees and Commissions. It is absolutely essential that the acting City Manager, considering the substantial authority granted to him or her within the documents directing the operation of the City, <u>must act with the highest level of Idealistic Principles and Ethical Behavior so to advance the respectful efforts and reputation of the City of Madeira.</u>

I believe I have well defined and substantiated in this letter, as well as the 10 previous letters I have written to you in the last five months, that your City is on an absolute collision course with a long series of justified lawsuits mostly caused by less than acceptable actions and "interpretations" by your City Manager.

If Mr. Moeller has been singled out as the City Council's "Sacrificial Lamb" because of special desires of the collective members of City Council regarding the Swing Line Grill project, then you had better take a real hard look at yourselves in the mirror and give yourselves "A Full Blown Conscience Check". If Mr. Moeller is and has been acting on his own in his ongoing display of unbridled arrogance honestly believing that his "interpretations" are more important than written words of the Code, then City Council is obligated to promptly correct this situation by taking actions to reverse the effects of Mr. Moeller's wrongdoings and set the stage for required future improvement in his Idealistic Principles and Ethical Behavior.

As I explained during the Oct. 17, 2016 Planning Commission Public Hearing, I have concluded that Mr. Moeller has consistently "Frustrated the Zoning Process" of the Swing Line Grill project by acting as the "Information Gate-Keeper" and wrongly interpreting and wrongly limiting information which should flow without limitation to the Planning Commission for their consideration. They never get to see the whole picture at one time before they are required to act. They never see all the relative pieces of the puzzle at one time before they are required to act. They receive it "piece by piece" as Mr. Moeller wants them to have it. Knowing that Mr. Moeller knows the Zoning Code better than anyone in the City administration, I find no reasonable excuse for what has been going on. Here are a few examples:

1) June 20, 2016, Only 2 Variances Requested, should have been at least 10 as defined in my 8-1-16 letter,

October 21, 2016 Page 3 of 5

To: Mr. Thomas Moeller, Madeira City Council, and, Madeira Planning Commission

From: James R. Tepe

2) June 20, 2016, Only 68 parking spaces required rather than the legitimate 87 parking space requirement because of Mr. Moeller's wrong "interpretation" as explained above,

- 3) Aug. 15, 2016, Mr. Moeller's statement that "This could be the Final Plan Approval if the Planning Commission fully approves the newly submitted plans and information." Mr. Moeller knew the required "Land Survey" and the "Final Parking Plan" had not yet been submitted to the Commission for their required review and consideration.
- 4) In my Aug. 22, 2016 letter to you I pointed out that the 1 page cover sheet / explanation authored by Amanda Zimmerlin (Assistant City Manager) stated; "Land Survey will be completed after PC Approval in conjunction with City on Approved Lot Split." My letter asked; "Who instructed Ms. Zimmerlin to type this statement". Seeing that Sect. #166.06(B) states: "Final Applications for Planning Commission or Administrative Review for Zoning Approval or Building Permits shall include a Land Survey." There can be no doubt that Ms. Zimmerlin encountered this conflicting requirement. Did Mr. Moeller instruct Ms. Zimmerlin to insert the above conflicting statement into the 1 page cover sheet / explanation she authored? Does this occasion or the effects of this occasion have any connection to her recent departure from employment with the City?
- The Aug. 15, 2016 "Staff Report" included a 2 page ARO Memo from Mr. Ballweg which included 12 Review Items and recommended tentative approval of the Swing Line Grill development contingent on compliance with Mr. Ballweg's requests. However, Mr. Ballweg's review and comments Related to The Wrong Drawings. Was this completely unresponsive ARO Memo intended to withhold the proper ARO analysis of the new Aug. 5, 2016 drawings from the Planning Commission on Aug. 15, 2016 during their Public Hearing? No one realized this blatant error had occurred during that Public Hearing. Does this fact alone strike down the validity of the Planning Commission's Approval of the Aug. 5, 2016 Drawings as the "Approved Preliminary Development Plan"? The ARO had never seen or commented on those Aug. 5, 2016 drawings. How much involvement did Mr. Moeller really have in this calamity? The Aug.5, 2016 Drawings were different than the Drawings Mr. Ballweg had reviewed and commented on.
- 6) At the recent Oct. 17, 2016 Planning Commission Meeting, Mr. Moeller again, by design, withheld the evolvement of the Final Parking Plan from the Planning Commission stating that consideration of the Swing Line Grill Final Application tonight only applies to the Building Plans and the Lot Depicted on the Abercrombie Final Site Layout Plan dated Sept. 21, 2016. This Final Site Layout Plan was signed by Craig Abercrombie, Registered Professional Surveyor. Although I have never heard of a Registered Professional Surveyor being wrong, Mr. Moeller stated that "Railroad Avenue will remain a 2 lane, 2 way roadway and "the Abercrombie "Sealed" Final Site Layout Plan", which was included in the Staff Report for the Planning Commission's consideration at this Public Hearing, "was wrong". The Abercrombie "Plan" is identical to the Aug. 5, 2016 Preliminary Plan Approved by the Planning Commission at their Aug. 15, 2016 Public Hearing. How, according to Mr. Moeller, can this Abercrombie Plan be wrong but essentially Approved by the Planning Commission? I'm sorry but I really can't follow this "Double-talk" and reach a logical conclusion.

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When I asked why the Parking Plan was not to be considered by the Planning Commission and those in attendance at this Public Hearing, Chair-person Tammy Schlagbaum quickly informed me that any parking lot questions were not to be asked or considered tonight – (Case Closed). That is when I openly accused Mr. Moeller of consistently "Frustrating" this Swing Line Grill Zoning Process by wrongly limiting vital information that should automatically flow to the Planning Commission in a timely fashion. Essentially, Mr. Moeller has, by way of the authority vested in him, become the "Puppet Master" of the Planning Commission by limiting the flow of information. Knowing that Mr. Moeller is "Staff", it is common accepted knowledge that the Planning Commission is only permitted to consider information submitted by "Staff" and the ARO when considering identified Variance Requests. I have a number of Planning Commission Minutes that well confirm this statement. This is a big problem.

I now need to address the Law Director Mr. Brian Fox's verbal support of Mr. Moeller's "interpretation" that Swing Line Grill is a "Restaurant" in accordance with the Ohio Revised Code Sect. 4301.01. While ORC 4301.01(B)(12) does define a "Restaurant" for the express purpose (4301.05) of defining the limitations of executive or administrative duties or powers of the Liquor Control Commission which reads: "Sections 4301.03, 4301.04, and 4301.041 of the ORC do not derogate from prejudice any other power expressly or impliedly granted to the Liquor Control Commission by Chapters 4301. and 4303. of the Revised Code, but except as expressly provided in Sections 4301.03, 4301.04 and 4301.41 of the Revised Code, the Commission shall not exercise executive duties or powers."

The Madeira Zoning Code Section 150.24 reads; "Nightclubs, Saloons, Cocktail Lounges <u>and other operations</u> <u>which serve alcoholic beverages.</u>" These words are not difficult to understand unless you want them to be difficult to understand. These words have a defined purpose in the Zoning Code and absolutely have a legal right to exist in the Code. There is no need whatsoever to "interpret" these words differently than what they clearly say. These words, contrary to Mr. Fox's suggested reference to the ORC, have a perfectly legal right to exist and to be respected accordingly. Mr. Fox's comment and directive in support of Mr. Moeller's "interpretation" are clearly incorrect. And one more thing Mr. Fox, the next time you want to do a Deposition on me, please give me proper legal notice and have a court recorder present.

So, considering the fact that the Planning Commission Approved the Swing Line Grill Final Plan with a number of "Conditions", none of which spelled out the inaccuracy of the Abercrombie "Final Site Layout Plan" or the Planning Commission Aug. 15, 2016 Approved identical plan prepared by Swing Line Grill's Architect, I believe I can safely conclude, contrary to Mr. Moeller's comment, that Railroad Avenue can now be reduced to a one-way roadway with a traffic use width of approximately 15.5 feet by the City and Mr. Powers executing the "Commitments" contained in Resolution #17-16 dated April 25, 2016.

As my letter to you from Robert McCabe Co., Inc., DBA McCabe Do-It Center dated October 17, 2016 specified that appropriate legal action would be taken if the City takes any action to dispense of any portion of existing Railroad Avenue Right-Of-Way prior to the City legally correcting their previous illegal "Taking", it is clear that the Oct. 17, 2016 "Approval Action" of the Planning Commission has opened the gate for the Robert McCabe Co., Inc. to proceed with an appropriate legal action as necessary.

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It is also obvious to me that any City of Madeira Taxpayer now has the right to file a Taxpayer's Lawsuit against the City for allowing or causing the Planning Commission to Approve a project in the Main Street Core District that violates Article VII .3, Chapter 154 of the Madeira City Charter which specifically states:

"The Planning Commission shall not grant a Variance in any case in which the deviation from the existing zoning ordinance is so substantial that it is the equivalent of a Change in the Zoning District."

THIS HAS OCCURRED.

Further the Charter Reads:

"When any such Appeal or Variance is filed, the Commission shall hold a Public Hearing on EACH Appeal and Variance---" THIS HAS NOT OCCURRED.

Thank you for your attention. I am also sorry this has turned into such a mess.

Again, Justice Requires Being Held Responsible For Your Actions.

Sincerely

James R. Tepe