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Enemies of the Republic

Illinois: A Triumph of Public Opinion – After an Eight Year's Political War, The Republican Party is Brought to Represent the People – A Missouri Parallel

ILLINOIS is a Republican state. Missouri, which we studied last, is Democratic. "Graft" knows no politics, but the "good citizen" does. To the grafter a party is but a tool of his trade, and the party to which a majority of the citizens "belong" is his party. He does not belong to it; it belongs to him. The result is that neither of our great parties truly represents us; both stand today for graft. They differ upon other, unessential things; they are alike in this, that whichever is in power is the grafter's party. Now, wherever we have gone, we have found that the biggest grafter is Big Business, and Big Business kept changing its party to be of the majority. After Missouri I visited three Republican states—Ohio, New York, and Illinois. The railroad that took me into Illinois turned Republican at the state line. The Royal Baking Powder Company, which had dealt with the Democrats in Missouri, appeared in New York with the Republicans. So with the American Book Company—in Missouri a Democrat, at home in Ohio it is a Republican. And so it goes in national politics. Wall Street, and all that "Wall Street" connotes, was Republican till President Roosevelt, refusing to acknowledge the privilege of capital, enforced the law against a combination of railroads. Then Wall Street began plotting with the Republican leaders for the nomination of a "safe man" for president, and, when that "safe man" died, looked to the Democrats—looked with its great campaign contribution for a bribe—and corrupt Democratic leaders, itching for the great financial graft, began its search for a "safe man."

How Parties Deliver Good Citizens

If the good citizen would do as the corrupt politician and the corrupting business man do, shift freely from one party to the other as the change served his interest, then both parties would represent good citizenship. They would differ—more than they do now—on broad questions of public policy, but they would both stand, as they do not now, for the public interest. But the good citizen is "loyal to party." Half the loyalty that is betrayed by parties would, if devoted to the state and the nation, save the country and the parties, too! Such independence, however, would mean non-partisanship in state and national politics, and the good citizen is only just learning, with many a qualm of conscience, to vote independently in municipal elections. In state and national politics he votes too constantly, not for his state and the United States, but for "his party." Hence his party can deliver his vote. Hence his party does deliver his vote in Ohio, New York, and Illinois, as in Missouri—to all comers with "pulls" and bribes.

What Corruption Really Is

This is serious, since we realized, in Missouri, that “bribery and corruption” are not accidental and occasional, but general and deliberate. I quoted the declaration made in open court by Judge Priest, one of the leaders of the Missouri bar, that bribery, at the most, is a “conventional crime.” And he was right. Bribery out there was “a custom of the country,” and political corruption was a system. And this system, laid wide open by Joseph W. Folk, proved to be, not an evil of government, but the government itself. Corruption had worked a revolution there. The representative democracy described in the state constitution of Missouri was a thing of paper. Drawn by dead men, it was dead. In its stead stood a reorganization of society, a commercial oligarchy, a government of special, not of common, interests; and this, the actual, government of this great state, was not a creation of paper and ink; you could not study it in the state library. We traced its superstructure in the crimes, the indictments, and the confessions of living men, and we saw that its foundation was laid, true and nice, upon the exact adjustment of the sordid ambitions of the political leaders of Missouri to the financial lusts of her captains of industry.

Political corruption, then, is a force by which a representative democracy is transformed into an oligarchy representative of special interests, and the medium of the revolution is the party.

So we must recognize parties and take up next a Republican state—Illinois. Illinois is not so demonstrably corrupt as Missouri. Other Republican states are worse, but these two offer just now a remarkable parallel, superficially in this, that at the same time Joseph W. Folk, the Democratic circuit attorney who had “done his duty” in St. Louis, was running for the Democratic nomination for governor of Democratic Missouri, Charles S. Deneen, the Republican state’s attorney (the same office), who had “done his duty” in Chicago, was running for the Republican nomination for governor of Republican Illinois. There are many unessential differences, and we shall note them as we go along, but fundamentally the parallel is still more striking and significant in this, that while the Democrats of Missouri were being asked to take back from Democratic boodlers the control of their party, the Republicans of Illinois were being asked to take back from Republican boodlers the control of their party. Booble was the issue in both campaigns; booble is the underlying issue in most American political campaigns, but here it was a party issue. Politicians, anxious to preserve their parties, have always pleaded for “reform within the party.” Well, here we have it. Here we have the fighting done within the party, and that is right. For parties do rule us, and if American citizens will “stick to party,” then it is important for all of us to know what each party decides within itself to represent: all of us or a few of us, the common interests which ask for nothing but law, order, and fair play, and pay for these in taxes that sustain the state; or those special interests which seek special favors and pay for them in bribes which corrupt the state.

Municipal Reform Impossible By Itself

Folk began the movement which his candidacy is bringing to a logical conclusion. Deneen did not. This does not matter. We are interested not in the men, but in the issue for which they stand, and the issue arose in both states in the same way—in a fight for municipal reform and the failure to get it. Fortunate failure! “Municipal reform” is a mean ideal. We have talked about it for years now, till it has come to be the highest aim of American citizenship. But think of

it for a moment: It is not the cities alone that are corrupt, but the states also and the United States, and we all know that this is so. Yet we of the cities say, "Give us good government in the cities where we live, and the states and the United States may go to the deuce." It is a mistake. It is more than a mistake. Municipal reform, all by itself, is impossible. City government and state government are of one sovereignty, and, as for corruption, the city and the state are in one system, and the city man and the "up-state" man have to work together to get what each needs.

The big grafter knows this; there is nothing narrow and "provincial" about him, and Folk and the Chicago reformers got over their municipal narrowness by following the big grafter. They started right. They did not begin their reform by passing and enforcing laws to make other people good. They saw early that the "best citizens" were the worst grafters, and they went after them and the municipal legislators who were selling out to them. Folk's method was that of the criminal prosecutor, and he put the municipal bribe-givers and bribe-takers on trial, and when they appealed to the state courts, the pursuit into the state taught the circuit attorney of St. Louis that boodling was not a crime of city individuals, but the established method of conducting public business in both city and state. Boodle was a question of government, and Mr. Folk, in order to finish his job, had to go into politics, and he went into politics. Declaring boodle to be the issue in both city and state, he appealed to the people.

The Corrupt System of Chicago

The Chicago reformers went into politics at the first plunge. The system that confronted them was like that of St. Louis; it was the typical form of municipal government in all unreformed American cities. The citizens were divided between two parties. These parties were organized by two groups of "leaders": Robert E. Burke, John Powers, Mayor John P. Hopkins, and Roger C. Sullivan, "Democrats"; and William Lorimer, "Doc" T. N. Jamieson, James Pease, et al., "Republicans." (Others there were, but those named are active today.) They had a rough working agreement by which the Democrats took the city, the Republicans Cook County, and these governments they ran "for the good of the party." That was their highest spoken sentiment—not the good of the community, but of the party, and the good of the party came to mean the good of the leaders and their friends. They and their friends were in politics for "what there was in it for them." Thus the government of Chicago and Cook County was not a government in the interest of the people.

The followers of the two groups of leaders, operating like bandits, held up citizens and robbed them, just as train robbers and brigands do. Everybody had to pay for everything, lawful and unlawful; taxpayers had to help the tax-collector defraud the city, and shared with him the "reduction"; merchants paid to violate ordinances; contractors to be freed from inspections; health board supervision was largely blackmail; and the police operated a system such as that which we found exposed in Minneapolis. The police of Chicago did not protect life and property; they protected the criminals; they licensed burglars and hold-up men by districts, guarded them while at work, and shared in their booty.

How Corruption Produces an Oligarchy

Now this is preposterous, but this is not the worst. This is crime, and if, when they had committed their crimes, the criminals had run away, all might have been well. But these were not

private robbers, they were public plunderers; they not only robbed the citizens, they plundered the city. And they not only plundered the city and county once or twice, they operated methodically and systematically. And they not only stayed by the loot, they stayed as judges, legislators, and executives. They were the government, and they sold the law, they rotted the sources of the law, they gave away public property, and they carried off the self-respect of the citizens of Chicago. For hold-up men and vulgar criminals were not the only “friends” of the leaders. Their circle included some of the leading citizens of the city. All men who were against the law were with the party rings; all men whose interests ran counter to the public interests were satisfied customers of this traffic in a people. Thus, though boodle was all that the politicians were after, their business was the sale of privileges; and the effect of the establishment of that business as the actual government was to transform the representative democracy of Chicago into an oligarchy—representative of privileged classes.

Our Privileged Classes

Nor is this all. The classes favored were: first, those who—like pickpockets, hold-up men, gamblers, and keepers of saloons and bawdy houses—wanted to break the law; second, those who—like tax-dodgers, railroads, and established big businesses—wanted to evade the law; and third, those who—like traction, gas, and other public utility companies—wanted to abuse general and procure and misuse special laws. In other words, boodle and graft, the “evils” happy pessimists speak of so lightly, had turned the city government of Chicago into an oligarchy of the worst citizens, of the enemies of the city.

Two Kinds of Municipal Reform

The Chicago reformers attacked the third form of corruption, that of active boodling for franchises and other special ordinances. As I have pointed out in “The Shame of the Cities,” there are two main roads to reform. One goes down among the vulgar criminal classes to the correction of obvious police scandals, and leads to what we call “good government.” This is easily achieved. Minneapolis got it in a summer. New York has fought longer for it, but has it at last—from Tammany Hall! The other road takes the reformer higher up among his own friends through high finance to higher politics, and leads, when successful, to an awakened public opinion against corrupt misrepresentation in government—to what I call self-government. Chicago’s Municipal Voters’ League had every incentive to fight for “good government.” The city had police graft and administrative abuses as bad as any Minneapolis or New York ever had. But John H. Hamline, William Kent, and other young men who were serving as aldermen, and the best of the newspapers, advised the League to strike at the council, and George E. Cole and his associates struck at the council. And when they struck there they struck the trail we traveled with Folk from St. Louis, the trail that runs between the two great parallels, business and politics, out of the city, up through the state to the United States.

Council Reform and the Political Rings

The council was the heart of the corrupt system of Chicago. The aldermen, supposedly elected to represent the city, but really chosen by the leaders of the two parties, were selling out the city. Peter Dunne (“Mr. Dooley”), a reporter in those days, described many of the members

as criminals marked by nature as such. Two-thirds of them were organized into a bipartisan “combine,” which operated under the direction of a “good business man,” Martin B. Madden, president of the Western Stone Company. “I rounded up the boys,” said Johnnie Powers (Democrat), “and Madden (Republican) told ’em what for.” There we have the linking of the two rings, political and financial. Back of the Democrats in the “combine” were the party bosses—“Bobbie” Burke, Mayor Hopkins, and Roger Sullivan, and back of the Republicans were the Republican bosses—Billy Lorimer, “Doc” Jamieson, Pease, and others. Lorimer, Jamieson and Company did not direct or share in the bribery of Republican aldermen. The city council was not a Republican graft; the Republicans, as I explained, had the county. But just as the Republican sheriff, in return for noninterference by the Democratic police in his horse-racing graft, let the police alone in vice graft, so for general immunity from all hindrances in their county contracts, the Republican leaders delivered over to the Democrats the Republican aldermen to vote with the “combine” that sold out municipal legislation. This was the bipartisan political system back of the corrupt council.

In front of the council were two financial rings. One of these was intact when I began my study of Illinois; this is the ring which centers in the Chicago National Bank— John R. Walsh, president. Walsh is a Democrat. He is the owner of the Democratic party organ, *The Chronicle*, and the power behind the throne of the Democratic bosses. The power behind the throne of the Republican bosses is John M. Smyth, the head of one of Chicago’s “big stores.” Smyth (Republican) is a director of the bank of Walsh (Democrat), and its former cashier, now vice-president, is Fred M. Blount, an active Republican politician.

The great graft of the Chicago Republicans is public contracts, and they control the sources of contracts—state and county boards and, through judges like Hanecy, and the governor, park boards. Lorimer was a street-car driver, but in politics he became a contractor and a friend of Walsh. Walsh is treasurer of the South Park Board; William Best, a director of the Chicago National Bank, is a member of the board, and so is Lyman A. Walton, vice-president of (Walsh’s) Equitable Trust Company. Blount has been treasurer of the West Park Board and of the Sanitary Board. The latter is the board which has spent millions to reverse the Chicago River, and make it, the city’s sewer, run out of, instead of into, the Lake. This developed a water power which the board once proposed to sell to a private corporation. Thomas M. Smyth, a relative of John M. Smyth, is an ex-president of the board. Contracts from all these boards have gone sometimes to a Democratic firm like Lyden & Drews (Lyden is a nephew of ex-Mayor Hopkins), more often to a Lorimer firm. Walsh’s institutions bond public officials and public officials deposit funds in his institutions. So do many of the politicians and sporting people. Other banks share in all this “legitimate graft,” of course; the Chicago National group does not get it all. Here, briefly outlined, is one great business ring which profits by, is satisfied with, and gives financial aid and moral support to the debased political system of the city, county, and state.

The other ring, now broken, was that of which the world-famous promoter, Charles T. Yerkes, was the center. He went to Chicago as a representative of Widener & Elkins, the street railway “financiers” of Philadelphia. He bought *The Inter Ocean*, the newspaper organ of the “stalwart” Republicans, and became a financial leader. He banked at the Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, John J. Mitchell, president. Now Mitchell is to Chicago what J. P. Morgan is to New York. But when Yerkes, recognized and beaten by Chicago, organized his street railway properties to leave them, the financial scheme involved a capitalization which could only be floated upon the theory that a new franchise was obtainable, and upon terms which it is incredible would be granted by an honest city council; yet Mitchell in Chicago and Morgan in

New York helped float this plan for the Union Traction Company. Such financial cooperation is moral support, and Yerkes had that from Mitchell and from other banks; he had it from the financial world generally. And when you consider the ramifications of influence from such banks in both rings, their directors, stockholders, customers, and friends, and from associated institutions, companies, and businesses, you can begin to understand what upheld the Hopkins-Sullivan Democrats, the Lorimer-Jamieson Republicans, the corrupt city council, and the whole rotten system of Chicago graft. What I have given is but a superficial sketch of the two main groups of those respectable powers which the Chicago reformers attacked when they attacked the Chicago City Council.

In 1895, when the Municipal Voters' League began its work, these financial powers had big plans before them. We shall follow two of them. The People's Gas and Coke Company wanted to combine all the Chicago gas companies and make a monopoly. The Hopkins-Sullivan Democrats, knowing this, had put through the council, when Hopkins was mayor, a franchise for the Ogden Gas Company. The organizers boast that they paid no bribes, but why should they? In the deal were Martin B. Madden, Johnnie Powers, Thomas Gahan, Roger Sullivan, and others. Chicago believes Mayor Hopkins had a two-elevenths interest, but I was most urgently persuaded to think that he had not. Say he wasn't in the deal. His crowd was, and among them were the politicians who sold franchises to business men; why shouldn't they give one to themselves? The scheme had all the marks of what, in Pennsylvania, would be called a "mace"—a company organized to sell out at blackmail prices to a "trust"; and, as a matter of fact, some fellows in the deal did come pretty near blackmail in their efforts to make the People's Company buy them out. Moreover, the two companies are working amicably together now under a financial settlement that made fortunes for the political promoters. But I must not get ahead of my story. In 1895 the gas deal had been passed through the "Democratic" Chicago council and was ready for the Republican state legislature.

The other big plan was Yerkes's own. Many Chicago traction franchises were expiring, and the companies wanted to have them extended. The corrupt municipal system being in good order, the companies could have had from the city council anything bribery could buy, but the council was unable under the law to grant an extension of franchises for more than twenty years, and that was not enough for Yerkes. Some of his bonds ran longer than that, and besides, he had learned his financial politics in Pennsylvania, where they give franchises for 999 years and "in perpetuity." Yerkes wanted a franchise for at least 50 years.

Yerkes Goes to the state System

And he tried to get it. Where? From the Illinois state legislature. Yerkes was a Big Business man, and, like the gas men, he understood the whole machinery of government as it is. He did not try first for home rule in Chicago; his plans took him out into the state. He was not dependent upon the boodlers of Chicago. Yerkes knew that corruption was a state as well as a municipal system in Pennsylvania, and when, in 1895, he went to Springfield, the capital of Illinois, he went confident that he would find the system there. And it was there.

The Old state System

It had been there for at least twenty years and closely resembled that of Missouri. The railroads and other great corporations of the state had built it up, and it was theirs. They hadn't

much use for it in Yerkes's day; they had long before got about all they required. They were vulnerable to taxation, but they controlled the state Board of Equalization (of taxes). About the only other use they had for the system was to prevent adverse legislation, and since, as the railroad men say, Illinois is "fair" and harbors no anti-railroad sentiment, they were, and they are, in very little danger. Nevertheless, with a few notable exceptions, the roads have always kept in touch with politics all along their lines, and maintained the system which still is the actual government of Illinois. The head of it is, not the railroad lobby, as in Missouri, but the bipartisan group of senators, called the "Senate combine," which is an old institution now reduced to refined blackmail and the orderly protection, for lump fees, of special interests. The House, more unwieldy and changeable, has to be moved by individual bribes of various amounts, and there is often scandal and quarreling over the division of the spoils; but the "regular business" in the House is done by committees which the Speaker appoints. To complete the legislative system, the governor should be either a figurehead or the boss.

There are railroad officials and corporation managers in Illinois of sufficient moral development to denounce corruption and oppose it, and they think well of themselves, because they never boodle. But the corrupt system which their roads established remains standing ready for the service of all who seek to plunder the people. And when Yerkes arrived, it was at his service. The system put through his 50 years' act for him. There was much talk of money paid; when, after the session, Speaker Meyer died, a large sum in new thousand-dollar bills was found in his safe deposit box. But Governor Altgeld, a Democrat, and neither a figurehead nor the boss of the system, vetoed the bill. The old system was not in good working order.

Yerkes, a great man in his class, set about making it go. In a quiet, "business-like" way, he "favored" John R. Tanner for governor on the Republican ticket for the election of 1896. Tanner was chairman of the Republican Central Committee. As we noted in Missouri, the chairman of a state committee is a powerful factor in a corrupt state system. Tanner came as near being a state boss as any man in Illinois politics, and he was "safe." He was nominated, and in that presidential year "good old Republican" Illinois elected him with a "solid Republican" legislature. Thus was the Republican state system repaired.

All clear before him, Yerkes found trouble brewing in his rear. The Democratic city system was getting out of order. The Chicago reformers were making progress. They were cutting down the corrupt majority of the council and organizing the public opinion which the great Chicago newspapers had developed against franchise stealing. Better men were chosen aldermen, and the League and the newspapers watched them and made the public watch and understand. By the spring of 1897 traction and Yerkes had become an issue in the city, and Carter H. Harrison was elected mayor on it. Yerkes was not afraid of Harrison. "Bobbie" Burke, the Democratic boss, had nominated the young man, and, though Harrison talked inimically, Burke would probably control him; and, anyhow, Yerkes used to say, "every man has his price."

Yerkes Relies Upon the state System

To make sure of his plans, however, Yerkes determined to make the perfected state system do the whole job for him. Instead of having it grant the city council power to extend traction franchises, he would have the state legislature pass bills granting the extension outright. And a set of measures, called the Humphrey Bills, which gave the companies fifty years more of life, were introduced in the Senate. This was an outrage, but it rendered a great service to Chicago. The Humphrey Bills began for the city one of the greatest lessons a city can learn—that the state is a

part of the municipal government and that municipal reform must include state reform. The mayoralty campaign was going on when these bills appeared, and the candidates, their orators, and the newspapers lashed themselves and the voters into a white heat over them. These bills violated the principle of "Home Rule," and mass-meetings denounced them in burning resolutions which spoke of "financial anarchists," "bribe-givers and bribetakers," and ordered posted on billboards as political traitors all Cook County senators who voted for the Humphrey Bills. The city recognized the real enemies of the city. John Maynard Harlan, a candidate for mayor, and the city's most effective orator, called a roll of directors and stockholders of the Chicago City Railway Company; these were the most self-respecting men in Chicago—Erskine M. Phelps, George H. Wheeler, Samuel W. Allerton, Marshall Field—but their company was interested with Yerkes; their counsel was with him at Springfield; and the town believed that their company's money was being paid out with his in bribes. This is the way Mr. Harlan called the roll:

"And now we have got to talk plain language. We have got to hold the right people responsible. We have got to name the directors of these companies; call them up. Erskine M. Phelps, I put you on the stand; take your seat; take your oath before the people of Chicago; place your hand upon the Bible of the people; take your oath, and let me question you, a director of the city railway. Erskine M. Phelps, do you know that your general counsel, do you know that the president of your company is down at Springfield—or if not there in person, by his attorney and representative—for the purpose of taking part in a grand larceny of the people of Chicago? There for the purpose of burglarizing the City of Chicago? If you don't know that we tell it to you now. Your agent, your president, your general counsel, formerly an honored member of the bar, that has done great service to this community, your general counsel is there engaged in this vile conspiracy. Now you know it, you know it well, Erskine M. Phelps, and you—should stop it.

"Marshall Field, merchant prince, the founder of a great museum, a museum that shall be the home of art, literature, and science; Marshall Field, whose voice is heard, when he chooses to make it heard, in the councils of the nation; Marshall Field, to whom there has been no such word as failure in all his private undertakings; Marshall Field, stockholder, influential citizen; Marshall Field, bring your influence to bear as a stockholder and stop this robbery."

The People of the state Aroused

Thus Mr. Harlan went through the list. It hurt, and it helped, too, for it aroused public opinion all over the state, and state opinion was needed, for when the reformers and Mayor Harrison, elected, went down to Springfield to protest, they found the state system at work for Yerkes, and it was at work for the gas companies also. It was one of the worst sessions in the history of the state. Everybody—captains of industry and bosses, bootblacks, hack-drivers, and chambermaids—talked graft; all men seemed to have money, and the bars and poker games were awash with it. It was a system in joyous operation, and anybody—the reformers, Chicago, the whole state—could see just what it was and whose it was and who were directing it.

The State System at Work

Yerkes sat in a chair at the head of the stairs in the rotunda of the capitol; he represented the American business man. In the executive chamber was Governor Tanner; he represented the state machine. William Lorimer occupied a chair in the Senate chamber; he represented the Republican party organization of Cook County. In the lobby moved "Doc" Jamieson

(Republican) and Roger Sullivan (Democrat). The Democrats of Cook County turn over to the Republicans the legislators they elect just as the Republicans of Chicago deliver Republican aldermen to the Democrats. But Roger Sullivan and his followers represented the Hopkins-Sullivan-Gahan Democrats at Springfield, and the two groups of "leaders" labored together. One day when Mayor Harrison, there to speak for his city, came up the stairs, Yerkes laughed at him, and well he might; for with both party leaders, the governor, and the state delivering over the city to him, what could the mayor of the city do? It was absurd. The mayor protested and the citizens met in mass, but their state government did not represent them; it represented "Business"; special, not common, interests. And the gas and the traction bills were advanced.

The Gas Deal Through the System

There was a hitch over the gas bills. They went to committee with the understanding that everything was "arranged," and gas stock rose. The bills did not come out and the stock dropped. Then "all was settled" and the stock revived. Again the bill hung, and all was unsettled, especially the stock. This happened time and time again, till the impression was spread abroad that the People's and the Ogden were fighting. Then the bills came out and were passed. It developed afterward that while petty legislators may have received cash bribes for gas legislation, the "Senate combine" and the bosses were taking their pay out of the stock market, and the succession of favorable reports and apparent failures were only for stock-jobbing purposes. After the session Lorimer, Jamieson, and others had plenty of money, and people were asking them "where they got it." The answer in the public mind was that they "got it" for putting the gas bills through with the traction deal, and they were silent for two years. Then they suddenly explained. Their belated explanation differed somewhat from that just given, but it admits that they received gas stock and is full of incidental interest.

In 1899 these Republican bosses were accused of a wish to make John W. Gates a United States senator. When such politicians choose such a "business man" for such high office, it is a safe working hypothesis to assume that the man himself or the business he represents has been at least a steady contributor to campaign funds. The Chicago newspapers had to account for the sudden rise of this great financial "sport" to such "bad eminence," and they recalled that in the rush of business men to the scandalous legislature of 1897 Gates was there with two bills for his Illinois Steel and Wire Company, and that Lorimer and Jamieson helped him to pass them. Now Lorimer and Jamieson were for Gates for United States senator. Why? Report had it that Gates had purchased for them, at 82, two thousand shares apiece of gas stock; and that when the gas bills passed Lorimer sold his at 93, while Jamieson held on till he got 103 and cleared \$40,000. The bosses liked this story, for the Gates bills were "honest bills." Here is Jamieson's statement as printed in the *Chicago Evening Journal* and never publicly denied:

The Bosses' Explanation

"As far as the stock story goes, it is correct. It is also true that the start of it was the four thousand shares of gas stock which Mr. Gates margined for us. It was in return for our looking out for Bills 90 and 108 (Gates's), which were liable to be overlooked in the rush of the closing day of the legislature. They were perfectly honest bills, there was no opposition to them, and our influence simply went to the extent of having them called up for discussion and passage. There were no views or votes against them, and naturally they passed. Mr. Gates in return gave us the

gas stock and we carried it through the big rise. With the money made we have made other deals. We have speculated freely and I may say with some success, and I do not care who knows it. There is nothing about the entire transaction to conceal, and perhaps it will answer the question some of our enemies have asked, 'Where did you get it?' Since it is out, I have no desire to deny or conceal it.

"As for Mr. Gates' candidacy, that is another matter. I do not know what his ambitions are. But I will say this, that he can have anything I can give him or help him to get. He has been a heavy contributor to the Republican campaign funds for many years, and has taken a big interest in state politics. He is a big man in this state, brainy, influential, and a leading manufacturer. He would make a good senator and he can have my support whenever he wants it. I am making no announcement of his candidacy, neither do I deny it. He could have a very large portion of Cook County back of him."

Lorimer, congressman and boss, said: "I have no desire to conceal anything. What Dr. Jamieson has said I indorse, and I am inclined to think Mr. Gates would get a good chance of winning if he entered the race as a candidate for senator."

Gates did not go to the Senate, so we may pass this side-light on the way "the System" produces United States senators. Pass also, but note well, the exposure this "explanation" makes of the character of the Cook County leaders of the Republican party of Illinois. The fact of immediate interest is that the gas bills went through the legislature and were signed by the governor, and that Chicago did not care. The city had been torn up again and again for the mains of companies that promised competition to the trust, and always the competitors sold out to the trust. They were at least relieved of that condition, for the purpose of the bills was to create a monopoly.

Illinois to Chicago's Rescue

Chicago concentrated all its attention upon the Humphrey bills, and that attention began to take effect. These bills had come down from the "Senate combine" to the House, and were in a fair way of being passed there, when the agitation in Chicago and the fight of the Chicago newspapers, which circulate throughout the state, aroused the country people, who began to speak to their representatives in the lower house. There was no direct appeal from Chicago to the country. I have never yet come upon an instance where a state, having been made intelligent concerning any sound, essential demand of a city, has failed to respond, but few cities have learned to confide in the "farmers," as they call them, and Chicago had not. Chicago's case was presented only indirectly to Illinois, but the state acted. Illinois killed the Humphrey bills in the House.

That did not beat the bosses. Chicago's chief stated objection to the Humphrey bills was that they violated the home-rule principle, so Yerkes substituted another, called the Allen Bill, which did not grant outright the fifty-year extension of franchises, but permitted the Chicago council to do so. From the point of view of the country this was fair, since it left the problem to Chicago, but as Chicago saw it, the move was an appeal from the state system back to the city system, and, with the implication of threatened bribery of the council, the Allen Bill threw the city into a fresh tempest of passion. The swing of public opinion was so swift that even the Allen Bill seemed in danger. The country members had "lost their nerve," and the bosses saw that the measure must be advanced under the gavel. Speaker Curtis was afraid to use force, and he suddenly developed a "gum boil," and was sent off in a special car to Mammoth Cave. The

speaker pro tem hammered the bill through to the third reading, then it was passed by both houses and Governor Tanner signed it.

Traction Fight Back in Chicago

The next step for Yerkes now was to get a Chicago council that would pass an ordinance to carry the Allen Law into effect. The outlook was discouraging, for the town was ringing with wrath, but Yerkes and his friends in both parties went quietly to work. The honest newspapers and the League also went to work, however, and loudly, and their appeal was to the people to send up aldermen that Yerkes couldn't buy. How the people responded, I have told in an article on Chicago in "The Shame of the Cities." But there is a part of the story I did not tell, Mayor Harrison's part. The League had tried to get enough honest aldermen to organize the council, but failed. Johnnie Powers beat them and the combine controlled the committees and had a majority for Yerkes's Lyman ordinance, which was to put the Allen Law into effect. But the mayor presides in the Chicago council, and he has a veto which it takes a two-thirds vote to override. Carter H. Harrison was the key to the situation.

Yerkes "Sees" Mayor Harrison

The time was come for Yerkes to "see" Mayor Harrison. The promoter had called often on the young man in the city hall, but always the mayor's secretary or someone else was by. Yerkes asked the mayor to dismiss the witness or go into a separate room, but the mayor never would. Now, with the council organized and ready, Yerkes had to "see" Harrison, and alone, and he saw him alone, as Yerkes thought; but there was a witness, so I know that Yerkes said that he could not understand why the young mayor was against traction. "Many of my friends in the deal are your friends," he said. "Some of your friends are in it. Why are you against it?" And the mayor answered that. Then Yerkes put to the mayor the great question:

"Mr. Mayor, what is it that you want?"

When the mayor answered that, Mr. Yerkes saw the beginning of the end of his Chicago career. He did not give up at once. The fight proceeded in the council, and it was a fight indeed. Reform aldermen were bought over and Harrison Democrats weakened, but the reformers put spies on their men and Harrison put the whip on his. And the System had its troubles, too. Aldermen in the boodle combine were asked by their children if what the other "scholars said at school was true, that their papa was a boodler." Willing boodlers coming home at night found a mass committee from the ward waiting to ask them if they were going to "sell us out to Yerkes." One alderman, finding his house closed against him one night, knocked for admittance, and, when his wife answered, she asked through the closed door if he was "for Chicago or for Yerkes." Some of these men declared they would have to "go back on the party," and many more had to "turn honest," for a mob, organized by Harrison Democrats, stood ready with ropes at the crisis to hang all "traitors." The council did not make the Allen Law effective; it did not grant a fifty-year extension of franchise for "nothing but boodle." Mayor Harrison defeated the treason of his own party.

National Democrats Speak for Yerkes

Chicago is thinking seriously now of throwing aside Mr. Harrison for a mayor who will give the city administrative reform, and anyone who will talk with this remarkable man must feel that a change is necessary. He has made many improvements. He has abolished some intolerable abuses. With all that he has accomplished, however, graft and inefficiency persist, and I could not find in his own mind any hope of such thorough-going administrative reform as that which Chicago now seems bent upon. No, that will not come from Mr. Harrison; he does not, in his heart, care enough about good government to give it. But Harrison does care about self-government; he really has a sense of government for a people. I don't know how he came by it, whether it was born in him or was acquired from his political experience, nor does that matter. Harrison is not merely a Democrat; he is a democrat with a small d. For the democracy he withstood Yerkes and all Yerkes's money. And he withstood also Richard Croker. The Tammany boss called on the ambitious young mayor just before a national Democratic convention. He spoke for himself, William C. Whitney, and other National Democrats, and his subject was the future of the party and Mr. Harrison. As the mayor once put it with a laugh: "Croker took me up on the mountain and showed me the cities of the earth." And while Harrison contemplated the view, Croker said that he had a friend, Mr. Yerkes, and that anything Mayor Harrison could do for that friend would be appreciated by Mr. Croker and by Croker's and Whitney's Wall Street friends, whom Yerkes had loaded up with Chicago traction stock. The Chicago Democratic mayor put aside the temptation of the national Democrats, and he cut loose from some of the same sort of "Democrats" at home. He did not recognize John R. Walsh. He fought Johnnie Powers and his Democratic combine. He finally dropped "Bobbie" Burke, his own Democratic boss. And when leaders of the Hopkins-Sullivan-Gahan wing of the Cook County Democracy came to him to sign an ordinance to permit them to sell out their Ogden Gas Company and complete the deal with the People's Gas and Coke Company, he refused them also. The two companies have finally come to an understanding with John R. Walsh, Roger Sullivan, etc., on the Ogden board; and C. K. G. Billings, chairman of the People's board, on the board of Walsh's bank. But they could not combine legally, and it was Harrison who foiled them. Harrison has lost all these leaders of the "business end" of his own party, and he had beaten them year by year till this spring. William R. Hearst came along with his anti-trust boom for the Presidency and combined with those fellows who have sold out the democracy to trusts. With such help the Hopkins-Sullivan-Burke-Powers democracy rose and defeated the Harrison democracy. Let Chicago put Harrison aside and go on its way, as it must, but the city should acknowledge that this man has served well the City of Chicago and American democracy.

Fighting Back in the state Again

But this is a Republican article. Yerkes, beaten in Chicago, was looking back to the state again. And Chicago, victorious in Chicago, was also looking back to the state. Yerkes asked only time and no legislation. Chicago demanded the repeal of the Allen Law in the session of 1899. Yerkes's hope was in the state system; Chicago's was in the people of Illinois, and this time the appeal was direct; not sympathetic, but emotional and intimate, and the country papers took it up. Chicago asked the state to keep out of the legislature every man who had voted for the Allen Law, and—I'd like to have every city in every state grasp the significance of the result of this cry of Chicago to Illinois—of sixteen retiring senators who voted for the act, but two were reelected; and of the eighty-two representatives who voted for it, but fourteen were reelected.

By this verdict the state system was thrown out of order once more, and it had to be rebuilt. The "senate combine" was reorganized, but it was timid, and Lawrence Y. Sherman, one of the fourteen representatives reelected over their Allen vote, was elected Speaker of the House. But Sherman, a lean, long, fighting countryman, "deceived," he said, "by Lorimer," was swearing angry at the Cook County ring, and when he organized the House he knew what he was about. It was his House, not Yerkes's, not Lorimer's, and it was going to repeal the Allen Law "first off." No Lorimer-Jamieson leader dared approach Sherman, so Yerkes himself sent for him and wanted the Speaker to "gavel" the repeal down.

"Will the Allen Law be repealed?" he asked Sherman.

"I don't know," said Sherman, "but there will be a roll-call."

"If there's a roll-call the bill will be repealed," said the captain of industry.

"Do you think I would stand up there and suspend a roll-call on a measure so important as that?" Sherman asked. Then Yerkes became angry. "You don't dare let the Allen Law be repealed. No man can turn tail on our interests and live politically."

There was the voice of the system, the sentiment of Big Business. Sherman dared, and Sherman has had to fight for his political life; but he lives politically by fighting. And he lives in Illinois, too. Yerkes lived in New York and London. There was a roll-call on the Allen repeal, and it was carried, with only one or two votes against it. The Senate passed it on up to Governor Tanner, and the governor signed it. That ended traction legislation in the interest of the franchise boodlers; and it ended the use of the state government as a system for turning out laws for special interests. But it did not destroy the System itself.

Chicago Takes the Aggressive

Mayor Harrison and the Chicago reformers, strengthened in the city council, took the aggressive now. They could refuse to extend franchises to the street railways, but they would have to let the companies run over the time, since the city had no power to take the property. They did not all want "municipal ownership," but the city had to obtain from the state legislature power to receive back the property in order to carry on negotiations to compel fair terms. They might not want to exercise that power, but they had to have it. They asked the legislature of 1899 for it. The legislators, afraid of the whole subject, would not touch any phase of it, and nothing was done. Negotiations with the companies proceeded, and the disposition of the city council, mayor, and reformers was to be fair, but the traction people would not give up their faith in corrupt force. They would not settle. In 1901 the city returned to the Springfield legislature with a comprehensive bill for a general street railway law, but the state system was being reorganized, and it was strong enough to strangle the city's bill in committee.

Chicago Takes Up Legislative Reform

That brought home to some of the Chicago reformers with full force the truth that the state legislature, being a part of their municipal government, was as much in need of systematic study and improvement as the council. That was as far as they saw. They did not yet realize that the legislative system is but a part of the whole state system, that this system is rooted in the corruption of the lesser cities, the towns, and country districts, and that general state reform is as necessary as municipal reform in Chicago. But Chicago reformers make their observations, not in a study, but on the firing line, and they see only what is right before them. They shoot at what

they see, however, and in 1901 they organized a Legislative Voters' League for Cook County, with George E. Cole as president and Hoyt King as secretary. This League applies to the nomination and election of senators and representatives from Chicago the same methods that proved so effective for aldermanic reform, viz.: it keeps records of legislators' votes and conduct, publishes them, and advises upon their nomination and election. Reform in Chicago always organizes, informs and helps direct the public opinion aroused, and its leaders wield that tremendous power with tact, political skill, and common sense, and with effect—as they proved so dramatically at the next session of the legislature, the session of 1903.

Chicago was bound to have its enabling legislation. Yerkes was gone, but his representatives and successors and the Lorimer-Jamieson Republican ring were bound to have no legislation. There was a new governor, Richard Yates, but Lorimer had led a convention stampede to nominate him, and he was “with the party.” The legislature was Republican, as usual. Lawrence Y. Sherman and a group of independent Republicans, called the “Fighting Forty,” were preparing to represent Chicago, but the Chicago bosses organized the house with John H. Miller for Speaker. There were rumors that the newspapers and the Legislative Voters' League had warned and won over the “Senate combine,” but it was the same old bipartisan combine, and the bosses trusted it. The situation seemed to be in Lorimer's hands when the representatives of the Municipal and Legislative Voters' Leagues, of the city council, and of all the candidates that were running for mayor in the pending Chicago campaign, looked it over at Springfield. Mr. Edwin Burritt Smith, who was there as special counsel to the city council's Traction Committee, sums it up thus in his article in the *Atlantic Monthly* for January, 1904: “It was understood that, as a condition of his election, the Speaker was required to promise to carry out Hinman's (the editor of Yerkes's “Republican” *Inter Ocean*) orders on all street railway measures, and to use the gavel when necessary to defeat objectionable legislation. Mr. Gus Nohe—Lorimer's member from his own legislative district—when asked whether there was to be any traction legislation, replied: ‘I don't know. I do whatever the old man (Lorimer) tells me; and he tells me to do about traction as Hinman says.’ Hinman himself announced that there would be no traction legislation at that session.”

Chicago Bosses Against Chicago

Congressman Lorimer, the boss, did not want to appear at Springfield, because he was running a “good business man” for mayor on the Republican ticket in Chicago, and his candidate was for traction legislation. But one of the city's bills, drawn by Walter L. Fisher, of the Municipal Voters' League, was going through the Senate. This was the Mueller Bill, and the “combine,” under the whip of the League, the Chicago newspapers, and public opinion generally, sent the measure down to the House. Lorimer had to go to Springfield, and he took personal charge in the House. It was indeed an emergency. The Mueller Bill was safely buried in the Municipal Committee, but clearly, with the lobby full of Chicago reformers and committees from citizens' associations, to say nothing of his own “business man for mayor”—all demanding legislation—some bill had to pass. Lorimer gave one day the word for action, and both parties in the House held caucuses that evening. The result was bad—“for the organization.” Lorimer sent for the legislators one by one, and late at night called a conference in his own room in the Leland Hotel, of certain ring-leaders, the Chicago Aldermanic Committee, Graeme Stuart, his business candidate for mayor; Frank O. Lowden (a candidate this year for governor), Edwin Burritt Smith, and others. Mr. Smith says Lorimer—a congressman, mind you, not a state legislator—opened

the discussion by asking, "What do you want?" Lorimer declared that the Mueller Bill was dead, and he offered as a substitute a bill to be called the Lindley Bill. That the official representatives of Chicago rejected; "it bore unmistakable signs," Mr. Smith says, "of tender regard for traction interests." Lorimer accepted some amendments, proposed others himself, and when these failed to satisfy the friends of the city, the boss, a leader of the Republican party in Illinois, said the Lindley Bill was all Chicago would get. "You must accept it with these amendments, pull down all opposition in the House and from the Chicago press, and actively support the bill. It is the Lindley Bill or nothing."

The Defeat of the Republican Bosses

The Chicago press had been telling the city and state all about the situation, and, with the Allen Bill episode in mind, the organization legislators were anxious and weak. Chicago decided to reject the Lindley substitute and to fight its own boss on the floor of the House. With Sherman's "Fighting Forty" and the Democrats who were willing to help they had the votes, and all that they needed was a roll-call. But the Speaker, asked if he would allow one, refused to say. For two days there were skirmishes, and the voting showed that the "organization" was in a precarious condition, but at last the Speaker rose, pale, but with gavel in hand, to force the amendments to the Lindley Bill. Back of him were some women; beside and before him stood a score of strong men ready to defend him. The bill was called up, and Mr. Lindley offered Lorimer's Amendment Number One. The law required a roll-call upon a demand of five members. Ninety-six rose and shouted "Roll-call!" The Speaker would not hear; he put the amendment and, amid confusion and outcries, swung down his gavel and declared the amendment carried. Amid great excitement Amendment Number Two was offered; members cried "Roll-call! Roll-call!" But again the gavel fell and the second amendment was "carried," and so, with the storm waxing, Numbers Three, Four, Five, and Six were hammered through. But at the sixth the House broke, and there was a rush for the Speaker's chair. If it hadn't been for the women back of him, missiles would have been showered upon him; as it was, the wave of angry members rose up to the chair, and the Speaker fled through a back door.

Balked, the House paused a moment; then Representative Sherman whispered something to a friendly representative, who called the House to order. The House reorganized with Representative Charles A. Allen as temporary Speaker, a roll-call showed a quorum present, and the Lindley Bill was moved for reconsideration. One by one, on roll-call, the amendments, Numbers Six, Five, Four, etc., were rejected in reverse order, the bill was laid on the table, and the Mueller Bill was substituted for it. Then a scathing resolution of censure was passed upon the fugitive Speaker and the House adjourned. He was in conference with Governor Yates, Lorimer, and Hinman, and when he returned to his seat that afternoon he took his censure and excused himself by making charges of attempts to bribe him, which were investigated and found to be unfounded. After the investigation the Mueller traction bill was finally passed and Governor Yates signed it. He wrote a memorandum giving reasons why the bill should not become a law, but he made it a law.

Boodle a Democratic Issue in Missouri

Now for the Missouri-Illinois parallel. When Mr. Folk realized that the political corruption of St. Louis was but a part of the financial-political state system, which has

supplanted a representative democracy with an oligarchy of criminals, he started what he called a counter-revolution. He saw, moreover, that his party, controlled by boodlers, was the organization of this treason. The Democratic party represented not democracy, but the enemies of democracy. What did he do? Because he was a Democrat, he appealed first to the Democrats of Missouri, because they were Democrats, to clear out first of all the Democratic boodlers because they were Democrats. That was putting party loyalty to a pretty severe test. What happened? Such a splendid exhibition of genuine patriotism as this country seldom has a chance to display. The Democrats of Missouri rose up and they smashed that rotten old machine all to pieces; they took back the control of their party and they are making it fit for any American citizen to support. And the good citizens of Missouri will be asked to support it, for, incidentally, the Democrats insured the nomination of Mr. Folk for governor. He will make his campaign on the same issue, "boodle," and since the Republican party also boodled, he will ask all men of all parties to let him organize an administration that will represent, not bribery, but all the men of Missouri.

Boodle a Republican Issue in Illinois

The issue was not made so clear, nor so personal, nor so exciting in Illinois, but Illinois seems to be more intelligent politically than Missouri, less partisan, and boodle was the issue there this summer. Chicago realized after its eight years of war that the existing political system misrepresented the people in both city and state government, and that the Republican party, the dominant one, was the party to try first to clean up. In it the worst traitors to the people were the Lorimer-Jamieson group. The Chicago reformers asked the Republicans of Cook County and of Illinois to take away from them the control of the party and restore it to Republicans who would represent the common interest of all the people of the state. The Chicago *Daily News*, the *Tribune* and the *Record-Herald*, the trusted newspapers that express public opinion in Chicago, and (therefore, I think) wield that "power of the press" which so many journals elsewhere are bemoaning the loss of, voiced a demand to have Charles S. Deneen nominated for governor.

Deneen the Folk of Chicago

Deneen is a Cook County Republican leader, a politician, who associated for years with Lorimer and Jamieson. Chicago is not afraid of politicians. All the city's best reform efforts have been directed, not to put reformers in office, but rather to force the politicians to represent the people, and the "newspaper trust" and the voters' leagues are developing a class of politicians, not always sincere, who recognize that public opinion is a constant force in politics. Deneen is an honest man; I never heard his integrity questioned. He has been state's attorney since 1896, and his record is one of orderly, efficient, fearless, and aggressively honest service. He did not go forth, like Folk, seeking out corruption in all places, but he performed the duties that came to him with tireless, masterful energy, and there is a line of cells in one state prison so full of business men whom Deneen convicted that it is called Bankers' Row. Deneen is a remarkable man. But, for the sake of simplification, let us say only that he is a politician who believes that it is good politics to serve the public.

That is all Chicago requires, and that made the issue in the Republican party of Illinois in the summer of 1904; the fight was over the nomination for governor, but the question raised was:

What shall the Republican party represent? Deneen said: "The public interest." He wanted to be governor, but he understood that the men who supported him were seeking to beat the Lorimer-Jamieson ring, which believes that the Republican party exists to serve special interests. Lorimer and Jamieson understood this, too. There were other candidates. Governor Yates, a shallow, pompous person, sought a second term, but he thought Yates was the issue. Then there was an eloquent young lawyer, Frank O. Lowden, son-in-law of George M. Pullman, who wants to be something prominent in politics, United States senator or governor. He is a "fine fellow" and he has more personal friends among the reformers and best citizens of Chicago than Deneen, but when he appeared as a candidate for the nomination the old ring backed him, not all his friends. Mr. Lowden is a "safe man"; he is the type that "fools" most good citizens. Having a "laudable ambition," he seeks an office, not an issue, and he cannot understand why he should not "welcome the support of his party"; and when he achieves office he cannot understand why he should not support his party. The Lowdens are the kind of men political bosses put up when the ring is on the verge of a defeat, and, being "good men," they cloud issues and save the rings. They do not mislead Chicago. The city saw through Lowden to the ring behind him, and the Republicans of Cook County sent to the convention a large majority of delegates instructed for Deneen. Many of the delegates, and some of the ward leaders, were reluctant and hankered for their old boss, but public opinion held them to their instructions.

If Deneen, or, better still, if Chicago had made as careful a canvass of the country as Folk did of Missouri, I believe Illinois would have responded like Missouri. As it was, the Republicans of Illinois did not decide. The country districts followed their leaders and the nomination was left to the convention. There were six or seven candidates. Yates, with his patronage-built state organization; Lowden, with the old bosses, the special interests, and his money; and Deneen, with Cook County, the Chicago newspapers, and the best public opinion—these three led in strength, and a deadlock ensued which, for duration, was unprecedented in the state.

Federal Branch of the System

The efforts to break it developed the apex of the System. I said a while ago that the United States government was a part of the state and municipal systems of Illinois and Chicago. Speaker Cannon, of the national House of Representatives, was chairman of the convention, and United States senators Cullum and Hopkins were present also. These men—the whole "Federal Bunch," as they are called—"worked" for Lowden. Not that they cared especially for him, though one of them remarked that it was well to have "a governor with a barrel." But their influence was for "harmony," the "good of the party," not of the state, nor even of the Republican citizens of the state—but of the old party leaders and "the thing as it was." Well, they did help to break the deadlock. Chicago and Illinois resent federal interference. When this spring the Municipal League made its successful fight to beat "Doc" Jamieson in that boss's own ward, Congressman Lorimer and Senators Cullom and Hopkins persuaded President Roosevelt to appoint Jamieson Naval Officer of the Port. Upon their advice, confirmed, as he said, by such "respectable business men as John M. Smyth," etc., the president gave the discredited boss the office and the moral and political support that went with it. William Kent says that that helped to defeat Jamieson in his ward. So, at the convention, the Chicago newspapers, talking always of the old ring, were able to point out that the national government was back of Lowden and his backers. This crystallized public opinion. The convention took a recess for ten days. When it

reconvened, though the deadlock held for two days more, the current of sentiment was toward Deneen; and Yates, to get even with the ring that had used, then dropped him, directed his delegates to vote for Deneen.

What the Republicans Decided to Represent

There was a “deal” between Yates and Deneen. But the terms were honorable, and besides, “political deals” are, like politicians, not bad in themselves. They are bad when they trade the public interest off for special and personal interests, and the deal which carried out the wishes of the best public opinion in Illinois and made Charles S. Deneen the Republican candidate for governor (and Lawrence Y. Sherman the candidate for lieutenant governor), did for the Republican party of Illinois what the Democratic voters of Missouri did for the Democratic party, when they sent up delegates instructed for Folk—restored the control to the people of the party. That deal completed the political ruin of the Lorimer-Jamieson ring, and, I verily believe, begins a movement to carry on out into the state the reform which was begun eight years ago in Chicago—a reform which aims to make the government, municipal and state, represent, not bribers, not corrupt politicians, not corrupting business men, but the common interests of the state—the citizens and friends, not the enemies, of the republic.