DOCTORAL DISSERTATION

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST:
A PRESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF A DEMOCRATIC HUMANIST PARADIGM
OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

By

Paula D. Gordon

Submitted to the
Faculty of the School of Government and Public Administration
Of The American University
In Partial Fulfillment of
The Requirements for the Degree
Of
Doctor of Philosophy
In
Public Administration

Committee:
Chairman: Robert Paul Boynton
Edgar S. Robinson
Roger W. Jones

Dean of the College: Glynn L. Wood
Date: November 25, 1975

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PREFACE

Mankind appears to be embarked upon a course which is leading further and further away from basic human values, basic human concerns, and purposes. The threatened eclipsing of man's humanity is occurring at a time when the world is wracked with problems and when strife, dissension, and alienation are widespread. Man is now challenged as never before to apply himself to the solving and ameliorating of his problems, to respond in a human and effective manner to the needs and problems of mankind, to become a positive shaper of the destiny of mankind. But man seems either unable or disinclined thus far to meet this challenge. Not only does he appear at present to display little capacity for solving or ameliorating the problems besetting mankind and for setting and working toward longrange humanistic and democratic goals, he seems to express little recognition or understanding of the serious implications of his present situation. Catastrophe which would include the demise of freedom and the thwarting and denial of human potential and aspirations seems certain if man continues in his present directionless course.

The present work is an attempt to develop a paradigm of public administration designed to help guide the way out of this present critical situation and to help keep mankind on a course which is oriented
toward the achievement of humanistic and democratic goals.

In developing this paradigm, work by an array of contributors to social and political theorizing and practice has been built upon. This includes the work of Dwight Waldo; Sheldon Wolin; and William G. Scott and David K. Hart:

-Waldo's underscoring of the need for a philosophy of change, a philosophy of public administration, a philosophy of cultural development.\(^1\) Waldo underscores the need for a holistic approach to the administering of mankind's affairs and for a philosophical basis upon which to base action.\(^2\) He has cited Untereiner's perception that we (in Waldo's words) "stop thinking piecemeal, that we seize this sorry non-scheme of things entire and think boldly in terms of the cultural design and development of contemporary society."\(^3\)

-Wolin's call for a holistic approach which emphasizes "a striving for an integrative form of direction."\(^4\) This "integrative form of direction" would reflect a concern with "what is general and


\(^2\)"Holistic" is used throughout this work to describe an approach in which the whole is seen as being more than the sum of its parts. An "holistic" approach is one which is comprehensive rather than fragmentary or piecemeal in character.

\(^3\)Waldo, "Public Administration and Change," p. 44.


Wolin speaks of the "political art as that art which strives for an integrative form of direction, one that is broader than that supplied
and integrative to men, a life of common involvements."\textsuperscript{1}

-Scott and Hart's description of what they refer to as the "administrative crisis," both part and parcel of the nihilism that may be seen as permeating so much of current theorizing and practice. This nihilism is seen as being directly traceable to the absence of a sense of "metaphysical direction" underlying current theorizing and practice.\textsuperscript{2}

Christian Bay's work which similarly focuses on the need for a sense of direction, particularly with respect to political theory and practice—is also drawn upon here. Bay would find an "integrative form of direction" through focusing on the needs of man, through gearing the attention of political theory to the meeting of and the responding to the needs of man.\textsuperscript{3} Current themes in political theorizing fall far short of this in his view, dealing as they do with far more narrow interests, with what he calls the "pseudopolitical."\textsuperscript{4} Bay defines the "political" in "Politics and Pseudopolitics" as all activity aimed at improving or protecting conditions for the

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\textsuperscript{1}Wolin, ibid.


satisfaction of human needs and demands in a given society or community, according to some universalistic scheme of priorities, implicit or explicit.\textsuperscript{1}

Bay's definition of the "pseudopolitical" is as follows:

activity resembling politics but concerned exclusively with the alleviation of personal neurosis or with promoting private or private interest group advantage.\textsuperscript{2}

The present work begins with the premise that man is capable of responding in a human way to the needs of others and to the needs of mankind generally; that he is capable of applying his efforts in an effective manner to the solving and ameliorating of societal problems, and that he is capable of being a responsible shaper of his own and mankind's destiny--that he is capable of evolving and basing his actions upon a philosophy of change, a philosophy of change which is at once a philosophy of public administration, a philosophy of cultural development.

This work is also based on the premise that there is such a thing as evil or wrong in the world. Evil or wrong is seen as consisting of the denial of that which protects, sustains, and nurtures or enhances life, health, and freedom. The present work is based on the premise that it is not possible to attain humanistic and democratic goals or to maximize basic human and democratic values, if one fails to set such goals and if one fails to act on the basis of human and democratic values.

The present work is based on the premise that the problems and dilemmas that characterize the times derive from the failure of individuals as well as mankind collectively to come to grips with

\textsuperscript{1} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid.
basic questions of value and purpose, meaning and direction in life. It would seem to lie beyond the realm of the conceivable that any individual, group, or society, let alone mankind collectively could move in any definite direction, toward any goal, with real purpose and meaning in view, if the most basic questions concerning value, purpose, meaning, and direction are not faced and if not attempt is made to find answers. The theory of developmental change, the theory of the public interest, and the approach to public administration that are presented here as a democratic humanist paradigm of public administration are based upon explicit answers to these most fundamental questions. ¹

The democratic humanist paradigm of public administration has been designed as a map for effecting the healthy development of culture and society. Public administration is seen here as societal change agentry and societal problem solving in the public interest. An outline which indicates how the paradigm can be applied in practice is offered here as an essential part of this paradigm.

As the democratic humanist paradigm of public administration is based in an explicit set of value, it is essential at the outset that some statement be made concerning the source or derivation of those values. The humanistic and democratic values which serve as the basis for this paradigm are seen here as either being transcendent in character (a natural right view of the source of values) or as

¹The descriptors "democratic humanist" are used here to refer to the specific set of democratic and humanist values and assumptions pertaining to life, health, and freedom that are described in this work. They are not intended to refer in any general way to the whole historical tradition of democratic humanism.
having their derivation in an existential perspective. As the latter is a relatively recent approach to valuing, a further explanation is in order here.

An Existential Derivation of Values

One may come to view values as having an irrefutable basis in what can be called natural reason if one simply addresses the question: Is life itself of value? The one asking this question, if he addresses the question with honesty, logical consistency, and human feeling, and if he arrives at an affirmation of the value of life, has the basis for deriving a set of humanistic and democratic values, values which may be seen as being totally consistent with humanistic and democratic values which have been regarded by non-existentially inclined individuals as being transcendent in character.¹

This set of democratic humanist values can be derived by simply following out the implications of the "fact" that life is of value. It follows that since life is of value, the sustenance and enhancement of life is of value. It also follows that since life is of value, that which leads to death or the constriction or denial of life and that which adversely affects health and development are counter to that which is of value. The constricting of personal and societal freedom is seen as adversely effecting healthy individual and societal development and thwarting the realization of individual and societal potentials and are therefore also seen as being counter

to that which is of value. That which is counter to that which is of value is viewed here as a "negative value." The sustenance and enhancement of life is seen as a "positive value" and that which contributes to the sustenance and enhancement of life, including the sustenance and enhancement of individual and societal freedom becomes a positive value. A so-called 'neutral' stance with respect to valuing is seen here as having the same effect as "negative valuing."

The Importance of Freedom

As freedom is a particularly key concept in this work, a few words should be said about it here. Freedom is seen here as being a politically and societally unrestricted status which enables man to explore, seek, and aspire to realize what it means to live, what it means to be human, what it means to be a part of mankind. ¹

Freedom is used here in a combination of two senses. The first relates to obtaining, securing "freedom from" repression and constraint, freedom from chains. The second is concerned with the nurturing of freedom in the sense of "freedom to"—freedom to seek the truth, freedom of association, freedom of worship, freedom of


expression in all its forms.  

The way in which man is viewed, what man values, and what he is free to value and what he is free to express are all seen here as being integrally bound up with one another. In what is commonly referred to as the "free" world, man are free to view life in its fullest possible dimensions; freedom of feeling and freedom of expression are givens. The "non-free" world is seen here as placing strictures on expression and hence on feeling.  

These strictures are seen as being rooted in the dogmatic or forced acceptance of a limited and limiting view of man and society which inhibits if not prohibits altogether the realization and even the recognition of the dimensions and potentials of human life, in both an individual and a societal sense.

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2 The terms "free" and "non-free" world are being used in a shorthand way here to distinguish between those nations which have non-authoritarian or non-totalitarian forms of government (e.g., the United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, West Germany, and the like) and those nations which have authoritarian and totalitarian forms of government (e.g., U.S.S.R., China, Yugoslavia, Poland, East Germany, and the like).
Without individual and societal freedom, access to the paths to such exploration, search, and realization is effectively thwarted or denied. Without freedom which allows for societal or political freedom and for the expression and experience of other aspects of freedom, the highest expressions of man's humanity and spiritual nature are seen here as being deadened or at least placed under a shadow. This would include the spontaneous expression of love, lovingness, generosity, trust, and joy.

Fear for one's life and/or for the lives of others can sharply curtail one's exercise of conscience and free expression. Acquiescence to such strictures can lead to spiritual, ethical, as well as political mutism. Political life may thereby be seen to lose its energy and motive force, the energy and motive force that can suffuse political life with meaning, direction, and purpose, and which can provide it as well with a truly human character, exemplified in the concern of one for another and of one for all, exemplified as well in the bond of trust between man and man which makes civilized society possible. The valuing of these expressions of man's humanity and the valuing of his freedom to express and realize his humanity can become the motive force for valuing life and liberty. Such values are all seen here as being integral to the democratic humanist paradigm of public administration.

Contemporary Equivocation Concerning the Value of Freedom, Life, and Health

Present widespread equivocation concerning the value of freedom, and concerning other human and democratic values and goals, including life and health, is seen here as being directly related to man's failure
to find or look for answers to basic questions concerned with the meaning of life. The result is seen as being the currently floundering attempts of man to determine a course for society and to recognize and respond to the needs and problems besetting mankind. Such equivocation is also seen as standing in the way of the adoption of the democratic humanist paradigm of public administration presented here.

Two Basic Sets of Assumptions and Values

A comparative analysis is undertaken in the present study which shows the strengths as well as the inadequacies, weaknesses, and equivocal character of a wide range of assumptions and values informing man's present efforts to administer his affairs. These assumptions and values are seen as falling into two basic sets. These two sets have been called here the "positivist metaphysic" and the "democratic humanist metaphysic." The "democratic humanist metaphysic" is the name given the set of assumptions and values which may be seen to underlie the democratic humanist paradigm of public administration presented here. This "metaphysic" may be seen as being fundamental to free democracy.

The "positivist metaphysic" may is the name given the set of values and assumptions which have been identified as being embodied in present rationalistic and empirically oriented trends in social scientific theorizing and practice.

The implications of each metaphysic for the future of mankind and for man's ability to deal effectively with his problems are explored. Continuing adherence to the "positivist metaphysic" is seen as holding the most negative of implications for the future of mankind, for the future of freedom and democracy, and for the future of civilization.
The "positivist metaphysic" is seen as constituting a most serious impediment to man's ability to come to terms with most pressing human and societal problems. It is seen as standing in the way of man's understanding of and responsiveness to human needs, the full range of human needs, including human aspirations. It is seen as standing in the way of man's very recognition of such needs and aspirations.

The Task of Reorienting along Democratic Humanist Lines

R.G.H. Siu's philosophical insights are seen here as being key to bringing about a democratic humanist orientation (or reorientation) to societal and political thought and action.\(^1\) Siu has postulated an approach to human knowledge which involves a synthesis of ways of knowing. While these ways of knowing include empirical and rational ways of knowing, they extend far beyond the limiting confines of such approaches. Siu's approach to knowledge encompasses as well the realm of intuition, common sense, and experience, and what he calls "no-knowledge" which he defines as "nature's ego as shared by all."\(^2\) When man acts on the basis of this full spectrum of ways of knowing, his actions can then be said to reflect what Siu calls "human-heartedness."\(^3\) In other words, through employing the entire spectrum of ways of knowing, man comes into


\(^2\)Idem, The Tao of Science, pp. 69-84, see especially pp. 79-84.

\(^3\)Idem, The Tao of Science, see especially pp. 129, 143-144, 159, and 166.
his own, realizing his own basic nature, his own intrinsic humanity. He is then able to express that humanity in his words and action.

The efforts of the Founding Fathers are seen here as reflecting an unselfconscious and basic iteration of such an approach. The democratic humanist paradigm of public administration is presented here as a further conscious iteration of the same basic set of values, and assumptions, goals, purposes, and principles which are seen as having informed the efforts of the Founding Fathers.

Addressing the Need for a Philosophy of Public Administration

The purpose of this work is to evolve and elaborate a philosophy of societal and cultural development, a philosophy for public administration. It has been written in response to a need also to evolve a paradigm based on such a philosophy, a paradigm aimed at helping man emerge from the present cultural and administrative crises which beset him.

The urgency of the need for employing the democratic humanist paradigm of public administration should become quite apparent—if it is not already—in the course of examining the inadequacies and deficiencies of present positivistically oriented tendencies to theorizing and actions, tendencies which may be seen to be adversely impacting man's ability to deal with his own problems and administer his own affairs, to shape society and culture, and to do so along healthy and beneficial lines.

The present work has been written by way of suggesting an approach to administering the affairs of mankind, an approach which is philosophically grounded in human and democratic values, an approach which
is offered here not only as the best possible alternative to our present course but as the necessary alternative to our present course. It is an approach which would help assure that each man has the right and the opportunity to become the one he is, so that the potentials latent within the human soul and within the family of man may both be recognized and realized. It is an approach which would help assure the survival of civilization and the survival as well of man's very humanity.

Acknowledgements

I wish to express my appreciation to my first professors in the field of public administration, particularly Victor Jones, Robert Biller, Orion F. White, Jr., Arnold Meltsner, and Gerald Caiden, and to William Sheppard, then Acting Dean at the University of California Graduate School of Public Affairs for his key role in advising me concerning courses. I wish also to thank Dwight Waldo, Roger Jones, Edgar Robinson, and most especially Robert P. Boynton, my advisor at the American University, each of whom has provided helpful encouragement and advice over the past two to six years. I am also particularly indebted to Professors Boynton, Robinson, and Morley Segal who helped spark the idea of pursuing the subject of a philosophy of change as a dissertation topic. I am also in my mother's debt, Mrs. Lylle C. Dallas, for her support and encouragement which were critical to the selection of so challenging a topic and to the completion of my academic work. The encouragement of friends (and understanding) and the guidance of encouragement of I.O.D., E.J., and A.K.I. are also gratefully acknowledged here.
I am of course also indebted to those who have contributed to the variety of literatures cited in the Preface and in the introductory chapter, most especially the contributions and work of Meher Baba, R.G.H. Siu, Ruth Benedict, and Abraham Maslow.

Special thanks are due an incrementally oriented friend who in 1972 inadvertently drove me out of frustration over differences in approaches to dealing with the problem of drug abuse--to evolve a case for an holistic approach to societal problem solving. Similar thanks are also due a "globalistically-oriented" problem solver and analyst who early in 1974 unwittingly caused me to begin to clarify my thinking about freedom which has resulted in my learning far more about freedom and all its meanings and implications than I ever either anticipated or imagined.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE OF CONTENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE .......................................................... iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES .................................................... xix</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter

I. INTRODUCTION ................................................. 1
   Focus and Purpose of the Study ................................. 1
   Structure of the Study and Basic Methodological
     Approach ...................................................... 2
   Implications and Importance of the Study ................. 28

II. A THEORY OF DEVELOPMENTAL CHANGE—THE BASIS FOR A
    DEMOCRATIC HUMANIST PARADIGM OF PUBLIC ADMINIS-
    TRATION ....................................................... 30
   Introduction .................................................... 30
   Defining the Ends and Means of Development ............... 30
   Change Agentry and the Theory of Developmental
     Change ......................................................... 51
   Normative and Educational Change Strategies and
     the Theory of Developmental Change ....................... 59
   The Theory of Developmental Change as It Relates
     to Political and Social Realms .............................. 71
   Postscript—The Important Differences between "Cul-
     tural Development" and "Cultural Imperialism" ........ 82

III. A DEMOCRATIC HUMANIST THEORY OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST .... 90
   Introduction .................................................... 90
   Toward a Philosophy of Public Administration and
     a Definition of the Public Interest ....................... 90
   Public Administration in the Public Interest in
     the Context of American Democracy ....................... 93
   Current Concepts of the Public Interest ................... 97
   A Closer Look at the Nature of the Debate Surround-
     ing the Concept of the Public Interest ................. 110

IV. THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
    APPROACH TO PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION .................. 118
   Introduction .................................................... 118
   Public Administration as Change Agentry and Problem
     Solving in the Public Interest ............................ 118
   The Basic Aspects and Elements of Change Agentry
     and Problem Solving in the Public Interest ........... 121

xvii
LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE

1. Shepard's Primary and Secondary Mentality Assumptions...... 5
2. Gross' Narrow and Broad Rationality Approaches.............. 18
3. Representational Map of Developmental Change............... 31
4. The Plotting of Developed Individuals, Groups, or
   Societies.................................................. 39
5. The Plotting of Those Aligned with the Values and Direc-
   tional Goal of Developmental Change........................ 39
6. Aspects of Development, Underdevelopment, and Over-
   development................................................. 42
7. The Plotting of Representative Populations on the Map
   of Developmental Change................................... 48
8. A Hypothetical White Middle-Class Public Official and a
   Population of Mexican Americans........................... 55
9. The Likely Character of Interaction Between a White
   Middle-Class Public Official and a Mexican
   American Population......................................... 57
10. The Provisional Placement of the Change Agent with
    Respect to the State of Development of a Changee............ 57
11. An Ideal Juxtaposition of Change Agent and Changee............ 58
12. The Effect of a Change Agent Headed in the Direction
    of Overdevelopment upon a Changee.......................... 60
13. The Effect of a Change Agent Headed in the Direction of
    Underdevelopment upon a Changee............................ 61
14. The Different Parameters of the "Free" and the "Non-Free"
    Worlds...................................................... 73
15. The Trend toward Overdevelopment on the Part of Both
    the "Free" World and the "Non-Free" World.................... 77
16. Leys' Typology of Meanings of "Public Interest".............. 97
17. The Utilitarian or Aggregationist Conception of the
    Public Interest.............................................. 100
18. The Process Orientation to the Public Interest............... 103
19. The Normative Concept of the Public Interest................ 104
20. The Cyclic Character of Societal Problems.................... 124
21. A Comprehensive Approach to Societal Problem Solving........ 127
22. McCurdy's Map of the Field of Public Administration........ 187
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Focus and Purpose of the Study

Sheldon Wolin has written of the need for an "integrative form of direction" in political and social theorizing.\textsuperscript{1} As Dwight Waldo has noted, the field of public administration, no less than political and social theorizing generally, is without a core focus, a core theory or philosophy, in effect, without a sense of direction.\textsuperscript{2} The field of public administration as well as schools within the field may be seen as lacking a clear-cut philosophy of change or development as they generally fail to be based upon explicit and internally consistent sets of assumptions and values which can be related in an effective manner to practical action. In fact the whole realm of practical action as it may be seen to apply to large scale societal change and societal problem solving may be seen as being addressed in a satisfactory manner by only one contemporary school of public administration, the School of Development Administration.\textsuperscript{3}

\textsuperscript{1} Wolin, Politics and Vision, p. 434.

\textsuperscript{2} Waldo, "Public Administration and Culture," and "Public Administration and Change: Terra Incognita."

public administration may be seen as having placed public administration in an instrumental, value neutral role, concerned with what in effect is the incremental, reactive manipulation or control of symptoms of problems.

The absence of a focus, the absence of a clear-cut basis upon which to base practice and action, the absence of an effective approach to action, the lack of a sense of "metaphysical direction" which would serve to focus action, may all be seen as causes and effects of what William G. Scott and David K. Hart have referred to as the "administrative crisis."¹

The present work represents an attempt to analyze and address the major factors which may be seen to underlie the administrative crisis and which appear to be the prime source of its perpetuation.

Structure of the Study and Basic Methodological Approach

To accomplish this task a mode of analysis is employed which can be called "prescriptive analysis." In prescriptive analysis idealized theories and approaches are fully outlined or developed; comparisons are drawn between these theories and approaches on the one hand and currently prominent theories and approaches on the other; and the major impediments to the adoption of the idealized theories and approaches are then examined in light of present realities, here including the contemporary administrative cultural climate and the critical issues and trends of the time.

In the present case two theories and one approach are presented,

¹Scott and Hart, "Administrative Crisis."
all fundamentally concerned with how man administers his affairs
and with the ends toward which those affairs are administered.
Together these comprise what is here being called the democratic
humanist paradigm of public administration. The first theory is a
type of developmental change.

Presentation of a Democratic Humanist Paradigm
of Public Administration: The Core Theory
of Developmental Change

The theory of developmental change is derived in large
measure from Abraham Maslow's theories concerned with human needs,
which included self-actualizing needs (metaneeds), and with individual
and societal health and development.¹(These theories are elaborated
in Chapter II.)

They theory of developmental change also draws upon ideas
found in the work of Ruth Benedict, ideas concerned with "synergy."
(Maslow's own work was influenced by these ideas and their earliest
exposition is in fact to be found in his work.)²

¹These concepts have been elaborated in the following works
by Abraham H. Maslow: "Synergy in the Society and in the Individual,"
Theory of Metamotivation: The Biological Rooting of the Value-Life,"
Journal of Humanistic Psychology 7 (Fall 1967): 93-127; Eupsychian
Management: A Journal (Homewood, Ill.: Irwin-Dorsey-Press, 1965);
Toward a Psychology of Being, 2nd ed. (Princeton, New Jersey: Van
Nostrand Co., 1968); and Motivation and Personality, 2nd ed. (New

²Maslow, "Synergy in the Society and the Individual" and
Eupsychian Management. (Maslow defines "synergy" in Eupsychian
Management, p. 20, as "the resolution of the dichotomy between selfish-
ness and unselfishness, or between selfishness and altruism.")

According to Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict originally expounded
her theories concerning "synergy" in the Anna Howard Shaw Memorial
Lectures that were given at Bryn Mawr in 1941. No transcript was made
of these lectures. (Margaret Mead, An Anthropologist at Work-Writings

Maslow relied on notes from a now lost manuscript of Benedict's
Benedict in her studies of societies evolved a rudimentary theory concerning what she called "synergy." She viewed some societies as being "high" synergy societies, and some as being "low" synergy societies; high synergy societies were those in which the self interest of individuals and the interest of the entire community were compatible; low synergy societies were those in which the interest expressed by individuals and the interest of the entire community were not compatible. Margaret Mead writes of Benedict's work concerned with synergy as "studies of the ways in which institutions in a culture either worked together and so released energy, or else were contradictory and discrepant and so dissipated human energy."

The theory of developmental change may also be seen to be based in a very fundamental way in a self-actualizing model of man. Because of the centrality of the self-actualizing model of man to the theory of developmental change and to the overall democratic humanist paradigm of public administration, some elaboration of this model and other concepts related to it should be provided here at the outset.

Other key concepts basic to the theory and to the paradigm

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1Mead, An Anthropologist at Work, p. 351.
The self-actualizing model of man

The self-actualizing model of man may be best described in terms of its counterpart, the rational model of man. Herbert Shepard's theories concerned with primary and secondary mentality assumptions can be especially helpful in providing a basis for such a description.¹

Shepard's primary and secondary mentality assumptions.
According to Shepard's theories primary mentality assumptions are those leading to behavior characterized by coercion, cut-throat competition, and compromise and secondary mentality assumptions are those leading to behavior characterized by cooperation, collaboration, and consensus-seeking.² (See Figure 1.)

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<th>Secondary Mentality Assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>consensus-seeking</td>
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<td>cut-throat competition</td>
<td>cooperation</td>
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<td>compromise</td>
<td>collaboration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 1. Shepard's Primary and Secondary Mentality Assumptions.

In Shepard's mind the movement away from primary mentality assumptions and toward secondary mentality assumptions is necessary to the healthy development of individuals and hence, the healthy development of society. The values and assumptions which are reflected in his view tend to be shared by those who espouse the so-called self-actualizing


²Ibid.
model of man.¹

Primary mentality assumptions may be seen as being characteristic of what can be called the rational model of man, secondary mentality assumptions as being characteristic of a self-actualizing model of man. Some overlapping of the models can be seen to occur. Indeed, man can be viewed as incorporating a mixture of these two models.²

Shepard's primary mentality assumptions may also be seen as being characteristic of social and organizational unhealthiness and what Gerald Caiden has defined as "bureaucracy."³ Shepard's secondary mentality assumptions may be expected to be found in those whose behavior and efforts exemplify and foster individual, organizational, and societal health.⁴

The rational man model, when viewed through the lens of Shepard's typology may be seen to have its theoretical roots in Aristotle, St. Thomas, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, the classical economists, the conflict theorists, and in positivism, rationalism, and empiricism generally.⁵

²Frederick Thayer has also been calling for a similar kind of transition in An End to Hierarchy! An End to Competition! Organizing the Politics and Economics of Survival (New York: New Viewpoints, Franklin Watts, Inc., 1975).
³Such a view is held by Chris Argyris. See his "Organization Man: Rational and Self-Actualizing," Public Administration Review 33 (July/August): 354-357.
⁴Caiden, The Dynamics of Public Administration, p. 8.
⁵Shepard, "Changing Interpersonal and Intergroup Relations in Organizations,"¹

These theoretical roots, particularly as they have been translated into present day rationalistic, positivist, and empiricist trends will be discussed at length below, particularly in the last two chapters.
More recent contributors to what could be called the rational man model include Herbert Simon and Vincent and Elinor Ostrom. Alberto Guerreiro Ramos with his tripartite typology contributes at once to theory concerned with the rational and self-actualizing models of man.

The self-actualizing model of man is subject to certain misinterpretation because of the term "self-actualization" and the various meanings that are ascribed to it. The term "self-actualization" can be—and often has been narrowly construed to mean the fulfilment of an individual's potentials and aspirations irrespective of societal values and development, irrespective as well at times of the individual's best interests and health.

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In the present writing, the term "self-actualization" is used in such a way as to incorporate a notion of psychological and social health. "Self-actualization" in this context incorporates Maslow's "metaneed" of concern for others. A self-actualizing person then would be one who was as concerned for the welfare of others as he was for his own welfare. He would be a person who showed in his actions as much concern for the "common good" as for his own good; in fact, the self-actualizing individual would see the common good and his own individual good as being one and the same.

Theoretical roots of the self-actualizing model of man may be seen to include the classical philosophers, St. Augustine, Rousseau, Dewey, the Judeo-Christian heritage, romanticism, idealism, transcendentalism, and latter day humanistic and existentialist psychology and philosophy.²

Recent contributors to the self-actualizing model of man, besides Maslow, Shepard, Ramos, and Argyris, include Hubert Bonner and his theories concerning what he calls the "proactivert"; Gordon Allport and his "open systems" approach to the understanding of man and his notions of "proaction," and "prosponsive" and "proactive" behavior; and Michael Harmon and his theories concerning personality

¹In this way the self-actualization theory of man can be seen to relate tangentially to the concept of enlightened self-interest. The emphasis in self-actualization theory may be seen as representing a symbiotic meshing of enlightened self-interest and would could be called "enlightened other-interestedness."

²The theoretical roots, particularly as they have been translated into latterday humanistic and existentialistic psychology and philosophy will be discussed at greater length below in Chapter II and in the last two chapters.
Harmon's five personality types. Harmon has distinguished among five personality types. One, "proactive man," can be seen as being synonymous with the self-actualizing model of man presented here. The other four types can be seen as being variations of the rational man model. These include "passive man" who exhibits neither the attributes of responsiveness nor advocacy, both of which characterize the "proactive man;" the "rationalist" or what Harmon has described as the "Petit-Eichmann"--the individual who becomes a pawn of those exercising coercive authority; the "prescriptive technocrat" who can be seen as being an advocate, but not for values which are necessarily in the service of the general good, lacking responsiveness as he does to individual and societal needs; and

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1See especially Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being and Eupsychian Management; Shepard, "Changing Interpersonal and Intergroup Relationships in Organizations;" Ramos, "Models of Man and Administrative Theory;" and Argyris, "Organization Man: Rational and Self-Actualizing."

The terms "proaction" and "prosponsive" and the like can all be seen as being descriptive of self-actualizing behavior. The emphasis of these terms as they are being used here is on forward looking, flexible, anticipatory, and psychologically and socially healthy approaches to theorizing, planning, action, and practice.


lastly, "reactive man," the expedient man, the Machiavellian who would "walk over his grandmother" should circumstances compel him to do so—the incrementalist who by virtue of his expedient bent, is not inclined to take the long view.1

Other recent contributors to the self-actualizing model of man. Argyris has contributed significantly in this area with his article on man as both rational and self-actualizing. This article has effectively changed the nature of the "debate" concerning the "validity" of either model of man.2

Ramos' "parenthetical man" most nearly approximates the self-actualizing model of man suggested here.3 The concept of noetic authority developed by James Carroll has particular pertinence with regard to Ramos' parenthetical man, and hence the self-actualizing model of man.4 Carroll has sought to develop a concept of authority which would have applicability to the parenthetical and hence the self-actualizing model of man. More will be said of this enlarged view of authority in the next section which deals with concepts of power and authority as they may be seen to relate to differing models of man.

Important of this model to the theory of developmental change and the paradigm of public administration. The theory of developmental

1These personality types are all discussed in Harmon's "Personality and Administrative Style."

2Argyris, "Organization Man: Rational and Self-Actualizing."

3Ramos, "Models of Man and Administrative Theory."

change as well as the democratic humanist paradigm of public administration may be seen as being predicated on the assumption that persons who can be regarded as self-actualizing, psychologically and socially healthy persons do exist, and have existed and that the more free and healthy a society, the greater will be the number of such persons. It is precisely this kind of society which the democratic humanist paradigm of public administration is designed to nurture, sustain, and enhance.

The concept of power

To understand the theory of developmental change and the overall paradigm of public administration, it is necessary to view the concept of power in a new light, in a way quite foreign to prevalent notions which link power solely with coercion and control. This "new" way may be seen to have its basis in the work of Follett, Dewey, Maslow, and others as will be noted shortly.

An understanding of power may be seen as being linked to an understanding of authority. A framework for discussing power and authority and the whole question of what has been called compliance is provided by Shepard's primary and secondary mentality assumptions model. A thesis of the article in which Shepard introduces these concepts has been discussed above—that in order for society to become more stable and healthy that individual and organizational behavior must become more and more informed by secondary mentality assumptions. Psychological and social health are seen to lie in the cultivation of secondary mentality assumptions.

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1 Shepard, "Changing Interpersonal and Intergroup Relationships in Organizations," see especially p. 1131.
Many who have contributed to the understanding of power and authority have viewed these concepts in terms of primary mentality assumptions. Machiavelli and Hobbes have been two political thinkers who have contributed much to the shaping of these concepts along primary mentality assumptional lines.\textsuperscript{1} Contemporary contributors who have been similarly oriented toward the primary mentality assumptions side of the spectrum include Lasswell, Kaplan, and Bachrach and Baritz.\textsuperscript{2} Bachrach and Baritz, in fact, may be seen as being among the most outstanding of contemporary theorists because of the succinct outline and overview they have provided of the primary mentality oriented concepts of power, authority, force, influence, and manipulation.\textsuperscript{3}

Contributors to the development and understanding of secondary mentality oriented concepts of power and authority. A number of individuals have contributed in recent years to the development and understanding of secondary mentality oriented concepts of power and authority. Harold Leavitt, Douglas McGregor, and those of the New Public Administration School all have been concerned to a greater or lesser extent with the concept of the equalization of power, the distribution of

\textsuperscript{1}This can be said of Machiavelli because of the influence his views may be seen to have had on Western man's understanding of human nature and assumptions concerning the manipulatability of man. Hobbes may be seen as being a major contributor as well to a primary mentality orientation to understanding behavior because of the influence his equally cynical views have apparently had concerning man's nature, seeing man as he did as being essentially selfish in his orientation to life.


\textsuperscript{3}Bachrach and Baritz, ibid.
power. Follett and Maslow have been concerned with uniquely secondary mentality type concepts of power—power as a self-generating force, power in terms of creative energy, power in terms of the releasing of creative energies, power in terms of "power with" others, instead of "power over" others. McGregor's Theory Y shares much in common with these secondary mentality oriented concepts of power and authority.

**Compliance, power, and authority.** Amitai Etzioni and Rensis Likert have each offered models which deal with the concepts of power and authority. Here again it is possible to see an obvious relationship between these models and Shepard's conceptual framework. With respect to Etzioni's work, it is the concept of "compliance" which allows us to see this relationship. Etzioni has seen compliance as being the core variable in understanding organizations. He identifies three types of organization, those which could be characterized as being coercive, utilitarian, or normative. Compliance is gained by authoritarian, rationalistic, and charismatic means respectively,

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according to Etzioni.¹

Likert speaks of four types of organizational relationships: exploitative authoritative; benevolent authoritative; consultative; and group participative.² These it is easy to see span the spectrum from leftward primary mentality assumptions to rightward secondary mentality assumptions. The kinds of compliance involved in each of these four types of organizational relationships can similarly be seen to span the spectrum of Etzioni's tripartite typology, from authoritarian, and rationalistic, to the charismatic and normative.

Barnard has contributed the concept of "zone of indifference" to help describe the nature of power, authority, and compliance.³ Simon has amplified these ideas in terms of what he sees as a "zone of acceptance," the scope of which he sees as being dependent upon the sanctions which the persons commanding authority—in effect or by design—has or wields. These sanctions include what Simon refers to as "community of purpose" and "habit factors" involving leadership and personality, as well as threats, including physical or economic threats.⁴

Follett's notion of the "law of the situation" can be seen as another means of approaching the concept of compliance:

¹Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations.
²Likert, The Human Organization.
⁴Simon, Administrative Behavior, p. 12.
Why does one comply? and with what is one complying? Because of the reactive connotation of "compliance," a more fitting term for the leftward side of Shepard's model would be Follett's term "co-active power." "Co-active power" implies that both parties choose to comply with one another, whether out of a common sense of purpose, common values, similar ways of regarding or assessing the situation, respect, trust, compassion, or love.

Compliance can be maintained through the use of sanctions or through the applications, the generation, or the nurturing of behavior which is conducive to cooperation. In dealing with the concepts of power, authority and compliance, the framework for the discussion has been expanded then to make room for a non-pejorative term which expresses the basic element of compliance--"co-active power," in secondary mentality terms, "conjoint power." Authority then when seen in this light, can be seen as ultimately residing in the individual. When an individual is a citizen in a free and democratic society, when he operates self-reliantly, yet in concert with others, he is co-acting, and engaging in "conjoint" generation and exercise of power. His voluntary accession to the rule of law which he himself has a role in sustaining is in effect based on co-action, and involves the con-joint, co-active exercise of power. Compliance in the form of co-action and in the exercise or conjoint power has a role in sustaining the rule of law while providing for societal freedom and for flexibility in societal, political, administrative, and organizational arrangements that permit a wide range of approaches

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1Follett's "law of the situation" is discussed in Dynamic Administration, pp. 105 ff.

2Idem, Dynamic Administration, pp. 95-116.
to power, authority, and compliance. While a free democratic society by no means guarantees that individuals will move in the rightward direction toward secondary mentality assumptions, it insures that the opportunity for such movement will be there.

Follett's term "co-active" could well become a key concept in understanding the nature of movement toward rightward secondary mentality assumptions. It may well help in supplanting the notion of power as "power over" with the view of power as a self-generating capacity, a capacity which is enhanced when exercised with others, not over others.

The relevance of this concept of power to the theory of developmental change and the democratic humanist paradigm of public administration. The successful employment of the democratic humanist paradigm of public administration as well as the theory of developmental change may be seen to turn on the acceptance and understanding of secondary mentality assumptions concerned with power, authority (self-emanating authority) and compliance (self-willed compliance.) The understanding and acceptance of such concepts provides the necessary basis for employing the kinds of educational and normative approaches to change which could be employed in the application of


2 Follett, Dynamic Administration and Maslow, Eupsychian Management.
the overall paradigm.

The theory of developmental change and the democratic humanist paradigm of public administration may be seen then as a guide for change agency, change agency which is characterized by secondary mentality assumptions rather than primary mentality assumptions, and based in a self-actualizing model of man rather than a rational model of man. This approach to change and development is based on the assumption that man has a realizable self-actualizing potential and that man is capable of adopting and employing secondary mentality oriented concepts of power and authority in the service of actualizing his potential and by extension, the potential of society.

Broad rationality

The theory of developmental change may be seen as well as being based in a "broad," holistic, and deductive approach to rationality rather than a "narrow," reductionist, and inductive approach to rationality. Bertram Gross' concepts of narrow and broad rationality are particularly pertinent here.¹

Gross' narrow and broad rationality approaches. The features of two approaches to rationality which are most relevant to the present work have been depicted in Figure 2 below.

An argument set forth by Braybrooke and Lindblom well illustrates the basic differences in perspectives that may be seen to divide the adherents to these two approaches. Braybrooke and Lindblom who have been among the chief exponents of the narrow rationality approach to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Narrow Rationality</th>
<th>Broad Rationality</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scope</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on short time horizon</td>
<td>Focus on longer time horizon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater emphasis on analytic abilities</td>
<td>Greater emphasis on synthetic abilities than analytic abilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rationality Dimensions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concerned in a major way with feasibility</td>
<td>More inclined to take risks and entertain uncertainties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concerned with consistency</td>
<td>Less inclined to emphasize consistency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Learning Dimensions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conductive to a specialized approach to knowing and action</td>
<td>Conductive to a generalist approach to knowing and action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conductive to working within a constricting methodological framework</td>
<td>Not conducive to working within a constrictive methodological framework</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 2. Gross' Narrow and Broad Rationality Approaches.¹

¹This chart is based on Gross' discussion and depiction of the differences between narrow and broad rationality approaches. (Ibid.)
the policy sciences have stated their conviction concerning what they see as being the untenability of the broad rationalist's position when they write,

(1)he likelihood that decisions can accomplish large social changes and, at the same time be guided by a high level of intellectual comprehension of the problems is slim. Such decisions require prodigious feats of synoptic analysis, beyond human capacities.

Broad rationalists could be expected to counter in two different ways. Those who considered themselves primarily rationalists and empiricists could claim that just as some persons exhibit extraordinary capacities in science (e.g., Einstein), others can demonstrate "prodigious feats of synoptic analysis" when it comes to the realm of social and political affairs.

Other broad rationalists not solely reliant on rational and empirical approaches might argue that there are ways of knowing, ways whose validity, if not existence, is denied by the narrow rationalist. They might further argue that such ways of knowing are essential to synoptic analysis.

**Importance of broad rationality to the theory of developmental change and the democratic humanist paradigm of public administration.**

The understanding and acceptance of the theory of developmental change and the democratic humanist paradigm of public administration may be seen as being dependent upon an understanding and acceptance of the broad rationality approach as it may be seen to pertain to theorizing and practice.

Ties with Western traditions and with other specific literatures and traditions

Ties with humanistic and democratic traditions

The theory of developmental change may be seen as sharing close ties to Western humanistic and democratic traditions, being based as it is in a set of explicit humanistic and democratic assumptions and values. These place the greatest importance on life itself—the fact and state of existence, on health in all its aspects, and at the same time, on freedom in both the individual and societal senses of that term. A major purpose in evolving this theory is to render explicit a consistent set of assumptions and values which can be seen as being in the service of humanistic and democratic principles and goals. The source of derivation of this set of assumptions and values may be seen as being either transcendent or existential in character.¹

Ties with global change literature

The theory of developmental change may also be seen as having ties with the more recent literature concerned with global change and the emphasis found there concerning the creation of a new world order in which the interdependent character of societal existence would be recognized and where such a recognition would lead to the replacing of conflict and competition, narrow and self-serving interest and allegiances with cooperation and collaboration, and a sense of responsibility and concern for the welfare of others.²

¹The derivation of values is discussed in the Foreword above.
²Lester R. Brown, World Without Borders (New York: Random House,
Other ties

A similar global orientation or consciousness is found as well in the writing of R.G.H. Siu and of Meher Baba. The views of each may be seen to represent a synthesis of Eastern and Western sensibilities concerning the nature of man, the nature of knowledge and action, and the nature of a healthy and stable social order.  

The actual application of the theory of developmental change in practice is seen as involving the employment of normative and educational strategies of change. Such strategies are seen as being the primary means of effecting developmental change, change which is directed toward the achievement of the ideal state of psychological and social health as these terms have been defined by


Contributors to this literature, emphasizing as they do the interdependence of man, have much in common with John Dewey and T.H. Green who similarly underscored the interdependence of individuals. See John Dewey, Freedom and Culture and T.H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London: Longmans Green, and Co., 1931)

Warren Bennis has also laid stress on interdependence in "Where Have All the Leaders Gone?" in Ethics, Leadership, and Interdependence, pp. 24-25 as has Harlan Cleaveland in his article in the same collection, "We Took Our Eye Off the Ball," pp. 58-62.


2Garth Jones' work on the strategies and tactics of change along with the work of William F. Whyte and Allan R. Holmberg have all stimulated the development of the basic elements of the approach to change agentry that is presented here as a part of the theory of developmental change. See Garth N. Jones, "Strategies and Tactics of Planning Organizational Change," Human Organization 24 (Fall, 1965): 192-194; William F. Whyte and Allan R. Holmberg, "Human Problems of U.S. Enterprise in Latin America: From Paternalism to Democracy-The Cornell/Perú Project," Human Organization 15 (Fall, 1956): 15-18;
Abraham Maslow. Coercive change strategies and arbitrary and undirected change are seen as leading to "overdevelopment" or "underdevelopment," movement away from basic human values and goals.

A Democratic Humanist Theory of the Public Interest and an Approach to Public Administration Based on that Theory

A theory of public interest based upon the theory of developmental change is also presented as a part of the democratic humanist paradigm of public administration. This theory is seen as being central to public administration. "Acting in the public interest" is defined as "acting in such a way as to maximize the values of life, health, and freedom." The approach to public administration presented is one based on this theory of the public interest. It is an approach in which public administration is seen as being


1 These terms are defined in the next chapter.

2 At the close of the next chapter a distinction is drawn between "cultural development" and "cultural imperialism." The latter is seen as resulting from coercive or arbitrary change; the former from normative and educational change strategies.
primarily concerned with societal problem solving and societal change agentry in the public interest.

A basic theory concerned with large scale societal problem solving is presented and the practical aspects involved in the application of this approach are outlined in detail, with examples given. The implications of this approach for organizational arrangements, for organizational health and for effective and responsible government are also examined.

The theories and the approach developed can be broadly described as constituting a new humanism, a humanistically oriented approach to the administering of the affairs of mankind and to the shaping of human culture.\(^1\) Administration is being viewed in the broadest possible sense, as Waldo has viewed it--as the means whereby man can give shape to his culture.\(^2\)

Comparing the Theories and Approaches that Make up the Democratic Humanist Paradigm of Public Administration with Other Theories and Approaches

The theory of developmental change which is central to this new humanism is compared to contemporary approaches to change, approaches

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\(^1\)Lester R. Brown in *World Without Borders* has written of the need for a "new humanism." He has described the possible way in which it could come into being:
It is even conceivable that the common crisis confronting all of us could draw mankind together, giving rise to a new humanism. (p. 338).

Administration is a part of the cultural complex; and it not only is acted upon, it acts. Indeed, by definition a system of rational cooperative action, it inaugurates and controls much change. Administration may be thought of as the major invention and device by which civilized men in complex societies try to control their culture. (p. 11).
which are either implicit or explicit in current theorizing and practice. The theory of the public interest that is presented is examined in light of other approaches to the public interest. A logical philosophical analysis of the differences between prescriptive and descriptive approaches is undertaken. A comparative analysis is undertaken as well which involves a comparison of the major contemporary schools of public administration and the public administration in the public interest approach that has been presented. This analysis is undertaken in light of a background analysis of the current status of what Dwight Waldo has referred to as the "administrative culture."¹

Methodology employed in the comparative analysis of major schools of public administration and the public administration in the public interest approach

An 'operational code mode' of analysis

The approach used in the comparative analysis of existing major schools of public administration and the new approach to public administration that is presented is based on Nathan Leites' "operational code" mode of analysis as described in a most thorough way in the literature by Alexander George.²

¹Waldo, "Public Administration and Culture."

According to George, the "operational code" mode of analysis was developed to respond to a perceived need for an analytical approach which would "illuminate political orientations, styles of calculation, and behavior" of political leaders as well as of elite groups.¹ George sees Leites as using the term "operational code" to refer to a set of general beliefs about fundamental issues of history and central questions of politics as these bear, in turn, on the problem of action."² George continues:

(These general beliefs) serve, as it were, as a prism that influences the actor's perceptions and diagnoses of the flow of political events, his definitions and estimates of particular situations. These beliefs also provide norms, standards, and guidelines that influence the actor's choice of strategy and tactics, his structuring and weighing of alternative courses of action. Such a belief system influences, but does not unilaterally determine, decision-making; it is an important, but not the only, variable that shapes decision-making behavior.³

(George, it should be noted finds "approaches to political calculation" a more apt descriptor than "operational code.")⁴

In George's view this mode of analysis goes beyond traditional approaches including, as he notes, the "systematic biographical analysis of a ruling group."⁵ As George also points out, Leites' original study has been hailed by some as

1971) David Silverman has developed a sociological approach to understanding organizations which bears certain affinities with Emmet's work. This approach is based on what Silverman calls an "action frame of reference." He is also concerned with the purposive character of action.

¹George, "The 'Operational Code','" p. 191 and 200.
³Ibid.
⁵Idem, "The 'Operational Code','" p. 192
a new genre of elite study that might fill some of the needs for a behavioral approach to studies of political leadership.\textsuperscript{1}

George sees this form of analysis as a means of providing "important imputs needed for behavioral analyses of political decision-making and leadership."\textsuperscript{2} He writes:

The "operational code" does this insofar as it encompasses that aspect of the political actor's perception and structuring of the political world to which he relates, and within which he attempts to operate to advance the interests with which he is identified.\textsuperscript{3}

What the "operational code" approach provides then is a means of constructing a "political actor's (or an elite group's) belief system about politics."\textsuperscript{4} In the present work this mode of analysis is adapted to the belief systems of administrators and more specifically, to schools of administrative thought and practice. The "operational code" mode of analysis as it is applied here focuses on the assumptions, values, perspectives, purposes, and modus operandi of the differing schools and of those who may be seen as being representative of differing schools of administrative thought and practice. Three major areas of potential differences are focused on: knowledge and values, administrative style, and change and goals.

Sources of data. Data relevant to this analysis has been obtained from case studies and from qualitative content analysis of texts and other materials. Analysis has also been based on inferences drawn from such materials, studies, and texts.

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{2}Idem, "The 'Operational Code,'" p. 220.

\textsuperscript{3}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{4}Idem, "The 'Operational Code,'" pp. 221 and passim.
Summary

This mode of analysis should provide illuminating descriptions of each school and its approach to administration. By comparing the general character of these approaches with the public administration in the public interest approach, it should be easier to see what factors and elements entering into the belief systems of each of the major schools differentiate them from each other and from the public administration in the public interest approach. Such an analysis would seem to be an essential step in understanding the implications that these differences hold for the success of man's administrative endeavors. This mode of analysis should also help in defining what impediments exist to effecting the changes within the field that are needed if the administrative crisis is to be met and overcome.

Comparing the Theories and Approaches that Make up the Democratic Humanist Paradigm of Public Administration with other Theories and Approaches

Two basic "metaphysics" that can be seen to inform contemporary administrative endeavor in a significant way emerge clearly in this study: the "democratic humanist metaphysic" and the "positivist metaphysic."¹ (Some post-war schools of public administration may be seen as attempting to merge assumptions and values selected from each metaphysic.)²

¹ Each will be discussed briefly here and defined and analyzed more fully in the last chapter.
² Such ill-founded attempts at merger are discussed in Chapter V.
humanist metaphysic," a metaphysic which incorporates human and
democratic values in life, health, and individual and societal freedom.

The "positivist metaphysic" is the name given here to the set
of assumptions and values which can be seen as being a part of posi-
tivistic, rationalistic, empirical, behavioral, scientific, approaches
which may be seen to characterize so much of current endeavor in social
scientific theorizing and practice as well as in public administration
theorizing and practice specifically.

Mode of analysis employed

The two metaphysics are compared in the concluding part of the
prescriptive analysis. The mode of analysis employed here is that of
logical philosophical analysis. The positivist metaphysic is particu-
larly closely examined as it is seen as being a chief impediment stand-
ing in the way of the adoption of the "democratic humanist metaphysic"
and the democratic humanist paradigm of public administration based on
it. In analyzing the "positivist metaphysic," its basic assumptions
and values, and its implications for theorizing and practice, its
implications for public administration are all analyzed.

Implications and Importance of the Study

The "positivist metaphysic" emerges in this study as a belief
system which serves to perpetuate a value neutral, reactive, incremental
approach and undirected approach to change. It emerges as well as an
approach which may be seen as helping render man ineffectual as a
problem solver as it undermines his ability and inclination to recognize
and respond to the full range of human needs and to deal with the most
pressing problems facing mankind. Adherence to the "positivist metaphysic"
emerges as being antithetic to the effective solving or amelioration of problems in that value based advocacy which may be seen as being essential to effective problem solving would seem to be precluded by the value neutral orientation of the positivist stance. Adherence to the assumptions and values comprising the "positivist metaphysic" is seen as impeding man's ability to administer and guide human affairs in what R.G.H. Siu would call a "human-hearted" way.¹

The adoption of the "democratic humanist metaphysic" being offered as an alternative is seen as being essential to man's ability to keep democratic freedom alive and hence to keep alive the possibility and promise of the realization of individual and societal potentials. The "democratic humanist metaphysic" is seen as being essential to man's ability to cope in an effective manner with the problems which beset him. Adoption or reaffirmation of the "democratic humanist metaphysic" is seen as being essential to man's survival and to his ability to retain and realize his basic humanity.

¹The term "human-hearted" is used throughout this work to refer to Siu's concept of "human-heartedness" as presented in The Tao of Science, pp. 129, 143-144, 159, and 166.
CHAPTER II

A THEORY OF DEVELOPMENTAL CHANGE—THE BASIS FOR A DEMOCRATIC
HUMANIST PARADIGM OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Introduction

In Chapter II a theory of developmental change is presented. This theory serves as the core theory of the democratic humanist paradigm of public administration which will be outlined in Chapters II, III, and IV of this work.

The theoretical roots of the theory of developmental change and the affinities the theory shares with theories and currents of thought in the humanistic and democratic traditions are discussed in this chapter. The goals for societal development as well as an overall strategy that can be employed to attain these goals are presented as a part of this theory. The relationship of the theory of developmental change to political and social realms is discussed at length.

Defining the Ends and Means of Development

Using Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs Theory as a Starting Point

A representational map of developmental change

Figure 3 below, representing an augmented version of the hierarchy of needs theory of Abraham Maslow, is offered here as an aid to understanding the theory of developmental change being
Fig. 3. Representational Map of Developmental Change.\(^2\)

\(^1\)The concept of self-actualization is dealt with presently.

\(^2\)Maslow's theory does not include the concepts of underdevelopment and overdevelopment as such. Maslow also did not seek to apply his theory to societal change in the way attempted here.
presented.¹ (Hereafter this aid will be referred to as a representational map of developmental change.)² The theory of developmental change will also be seen to draw upon other of Maslow's theories concerning psychological and social health, and social improvement.³

The representational map of developmental change consists of a triangle which is stratified into sections. Each section is labeled to correspond to the different levels of needs which comprise Maslow's theory of the hierarchy of needs.⁴

The first four levels of needs (physiological, security, social, and ego) must be met in order for fifth level "metaneeds," self-actualization needs, to come into full play.⁵ The ideal state


²The term "representational" is used to underscore that what is intended here is an attempt to provide an artistic means of illustrating the basic nature of the theory of developmental change. The map is not intended to serve as an exact representation of reality or abstract realities. The use of the map is rather intended to suggest a way of generalizing which can aid in discussing, analyzing, and understanding otherwise abstruse, amorphous, and unwieldy subject matter.

³See especially Toward a Psychology of Being and Eupyschian Management by Maslow. It should be noted that Maslow's theory does not include the concepts of underdevelopment and overdevelopment as provided for in the theory of developmental change (Figure 3). Maslow also did not seek to apply his theory to societal change in the way attempted here.

⁴See especially Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being. An earlier statement of this theory is found in Motivation and Personality.

⁵"Self-actualization is seen here as being synonymous with the fruition of healthy human development. Maslow's use and definition of the term 'metaneeds' is found in "A Theory of Metamotivation," p. 94."
of development corresponding to Maslow's concept of the fifth level need, the growth need of self-actualization, is at the apex of the triangle. As in Maslow's basic theory, a similar premise abides here—that in order for the ideal state of development to be realized, all of the other levels of needs must be progressively or simultaneously met.

Maslow's concept of self-actualization and healthy development

Maslow's concept of self-actualization is based on the simple premise that man has both "deficiency" needs and what Maslow called "metaneeds." \(^1\) The defining characteristics of a self-actualizing person included in Maslow's view "creativity, spontaneity, selfhood, authenticity, caring for others, being able to love, yearning for truth." \(^2\) (It should be noted that the "metaneeds" of concern for others is seen here as being a key determinant and attribute of healthy individual and societal development.) The self-actualizing person, according to Maslow, knows feelings of "zest in living, of happiness or euphoria, of serenity, of joy, of calmness, of responsibility, of confidence in one's ability to handle stresses, anxieties, and problems." \(^3\)

The defining characteristics for a person who is motivated out of deficiency rather than growth needs include: "self-betrayal, fixation, regression, and living by fear rather than by growth." \(^4\) The subjective signs of these propensities were seen by Maslow as having included "anxiety, despair, boredom, inability to enjoy, intrinsic guilt,

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\(^1\) Ibid.

\(^2\) Idem, Toward a Psychology of Being, p. 160.

\(^3\) Idem, Toward a Psychology of Being, p. 157.

\(^4\) Ibid.
intrinsic shame, aimlessness, feelings of emptiness, of lack of identity, etc."¹

By extension social health and social pathology would be defined in terms of the prevalence of either growth motivated or deficiency needs motivated individuals and in terms of the general direction in which the society could be seen to be moving.

Maslow's concept of self-actualization has often been interpreted in such a way that it fails to mean what Maslow intended.² This misinterpretation generally limits the scope of the concept to concern for ego and social needs. In these cases, self-actualization is understood as being synonymous with personal self development. As used here, and as used by Maslow, the concept of self-actualization takes on other most important dimensions, dimensions related to the concept of synergy.

Benedict's concepts of high and low synergy societies

"Self-actualization," as the term is being used here, means to function at a level of what Benedict called "high synergy." "High synergy," as was noted above refers to a society in which an individual's actions can be seen as simultaneously serving the best interests of the individual and the best interests of the social whole.³ Maslow speaks of high synergy societies as being those which are organized on the principle that "what was good for one was good for

¹Ibid.

²One man's concept of self-actualization can be another man's concept of social and ego needs.

³References to Benedict's concept have been cited in the footnotes of pp. 3 and 4 of this work.
all." By contrast, in low synergy societies, "what profited one, meant less for the other."1 Elsewhere Maslow defines synergy as "the resolution of the dichotomy between selfishness and unselfishness, or between selfishness and altruism."2 The self-actualizing individual is one in whom such dichotomies have been resolved.

The relevance of Shepard's mentality assumptions

Herbert, in writing about the need for "a more humanistic organization than we have known in the past," espouses the view that social organization should further and significantly contribute to personal well being and "self-actualization through authentic, nonexploitive, interpersonal relationships."3 This would entail a movement away from behavior based on primary mentality assumptions and toward behavior based on secondary mentality assumptions.4

It is precisely these same principles and aims which may be seen to underlie the theory of developmental change. They are seen as being key to effective change, whatever its nature--social, political, administrative, or organizational--and whatever its context--public or private organizations, underdeveloped or "developed" countries, etc.

The meaning of societal and political development, underdevelopment, and overdevelopment

2 Idem, Eupsychian Management, p. 20.
4 These assumptions have been more fully elaborated in the introductory chapter. See pp. 5 ff. and Figure 1.
The concept of development may be seen as being closely tied to the concept of self-actualization and to what could be called by extension, "societal actualization"—the realization of the latent potential for good, the good of the society considered as a whole and the good of its members considered individually.¹ This would entail the realization of the potential to sustain and enhance the values of life, health, and freedom and their accompanying values of truth or honest, fair play, and justice.

By way of defining what is meant here by "development," "underdevelopment," and "overdevelopment," and particularly what is meant by the latter two in terms of "development," it should be pointed out that "development" and "underdevelopment" have often been used in the literature as if they could be plotted on a single line continuum with underdevelopment at one end and the ideal of development (however defined or undefined) at the other.² The notion that a single line continuum can adequately serve to describe differing types and degrees of development is rejected here, and the term "overdevelopment" is introduced to add some previously missing dimensions to the consideration of the various aspects of development.

¹"Good" is used here in the way it was defined in the Foreword above. The term "societal actualization" is intended to encompass a concern for both the social and the political realms. Follett's "unleashing of creative energies" (The New State, pp. 159-160) and Bay's view of responsiveness to human and societal needs ("Politics and Pseudopolitics") would be seen as being fully in keeping with this concept of societal actualization.

²Waldo uses the term "overdevelopment" in a somewhat related manner in "Public Administration and Change," p. 129. In this same article he discusses the lack of dimension in thinking about change.
The meaning of "development"

One of the criteria for a developed society in terms of the theory of developmental change is that the members of the society exhibit a high degree of psychological and social healthiness.\(^1\) The behavior of the members of the society would be characterized by maturity, responsibility, and psychological balance. It would be characterized as well by a concern for the welfare of others. Such behavior would be "self-actualizing" behavior.

Persons exhibiting such a high degree of social and psychological health would naturally be inclined to act in the public interest in the truest sense of the term.\(^2\) Their actions could also be said to be in keeping with Rousseau's concept of the general will.\(^3\) They would be exemplifying in their actions what John Stuart Mill spoke of as man's natural concern for the good of others.\(^4\)

The action of the members of such a society and the actions taken by the governing body acting on behalf of such a society in a representative democracy, would reflect values in life, health, and freedom and attendant values in truth, honesty, fair play, and

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2 The concept of the "public interest" is the focus of Chapter III below.


justice.

The greater the manifestation of such attributes and propensities in the members of a society, the more value placed on life, health, and freedom, the more highly developed the society can be seen to be.\(^1\)

In terms of the map of developmental change, an individual, a group, or a society regularly manifesting such attributes and propensities could be "plotted" on the upper level of the hierarchy. (See Figure 4 below.)

Those whose behavior and actions were in "alignment" with the values and directional goal of developmental change, but were not yet regularly manifesting these healthy attributes and propensities, could be plotted on the map with an arrow representing the path in which their development was moving. (See Figure 5 below.)

In terms then of the theory of developmental change, a society could be considered developed or moving in the direction of healthy development (whatever its starting point), so long as it achieved or was moving in the direction of the ideal goal of development.

If they are grounded in similar human values and oriented in the direction of the ideal goal of development as it has been defined here, different societies and cultures can not be seen as being intrinsically at odds with each other. This is owing to the fact that such societies and cultures will be operating on the basis of the

\(^1\)Ruth Benedict's notion of high synergy societies alluded to above would be applicable to societies which attained the highest level of development.
Fig. 4. The Plotting of Developed Individuals, Groups, or Societies.

Fig. 5. The Plotting of Those Aligned with the Values and Directional Goal of Developmental Change.
same secondary mentality assumptions; all will share a similar high synergistic orientation with this orientation extending to other societies and cultures. Societies and cultures with similar healthy orientations can be expected to strive to maintain the same kind of healthy relationships with other societies and cultures as they maintain within their society or culture.

Different societies and cultures can be expected to be at odds with one another if they are operating on the basis of differing motivational assumptions, differing values and goals. Societies and cultures operating on the basis of non-human, value neutral, or anti-human values and goals may be seen to be at odds with those operating on the basis of secondary mentality assumptions and human values and goals.

The meaning of "underdevelopment"

While those societies which have a decidedly urban and technological orientation are to be found on the middle levels on the right hand side of the map of developmental change, those societies which are traditional, folk, and non-urban in their orientation are to be found on the left hand side of the map. (See Figure 6 below.)

Underdevelopment is being viewed as development which has been arrested or aborted, or development which has suffered a reversal. In any case "underdevelopment" connotes a failure for whatever reason to realize latent human potential for psychological and social health, for maturation and growth, involving as they do the realization and expression of basic human values.

1Robert Redfield has written of the spectrum of conceptions that can be found concerning "human nature" of "ideas...of the inhuman and
When the "progress" of underdeveloped societies continues to be in a line away from the ideal goal of development, such "progress" is actually "regress," "regress" away from that which is human and that which is civilized. In such a regressive situation, there is a failure to realize human potential and to achieve the balance of mental and emotional health and development necessary for the realization and expression of humanity.

When underdeveloped societies fall under the influence of overdeveloped societies, the result can be a further skewing of development. In either case—whether an underdeveloped society follows a self-chosen path of regress or whether it falls under the partial or total influence of an overdeveloped society, it may be seen to be operating on the basis of primary mentality assumptions. In the case of the former, they would be a very primitive form of such assumptions; in the case of the latter, when the values and ways of overdevelopment are taken on, the character of these assumptions is altered, becoming more sophisticated versions of primary mentality assumptions. Coercion, cut-throat competition, and compromise would be seen as being more recognizably Machiavellian, modern, and materialistic in their orientation.

Whichever of these two paths it might follow, the underdeveloped society would be seen to fall into Benedict's low synergy category. The third path of healthy development is the option which is the focus of the theory of developmental change.

High Synergy
---
Secondary Mentality Assumptions
---
"Power With"

Fig. 6. Aspects of Development, Underdevelopment, and Overdevelopment
The "overdeveloped" society

The term "overdevelopment" has been introduced because thinking about development has tended not to discriminate between what could be considered sound or healthy or desirable forms of developmental change and what could be considered destructive forms of change, forms which appear to fail to reflect a concern for basic human and social values, needs, and aims.

Overdevelopment can be seen not only as being the result of change which fails to reflect a concern for basic human and societal values, but also as the result of change which tends to move away from what can be regarded as civilized behavior. The uncivilized behavior which results from overdevelopment is not uncivilized in the typical sense of the term uncivilized. "Uncivilized" more typically carries with it the connotation of primitive savagery, and societal chaos and orderlessness that one would expect to find in a primitive savagery, and societal chaos and orderlessness that one would expect to find in a primitive and lawless society.

If one were to characterize the overdeveloped society as "uncivilized," one would mean something slightly different. The savagery to be found in the overdeveloped society would take a more refined form. It would manifest itself in the wanton disregard for human values. Such "savagery," even if it be an unwitting savagery may be seen as being in keeping with the dictionary definition of "savage"--"not under human control." If this definition is construed to mean "not under control that can be characterized as being human," then it becomes a definition which most aptly fits the overdeveloped society. The overdeveloped society and the members of it are not "under
human control." Whatever control they seek, aspire to, or exert, fails to reflect a truly human quality, it fails to reflect human values. It fails to reflect Siu's "human-heartedness."¹

The overdeveloped society is one which is deviating from basic human values and goals. It is one in which development may be seen as being stifled, repressed, or aborted. It is one in which change may be seen as most typically reflecting nihilistic assumptions and values.

Overdeveloped societies may also regress taking on the more obvious attributes of the "cruel, nasty, and brutish" life one finds in the most primitive and lawless society, group, or tribe. The drugged or non-drugged mindlessness, passivity, or apathy; the self-centeredness and self-indulgence; the "dog-eat-dog syndrome; the anomie, alienation, and "homelessness" sensed by so many can be seen to be symptoms of overdevelopment—all relating as they to to an abrogation, if temporary, of human feeling, human values, and sensitivities--of "human-heartedness."²

The overdeveloped society falls, along with the underdeveloped society, into Benedict's "low synergy" society category, for the society as a whole and the members of the society individually fail to have their own best interests or the best interests of the social whole at heart; in fact, they are acting against their own best interest. By continuing to follow a trajectory which leads away from the goal of

¹Siu discusses "human-heartedness" in his The Tao of Science, pp. 129, 143-144, 159, and 166.

²Maslow has viewed passiveness, self-centeredness, and self-indulgence as being primary factors which inhibit individual resourcefulness and impede social progress and reform. Eupsychian Management, pp. 256ff.
development, they lessen their very chances for survival, let alone their chances for realizing healthy and peaceable development and fulfilment, individual or societal. (See Figure 6.)

Paths to overdevelopment. Overdevelopment may be the result of coercive or arbitrary change.\(^1\) Overdevelopment would result from change which reflected negative or neutral value stances.\(^2\) However, it has come about, overdevelopment can be described as being aberrant change, change which has strayed from that which is human.

A prime example of overdevelopment would be in the overweening emphasis given to technological concerns and technological "solutions" to problems, concerns and "solutions" which have become bad in themselves to the extent they have failed to reflect consideration for human concerns, aims, and values. The apparently unquestioned or little questioned belief in the value of unbridled technological "progress" is a case in point.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) This would occur in that coercive and arbitrary forms of change cannot be seen to be in the service of humanistic values and goals, except perhaps in certain circumstances where life itself is in the balance. A departure from such values and goals in any other circumstance would be synonymous with either overdevelopment or underdevelopment.

\(^2\) Negative and neutral value stances are discussed in the Foreword above.

\(^3\) The "technological development" which Scott and Hart see as being the implicit aim of contemporary society in effect constitutes "overdevelopment" as the term is being used here. See their "Administrative Crisis," p. 419.

Larry Kirkhart and Orion F. White, Jr., discuss a phenomenon related to "overdevelopment: in their "The Future of Organizational Development," Public Administration Review 34 (March/April 1974): 129-140. They write there of "technicism" which is the rise to predominance of mechanistic process over substance, the reign of routine, the tendency to set policy by viewing technical capability as opportunity, the pervasive systematization and control of human existence." (P. 129.)
Societal ills from drug-induced mindlessness to apathy, anomie, and alienation may all be seen as being related to trends toward arbitrary or overdevelopment. Of immediate concern here is how the theory of developmental change might serve as an aid in redirecting, rechanneling individual and societal energies along more constructive and healthy lines of development, lines of development which reflect the conscious and human valuing of life, health, and freedom.

Charting development

On the basis of the preceding discussion, it should have become apparent that the representational map of developmental change can be used as a basis for speaking of individual, group, or societal change. While the explanatory examples used below involve groups and representatives of groups within society, use of such examples is by no way meant to imply a limitation to either the narrower or broader applicability of the map. What follows is meant to serve as an example of how development can be viewed and charted using the representational map of developmental change.

Various segments of any given society can be seen to fall into differing sectors of the map. For instance, in the United States, a significant portion of the Native American Indian population might be most aptly plotted in the lower left portion of the

map while upwardly mobile lower middleclass blacks might be plotted
to the right of the center of the map. (See Figure 7 below.)

It cannot be stressed too strongly at this juncture that the
plotting of any individual, group, or society is intended to be seen
as an effort to generalize and depict as best one can--the current
"status" of an individual, group, or society. Such an attempt to
generalize is necessarily fraught with shortcomings. Not only is
it difficult to make such generalizations, but the very act of generali-
zating is subject to misinterpretation.

In the case of the former, it may be exceedingly difficult
to even vaguely plot the "status" of development of an individual
at any given point in time. The same would surely hold for groups
and societies as well because they as well as the individuals who
comprise them are changeable and difficult to generalize about.

The map of developmental change is not, however, being sug-
gested as a "precise" means of depicting development or an empirically
"valid" way of depicting development. It is being suggested as an
aid to discussing and understanding what can be meant by development
given the frame of reference of humanistic and democratic values which
have been discussed at some length above.

Some effort to make generalizations about the state of "develop-
ment" of individuals, groups, or societies is necessary if the map is
to serve as a basis for discussing developmental change and change
agency. Such attempts at generalizing concerning the status of develop-
ment of individuals, groups, or societies, while necessarily an imprecise
exercise, is essential to understanding the nature and potential of the
theory of developmental change.
Fig. 7. The Plotting of Representative Populations on the Map of Developmental Change.
Another shortcoming which should be acknowledged, is that of possible misinterpretation of the motives behind or the purposes of attempting such "plotting." On the one hand, there is the possibility that such efforts could be interpreted as being racist. On the other hand there is the possibility of the entire theory being construed as one which advocates cultural imperialism. (The latter possibility has been anticipated and is discussed at the end of this chapter.)

As for the possible interpretation of the plotting of individuals, groups, or societies as constituting racism, or reflecting racist views, it cannot be emphasized too strongly that this has not been the motivation here. Stereotyping of any sort may be seen as a slur in that in attempting to generalize one may be guilty of dealing with people as if they were less than human and as if they were far less complicated and varied than they actually are. Stereotyping and attempts to generalize in more careful ways may also carry with them the assumed judgment that some are better or worse than others by virtue of the fact of their racial or national origins and their placement on the map of developmental change. The attempt to realistically plot the status of development of an individual, group, or society is not meant to carry with it any connotation of "better" or "worse." The value judgment that is being made has to do with the direction their development appears to be taking and the direction which their development could best be taking.

The purpose behind attempting to approximate and depict the current state of development of an individual, group, or society is to provide a basis for discussing and understanding present dehumanizing and anti-humanistic and anti-free democratic societal trends, the implications of such
trends, and the alternative of healthy developmental change that needs to be considered.

The plotting of individuals, groups, and societies is not subject to checks of accuracy. Such plotting hinges on individual perception and understanding as such perception and understanding may be seen to pertain not only to the individuals, groups, or societies plotted, but to the theory of developmental change and its accompanying concepts of development, underdevelopment, and overdevelopment as well.

However questionable the plotting of individuals, societies, or groups in the eyes of an onlooker, the point is that in order to understand the general principles of the theory of developmental change, and in order to employ the theory, one must attempt as best one can to concretize what is meant by development, underdevelopment and overdevelopment, and what is meant by progression toward or away from the ideal of development. It would seem that this could best be done by using common referents, including groups within the society whose recent cultural and social histories were fairly well known.

This theory is not being presented out of any intention to demean any individual, society, or group or to thwart, subvert, abort, or sidetrack the development of any individual, society, or group. It is being presented rather with the intention of showing how the healthy development of any individual, society, or group can be nurtured and enhanced--however the development of such an individual, society, or group might be characterized in terms of the map of developmental change. It is also intended to help show how creative
human energies can be unleashed and channelled in positive and constructive ways and how human dignity and individual and societal actualization can in effect be realized.

**Change Agentry and the Theory of Developmental Change**

In the context of the theory of developmental change, the achievement of societal development or the progression toward the ideal state of development requires that there be a movement upward toward the apex of the triangle--the closer to the apex, the more highly developed the individual, society, or group, the more of its potential it may be seen to have realized. The same upward goal-directed movement would be required for achieving any form of development--political, social, administrative, or organizational.

**Effecting Developmental Change**

The problems involved in effecting movement directed toward development are many and need to be the concern of all who engage in theorizing or action which is concerned with change. As has been noted, problems may be seen to lie in assessing the stage and state of development of the various segments of a society. Similar problems exist in trying to depict the state of development of a society as a whole or the state of development of individuals. Some attempt at generalization is necessary, however, both in understanding and in employing the theory of developmental change. It is necessary in devising strategies designed to stimulate and bring about movement in the direction of the ideal state of development and in understanding the implications and the likely consequences of such strategies.
Those persons who themselves occupy niches toward the top of the triangle, whose development is headed in the direction of the ideal state of development, may be regarded as being the most likely candidates to successfully bring about developmental change.

The one who attempts or serves to bring about developmental change can be regarded as a change agent. The multiple leadership of a group, the government of a nation, or the like, may also be seen to perform in the capacity of a change agent, sharing all the major attributes of an individual change agent. One may understand change agentry as it may be seen to pertain to the theory of developmental change by understanding the role of the individual agent of developmental change.

The one who attempts to bring about developmental change may be in a role of prominence in a society such as a chief executive, a high governmental official, or a legislator. He may also try to bring about developmental change in the public interest from a perch outside of government. Whatever the change agent's role, whatever his base of operation, he may be regarded as sharing the attributes of the legislator described by the classical philosophers, the "legislator" and "guide" described by Rousseau, the leader and manager described by

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1The term "change agent" is being used here in a very broad sense. "Change agentry" is seen here not only as involving the introduction of innovation, but the instigation, stimulation, and overseeing of developmentally oriented change of any form. In this sense governments as well as individual officials, administrators, or technical experts can all be seen as serving in the capacity of change agents.
by Follett and Maslow. He may serve at once as a leader, an educator, a guide and a facilitator and a coordinator, a policy planner and implementor, and a problem anticipator, preventor and solver. His sphere of concern and oversight (mandated or self-selected) may be specified or unspecified. In any case, he is an agent of change and if the kind of change he is trying to effect is developmental change, the approaches described here would be wholly applicable to him.

The development of the change agent

When the change agent is not highly developed himself and is not oriented in the direction of the ideal goal of development, many problems are found to occur and much that is counter productive can be expected to result. In such cases, the person acting as change agent may have many unmet needs himself. If he is shortsighted and if he has limited understanding and experience, he is apt to design approaches to change which accelerate the development of others in terms of his own needs, his own stage of development, and his own limited goals.

An instance of the foregoing would be a white middleclass, public official working as an administrator in a public welfare program who may in effect try to impose his own state of development upon a

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The classical philosophers and Rousseau have spoken of the "legislator" as a guide and leader. (See especially Chapter VII of Book II of Rousseau's The Social Contract.) Follett's views concerning the leader and the manager (Dynamic Administration, pp. 247-269) and Maslow's views concerning the ideal leader and manager (Eupsychian Management, pp. 61-67 especially) may be seen to have much in common with the classical and Rousseauian concept of the "legislator."
population of Mexican Americans whom he is to serve. The hypothetical state of development of the public official and the Mexican American population he is to serve are plotted on the map of developmental change shown in Figure 8 below.

The official would be in the position of causing a deflection in the ideal upward path of development of the Mexican population and of complicating at best the upward progress of such a population toward the ideal state of development. This could happen because such a change agent would likely be attempting to apply strategies and approaches which would not be suited to the population's specific problems, needs, cultural heritage, and requirements.

A case could be made that the white middle class public official in this situation would actually be striving not only to bring the Mexican American up—and with reference to the map—and over to his own position, but to move him as well in the direction of the goal which the official holds as ideal or the goal toward which the official is himself effectively tending. The directional character of that goal and the character of that interaction is depicted in Figure 9 below.

The change agents in such cases can be seen as inadvertently disservin the best interests of those whom they are striving to serve by effectively leading them in a direction of overdevelopment and deflecting them from a course which would lead to their more direct advancement to the directional goal of development.

The ideal focus of the change agent with respect to the changee

In order for apex oriented upward movement to be assured, the change agent needs to be naturally placed or be able to place himself
(The broken arrow in the figure depicts the ideal upward path of development.)

![Diagram](image)

**Fig. 8. A Hypothetical Public Official and A Population of Mexican Americans**
provisionally, as it were, on a line between the changee and the ideal or directional goal of psychologically and socially healthy development. (See Figure 10 below.)

By provisionally moving his point of reference, the change agent is able to at once have the most direct view of the goal as seen from the changee's point of view and the most direct view of the changee and the antecedent conditions which brought the changee to his present state of development. It is as if such a perspective would be impossible to have unless the change agent had as direct a view as possible and as deep an understanding as possible of all of these factors. ¹

The optimal level of development of the change agent with respect to the state of development of the changee

Ideally the change agent should be several levels beyond the changee in his own development. Most importantly the change agent should himself be headed in the direction of the ideal of development, the directional goal of psychological and social healthy. Such a relationship is depicted in Figure 11 below.

If instead, the change agent is headed in the direction of

¹The need for understanding action and attitudes is discussed in a different way in Alexander George, "The 'Operational Code'". George sees this approach (developed by N. Leites) as being especially helpful in providing a way of viewing the "belief systems" of political actors and decision-makers. (See Chapter I for a more detailed discussion of this approach.)

Everett Rogers and F. Floyd Shoemaker in Communication of Innovations--A Cross-Cultural Approach, 2nd ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1971) discuss the importance of both empathy and "homophily" in change agentry, pp. 210-244. "Homophily" is "the degree to which pairs of individuals who interact are similar in certain attributes, such as beliefs, values, education, social status and the like." (p. 210.)
(The broken arrows depict the actual or likely directional goal, given the situation. The solid arrow depicts the line of influence.)

Fig. 9. The Likely Character of the Interaction Between the Public Official and a Mexican American Population.

Fig. 10. The Provisional Placement of the Change Agent with Respect to the State of Development of the Changee.
(The solid arrows indicate lines of influence; the broken arrows indicate the ideal path of progress toward the goal of psychological and social health.)

Fig. 11. An Ideal Juxtaposition of Change Agent and Changee.
overdevelopment or even underdevelopment, his intervention will
serve as an impediment to the healthy development of the changee.
Figures 12 and 13 depict each of these situations.

Normative and Educational Change Strategies and
the Theory of Developmental Change

Change Strategies

Of the various kinds of change strategies that have been
identified, the kinds of strategies that would appear to have the
greatest bearing on the attainment of developmental change are those
of a normative and educational character.¹ The preservation of
freedom and the fostering of humanity, personal integrity, and
social and psychological health would seem to depend upon the use
of non-coercive strategies.² Attitudes, behavior, and understanding
and motivation need to be focused on by the change agent. This focus
needs to be of a non-coercive form if the changee's ascent to the
ideal state of development is to be assured. Assurance of success
would seem to depend on the acquisition and development of Shepard's
secondary mentality assumptions. Coercive forms of change would not

¹G.N. Jones, "Strategies and Tactics of Planning Organizational Change." Literature in which normative and educational
strategies are described include: Whyte and Holmberg, "Human Problems
of U.S. Enterprise in Latin America;" Holmberg, "Changing Community
Attitudes and Values in Peru;" Whyte, "Imitation or Innovation:
Reflections on the Institutional Development of Peru;" O. F. White, Jr.,
"The Dialectical Organization;" and Grinnell, "The Informal Action
group."

²Poflett's concept of "power with" not "power over" are
relevant here. Dynamic Administration, pp. 95-116.
(The broken arrow indicates the path of likely development and the solid arrow indicates the line of influence exerted on the changee by the change agent.)

Fig. 12. The Effect of a Change Agent Headed in the Direction of Overdevelopment Upon a Changee
(The broken arrow indicates the path of likely development and the solid arrow indicates the line of influence exerted on the changee by the change agent.)

Fig. 13. The Effect of a Change Agent Headed in the Direction of Underdevelopment upon a Changee.
foster the development of such healthy assumptions.\footnote{Maslow's insights concerning the relationship of health to management styles are particularly relevant here. He writes in \textit{Eupsychian Management}, Partly, the whole eupsychian development of management policy and leadership policy depends on bosses being able to give up power over other people, permitting them to be free, and actually enjoying the freedom of other people and the self-actualization of other people. This is exactly a characteristic of self-actualizing people, and of growing psychological health. Healthy people have no need for power over other people; they don't enjoy it, they don't want it, and they will use it only when there is some factual need in the situation for it. It is as if the growing out of pathology into health took away all the necessities for power over people, and then simply changed automatically the whole philosophy of management and leadership of these people from a Theory X to a Theory Y kind of thing (McGregor), even without any conscious effort to do so. (p. 161).} It is by nurturing understanding and motivation, by nurturing maturity and psychologically and socially healthy attitudes that such assumptions can become an intrinsic part of the changee's being and actions and come to play a positive role in the progress toward the ideal state of development.

Change agents who have thoughtfully and skillfully planned and implemented programs of change can effectively push forward the development of a society or a segment of society in such a way as to circumvent years, if not decades or centuries, of what might otherwise have been haphazard change and development. The Vicos experiment is a prime example of such century jumping. (The Vicos project was a joint project of Cornell University and the Peruvian government. The objective of the project was to assist an Indian community to move from feudatory status to one of self government and self-
sufficiency.)¹

The changes which reportedly took place in Vicos seem to have been both successful and long-term. The changes which were effected in Vicos were implemented primarily by means of educational strategies, strategies which were designed to encourage and nurture the development of self-sufficient individuals, capable of assuming, and of exercising responsibility over their own lives and their own social order. The success of this project appears to have been largely owing to the skill and devoted efforts of an interdisciplinary team of social scientists who brought to their work a deep sensitivity to the culture and the social environment and a deep concern for the people and the best interests of the people whose lives and society they were striving to impact in a positive way.

The Vicos example would indicate that the success of a change agent is not dependent upon his having had an upbringing similar to that of the changee, but rather on the change agent's ability to understand the changee and to grasp the significance of those factors which have played an influencial role in the changee's life. The change agent must not only possess an understanding of the changee and his past, but he must also be able to successfully nurture the healthy development and maturation of the changee. He can only do this if he is extremely perceptive concerning human behavior, learning, and

¹The Vicos project is discussed at length in Whyte and Holmberg, "Human Problems of U.S. Enterprise in Latin America;" Holmberg, "Changing Community Attitudes and Values in Peru;" Whyte, "Imitation or Innovation" Reflections on the Institutional Development of Peru;" and Leland Stowe, "Miracle at Vicos," Reader's Digest, 82 (April 1963):222-228.
motivation, and if he has the best interests of the changee at heart.\footnote{Figure 11 above may be seen as most aptly depicting the kind of relationship that the change agents had with respect to the changees in the Vicos project.}

In order for upward movement toward the goal of ideal development to be assured, the change agent must be operating on the basis of the set of humanistic and democratic assumptions and values discussed at length earlier. He must be able to perceive the differences that exist between the changee's set of values and assumptions and the humanistic and democratic set of values and assumptions he holds.

The change agent who holds elective office in a representative democracy must possess a similarly high degree of perpectivity. Such perpectivity is extremely important in the role he plays in educating, leading, and generating consensus for policies, programs, and actions, all of which he deems to be in the public interest. His perpectivity, his abilities, and his wisdom in his role as educator, leader, guide, and generator of consensus can be seen as being critical to the strength and survival of the political system. If such a person, serving as helmsman so to speak, loses the trust of the people whom he would guide and serve, if he fails to be able to gain their support for those things he would do on their behalf, and if he fails to serve in the public interest, the very basis of representative democracy becomes weakened. The strength and survival of representative democracy can be seen to turn on the capacity of those who hold positions of public trust to serve well in their role as guides and change agents. It is they who embody the ideals, the values, and the principles of the society. It is they who motivate,
educate, and lead. It is they who serve as prime facilitators of
the process of societal development and actualization.

Warren Bennis has written of this facilitative role in terms
of "social architecture." He sees the leader as a "social architect"
concerned with the set of values which guide decision-making and
behavior.¹

Paul Davidoff's value-based advocacy; Allan Blackman's and
Henrik Blum's discussion of goal-oriented planning and action; and
Michael Harmon's discussion of the "proactive administrator" also can
be seen to bear upon essential activities and basic orientations
which can be seen to characterize the change agent.²

Yehezkel Dror in his approach to policy planning and imple-
mentation; Bertram Gross in his approach to theory and practice; and
R.G.H. Siu in his unique effort to meld Eastern wisdom and Western
knowledge in approaching the subject of knowledge and action--have all

¹In Bennis, "Where Have All the Leaders Gone?" in Ethics,
Leadership, and Interdependence, p. 37. Other related literature
focusing on the facilitation of change and on the diffusion of inno-
vation includes: Bennis et al., eds., The Planning of Change; Rogers
and Shoemaker, Communication of Innovation; and National Institute of
Mental Health, Planning for Creative Change in Mental Health Services:
Office, 1971) and Planning for Creative Change in Mental Health Services,
A Distillation of Principles on Research Utilization, Vol. II (Washing-

²Paul Davidoff, "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning," Journal
of the American Institute of Planners 31 (November 1965): 331-338 and
Allan Blackman in collaboration with Henrik L. Blum, "Approaches to
Social Change and Their Consequences for Planning," in Notes on Compre-
hensive Planning for Health, ed. Henrik L. Blum and Associates (Berkeley,
Calif.: Comprehensive Health Planning Unit, School of Public Health,
University of California, 1968), pp. 2.02-2.16; and Michael M. Harmon,
'Personality and Administrative Style.'
taken into consideration the role of the intuitional and the extra-rational as well as the role of synthetic reasoning abilities in change agentry. These attributes which describe the approach taken by the effective agent of developmental change are focused on by a variety of contributors to the literature.¹ A propensity for the kind of "previsionary" thinking that Bertrand de Jouvenel writes about and an inclination for trying to envision what the ideal future would look like (Aristotle) would similarly characterize the ideal change agent.²

The change agent's roles as "proactive" problem solver, policy maker and facilitator of the problem solving and policy making and implementation processes—will be discussed below in Chapter III.


²"Prevision" is a term used by de Jouvenel in his paper, "Political Science and Prevision," American Political Science Review 65 (March 1965): 29-38. The concept of "prevision" bears great similarity to Gross' "broad rationality" which is discussed in Chapter I above. A "previsionary" approach is one that is future oriented, one that is anticipatory and longrange in its orientation. DeJouvenel's concept of "prevision" is wholly in keeping with Aristotle's view that a "task of the "science of politics" is "to discuss the best constitution, what it is and what it would be like if it could be constructed as one would wish, without any hindrance from outside." Aristotle then goes on to say that (a)nother (task) is to consider what constitution is suited to what people. For to attain the best is perhaps impossible; so the good lawgiver and the genuine politician will have regard both to the "absolute best" and to the "best in the circumstances," (The Politics [Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1962], pp. 149-150.)

The ideal state of psychological and social health is seen here as being the "absolute best."
Effecting upward movement in the direction of the ideal goal of development

Upward movement can be motivated or stimulated by the change agent through the direct imparting, stimulating, or awakening of understanding, knowledge, and motivation in the changee. The change agent can serve as a facilitator of learning; he can thereby help the changee understand what values and assumptions he had been operating on. The change agent can also help the changee understand (both intellectually and non-intellectually to the extent possible) the merit of values and assumptions which more fully and effectively serve not only the changee's self interest but the best interest of the group and society as a whole. In order to serve as a facilitator in effecting such change, it is important that the change agent is to succeed in imparting or awakening the necessary self understanding in the changee.¹

Movement in the direction of the ideal goal of development may be stimulated by sheer force of example. In the realm of attitude and behavior change a model can be exceedingly important as an educational tool because of the nature of motivation and the nature of learning. Enthusiasm, hope, concern for others are all attributes which can be most rapidly nurtured in the changee by a change agent who is capable

¹The leader as educator is discussed in Warren Bennis, "Where Have All the Leaders Gone?" in Ethics, Leadership and Interdependence, p. 46.

Inayat Khan's writing on education and development and his insights into the bearing of these upon the ideally free and healthy character of political and social life may also be seen to be closely related to the present theory of change and change agentry. See his "The Training of Youth," in The Sufi Message of Hazrat Inayat Khan, Vol. III.
of eliciting, awakening, or otherwise nurturing these kinds of attributes by means of his own actions and example.¹

Bennis' observation concerning research into successful efforts in therapeutic change bear noting here. Bennis reports that

The common chord among successful therapists had to do with whether they had hope in the ability to solve a problem, in the ability to help someone.² (Italics added.)

The element of hope may be seen to play no less a role in the success of a change agent's efforts to bring about developmental change.

The attitude next to hope which would seem to be most crucial to the success of any effort directed toward developmental change would be that of valuing life and health and manifesting such values in being actively concerned for the welfare of others. As members of a society move beyond narrow self interests and self-indulgent


The work of Gross, Organizations and Their Managing; Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Psychology (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965); Grinnell, "The Informal Action Group;" along with the work of Maslow, Eupsychian Management; Follett, Dynamic Administration; and McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise, have all all placed a similar importance on the example of the change agent, manager, or leader.

²Bennis, "Where Have All the Leaders Gone?" in Ethics, Leadership, and Interdependence, p. 47.
attitudes, if their development continues upward, they become increasingly selfless and self-giving in their manner and increasingly concerned for others.\(^1\)

A person who would try to bring about fundamental attitudinal and behavioral changes and hence changes in values and basic assumptions must be able to assess realistically the development of the changee and the situation in which the change is to be undertaken.\(^2\) He must have in mind the direction of the change he would effect, and most importantly he must fit his means of effecting those changes to the changees involved. That is to say, he must approach them fully cognizant of their state of development and what it means, if he is to be successful in helping them develop and if he is not merely to uproot them or otherwise displace them.

The tendency among many change agents seems to be to engage in activities which uproot changees from their cultural heritage and deflect them from a natural path of developmental change. The result is at least disruptive, if not disastrous. Unskilful and thoughtlessly designed attempts at change can actually be seen as constituting a setback in the progression toward a higher or more ideal state of development. Such ill-fated efforts have given a bad name to change

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\(^1\) Meher Baba's insights concerning the bearing of self-giving love upon cooperation and the role of cooperation in addressing mankind's problems bear an obvious affinity to Shepard's concept of secondary mentality assumptions and represent a succinct summation of the central themes of Judeo-Christian thought. See Meher Baba, "The New Humanity," in Discourses, Vol. 1, p. 19.

\(^2\) Alexander George's concern with understanding the factors involved in action has been discussed in Chapter I above. Max Millikan has also been concerned with understanding action. His attention has been focused on the goals of action, the instruments and strategies for implementing those goals, and the environment in which the action takes place. See his "Inquiry and Policy" The Relation of Knowledge to Action," in Human Meaning of the Social Sciences, ed. D. Lerner (New York: Meridian, 1959), pp. 158-180.
and change agentry.

Change which is aimed at cultural development can be facilitated and facilitated effectively and without being worthy of the epithet "cultural imperialism."\(^1\) When change is directed toward serving the values of life and health and when change is directed toward serving the best and most basic interests of the individual, the group, the society, and mankind as a whole, then an epithet such as "cultural imperialism" is wholly inappropriate.

The fact that change efforts have often been designed and carried out in such a way that they fail to foster development (in the sense the term is being used here) is no reason for assuming that change efforts perforce can only serve the narrow interests and goals of the change agent or can only disserve the best interests of the changee. To assume that there can be no such thing as a change agent who has both the interest of the changee and the larger social whole at heart, a change agent capable of addressing the developmental needs of the changee in terms of the changee's background and context.

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\(^1\)"Cultural imperialism" is discussed at the close of this chapter.
A change agent's purpose is to help maintain and sustain life while striving to enhance the quality of life. The change agent does this by striving to help others meet the full range of human needs and potentials, and by helping others strive for and achieve psychological and social health, and individual and social development. By working for the realization of these goals, man at once fulfils his own highest needs and aspirations, while helping others do the same.

The Theory of Developmental Change as it Relates to Political and Social Realms

A Framework for Understanding the Essential Differences between the "Free" World and the "Non-Free" World¹

Fundamental differences in perspectives

The theory of developmental change that has been outlined here can be helpful in evolving an understanding of the differences in perspectives and approaches that serve to distinguish the political and social life of the "free" world from that of the "non-free" world. The theory can be used to point up basic differences in perspective and approach, differences in the way in which those in the "free" and "non-free" worlds view the political and social realm, in the ways in which they view change and development and in the values and assumptions which underlie those views.²

¹The use of these terms in this work has been explained in the Foreword, see fn. 2, pp. x.

²The following works provide a full spectrum of such approaches and perspectives: Maslow, Eupyschian Management; Wolin, Politics and Vision; and Waldo, Administrative State, "Public Administration and Change," and "Development of Theory of Democratic Administration," American Political Science Review 46 (March 1952):81-103. The work of
The representational map of developmental change can be used to illustrate the differences that exist between those of differing political and social persuasion. If one were to compare the perspective and approach to political and social thought and action of the free world with that of the non-free world, the following schema could be used to illustrate the most basic differences. (See Figure 14 below.)

these three most clearly reflects the values, perspectives and approaches that can be seen to be in harmony with non-authoritarian and non-totalitarian forms of government.

Herbert Simon's rejoinder to Waldo and Waldo's response, American Political Science Review 46 (June 1952): 494-496 and 500-503, provide a view of the differences within the "free" world which differentiate those of a non-positivist perspective (Waldo) and those of a positivist persuasion (Simon).

The work of Eugén Pusis focuses on an approach which is more narrow than that of Malow, Wolin, or Waldo. Pusic is concerned with a socialistic frame of reference and while he would stress some of the same goals and ideals found in the "free" world, he would base his approach in certain assumptions and values which have been a part of Marxist approaches. This orientation is particularly evident in his "Social Planning-Interests and Techniques."

C.D. Bernal's approach is in precise alignment with the values, goals, and assumptions of Marxist thought. (Science in History, Vol. 4: The Social Sciences: Conclusion [Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1971].)


1 The map can also be used to point up differences which can be seen to exist between those holding different philosophies concerning the nature and meaning of life as well as different philosophies concerning the nature and meaning of administration. The map will be used in Chapter III to point up differences in philosophical approaches to the concept of the public interest.

2 These differences will be dealt with in a somewhat different way in Chapter VI below. The belief systems of Marxism and Communism are touched on there.
Fig. 14. The Different Parameters of the "Free" and the "Non-Free" Worlds.

Key:

"Free" World

"Non-Free" World
From the schema it is easy to see that the full range of Maslow's hierarchy of needs falls within the purview of the "free" world. Within the prevailing social and political ordering of the "non-free" world, however, a concern for or a recognition of the higher level needs of man fails to have a place. The perspective in the "non-free" world is seen here as a necessarily limited one, based as it apparently is on a constricted and constricting view of the nature and needs of man, of the nature, meaning, and purpose of political and social order, and of the nature, meaning, and purpose of life itself.

A most obvious differences between the two disparate perspectives found in the "free" and "non-free" worlds is the much broader range of values and aspirations likely to find expression in the "free" world, values and aspirations which are precluded from expression within the "non-free" world.¹

The major differences between social and political development in the "free" world and the "non-free" world may be seen to lie in the differing ways in which human nature, human fulfilment, human and societal potentials are viewed.² In the "free" world, there an opportunity as well as an inclination to view man as a being with a wide range of needs and aspirations, including those of personal and social development and fulfilment as seen in the context of self-actualization and societal actualization as both of these terms

¹The implications of freedom and specifically of freedom of expression, freedom of action, freedom to follow one's own inclination, freedom to seek the truth as well as freedom from political and societal restraints have been discussed above in the Foreword.

²Dewey's views regarding individual and social freedom are totally anathema to those found in the "non-free" world--based as they are in wholly
have been discussed above.¹ In the "free" world, there is an unfettered opportunity to view such needs and aspirations in terms of their intrinsically human or spiritual character.

In the "non-free" world man tends to be viewed in a way which by contrast with that found in the "free" world—is narrow and constricted as well as constricting. Existence itself tends to be viewed within the confines of limited political, social, and economic parameters. The higher needs and aspirations of man, the very concepts of human fulfilment, of individual or spiritual fulfilment either lose their dimension and scope or find no place at all for expression.

Whereas the focus in the "non-free" world seems to be on the social and lower levels needs of man, and the economic, social, and political adjustments deemed necessary to meet these needs, the "free" world's focus is not similarly constricted. The focus of political and social thought and action is not concentrated fixedly on adjustments in the ordering of the material aspects of social existence, but rather there is a wide variation of foci, covering the entire range of developmental concerns which span the totality of man's life.²

different sets of assumptions and values. See especially his Freedom and Culture and Individualism, Old and New.

¹The views which Maslow and Shepard have expressed concerning man's development also find no reflection in the "non-free" world. The forced or involuntary "cooperation" found at the level of economic arrangements in parts of the "non-free" world, cannot be considered a sign of healthy unfettered development as healthy development has been defined here.

²Meher Baba has written that (t)o understand the problem of humanity as merely a problem of bread is to reduce humanity to the level of animality. But even when man sets himself to the limited task of securing purely material adjustment, he can only succeed in this attempt if he has spiritual understanding. Economic adjustment is impossible unless people realise that there can be no planned and co-operative action in economic matters until self-interest gives place to self-giving love. Otherwise,
In the "free" world, man becomes multi-dimensional; he is not just a social being. He is not a being whose life is viewed as being necessarily socially and historically determined. In the "free" world the opportunity exists for man to realize his humanity and his unique human potential and to help others in the realization of theirs. In the "free" world, man is free to value truth and to seek the truth—whatever truth may mean to him, so long as his doing so does not infringe on the freedom of others. In the "non-free" world, no similar opportunities exist. In effect such human and societal potential is disregarded or even systematically thwarted.

Threats posed to both the "free" and "non-free" worlds by overdevelopment

While there are many ways in which the "free" and "non-free" worlds may be seen to differ from one another, there is one way in which both may be seen as becoming more and more similar. It would appear to be the case that not only the "free" world, but the "non-free" world as well are tending to move in the direction of overdevelopment. In the process those who inhabit either world are both becoming increasingly estranged from themselves and their own intrinsic human qualities. If the map of developmental change were used to show this trend, the resulting schema would look like Figure 15 below.

That both the "free" and "non-free" worlds appear to be heading in the direction of overdevelopment is particularly ironic in one respect. Marxist and Communist doctrine may be seen to have arisen—in part at least—to redress the "evils" of capitalism, these

..with the best of equipment and efficiency in the material spheres, humanity cannot avoid conflict and insufficiency. ("The New Humanity," in Discourses, Vol I, p. 19.)
Fig. 15. The Trend toward Overdevelopment on the Part of Both the "Free" and "Non-Free" Worlds
wrongs, in terms of Marxist and Communist doctrines, amounting to a neglect of basic needs of the masses, the laboring population. Marxist and Communist doctrines may be seen as an effort to correct these wrongs, which are in effect the result of overdevelopment as it has been defined here.

In trying to create a new approach to the ordering of society and in trying to assure that these evils would not be a part of such an ordering, they failed to take into consideration or to fully perceive the multi-dimensional aspects of man. Because of the fundamental error, because they failed to base their diagnosis of man's problems in a true or deep understanding of the nature of man, the nature of the human situation, and the potential of both man and society, they evolved approaches to the ordering of society which do far greater harm to man's nature and spirit, in that he not only loses his capacity for realizing potentials, possible becoming sidetracked in frenetic activity, revolution, and violence, but he may also lose his very impetus to survive at all.¹

The "murdering" of the human spirit and "murder" by starvation can both be seen as being heinous crimes.² In terms of humanistic and democratic values, however, the former is far more heinous crime than the latter because once the human spirit is killed or deadened, there is no hope that any of man's needs can be met in a civilized manner. For no effective action is likely to be taken to address any of man's most basic needs, including those for food, if no man values life,


²Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn uses the term "spiritual murder" in
his own or any one else's. The conditions of existence itself become untenable.

The "cure" offered by Marxist and Communist doctrine is not only based in a materialistic and hence partial diagnosis of the disease, the suggested cure leads to an even worse disease. Through their focus on mind and matter, the Marxists and the Communists have neglected the human spirit and the nature of man. They have neglected ways of knowing other than purely rational and empirical ways of knowing. As a result they have become just as divorced from basic human values as the Western adherent of scientism. They have merely started from somewhat differing views and premises concerning man, society, and history. ¹

The theory of developmental change has its roots in basic human values and is intended to suggest a cure for the full range of diseases, "dis-eases," that afflict mankind and that man inflicts upon man.

Man seems to be at a crossroads, out of touch with his own humanity or losing touch with his own humanity and with little apparent understanding of or concern for his options. In this "homeless" and alienated state, he may well opt for following the path of least resistance, which may be simply continuing on in the current mindless and "heartless" vein. He might also grasp for what appear to be easy answers,

Letter to Soviet Leaders, p. 50.

¹ The values and assumptions underlying these views and premises and their implications will be discussed at length in the final chapter.
easy ways out, anything to relieve him from the burdensome responsibility of action, anything that gives a semblance of order and control, or meaning, even if the cost is the loss of the freedom and humanity of others, or the loss of his own freedom and humanity. The very reason for keeping free democracies alive and flourishing is so that man will not lose touch with his own humanity. Indeed, it is so that man's humanity may find its fullest possible expression.

It should be readily apparent that developmental change based on the values and assumptions discussed above is impossible within a social and political system which would in and of itself foster and perpetuate a limited view of man and man's potential and which would deny man the freedom to realize his potential. Developmental change of the form described here would also not be possible unless someone had the freedom or exercised the freedom he possessed to seek and realize such development in himself. Unless there are individuals who are free to realize such development and who are free to give expression to their humanity, there are not apt to be individuals around who will be able to perform in a facilitative role, in helping other persons realize such development or in fostering societal development generally. In order for mankind generally or any given segment of mankind to move in the direction of the ideal state of development, some individuals must assume a facilitative role, unless and until adult human beings all begin to serve in a self facilitative capacity.

The curtailment and thwarting of development, expression, and action which is a defining characteristic of the "non-free" world has a decidedly detrimental effect on the societies in which such constraints are found. Such constraints have a particularly noticeable detrimental
effect on those who have been traversing the higher levels of the hierarchy of needs. Society as a whole may be seen to suffer because these individuals are not free to serve as facilitators--by example, through their expression of concern for others--of the development of those at lower levels of the human needs hierarchy. In order for the needs of man to be met in a manner that will endure, they must be met with compassion, understanding, self-giving love and concern, humanity, generosity, and a sense of responsibility, all of which typify the development of those on the highest level of the needs hierarchy. The hopes of a society, indeed, the hopes of mankind, may well rest in such individuals at this most critical time in man's history.

Factoring the human soul back into political and social thought

Wolin makes a most important observation in discussing Bentham's philosophy. Wolin points out that it was at that juncture in the history of political and social thought that the human soul was "factored out."¹ The reinstatement of the human soul in political and social thought and action as well--would seem most essential to the survival and future of civilization. The future of mankind will at best be a bleak one unless the human and spiritual dimensions of man's life come into full play, unless life and health become central values and unless the role that freedom plays in the realization of individual and societal potential is understood and freedom itself

becomes prized.¹

Postscript- The Important Differences between "Cultural Development" and "Cultural Imperialism"

The question of the difference between cultural development and a so-called "cultural imperialism" needs to be raised here in an effort to avert any possible misunderstanding concerning the basic aims of the theory of developmental change.

In order to understand the difference between these terms, one must seek to understand something of three ways in which change itself may be viewed:

1) coercive change---"cultural imperialism" where change is forced rather than voluntary could be so characterized;
2) noncoercive change---cultural development in the service of sustaining and enhancing basic human values of life, health, and freedom, and in which change is not forced---could be so characterized; and
3) undirected or arbitrarily directed change---disjointed, incremental, and reactive approaches to change could be so characterized; these can be seen to include the viewing of change as process,

¹This may be seen as a "spiritualization of the political." Meher Baba has written that the "spiritualization" of political action "can be instrumental in establishing a real brotherhood of humanity." In a similar vein he has stated that a spiritualization of "science can redeem humanity from unnecessary suffering and handicaps." (Discourses, Vol. 1, p. 125.) Meher Baba has also written that "true culture is the result of spiritual values assimilated into life." (Listen, Humanity, p. 180.)
process unrelated to longrange goals or objectives, and the viewing of change as "responsiveness to change," "change" in effect "for the sake of change."\textsuperscript{1}

The Viewing of Change as "Responsiveness to Change"

A theme that is often found in current approaches to theory and practice emphasizes responsiveness to change, that is, the creation of a mechanism that allows for continuous responsiveness to change. Creation of such a mechanism for change has been considered by some as the sole aim and function of the developmental process.\textsuperscript{2} The fact of the amoral or nihilistic implications of such an aim seems either to elude those who subscribe to the view or to be accepted as being in keeping with what is seen as the "necessary" value neutral character of social scientific endeavor.

The meaning of "purpose" (defined in Webster's as "something set up as an object or end to be attained") becomes obscured when change is viewed from a value neutral frame of reference. If the creation of a mechanism that would allow for continuous responsiveness to change is seen as being an end in itself, if this mechanism for change is not seen as being subservient to a higher purpose, such as the attainment of or the directional growth toward psychological and social health, then the process itself becomes the purpose and the purpose in such a case is in effect without reference to values unless one views adaptability to change as a good in itself. In effect, the

\textsuperscript{1}For a somewhat different approach to change see Carter Zeleznik, "Some Reflections on Change," \textit{Kyklos} (1960): 373-385.

\textsuperscript{2}Such a focus is found in many of the Subschools of Organizational Theory and Behavior. These are discussed in Chapter V below.
confusion of process with purpose, or the viewing of change as a purpose in itself, either denies purpose its true meaning or makes purpose at best subordinate to process if not totally obscured by a concern for process.

Waldo has noted that

the development of the notion that the end or aim of the development process is to create mechanisms for further change and adjustment...was developed as a counter to the charge that the West in general and the U.S. in particular were trying, in technical assistance and development efforts, to impose its own pattern on the rest of the world—in short, a charge of cultural imperialism.¹

Instead of trying to evolve an approach to developmental change which did not constitute "cultural imperialism" and which did not carry with it the connotation of "cultural imperialism," an asceptic attitude of value neutral change agentry was adopted, the avowed aim of which was responsiveness to change. Instead of trying to evolve an approach to the developmental process which was in the service of the most basic human values, of the inalienability and sanctity of human life and of the worth of human health, development, and freedom—instead of this, a pseudo-purpose was made of the change process itself.²

Alternatives-Coercive Change or Developmental Change

It is easy to understand the rejection or authoritarian, "imperialistic" coercive and otherwise abhorrent techniques aiming


²For an example of change which did focus on development, see accounts of the Vicos Project in Whyte and Holmberg, "Human Problems of U.S. Enterprise in Latin America;" Whyte, "Imitation or Innovation: Reflections on the Institutional Development of Peru;" and Holmberg, "Changing Community Attitudes and Values in Peru: A Case Study in Guided Change."
at forcing change, particularly when either the techniques of change or the kind of change sought could be seen as being destructive of basic human and societal values. Such approaches to change deny free expression, deny free and healthy development. They deny assumption of responsibility by the individual. They thwart the unfolding of a sense of self, a sense of community and society, and a sense therefore, of being a meaningful part of mankind.

Authoritarian and coercive strategies of change create resistance which thereby nurture unhealthy closing off attitudes which in turn constitute a set back in the developing of the secondary mentality assumptions that are so necessary to healthy development. A concern for the welfare of others is a concern which cannot be coerced and still be considered genuine. The feelings, attitudes and values which Rousseau and others have seen as being essential to the viability of society: compassion, generosity, fellow feeling, self-giving love—must either come from personal recognition that these are an intrinsic part of being human or they must flow from an existential awareness that if life has value at all and is worth preserving, man's essential humanity is worthy of preservation and expression.¹

¹Some of Rousseau's views on compassion are found in his Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality, pp. 202-204. Meher Baba writes in a kindred vein of the importance of "self-giving love" in "The New Humanity" in Discourses, Vol. 1, pp. 17-25.

Rousseau's notions concerning the role of compassion in providing the basis for morality and Meher Baba's views on the fundamental role of "self-giving love" may be seen as bearing the closest of resemblances to the basis for moral living found in the Judeo-Christian heritage. These views are all reflected as well in the theory of developmental change presented here.
Viewing Change Processes in Terms of "Tuition" and "Intuition"

The expressions of humanness just alluded to cannot be forced through coercive methods or through what Meher Baba has called "tuition." Their acknowledgment and expression is dependent upon "intuition." Meher Baba has distinguished between "tuition" and "intuition" in the following way:

Intuition has been buried under the debris of piecemeal tuition of assailing experiences of the false. Tuition is impressed from without, while intuition dawns from within. Tuition thwarts intuition. Therefore, the tutoring of the mind by external events has to be countered by inner awakening. Then and only then can intuition, in its transcendent understanding, truly judge without yielding to the stupor of indiscriminate impressibility.¹

Impressibility, the "Homeless Mind," and Alienation

A disturbing feature of life today is that many persons for a variety of different reasons seem willing or inclined to "yield to the stupor of indiscriminate impressibility;" to accept as solutions, answers which are not solutions or answers at all; to follow the path of least resistance giving up their individual will, their individual conscience, and their own judgment concerning right, wrong, and truth.² Such propensities, such forms of weakness and their implications for modern society are focused on in The Homeless Mind by Peter Berger, Brigitte Berger, and Hansfried Kellner. They


²Ernst Cassirer and Immanuel Kant have written forcefully of the relation of conscience to freedom and to responsible or authentic action. Freedom is seen as a task in the sense that one cannot be free unless one exercises his judgment, unless one is following the dictates of his own conscience--so long as such action does not impinge on the freedom of others. See Cassirer, The Myth of the State, pp. 284-288.
write,

If modernization can be described as a spreading condition of homelessness, then socialism can be understood as the promise of a new home.¹

Because modern man has become so indiscriminately impressionable, he is in danger of embracing world views, philosophies, and ideologies, which if he were to exercise sound judgment, he would find wanting.²

Approaching the theme of homelessness from a somewhat different angle, Edgar Robinson has pointed to other implications of this syndrome. In his elucidations of John Dewey's thought, he has noted that "the moment a person feels a loss of identity, he ceases to be a convinced and reliable agent of democracy."³ The alienated, no less than the unthinking and the "indiscriminately impressionable" may become the witting or unwitting advocates or pawns of approaches to social and political thought and action which deny human values, particularly the value of life itself and the value of freedom, in both its individual and social senses.

To attain or regain one's stature as a fully functioning individual, to become a convinced and responsible bearer and agent of


²The deficits that can be found in prevailing world views in the "free" world and in the "non-free" world are discussed earlier in this chapter.

humanistic values, one must begin to value life and personhood. It is here that religion, philosophy, and the arts have such a fundamental role to play in the life of man. It is here that one can awaken to, see, and experience, or otherwise come to value the importance of life and the importance of freedom, the importance and the meaning of such intangibles as love, truth, harmony, and beauty.

While these latter intangibles may be seen as being very much interrelated with one another, it is the valuing of life and the valuing of freedom which are central to the theory of developmental change and hence of central concern here. Through religion, philosophy, and the arts man can develop a sense of the importance of freedom, the importance of freedom to seek the truth of one's own being, and the freedom to seek truth and meaning in life and to express oneself in accord with that awakened understanding.

Through cultural imperialism man's experience of freedom and his realization of what freedom can mean can be drastically thwarted, if not altogether curtailed. Through cultural development man's experience of freedom and his potential for realizing what freedom can mean is given free reign, so long as his exercise of freedom does not interfere with the freedom or the rights of others.

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1The question of what constitutes interference with the freedom or rights of others is a very complex one and will not because of its complexity be dealt with at length in this work. It is important however to point out in passing the problematic character of defining what constitutes interference with the freedom and rights of others. The so-called "victimless" crime represents but one area of dispute. Not only is there controversy over what an individual should be allowed to do in private if that behavior is detrimental or potentially detrimental to him; there is also a question about what is detrimental to an individual and if something is detrimental to an individual, is it also detrimental ipso facto to society at large? In keeping with the theories introduced here, if an individual's actions can be seen to have a detrimental effect on him, then such actions constitute both a personal and a social liability.
Whether or not an approach to change is seen as being one of cultural imperialism or one of cultural development, may be seen to turn on the importance given freedom, on the role freedom is seen to have in the development and life of man and society. Imperialism involved the extending of power over others. Such an approach reflects little regard for freedom in any sense of the word. It also reflects little understanding or appreciation of the process of healthy individual and societal development. Cultural development, on the other hand, incorporates the view of power found in Follett's work, power as a "self developing capacity" to be used to unleash energies, power in the sense of "power with others," not in the sense of "power over" others. ¹

Those who undertake cultural development then are employing an approach to change which at once fosters healthy personal, social, and cultural development as well as individual and societal freedom. The actions of those engaged in cultural imperialism fosters none of these. The motivations and assumptions and values underlying cultural imperialism and cultural development can be seen as being as different from one another as Shepard's primary and secondary mentality assumptions. Viewed in this way, one can readily see that the theory of developmental change is one which is designed to promote cultural development, not one which serves the coercive, repressive, and anti-humanistic aims of cultural imperialism.

¹Follett, Dynamic Administration, pp. 95-116.
CHAPTER III

A DEMOCRATIC HUMANIST THEORY

OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST

Introduction

In Chapter a theory of the public interest based on the theory of developmental change is presented. This theory is seen as being central to the development of a general and normative theory of public administration. (Such a theory of public administration called here "public administration in the public interest" is the focus of Chapter IV.) In the present chapter, the concept of the public interest is explored. This exploration includes an overview of the way in which the concept has typically been defined. The definition of the public interest that is presented is based upon the same set of humanistic and democratic assumptions and values which informed the theory of developmental change. This concept of the public interest can be seen as being wholly in keeping with the directional character of the theory of developmental change. The potential bearing of this concept of the public interest upon the resolution of the administrative crisis is of major concern here.

Toward a Philosophy of Public Administration and a Definition of the Public Interest

What came to impress me as peculiar and paradoxical was that though American public administration generally has been a major agent of change in American life; though social, economic, or even political change is the raison d'etre of many administrative agencies, and though our administrative agencies exist in a milieu of swift and sweeping change, nevertheless American public
administration has no consciously articulated philosophy of change and no generally accepted theory of change.

Dwight Waldo in "Public Administration and Change: Terra Paene Incognita"

The creation, production, and consumption of goods and services require so much energy and talent, and are so interesting and satisfying, that few pause to inquire as to the purpose of all this frenetic activity.

It is assumed that ultimate ends will take care of themselves, and they tend to be taken for granted. Presumably it is sufficient for technological society to be governed by the principles of science engineering, and economics, since in their refinement lies the surest course to social improvement. Thus we are without a metaphysical direction because we are culturally prepared to accept the premise that beneficial ends will emerge automatically from increased technological development.

William G. Scott and David K. Hart in "Administrative Crisis: The Neglect of Metaphysical Speculation"

The introductory quotations from Waldo and Scott and Hart are doubtlessly among the most succinct statements that can be found in the contemporary literature concerning the absence of and the need for an inquiry into the purposes of administrative, social, and cultural change—the absence of and the need for a philosophy of public administration. 3

In Chapters II through IV an attempt is made to respond to the need Waldo cites, the need to develop a theory or philosophy of change for public administration, and, hence, the need that Scott and Hart cite—the need to provide a metaphysical direction for administrative theory


3Others who have acknowledged the need for a philosophy of public administration include W.J. Siffin, "The New Public Administration—Its Study in the United States," Public Administration (London) 34 (Winter 1956): 369-370; and Gerald Caiden, The Dynamics of Public Administration. Caiden observes (p. 225), "There are theories in public administration, but there are no general theories of public administration."
and practice.

In the previous chapter an effort was made to show the relevance of the theory of developmental change presented to political and social theorizing and action in the context of American Democracy. Political and social theorizing and action were seen in terms of a philosophy or theory of change in which the goals of change, the sustenance and enhancement of life and social and psychological health were made explicit. Just as the focus of such social and political theorizing and action can be seen to be upon the purpose of change, the goals of change, and the processes which serve those purposes and goals, so too can the focus of public administrative theorizing and practice be seen to be upon purposes and goals and the ways and means of accomplishing those purposes and seeking realization of those goals. Similarly public administrative theory and practice may also be seen to entail the same focus on the developmental character of the goals of change and of the approaches employed in realizing those goals and purposes. The theory of the public interest which is basic to the approach to public administration presented here may also be seen to share this same focus. The concept of the public interest is defined here in terms of the theory of developmental change.

Defining the "Public Interest"

"To act in the public interest" is defined here as meaning "to act to preserve and enhance humanistic values in life and health and democratic values in individual and societal freedom." Acting in the public interest is a dynamic concept which involves the attempt to maximize at any given point in time both humanistic and democratic
sets of values, to maximize them in such a way that neither is
sacrificed, neither suffers at the expense of the other.¹

Public Administration in the Public Interest
in the Context of American Democracy

The Relevance of the Preamble to the Constitution

The approach to public administration presented here is one
in which the public administrator is viewed as being an agent of
humanistic and democratic change, an agent who is engaged in the
governance of a free society, one who is attempting to serve the
public—to serve in the public interest. This approach to public
administration is one in which the public administrator is seen as
upholder of rights and promoter of purposes provided for in the Con-
stitution, including "promot(ing) the General Welfare, and secur(ing)
the Blessing of Liberty to Ourselves and our Posterity."²

When a public administrator swears or affirms to uphold the
Constitution, that public administrator can be seen as taking upon
himself the obligation to do his best to serve in the public interest,
in other words, to try to serve in a way that is consonant with the
U.S. Constitution, and perhaps most relevantly, consonant with the
general tenets laid down in the Preamble to the Constitution. The
Federal level public administrator is obliged—at least in theory—to
seek to act in the public interest, to seek to serve the public good.
The Oath he takes in assuming a role in public service allows him no
options, unless of course he is to go back on his word, and in effect

¹The conventional conceptions of the public interest will be dis-
cussed presently. These conceptions will be compared with the definition
presented here.

²U.S. Constitution, Preamble.
disaffirm his oath.

Tendencies to "pseudopoliticize" the public service

Those taking such oaths are not--again, theoretically--at liberty to engage in what Bay calls "pseudopolitics."

They are not in theory free to engage in what amounts to the politics of narrow or selfish interests. In Bay's words "pseudopolitics," the politics of narrow or selfish interests, as has been noted earlier, includes "activity resembling politics but concerned exclusively with the alleviation of personal neuroses or with promoting private of private interest group advantage."

It bears noting here in passing that some theoreticians and practitioners define the purpose of public administration in terms of the "promoting of private or private interest group advantage," at least their emphasis would seem to have this general effect. It also bears noting here that much that transpires under the guise of public administration can be seen as being concerned with what Bay refers to as the "alleviation of personal neuroses." The administrative crisis may be seen as being exacerbated by a focusing on such pseudo- and non-political, narrow and self-serving purposes. Indeed the meeting of the administrative crisis will require a refocusing on true political purposes.

The obligation of the public administrator to serve in the public interest

The public administrator is seen here as being one who voluntarily

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2 Ibid. This is not to say that the conscientious administrator is bound to disregard the current political process heavily oriented as
accepts an obligation to serve in the public interest. The public administrator then is one who seeks to act to preserve and enhance humanistic values in life and health and democratic values in individual and societal freedom. The public administrator is thereby, in the context of American Democracy, accepting an obligation to respond to human and societal needs and problems and to respond to such needs and problems in a way that is in keeping with the public interest.

**Analogies to the field of medicine**

The public administrator when seen in this light shares many affinities to the doctor of medicine. In a similar way to the doctor of medicine, the public administrator is devoting himself to a realm of human and societal service. Implicit in this act is a commitment to serving the public good.

A public administrator, no less than a doctor, can only fulfill his duty if he maintains a commitment to this ideal of service, if he continues to exercise a sense of responsibility and commitment in serving the best interest of the public. While the doctor of medicine does so by doing what he can to preserve and enhance human health, the public administrator who is dedicated to serving in the public interest does so by conserving, nurturing, and providing stewardship over human

it is toward the pseudopolitical. It is to say that he is bound to try to rise above the pseudopolitical and to concern himself with that which is truly political in character.

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1 This analogy to medicine is found elsewhere in the literature. See especially Caiden, The Dynamics of Public Administration, p. 281; Dwight Waldo, "Scope of the Theory of Public Administration," from "Theory and Practice of Public Administration," Monograph No. 8 of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia (October 1968): 10-11; and Bay, "The Cheerful Science of Dismal Politics."
and other resources, including natural resources. The efforts of both can thereby be seen to be vitally linked to the health and development of mankind and civilization.

Public administration quite obviously, however, has by far the broader focus of the two. For it is through the efforts of those engaged in public administration that cultures are shaped and developed. It is through the efforts of administration and public administration in particular that mankind's problems and needs can be met and solved or ameliorated. In this way administration may be seen as man's best practical means of guiding and helping shape mankind's destiny.\(^1\) The discussion and analysis being undertaken here are intended to help provide a better basis for understanding the concept of the public interest and the role this concept may be seen as playing in public administration in the context of American Democracy.

In the discussion that immediately follows, different approaches and stances taken with respect to the concept of the public interest will be discussed and analyzed. The purpose in undertaking such an analysis is to identify some very basic differences which may be seen to differentiate many of the major contemporary schools of public administration. The "partial" quality of many of these approaches and the typically overdevelopmental trajectory of the kind of change they may be seen as engendering should become apparent in the course of this analysis. The importance of the humanistic and democratic concept of the public interest should also become apparent, particularly

\(^1\)Dwight Waldo has written in a quite similar vein in The Study of Public Administration, p. 11 (quoted fn. 2, p. 23 above).
the potential of such a concept for helping engender the kind of directional change that should be valued above all else in a free democracy.

Current Concepts of the Public Interest

Leys' Typology of Meanings of "Public Interest"

Wayne A.R. Leys has developed a very useful typology of substantive meanings of "public interest." These meanings fall into four categories shown here in Figure 16.

A. Utilitarian or aggregationist approach
B. Process-oriented approach
C. Normative, public good approach
D. The "public interest" as a vague organizing concept

Fig. 16. Substantive Meanings of the "public Interest". ¹

(Leys' fourth category which focuses on the concept of the public interest as a vague "organizing" concept, may for all intents and purposes be seen here as a fainter and less decisive prior iteration of the normative conception of the public good. ² For this reason it is not discussed as a separate and distinct category here. Rather it is considered here as being subsumed in the third category.)


²Leys quotes Drucker regarding his view on the public interest as an organizing concept, ibid, p. 239.
Of central concern here are the different types of substantive meanings delineated in Leys' typology. All of these substantive meanings may be seen as being essentially prescriptive in character, although some are focused more on what "is" than on what "should be." That is to say that some are more focused on either description or process than on what should be. The assumption implicit in both these cases is that a description of "what is" or the process of determining what "should be" is more important than the actual consideration of what "should be." In the case of the normative approach to the public interest, the assumption is that what "should be" is of paramount importance.

Each approach then may be seen to embody an implicit, if not explicit directional philosophy or orientation which can be depicted in terms of the representational map of developmental change. Each of the three basic approaches is so described in the figures which appear below.

The "utilitarian" or "aggregationist" orientation to the public interest: the "sum of" approach to the public interest

The "utilitarian" or aggregationists' concept of the public

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1 The basic differences in the substantive meanings ascribed to the concept of the "public interest" can also be viewed in light of the distinctions Christian Bay draws between the "political" and the "pseudopolitical." These definitions have been given above. Especially see the Foreword.

2 Patrick J. Conklin has used this terminology, "the sum of approach" in describing a prevalent perspective which can be found in current public administration theorizing today. (Interview, 14 July 1975.)

The "sum of" approach may also be seen to have its source in the following statement of Jeremy Bentham from A Fragment on Government and Principles of Morals and Legislation (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1948):
interest as depicted in Figure 17 below can be called the "sum of" approach to the public interest. The "sum of" philosophy of the public interest may be seen as being most typically rooted in primary mentality assumptions concerning man. Edgar Bodenheimer underscores this point in his writing when he discusses Bertram Russell's observations regarding Bentham's views concerning the subject of the interests of the political community.¹ Bodenheimer writes,

Russell has observed (that) the Benthamite doctrine (based on the conception of the individual as an essentially selfish being) could be accepted only on the supposition that the sum total of selfish individual actions could be equated with the maximum happiness of the community.²

In the case of "utilitarian" approaches, change tends to be in the direction of overdevelopment because of the tendency of this approach to be based in primary mentality assumptions concerning the nature of man and upon typically materialistically oriented values and definitions of what constitutes man's interests.

The process-oriented approach to the public interest

Emerson's notion of what constituted man's greatness or his


² Ibid.
(The dotted triangle outlines the parameters of the limited conception of the nature of man and the typically primary mentality oriented orientation which may be seen to underlie this kind of approach.)

Change leading in the direction of overdevelopment which can be characterized by unbridled technological progress, the preeminence of materialist concerns and/or hedonism—all typically based in primary mentality assumptions.

Fig. 17 The "Utilitarian" or "Aggregationist" Orientation
potential for greatness provides an apt springboard for discussing
the nature and the implications of the process orientation. In
his Journal of 1834 Emerson wrote of man's greatness or potential
for greatness in terms of what motivated his action. He wrote

Man is great, not in his goals, but in his transition from
State to State. Great in act, but instantly dwarfed by self-
indulgence.¹

In the context of Emerson's value frame of reference, the
"utilitarian" or "aggregationist" approach to the public interest
would most likely be one which Emerson would find wanting, because
it tended to focus on man's potential for self-indulgent action,
mistaking that which in fact "dwarfed" man for that which made him
good or great.

If Emerson were to have had to pass judgment on Leys' second
category of substantive meanings ascribed to "public interest,"
he would likely have viewed it negatively as well. Extrapolating
again on the basis of this one statement, one could imagine Emerson's
assessment to be harshly critical for in his view the focus on
"transition from State to State" had importance only in so far as
that transition could be seen to relate to a higher purpose.² Great-
ness was not, in Emerson's view, an attribute ascribable to arbitrary
or directionless transition or change, but to movement which was for-
ward looking in its orientation, directed toward an ideal. In this
regard Emerson might well be seen as being an advocate for the kind
of approach to developmental change presented above. When viewed in

¹Ralph Waldo Emerson, Journals, ed Edward Waldo Emerson

²Ibid.
this light, it becomes readily apparent that the process-oriented
definition of the public interest has implicit in it a philosophy
of undirected and arbitrary change (See Figure 18 below). In this
way it can be seen as being unfocused with respect to any positive
purpose or goal.

The normative concept of
the public good or the
public interest

This approach to the public interest is depicted in Figure
19 below. The normative approach to the public interest may be seen
to encompass approaches which are essentially forward-looking
and idealistic in their orientation, approaches which reflect the
kinds of humanistic and democratic values found in the theory of
developmental change outlined above.

This approach to the public interest may be seen as being
one which takes into consideration the dynamically changing character
of social and political action.

The normative approach to the public good has been described
by both Aristotle and Paul Appleby in ways which are totally in con-
sonance with the humanistic and democratic theory of the public
interest presented above.

Aristotle has written:

The true forms of government... are those in which the one, or
the few, or the many, govern with a view to the common interest;
but governments which rule with a view to the private interest,
whether of the one, or of the few, or of the many, are perversions.¹

Some of Paul Appleby's notions concerning the public

¹Aristotle as quoted in William Ebenstein, Great Political
Thinkers-Plato to the Present, 4th ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart,
Fig. 18. The Process Orientation to the Public Interest
Fig. 19. Normative Conception of the Public Interest
interest which bear a notable similarity to those of Aristotle are crystallized in the following quote:

Neither the simple reconciliation of private interests nor their reconciliation modified by considerations of public interest is in the end a technical performance, no matter how many technical factors may figure in it. It is a political function, involving essentially the weighing of forces and the subjective identification of the narrow area with in which these forces may be balanced and the exercising of discretion concerning the point within that area at which acceptability and the public interest may be effectively and properly maximized.

The concept of the public interest which is basic to the democratic humanist approach to public administration presented here may be seen as being closely tied to the concepts of the public good and the public interest which have been implied by Aristotle and Appleby both.

The democratic humanist theory of the public interest presented above represents a later version of these concepts. There is very little difference with respect to words or essential meaning. The democratic humanist theory of the public interest focuses on the need for striking a balance which maximizes both basic human values and basic democratic values. Acting in the public interest is here being equated with acting in such a way as to preserve and enhance humanistic values in life and health and democratic values of individual and societal freedom. Acting in the public interest entails the cultivation of an attitude of reverence for life, as well as the adoption of a sense of responsibility for the welfare of others. One assumes a role of being one's brother's keeper.

Acting in the public interest entails as well trying to see beyond one's self-interest and beyond the expediency of the moment. Meher Baba has underscored the need for taking this kind of a long view in his discussion of approaches to ameliorating the problems of mankind in Listen, Humanity:

There are further questions of great importance in rendering help to a suffering humanity, such as temporary versus permanent relief. Often a sharp choice must be made. When immediate relief is likely to turn a curable case into an incurable one, or to spread the infection to others, insistence upon immediate relief and refusal to try for a permanent cure is unthinkable.¹

Another most important aspect of this concept of the public interest is that it is in consonance with Follett's view that "democracy has one task only--to free the creative spirit of man."²

Edgar Bodenheimer has written in a similar vein:

A social structure which affords the widest possible opportunities for the activation of all human energies and talents can hardly draw censure from reasonable men, and there seems to be a growing convergence among the peoples of the world toward a general acceptance of this view.³

The realization of the potentials for individual (self-) and societal actualization are central to the concept of the public interest which is the approach to public administration presented here.

The service that man renders man derives from the responsiveness of men to the needs of all others, their assumption of responsibility for the welfare of others and their acknowledgement of the value of "unleashing the creative spirit of man" and "activat(ing)...human

¹Meher Baba, Listen, Humanity, p. 149.
²Follett, The New State, p. 159.
energies.  

Such a view of serving in the public interest gives rise to a view of organizational health, a view which is explicit in Gerald Caiden's discussion of the concept of bureapathy.  

Caiden has written of bureapathy as being characteristic of organizational activity where purpose is subordinate to process, service to authority, reality to form, and adaptation to precedent.  

Public administration in the public interest, public service in the public interest as the approach is here described would subordinate process to purpose and authority to service.  Reality would be valued over form and adaptation over precedent. The healthy administrator would attempt to suffuse such principles and values into the life of the organization. The same values and principles would also be reflected in the way in which the administrator guided organizational activity.

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1 Follett, The New State, p. 159.

2 Caiden, The Dynamics of Public Administration, p. 8.

3 Ibid.

4 St. Augustine's discussion concerning the relationship of service and authority bears closely on this notion:  

...(T)he rule of the society is love, and love means service, any authority will only be a mode of service. They who exercise authority are in the service of those over whom they appear to exercise authority; and they exercise authority, not from a desire for domination, but by virtue of a duty to give counsel and aid.

efforts aimed at societal change and societal problem solving.¹

Summation

The administrator whose actions are guided by the humanistic and democratic theory of the public interest may be seen as serving to reinstate the principles, values, and assumptions which constitute the heritage as well as the essence of government in a free and democratic society.

The administrator (or public official) whose actions are guided by an "aggregationist" or "utilitarian" or process-oriented concept of the public interest or a concept of the public interest which otherwise fails to be informed by humanistic and democratic values--may not be seen to be similarly contributing to the development and actualization of that society or of man in general. In fact in many instances, particularly if the approach taken reflects anti-humanistic and anti-democratic values and assumptions, or if it reflects a view of man as intrinsically selfish or self-indulgent, the direction of the change that that society takes can be none other than away from the ideal directional goal of development, either in the direction of overdevelopment or underdevelopment, and regressive development, but not in the direction of healthy development.

As was noted in Chapter II, the Marxist and Communist views of desirable social change contrasts markedly with the goals of the democratic humanist theory of developmental change. (See Figure 14 above where this contrast has been depicted.) In Marxism and Communism

¹The way in which this concept of the public interest can be applied in societal problem solving and change agentry is the subject of the next chapter.
the social good is seen in materialistic terms. It is seen in terms of the enhancement of economic arrangements. Social change is seen as arising out of the evolution of social consciousness.\textsuperscript{1} Concrete material needs are seen as having the determining role in this evolution. This concept of the goals of social change may be seen as having no basis in human values beyond the value of subsistence. Denying the inalienability of man's right to life or making this value subsidiary to the will of the state or the interest of the "proletariat" and denying man both individual and societal freedom, Marxism and Communism can be seen as engendering change which directed toward overdevelopment or underdevelopment, change which leads away from healthy development and basic human values and fundamental values in individual and societal freedom.

An equally negative direction of change or state of stasis can result from sheer disinterest concerning the concept of the public good, the public interest. Julius Cohen in his writing concerning the concept of the public interest expresses his concern that this concept is a kind of endangered species. He writes,

\begin{quote}
We, meaning the public, do not know where we want the government to go; our society is suffering from that dread sociological disease called anomie, since we are fast becoming a public without an interest, it is feared that the concept of the public interest, like the whooping crane, is facing extinction.\textsuperscript{2}
\end{quote}

Without advocates, freedom, the public interest, the values in life and health which make up the public interest can vanish.

\textsuperscript{1}Marx and Engels wrote of the socially determined character of consciousness as they saw it in The German Ideology, ed. R. Pascal (New York: International Publishers, 1947).

overnight with the fall of democratic government and the fall of democratic ideals and principles.¹ The preservation of these values requires committed advocates, advocates among the general citizenry and advocates most importantly throughout the ranks of public administrators who in theory as well as practice are striving to serve in the public interest.

A Closer Look at the Nature of the Debate Surrounding the Concept of the Public Interest

Before moving on to a discussion of the ways in which the democratic humanist theory of the public interest presented above can be expressed in action, in change agentry and societal problem solving, it is important to direct some attention to the nature of the current debate or discourse concerned with the subject of the public interest.

The values and assumptions which one brings to such a discourse are not always made explicit, but explicit or not, they can be identified and their role in shaping a perspective concerning the substantive meaning of the public interest can be discerned.

By way of attempting to simplify what could otherwise prove a very cumbersome task of analysis, approaches to the concept of the public interest will be viewed as being either prescriptive and hence normative in their orientation or primarily descriptive and "value neutral" in their orientation. The first class can be divided into

¹Edgar Robinson in his lecture on John Dewey ("John Dewey as Prophet or Loss") spoke of a similar danger to democracy, a danger inherent in the spread of alienation in American society. He spoke in terms of the necessity for democracy to have advocates.
those approaches which reflect positive or negative values, e.g.,
values which in effect foster healthy development or values which
do not. Leys' normative classification would be synonymous with
the first; his utilitarian or aggregationist classification would
be synonymous with the second.

The second class may also be seen as encompassing those
approaches to the public interest which strive to be process-oriented,
approaches which are typically empirically or rationally based and
value neutral. The assumptions of such a stance of value neutrality,
in effect, if not intent, constitute the basis of a "negative"
value stance.¹

When viewed in this light, the way in which one approaches
the public interest may be seen to have definite moral implications.
The indisputable conclusion one must eventually come to is that the
question of what constitutes the public interest is a moral question.
In the final analysis, whatever one concludes concerning the sub-
stantive meaning (or absence of meaning) of the concept of the public
interest, that conclusion can be seen to be related to values and
assumptions concerning what is good and what is not, even if what is
good is seen as being not taking a stand concerning what is or might
be considered good.

The conclusions reached concerning the public interest, the
perspectives evolved, can also be seen to derive from assumptions
concerning the nature of knowledge and the nature of man. The tendency
of the person who is empirically and rationally oriented in his approach

¹See Foreword above for a discussion of value stances.
to such matters is apt to reject out of hand any approach which falls in Leys' normative category. This would most definitely include the normative and prescriptive approach to the public interest which is seen here as being central to public administration.

This out of hand rejection may be seen to be based in a set of values and assumptions which are opposed in crucial ways to those which underpin the perspectives of the normativists.

Schubert and the Public Interest

Glendon Schubert in his treatment of the concept of the public interest has provided a description of what he calls the "Idealist" perspective. This description provides important insight, if somewhat inadvertently, into a very fundamental point of contention in the debate surrounding the public interest—the nature of values and the nature of knowledge. Are values transcendent or relative? ¹ Can that which is called knowledge be attained through other than rational and empirical means? Schubert writes

Idealists believe that the public interest reposes not in the positive law made by men, but in the higher law, in natural law. They describe the public interest as a thing of substance, independent of the decisional process and absolute in terms. They advise the public official to ex-cogitate the true essence of the public interest by means of a mental act of extrasensory perception.²

¹Glendon Schubert, The Public Interest—Critique of the Theory of a Political Concept (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960). Schubert does not deal here with a third option discussed above—that of deriving humanist values out of existential bedrock. The failure to take into account or to even consider the implications of such existentially derived values, constitutes a most serious flaw in Schubert's analysis and the analyses of other empirically and rationally oriented analysts, who similarly overlook or fail to see the importance of the existential perspective.

Schubert, perhaps without really intending to, has zeroed in on questions of valuing and knowing, questions around whose answers the futures of governments and of civilization may indeed be seen to turn.

Schubert, in the closing statement of his book, also apparently inadvertently, underscores the deficiencies and irresolvable conflicts implicit in the approach to the public interest which seeks to be wholly empirical and rational in its orientation (i.e., one such as his own). He writes,

I would...argue...that if the public interest concept makes no operational sense, notwithstanding the efforts of a generation of capable scholars, then political scientists might better spend their time nurturing concepts that offer greater promise of becoming useful tools in the scientific study of political responsibility.¹

The "value-laden" term "responsibility" is saturated with idealism, with moral value judgments. The value frame of reference this single term evokes involves values and ideals which have moral connotations, values which in the end cannot be gleaned by rational and empirical means alone. Responsibility is a concept describing the moral character of relationships which can exist between man and man. It is not and cannot be viewed as being a value neutral or amoral concept.

Responsibility describes a moral quality that only thinking and valuing human beings can knowingly express. To seek to make "operational sense" of what is essentially a non-quantifiable attribute is not only destined to be a fruitless venture, but is in fact an absurd undertaking.

¹Idem, The Public Interest, p. 224.
When one tries to base one's approach in epistemologies and axiologies which are counter to one another, the result at best must lead to a mild case of schizophrenia. One cannot be an empiricist at heart decrying idealism as being based in "extrasensory perception" or in metaphysics and art, and yet seek to incorporate into his study a concern for that which is essentially non-approachable, non-understandable through solely rational and empirical means. To attempt such an incorporation should lead the analyst to a recognition of the incompleteness and deficiencies of the basic set of assumptions and values upon which he has been operating.

If such an analyst were to continue to base his approach in a confining and deficient paradigm, he could be expected to become amoral, morally schizophrenic, or totally devoid of his basic humanity. The antidote would seem to lie in what Siu has called "human-heartedness." The "human-hearted" man would not limit what he knew (or what he thought he knew) to that which can be known empirically or rationally.

Flathman would seem to be decrying the limitation inherent in the solely rational and empirical approaches to analysis and understanding. In his treatment of the moral character of the concept of the public interest, he writes

...but the questions of value are not amenable to rational transsubjective, scientific analysis.

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1 Such problems, implications, and consequences are discussed further in the final chapter.

2 Siu, The Tao of Science, see especially pp. 129 and 143-144.

Schubert's quest for a consistent empirically based theory

Schubert would seem to be looking for a theory of the public interest which would provide a basis for understanding how the public interest is defined in practice. He writes:

No systematic body of "public-interest theory" appears extant. American writers in the field of political science have evolved neither a unified nor a consistent theory to describe how the public interest is defined in governmental decisionmaking; they have not constructed theoretical models with the degree of precision and specificity necessary if such models are to be used as a description of, or a guide to, the actual behavior of real people.

There is a most serious error in logic here in that an understanding of how the public interest is defined can at best have only slight academic interest or significance. Studying what is apart from a consideration of the all important question of what should be in the public interest? is destined to yield scant understanding, not only of how the public interest is defined, but of how it can be defined, to what ends, and why.

LaPorte's Call for an Empirically Verifiable Operational Approach

Todd LaPorte would also seem to be looking for a similar kind of empirically supportable theory. He would try to bridge the gap that separates descriptive and explanatory theory from prescriptive and normative theory when he urges that theorists should "write theory in such a way that if it is false it can be verified to be so." (Italics in original.) The fallacy here that renders such a criterion wholly absurd derives from the fact that normative theory simply cannot be written

1Schubert, The Public Interest, p. 220.

in such a way that it can be subject to empirical proofs of validity or invalidity.

The error in thinking that appears to lead many to believe that it might be possible to subject normative theory to empirical proofs of validity is traceable to the assumptions that only the empirically and rationally oriented approaches to knowing yield "real" knowledge, including knowledge (and understanding) of values.

An empirically and rationally oriented methodology cannot be developed which would make it possible to subject normative theory to empirical proof because the reasons that a normative theory works or fails to work are traceable to non-empirically sensible factors. Requirements for replicability cannot be satisfied unless these factors (which include or can include intuition, aspiration, concern, hope, love, etc.) are replicated. Since they defy quantification or "proof" of existence and hence "operationalization," empirical standards for replicability cannot be met.¹

Even if empirical standards for replicability could be met, such exercises serve to obscure the significance of normative theory. The central concern of normative theory is not with what is or might be workable and replicable; the central concern of normative theory is with what should be and with what needs to be. No solely empirically based methodology or approach can ever touch or fathom the attributes, the qualities, the "reasoning" of the human heart, mind, and conscience which are at the core of normative approaches.

¹Richard E. Flathman sees the concept as defying "operationalization" because "the concept (of the public interest) can only be used to express subjective preference or as an honorific label." (Flathman, The Public Interest, p. 9.)
Descriptive and analytically oriented approaches are as far removed epistemologically and axiologically from prescriptive and normative approaches as the "clarification" of values is from the act of valuing itself. While the former may serve as an aid or prod to understanding, it may also serve to dehumanize and objectify in an unreal and non- or inhuman way that which has such a central role in living--valuing.¹

It is the act of valuing and the motivation which underlies positive valuing upon which the shape of the future rests. To emphasize, owing to a limited methodology, what is or what has been and to fail to consider what should be is--to turn Machiavelli's statement right side around--to bring about man's ruin rather than his preservation.²

¹A more thorough analysis of the values and assumptions which underlie the "empirical" paradigm will be provided in Chapter VI. The implications that these values and assumptions hold for public administration theory and practice are explored further there.

²Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince and the Discourses, trans. Luigi Ricci, rev. E.R.P. Vincent (New York: Modern Library, 1950), (F)or how we live is so far removed from how we ought to live, that he who abandons what is done for what ought to be done, will rather learn to bring about his own ruin than his preservation. (p. 56).
CHAPTER IV

THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE PUBLIC
INTEREST APPROACH TO PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION

Introduction

In Chapter IV the relevance of the democratic humanist
type of the public interest to public administration is spelled
out. This approach to public administration is called "public
administration in the public interest." Public administration in
terms of this approach is seen as societal change agentry and
societal problem solving in the public interest. The outlining
of the "public administration in the public interest" approach
includes the presentation of a meta-theory of societal problem
solving and the relating of this theory of problem solving to a
pertinent theory concerned with different types of organizations,
including those which are knowledge-oriented, knowledge utilizing,
societal problem solving organizations. The implications of this
approach for responsive and responsible public administration and
government are discussed.

Public Administration as Change Agentry and Problem
Solving in the Public Interest

Defining the Focus of Public Administration

Public administration
as prescriptive and
purposive
Public administration as the term is being used here is concerned with responding to and addressing human and societal needs. It is concerned with the facilitation of developmental change on behalf of both self-actualization and societal actualization. Public administration is seen as being grounded in concern for human welfare, for the maintenance and improvement of the human condition, for the improvement in the quality of life, the sustenance and enhancement of individual and societal freedom, and for the development of a more human civilization. It is concerned with the amelioration or the solution of the major problems facing man and society.

There are obviously many factors which stand in the way of the acceptance as well as the employment of such an approach to public administration. The major factors which have impeded the evolution and are likely to slow down acceptance of a normative theory of public administration such as the one proposed here--have been noted above, in as much as it is these same factors which have impeded the evolution and acceptance of holistic and humanistic theories of change and similarly oriented theories of the public interest.

The major factors which can be expected to impede or slow down the employment of this normative approach to public administration may be seen to include an additional range of factors, factors which bear specifically on both the human and the practical sides of change agentry and societal problem solving. Some of these factors most obviously include hatred, intolerance, selfishness, and lust for power; insensitivity to and lack of concern for human needs; and an absence of purpose and motivation.

While these factors may be seen to derive from or be related
to the impoverishment of social and political theorizing and speculation and the impoverishment of cultural and societal values, there are other factors to consider here, factors which relate to the most practical aspects of action: the effecting of change and the ameliorating and solving of problems. These latter factors include ignorance, ineptitude, and just plain lack of adequate application of human ingenuity, intelligence, experience, and common sense to the solution of societal problems.

There are several reasons for spending some time here discussing some of the more practical aspects of change agency and societal problem solving. These are as follows:

1) Most of the major schools of thought that can be found in public administration today appear to be concerned with various fragmentary aspects of practical action. None with the exception of the School of Development Administration is concerned with the practical aspects of ameliorating or solving large scale "nitty-gritty" societal problems. As a result knowledge and understanding of large scale societal problem solving appear today to be as rare as experience and expertise in such matters.

2) Because of what could be characterized as an anti- or non-practical orientation of most theory, such theory simply does not lend itself to translation into practical action.

3) Similarly, owing to an absence of theory which relates practice to societal values and longrange societal goals, few persons may be expected to be inclined, able, or trained to translate

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1Caiden defines Development Administration using these terms in *The Dynamics of Public Administration*, p. 264.
theory of this kind into action.\footnote{It should go without saying that the educating and training of public administrators who were so equipped would require the radical overhauling and reorienting of most present approaches to training and education. Because of the size and complexity of such overhauling and reorienting efforts, a separate work would be required to do the subject justice. For that reason, only the most obvious implications of this approach for the educating and training of public administrators are touched on in the present work.}

Some effort needs to be made then to define and describe what is meant by large scale societal problem solving in the context of the theories of change and public administration presented here. In effect this would amount to taking a first major step to translating such theories into action.

\textit{The Basic Aspects and Elements of Change Agentry and Problem Solving in the Public Interest}

Change agentry in the service of the goals of developmental change has been discussed at length above. The bearing of such an approach upon societal problem solving should become increasingly clear in the discussion of societal problem solving which follows.

\textit{Taking a Meta-Level Look at Problems and Problem Solving}

John Cage has recounted an anecdote in \textit{Silence} which bears on what could be seen as the meta-level aspects of problem solving.\footnote{John Cage, \textit{Silence} (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1966), p. 93.} The anecdote is about Arnold Schönberg, the famed composer, when he was teaching a class in advanced musical composition at the University of California at Los Angeles. Schönberg had asked the class to come up with a solution to a problem in musical composition. One solution was offered. He asked the class for another solution, and then another...
and another. After a number of solutions had been advanced, he charged the class to tell him what principle underlay all of those solutions.

Societal problems, whatever their level of magnitude, may similarly be seen to share certain principles or features in common, as can their solutions. Problems can be viewed in terms of their probable cyclic character and their potential for recurrence. Problem solving may be viewed in terms of certain common elements which can be seen to make up the problem solving process. Certain commonly shared principles may be seen to apply. These common principles, features, and elements, can be seen to apply to all levels of problems and their solution or amelioration. This includes meta-level problems (e.g., meeting the administrative crisis) as well as more concretized large scale or small scale human and societal problems.

Defining the meaning of "societal problem"

"Problem" is defined in Webster's as a "source of perplexity or vexation" with "perplexity" having to do with "complications and uncertainties" and "vexation" having to do with "the bring(ing) of trouble, distress, or agitation" A societal problem is a problem, in the sense just defined, which emerges from a societal context and which has societal implications.

The cyclic character of societal problems

A societal problem may be viewed in terms of its probable cyclic character and its potential for recurrence. Looking at the first of these more closely, societal problems can be seen to have an
historical life cycle.¹ That is they can be seen as having beginnings, sources, causes, and endings. They can also be seen as going through stages in which symptoms ("evidences" or "indications") of the problem become apparent. These symptoms may become more pronounced; they may change in character; they may create other problems; they may lie quiescent; they may be arrested as the source or cause that gave rise to the symptom ceases to exist. They may also be arrested, manipulated, or altered while nothing is done with respect to the sources of causes of the problem.

Societal problems then may be seen to have an historical life cycle which may be interrupted at any given point by intervention. Such intervention can in turn alter the historical evolution or devolution of the problem. The diagram in Figure 20 below depicts this cycle.

The potential for the recurrence of societal problems

Viewing the cyclic character of problems in the way described above and depicted in Figure 20 allows one to see the problem solving process in terms of the overall history, potential history or evolution of a problem. Viewing problems in this way should allow one to see as well what must be done not only to ameliorate or solve a problem, but to keep it from beginning the cycle anew.

Approaches typically taken to dealing with societal problems,

¹The problem of drug abuse is analyzed in terms of its cyclic character in Paula D. Gordon, "'Alternatives to Drugs' as a Part of Comprehensive Efforts to Ameliorate the Drug Problem," Journal of Drug Education 2 (September 1972):289-296.
Worsening symptoms can complicate management of problems and amelioration or solving of the problems; crises may occur as a result.

Steps at intervention may be taken to keep the symptoms from getting worse.

If symptoms are arrested or controlled, and underlying sources and causes are not dealt with, the cycle may begin in a new form or continue in a similar form.

Problems emerge from certain sources and root causes.

Symptoms manifest.

Fig. 20. The Cyclic Character of Societal Problems
whatever their stage of evolution or devolution, are generally focused on the most obvious and most vexing symptoms of problems. Cases in point include problems which are particularly societally disruptive or troublesome, such as the energy problem with its most immediate and vexing accompanying symptom—shortages of fuel supplies; environmental problems and intolerably high and hazardous levels of pollution, radiation, and the like; the crime problem and decreasing safety on the streets and security in homes and businesses, etc.; and the drug problem and the alcohol problem with increasing numbers of persons becoming personal and social liabilities, suffering diminished health, while also causing, or being a potential cause of hardship, harm, or injury to others, as well as to themselves.

At the meta-level, e.g., the problem of the administrative crisis, the symptoms can be seen as being the worsening societal problems themselves.

A comprehensive approach to problem solving

In addressing a problem in a way that is apt to lead to its amelioration or solution, a comprehensive, rather than a piecemeal approach needs to be taken. Rather than attempting to deal solely with symptoms, the would-be problem solver must deal at once with the sources or underlying causes of the problem, with the early manifestation of symptoms, as well as with the late manifestation of symptoms. He may also be called upon to deal with crises which arise. Unless all of these are considered and addressed, no long-term amelioration or solution to a problem can be expected. Figure
21 below depicts the elements involved in a comprehensive approach to problem solving.

Using the contemporary problems related to energy and crime as examples

The energy problem

A typical example of a fragmentary approach to problem solving and amelioration would be the handling of the energy problem by attempting to deal with the problem solely in terms of adjusting supplies and creating new sources, rather than taking a longrange view. A comprehensive approach to dealing with the energy problem would include trying to evolve an approach to the problem aimed at dealing with all of its aspects in terms of societal values and the goal of individual and societal development. This would ideally entail such things as

1) fostering new attitudes and values which would be in keeping with the public interest;
2) fostering an approach to energy conservation which would make it unnecessary to endanger life through the creation and use of unsafe or environmentally damaging energy sources (e.g., the nuclear breeder reactor);
3) creating or utilizing environmentally safe sources of energy, e.g., biomass, solar, wind, geothermal, and tidal sources;
4) fostering, promoting massive resource recycling and recovery efforts; and
5) taking steps to assure that the creation, distribution, and use of alternative energy sources such as those listed here will not create more serious problems.
Crisis intervention and the arresting and addressing of advanced symptoms and "rehabilitation"

Fig. 21. A Comprehensive Approach to Societal Problem Solving
What is called for, in effect, is an overall policy which reflects a philosophy and a set of values and assumptions, a policy which subserves longrange societal goals of development (individual and societal development) and a policy which safeguards and provides for all aspects of the public interest.¹

The crime problem

Dealing with the problem of crime is similarly a matter of dealing with all aspects of the problem. It is a matter of dealing at once with prevention, intervention, and rehabilitation. It is a matter of providing for the effective and just administration of justice. With respect to prevention, it is a matter of addressing unmet needs, including the most basic unmet lower and middle-range needs of the most severely disadvantaged and the most seriously alienated in the society. It is a matter as well of addressing the higher range needs of others who are also seriously alienated. In some cases this may mean providing means whereby individuals can become meaningfully employed and meaningfully involved in life. For many this may be accomplished through reforms within the educational system, reforms which address the problems of alienation and help individuals gain a sense of self worth and a sense of meaning and individual and social purpose in life. For others, it may be accomplished through institutional and societal reforms which have a similar healthy orientation.

¹References pertaining to energy related policies and to the approaches mentioned in the list above have been compiled for the Federal Energy Administration by Paula D. Gordon in "Suggested Lists of Materials to be Made Available to Public Officials," 29 July 1974 (Photocopied.)
The comprehensive approach to dealing with the problem of crime would then deal with the unmet needs and unfulfilled aspirations that give rise to the criminal activity in the first place. The comprehensive approach would provide for early intervention in criminal activity and the taking of effective steps to assure that everything possible has been done to address these needs and causes that gave rise to the behavior in the first place. The approach would include efforts to motivate the individuals who had been involved in criminal activities or who were likely to become involved and to redirect their energies in constructive and socially beneficial directions. Community service sentencing whereby individuals who do not represent a serious threat to society could receive sentences to community service in lieu of incarceration would be one approach. Another would be providing for educational and counseling programs in lieu of incarceration, including traffic court school kinds of programs.¹

More effective approaches to treating and rehabilitating hardened criminals, and individuals who have committed more serious crimes, would need to be employed. These could include approaches which focused on helping instill new values, helping awaken self understanding, helping the individual develop what talents he may have so that he may feel meaningfully active during his period of

rehabilitation and so that he may be adequately prepared to assume a respectable and useful role in society subsequent to his rehabilitation. As one of the most difficult steps in the rehabilitation process is the return of the individual to society, and the finding of gainful, legitimate employment, provision should be made for employment, if need be, in government supported firms or services. General as well as specific improvements in the administration of justice would also be required.

The administration of justice could be rendered far more effective in general if humanistic approaches to understanding and addressing the problems of crime were promulgated and if the consequences for engaging in criminal or deviant behavior were appropriate to the rehabilitative needs of the individual and the seriousness of the activity. Technical assistance, informational and educational programs could accomplish much to bring about reforms in these areas. Proactive initiatives and leadership on the part of those at the highest judicial levels could do much to renovate and reorient the justice system in the nation.¹ It is a matter more than anything else of awakening understanding and encouraging those in positions of responsibility to develop sound philosophical and humanistically oriented approaches to the administering of justice and helping provide them with any assistance they may need in translating such understanding and approaches into effective reforms, policies, and action.

Looking at a Meta-Level Order of Problems

The administrative crisis

Dealing with the meta-level problem of the administrative crisis, is a matter of trying to understand the root causes of the crisis while attempting at the same time to make up for those deficits, and while trying to deal more effectively with societal problems, both those of an immediate crisis character and those of a long-term and smoldering character. It entails in effect, the evolution of the kinds of theories of change, public administration, and the public interest which have been presented here, theories which have been developed on the bed rock of humanistic and democratic values.

It entails as well the effective application of meta-level theories of developmental change and societal problem solving. It entails an understanding of the effective development and application of such theories and an understanding of the nature, roots, and implications of a value-based approach to societal problem solving and societal change.

A summation

In the three problems discussed briefly here, a common similarity can be found. Each of these problems, if it is to be ameliorated or solved, requires that there be would-be problem solvers who are concerned for the social good, persons who would serve in the public interest, persons who would assume the responsibility and take the initiative to institute the actions necessary to ameliorating or solving problems. The problem solver, to be successful must have the kind of developmental orientation to change
outlined above in Chapter II. In keeping with the democratic humanist theory of the public interest presented in Chapter III, he must address his efforts to ameliorating and solving societal problems in such a way that the immediate as well as the longrange interests of the society are best served.

The Major Elements Involved in the Wedding of Societal Problem Solving Theory and Practice

Far more is involved in successful problem solving than the ability to see a problem in terms of its cyclic potential and the inclination to seek to address the problem in light of humanistic values and values in individual and societal freedom.

The other elements of problem solving can be seen to include the exercise of uncommon amounts of common sense, ingenuity, understanding, insight, initiative, integrity, commitment, and even courage. They can also include the deceptively simple matter of expertise.

These various elements can be seen to include:
1) understanding the nature and scope of the problems, the short range and longrange implications for individuals and society; understanding the nature of the solution to the problems;
2) capacity to recognize, develop, and implement viable approaches, programs, and policies designed to deal with the underlying causes as well as the symptoms of the problems; inclination and capacity to promulgate such approaches;
3) capacity to effectively muster and utilize resources, including the mustering and orchestration of both human and fiscal resources;
ability to establish sound priorities for training, technical assistance, knowledge utilization, and innovation diffusion; 4) administrative expertise including familiarity with pertinent kinds of organizational and administrative operations and arrangements; administrative ability and insight to wed understand to viable action; the ability to perceive and implement ways of promulgating effective approaches, policies, and programs; 5) understanding the political and psycho-social factors influencing the environment in which persons are trying to deal with the problems; and the combining of such understanding with interest, commitment, and the capacity for leadership.

Examples

Arvid Pardo

An outstanding example of what is entailed in effective societal problem solving (short of implementation) can be found in Arvid Pardo's concise and incisive analysis of the problems related to the development and implementation of a global policy relating to the oceans, their sustenance and the protection and utilization of their resources.¹

Pardo's analysis is rooted in a global perspective in

which the interdependence of nations is acknowledged and the need for their cooperation in working toward the resolution of common problems is seen as being essential to the future of the oceans as well as to peace in the world and to the preservation and wise use of the world's dwindling natural resources.

Pardo's analysis includes likely scenarios based on the "operational codes," sets of values, assumptions, perspectives, and political agendas which he observes to be shaping present actions and likely to shape the future actions of the key actors involved in the shaping and implementation of ocean policy.¹ He contrasts the likely resulting scenario with what to him would be the most salutary scenario. He outlines what an ideal ocean policy would look like and lists the steps necessary to effect it. He sums up present approaches to the evolution of ocean policy as having serious and basic deficiencies. He sees the focus of these approaches as being "on immediate issues, which are perceived as vital, national interest—and not so much on long-term issues," the kind of issues which he feels could be decisive with respect to the world's future.² He argues that this narrow nationalistic approach is going against the tide of history, "going against the imperative for cooperative endeavor which is becoming increasingly important in present world conditions."³ He sees such "cooperative endeavor" as being "imposed

¹While Pardo does not use this term (coined by Leites, see George, "The Operational Code"), what he is engaging in is an analysis of the operational codes of the major actors concerned with ocean policy. See Chapter I above for a discussion of this mode of analysis.

²Bill Moyers; Interview with Arvid Pardo, p. 9.

³Idem, Interview with Arvid Pardo, p. 11.
on us by technological advance and by increasing communications between nations" among other factors.¹

Whereas the goals of Pardo's idealized policy would be directed toward the sound "management of resources" and the "preservation of the marine environment, he sees current Law of the Sea efforts being directed instead toward "problems of jurisdiction and allocation of resources."²

Here is a most clear example of the deficiencies and implications of policy which focuses on immediate needs and procedural issues divorced from a concern for overriding values and purposes. Pardo's approach, in sharp contradistinction, is based on a concern for the long-term results of policy. He focuses on the most basic questions of values and goals. The alternatives are made quite clear. The choices among alternatives can be seen to turn on understanding, comprehension of the facts and their implications, and most importantly on the values and assumptions which one brings to bear in the problem-solving process.

Pardo's approach epitomizes proactive, public interest-oriented problem solving at its best, the kind of focus on problem solving which would characterize public administration in the public interest. Pardo has dealt with all the elements of the problem, reflected a comprehension of all the major political and philosophical, value issues and questions involved. He has synthesized this masterfully in an analysis which includes attention to what is, what should be and what must happen if we are to move from what is

¹Idem, Interview with Arvid Pardo, pp. 11-12.

to what should be. This process of analysis could be called "prescriptive analysis," for it focuses attention on all those aspects of the problem which must be comprehended if positive steps are to be taken to ameliorate or solve the problem.

Another key difference which distinguishes Pardo's approach to problem analysis from that of most other persons is that he has undertaken his analysis in an explicit value frame of reference, making explicit, if not just implying at every juncture, the values and goals he sees as being of paramount concern. He has made explicit what he sees as being the longrange best interests of mankind in these matters.

Lester Brown

Lester Brown has undertaken and accomplished similar feats of synthesis and analysis which like Pardo's efforts--are also based in an explicit value frame of reference. He has focused both on the analysis of the problem and the outline of solutions. He has thereby done the groundwork needed for implementing the solutions. Brown's work along with Pardo's has helped pave the way for the practical and political initiatives that need to be taken in seeking solutions to some of the major problems confronting mankind.

Other examples

Other examples of attempts to comprehensively analyze societal

problems and to prescribe solutions based on that analysis can be found in three papers relating to different aspects of the problem of drug abuse.¹ In one paper an analysis of the marijuana controversy is provided in which the effects and potentials for harm of this drug are viewed in a context in which individual and societal health are seen as primary values. Policy options based on this analysis are recommended. An analysis is also included of the factors impeding resolution of the controversy from ignorance of the research to the time lag involved in assimilating information, to the value neutral reading of research findings. The compounding of the problem by the generation gap issue and problems involving the development of humanistic policy based on understanding of the implications of research findings for individual and social health are also discussed.²

The other two papers focus on the nature of the drug problem and the spectrum of initiatives, programs, and policies which need to be undertaken and implemented in order to ameliorate the problem.³


²Idem, "Toward the Resolution of the Controversy Surrounding the Effects and Social Health Implications of Marijuana Use."

³Idem, "'Alternatives to Drugs'" and "The Promulgation of Promising approaches to Prevention and Early Intervention."
The Most Obvious Impediments to Effective Societal Problem Solving

The Most Basic Inadequacies in Outlook and Understanding

In attempting to summarize concerning the major impediments to effective societal problem solving, based on the discussion thus far, one can trace most basic inadequacies to the outlook and understanding of the would-be problem solver. The failure of would-be problem solvers to take a "meta-level" look at problems and problem solving, whether through conscious effort or through predisposition, constitutes a most serious impediment to effective problem solving. One who fails to approach problems and problem solving from such a vantage cannot hope to comprehend the most essential elements which go into effective problem solving. Basic failure to comprehend the nature and implications of a problem automatically renders attempts to solve or ameliorate such a problem ineffective, however efficient or effective the administrative and organizational arrangements that may have been put in place.

Failure to understand that the solving or amelioration of problems requires far more than administrative expertise--renders efforts to deal with complex societal problems wholly inadequate.

Focus on fragments of problems, on symptoms, and on "pseudo-problems"

Focus on "pseudo-problems (often out of "pseudo-political" motivations) can be seen in approaches that many of the actors involved in ocean policy formulation and implementation appear to be taking. The efforts of such actors constitute a stellar example of the inadequacy of "pseudo-problem" solving approaches, approaches
which are directed at symptom manipulation or control. Such efforts are not only doomed to failure, they are standing in the way of other potentially effective problem solving efforts. Temporary manipulation or control of symptoms may well tend to exacerbate the problem, create new symptoms, or lead to new problems. Such attempts at symptom manipulation or control in no way can be seen as a means to the long-term amelioration or solution of a problem. Yet it is just such a focus which can be found to dominate problem solving efforts throughout government today. For this reason the whole subject of how societal problems can be effectively addressed, is of paramount importance today. While it is essential that those in the Executive Branch of the Federal government acquire such understanding, it is important as well that those in the Legislative and Judiciary Branches acquire a similar understanding in order to carry out their respective roles and obligations in a responsible and responsive manner.

Superficial attempts at problem solving: the inadequacies of "puzzle-solving" approaches

Problems not only tend to be defined in partial and superficial ways, in terms of their symptoms, but the manipulation or control of the symptoms tends to be approached as if the problem were simply a puzzle. Puzzles, unlike societal problems, can be solved through the application of reason and technical skill. Ingenuity and common sense can also play key roles. Far more is required when dealing with a complex societal problem.

Complex societal problem solving requires the capacity for
understanding and apprehension which lie beyond the range of the expertise of the one who has been trained as a puzzle solver.\textsuperscript{1}

Those whose training or background has led them to adopt the narrow view of administration and prepared them to deal with problems as they would with puzzles, are wholly unprepared to grapple with the complex societal problems confronting mankind today. They may do well with managing small pieces of problems which lend themselves to puzzle-solving approaches; they may even appear to be successful in their attempts to apply such approaches to the short-term arresting or ameliorating of certain symptoms of larger problems, but they fail to begin to rise to the challenge of dealing with complex problems in such a way that these problems can be solved or significantly ameliorated.

Societal problems are not amenable to puzzle-solving techniques. Neither can they be solved by taking a vote to see what solution is most popular. Problem solving requires a breadth of vision and understanding and expertise combined with a comprehension of political, social, and even spiritual realities—a collection of capacities and aptitudes which are not only typically foreign to the puzzle solver, but positively anathema to him. This can be seen as owing in large measure to the differences in approaches to reasoning and perceiving

which distinguish the narrow rationalist from the broad rationalist and the differences which can be seen to distinguish the person acting on the basis of primary mentality assumptions (and hence self-serving or narrowly focused interests) and the person operating on the basis of secondary mentality assumptions and therefore, "other-focused" and humanistically-oriented interests.

Problem definition and problem solution—the role of psychological health and maturity

Margaret Thaler Singer's work provides certain important insights into the nature of realistic problem definition and effective problem solving. This includes work that she did in the 1960's which focused on the problem-solving behavior in families. She was concerned there with the way in which the character of problem-solving behavior could be seen to correlate with the psychological healthiness or unhealthiness of the adolescent youth in those families.¹ Other pertinent work includes an earlier study with Lyman Wynne which concerned individual schizophrenic impairment and family patterns of thinking and communicating.²

In the research which concerned with problem solving, Singer compared families having adolescents with problems (covering a wide

¹This research was reported on by Dr. Singer at "The Teenager's Quest for Freedom." a symposium held at the University of California Medical Center in San Francisco in September, 1968.

range from delinquency to schizophrenia) with families having "normal" adolescents. One of the major areas of concern in here studies was the way in which families approached problem solving. Dr. Singer's studies indicate that there is a definite correlation between families having adolescents with serious problems involving delinquency, psychopathology, or underachievement and families which cannot effectively confront and solve problems.

Dr. Singer found that families which reached successful solutions to problems shared certain characteristics in common. These included the fact that such families treated problems with a certain sense of detachment. A distance from the problem was maintained. Therefore, personalities did not become the central issue. The problem itself was the issue. It was easier to find a solution when no one felt personally threatened. Viewpoints were solicited and each person's view respected. Mutual effort was directed at solving problems. Singer's research indicates that this approach to problem solving may well be more conducive to psychologically healthy development than the less positive and less successful approaches used in families which had "abnormal" adolescents. Her studies also indicate that the maturity and psychological healthiness of family members will bear greatly upon the approach the family takes to solving problems.

The insights that can be gleaned from Singer's research may be seen to bear as well on societal problem solving. If the would-be problem solver is not himself psychologically healthy, if he, in terms of the representational map of developmental change, is primarily caught up in trying to satisfy his own deficiency needs, his own ego,
social, and lower level needs, he can serve as neither an effective agent of developmental change nor an effective solver of problems. He will not be effective because he will not be addressing problems in terms of healthy goal oriented values and assumptions. He will be apt instead to be acting on the basis of narrow self-serving interests and needs, on the basis of primary mentality assumptions.

"Bureaupathology" and "pseudo-politics"—handicaps to societal problem solving

In a situation rife with bureaupathology in which process is more important than purpose, authority, more important than service, form more important than reality, and precedence more important than adaptability (Caiden), realistic approaches to defining problems and effective approaches to solving problems would not only be unlikely to emerge, they would be unlikely to get very far, if they did once surface.¹

Similarly, the organizational or societal environment in which primary mentality assumptions reign supreme is not conducive to healthy problem solving. A prime source of the administrative crisis facing mankind today can be traced to the continuing prevalence of primary mentality assumptions.

Implications for public administration in the public interest

The often "pseudopolitical" character of the environment of

¹Caiden's description of bureaupathology is found in The Dynamics of Public Administration, p. 8.
government can also make honest, apt, and realistic approaches to the defining of problems and effective approaches to the solving of problems rarities. "Pseudopolitics" with its focus on "activities concerned...with the alleviation of personal neuroses or with promoting private or private interest group advantage," can be seen as a form of bureauapathy.¹ More seriously, however, it can be seen as resulting in a severely morally impoverished approach to dealing with human and societal problems. When, for instance, a solution to a problem is understood (however superficially) and no attempt is made to act on the basis of that understanding, then political values, "pseudopolitical" values, can be seen to preempt human values, real political values. The prevalence of pseudopolitics in the Executive and Legislative Branches particularly, makes it highly improbable that societal problems can be effectively addressed. Indeed the prevalence of pseudopolitics impedes even the recognition and the understanding of such problems, both of which are obviously necessary prerequisites to the effectiveness of problem-solving efforts.

¹Bay's definition of "pseudopolitics" is taken from his "Politics and Pseudopolitics," p. 113.
problems which negatively affect human beings and society—is the antithesis of public administration in the public interest. Yet through the widely pervasive Machiavellian cynicism and its accompanying lack of humanistic values and absence of a sense of service and a sense of public responsibility so widespread in government today, such attitudes and values are regularly making a mockery of the meaning of the words "public service." The creating of bureaucratic empires for the sake of the perpetuating of what may well be inadequate, ineffective, and non-responsive programs would be an example of the manifestation of such cynicism and value impoverishment. The studying of a problem, the researching of problems, with no thought or resources devoted to the application of existing or new knowledge and understanding to the solution of such problems is an example of a similar syndrome combined with acute shortsightedness into how problems get solved: Someone must initiate and implement actions designed to solve or ameliorate a problem. Studies and research do not accomplish that. Knowledge and understanding must be translated into effective action.

Such uncaring attitudes, such negativism, cynicism, and disregard for human life and welfare should have no place in American government. These attitudes can be seen as evolving from the nihilism and cynicism that have come to permeate so much of Western intellectual history. The genesis of such attitudes and values and their implications will be explored more fully in the last chapter. For the time being the point to note is that problem-solving efforts may fail to be in the public interest simply because certain of those persons holding positions of public responsibility are consciously choosing
to act in other than the public interest, letting their actions be
guided by what they perceive to be political, personal, or job-
related expediency. A course of political expediency may be opted
for because of the desire of the politically-minded person in a
position of responsibility to give the public what it wants and what
it thinks it needs, even though that person may know full well that
by doing so, the problem will neither be ameliorated or solved.¹

With similar results, the expedient person concerned about
personal gain, his job security or upward mobility may be very
hesitant to risk "rocking the boat" by calling attention to unaddres-
sed or inadequately addressed problems. In such cases, the public
interest fails to be served, and the basic principles of American
government become subverted.

The Obligations of Persons in Positions of Public
Trust Not to Play Games with People's Lives,
Welfare, and Freedoms, and the Health,
Stability, and Freedom of the
Nation and Society

The public official, the public administrator included, who

understand a problem is obliged to try to solve that problem
using the understanding that he has. It is his duty in his role as
change agent and problem solver to serve as an educator in cases
where the public lacks clear insight into the nature of a problem.
By serving in the capacity of an educator, he alone may be in a good
position to build support and help generate understanding that will

¹The tendency on the part of many members of the general public
is quite obviously to recognize a problem as such because of the
emergence of overt and "vexatious" symptoms. They along with others
untutored in problem solving may be expected to falsely assume that
a problem can be solved by arresting or controlling the symptoms.
be needed to address a given problem effectively. To fail to act in such a responsible way is tantamount to playing games with people's lives, welfare, and freedoms, indeed with the health and stability and freedom of the nation and the society and today, with the very fate of civilization.

Failure to act in a responsible way is a political crime in the truest sense of this phrase--a crime against the people. By opting for temporary "pseudopolitical" and self-serving political, personal, or job-related gains, the moral principles and the humanistic values upon which the nation was established are being jettisoned.

Redirecting Public Service Toward the Public Interest

What can be done to help assure that those who serve in government serve in the public interest? The problems which can now be found in government have gotten quite out of hand. Massive reform involving a very basic reorientation is required. Certain actions and reforms could help in de-pseudopoliticizing public service. Because the pseudopoliticizing of the public service can have such a significant effect on efforts to define, address, and resolve societal problems, these actions and reforms merit some attention here.

Specific actions and reforms that are needed in order to help assure that government service is able to serve in the public interest

Specific actions and reforms that are needed include:

1) putting a stop to all forms of mishandling or misusing of information, including the use of information or communications in ways which conceal the truth or otherwise disserve the public interest;
2) acting in ways that safeguard rather than infringe human rights and freedoms;
3) uprooting unfair and discriminatory personnel practices; providing safeguards so that persons who do their jobs will not in effect place their jobs in jeopardy;
4) bringing about reforms in all branches of government, reforms aimed at making the public interest and concern for the common good the focus of governmental activity.¹

Moral leadership and the example and efforts of those in high positions can do much to bring about needed changes. An attitude of dedication to the public good can be instilled through example. The syndrome of "playing one's cards close to the chest" can be similarly dispelled. Attitudes of openness, collaboration, and cooperation—all conducive to consensus-seeking and effective problem-solving—can be encouraged through example. At the Federal level this would entail a common focusing on solving the nation's problems and working toward the realization of the nation's potential. Such a reorientation in attitudes could also be facilitated through the creation of appropriate administrative and organizational arrangements.

The insertion of ethical content into civil service training

¹Matters such as these are discussed in Robert Vaughn, The Spoiled System: A Call for Reform of the Civil Service System (New York: Charter House, 1974).

²This would include checking inter- and intra-agency rivalries and the kinds of individual and bureaucratic jockeying for position, power, and influence which subvert the aims and principles of government.
programs will serve to acquaint all old and all incoming persons with ethical codes of conduct. Such training should include study of acceptable and unacceptable practices as well as procedures to follow when confronted by those who persist in engaging in unacceptable practices.

Preservice and inservice training programs can help to motivate and inspire high standards and ideals in those in the public service and can do much to establish or strengthen open patterns of interaction and collaboration within the public service and between those who serve the public and the public.

The establishment of sufficiently independent and powerful ombudsmen offices to properly handle complaints and disclosures of wrongdoing are needed. The institution of a moratorium on the prosecution of all corrupt practices prior to a designated date should be considered. Possible immunity from prosecution for those who come forward on their own accord and possible probationary periods for such persons, depending on the seriousness of their wrongdoing, would be other possibilities that should be considered.

The enforcement of present regulation and the enacting of new safeguards will be needed in many areas. Adherence to the spirit of the law must be preeminent so that a statute such as the Freedom of Information Act is not turned into a tool for denying information.

At every level of government practices which are antithetical to the public interest need to be brought into line with the public interest. The concern of government should come again to be synonymous with concern for the public interest, the public good.¹

¹It should go without saying that such an alignment or realignment could mean a shift away from "government by contract."
The Seriously Neglected Practical Side of Orchestrating Solutions to Societal Problems

Success in dealing with the kinds of problems just discussed is important to success in ameliorating or solving societal problems. The approaches and remedies just outlined, however, while addressing certain impediments to effective problem solving, do not come to grips with some most fundamental organizational and practical concerns which can be equally important in effective problem solving.

The discussion which immediately follows is in two parts. In the first part, a typology of organizational approaches to dealing with societal problems is presented. The deficiencies of two of the three types--crisis- and routine-oriented organizational approaches--are discussed first. The deficiencies touched upon involve the failure of these approaches to effectively address complex societal problems. The related deficiencies presently beleaguering the third type of approach--the knowledge-oriented approach--are then discussed and analyzed. In the second part an outline is suggested of a comprehensive approach to maximizing the effectiveness of the knowledge-oriented approach. It is this approach which is seen as being best suited to complex societal problem solving. The example discussed is the Research Applied to National Needs Program (RANN) of the National Science Foundation.

Suojanen's Typology of Organizational Orientations to Societal Problems

Crisis-oriented, routine-oriented, and knowledge-oriented organizations

Waino Suojanen's observations concerning differing types
of organizations can be seen as bearing in an important way on present concerns. Suojanen speaks of organizations which have a primarily "crisis-oriented," combat-oriented, firefighting approach. (The Federal Energy Office as it was formed in 1973 was a prime example.) Organizations can be maintenance-oriented, or what Suojanen refers to as "routine-oriented." They tend to be concerned with the delivery of routine services or the routine management of the selected and generally most overt symptoms of given societal problems. (The Social Security Administration and the Internal Revenue Revenue Service would be two of many possible examples.) Very few organizations, however, are what Suojanen calls "knowledge-oriented" organizations, concentrating on the preservation, application, and dissemination of knowledge. (To some extent the National Aeronautics and Space Administration can be seen to be such an organization, except that the immediately mandated task at the time of its creation had narrow technological parameters and did not involve the amelioration or solution of a complex societal problem as "societal problem" has been defined here. The task orientation of NASA along with its focus on knowledge utilization make it a kind of conglomeration of organizational types. While much of value can be gleaned from the example of NASA's effectiveness in fulfilling its mandate, the organization cannot be seen to provide a prototype for the ideal knowledge-
oriented organization. This is owing to the fact that NASA was not
and is not dealing first and foremost with "nitty-gritty" large-
scale societal problems, even though solutions to may small-scale
problems have been suggested as a result of NASA program efforts.
These solutions have been spin-offs of the technological advances
made in the overall program.)

The Energy Research and Development
Administration's potential as a
knowledge-oriented
organization

The Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA)
can be seen as an example of an organization which does have a
"knowledge-orientation." ERDA is an example of an organization with
a mandate and a potential to most decisively impact the amelioration
and solution of a major societal problem. ERDA could, if its potential
were realized, have profound impact on the success of national as
well as global efforts to cope with energy-related problems.

The Research Applied to National
Needs Program of the National
Science Foundation

The Research Applied to National Needs Program (RANN) of the
National Science Foundation has a similar potential, but because of
its currently fragmentary approach to the defining and addressing
of a full spectrum of the most pressing national needs and because
of a continuing strong research rather than knowledge-utilizing
orientation, the RANN program thus far appear to be falling far
short of its potential.¹ How RANN could realize its potential will
be discussed presently.

¹Such potentials are dealt with both directly and indirectly
Other knowledge-oriented organizations

Volunteers in Technical Assistance

On a small scale, and also in a necessarily fragmented, but perhaps more effective way than other knowledge-oriented organizations just mentioned, the non-profit volunteer technical assistance organization, Volunteers in Technical Assistance (VITA) may well be better geared to bring about needed changes and do more to effectively address societal problems than most governmental organizations. Its exemplary functioning as a knowledge-oriented organization may well relate to the fact that it takes seriously its mission of responding to the technical assistance needs of underdeveloped countries. It also is not bound by research orientations and strong aversion to value-based advocacy and action which appear to be holding back other knowledge-oriented organizations.\(^1\)

Schumacher's Intermediate Technology Development Group

E.F. Schumacher's "Intermediate Technology Development Group" is also a good example of a knowledge-oriented organization.¹ Schumacher's approach is particularly noteworthy because of his common sense, value-based advocacy approach to societal problem solving.

The apparent disinclination of government agencies, national and global, to act with a similar degree of purposefulness and common sense may say as much for the dismal state of the sense of public service as it does for the inability of the scientifically oriented professionals in government service to break out of their traditional pure research orientation and begin to think and act in terms of the actual application of knowledge, understanding, and common sense to the solution of problems. The theoretical and pure science orientation of many in what should be mission-oriented government agencies, may well be responsible for the inertia, the ineffectiveness and the backwardness which characterize most present governmental problem solving efforts.

The exemplary efforts of the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Extension Service

The Federal agency which appears to have made unusually great strides in the area of utilizing knowledge is the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Extension Service. The task orientation of agriculture


For an outline of Schumacher's approach to societal problem solving, see his Small is Beautiful: Economics As If People Mattered (New York Harper and Row, 1973).
doubtlessly has much to do with the logical and effective evolution of Agricultural Extension's efforts in helping advance agricultural practices. The experimental branching out of Agricultural Extension in Oklahoma to include an Engineering and Management Technology Extension System bears special attention.\(^1\) The potential for using the Agricultural Extension as a model, if not a base for promulgating an endless range of advances, innovations and promising approaches would seem limitless. While a growing number of agencies are developing their knowledge utilization capacities, this potential has not begun to be fully explored.\(^2\)

Maximizing the Effectiveness of Knowledge-Oriented Societal Problem Solving Organizations

The Potential of the RANN Program

The example of the RANN Program of the National Science Foundation is drawn on here to demonstrate the kinds of emphases, the kinds of efforts which one could expect to find in a knowledge-oriented organization. The kinds of recommendations made here may be seen to have ties with ideas found in the work of Follett, Maslow, and Gross which bear either directly or indirectly on leadership and coordination.\(^3\) Lessons gleaned from the literature which focuses

\(^1\)Oklahoma State University, Engineering and Management Technology Extension System for Oklahoma: Better Solutions/Better Communities (Stillwater, Oklahoma: Center for Local Government Technology, Oklahoma State University, 1975).

\(^2\)Early pioneers in knowledge utilization have included the U.S Office of Education, Social Rehabilitation Services, the National Institute of Mental Health, the Department of Labor, the National Library of Medicine, the National Bureau of Standards; and more recently the Environmental Protection Agency and the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice.

\(^3\)Follett, The Dynamics of Management; Maslow, Eupsychian Management;
on effective task or action groups have also been incorporated.\(^1\)

The proactive, advocacy approach found in Harmon's "proactive" man is also found reflected in the recommendations which are offered below.\(^2\)

The recommendations suggested with regard to maximizing the potential of this knowledge-oriented organization may be seen to share closer ties to the change literature of anthropology and the knowledge utilization literature than to most of the public administration literature.\(^3\)

The recommendations which focus on the maximizing of existing expertise and the need for developing essential communications linkages between the major actors in the problem solving process are related to the same body of literature based on a common sense extrapolation of principles gleaned in both the fields of knowledge utilization and anthropology as it relates to learning and developmental change.

As the knowledge utilization literature records, some individuals can be seen as being innovators, others more typically as opinion leaders and early adaptors of innovative ideas and others still as late adaptors

\(^1\)Grinnell, "The Informal Action Group;" McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise; and Schein, Organizational Psychology.

\(^2\)Harmon, "Personality and Administrative Style."

\(^3\)See especially Rogers and Shoemaker, Communication of Innovations; G.N. Jones, "Strategies and Tactics of Planning Organizational Change;" Bennis et al., The Planning of Change; and the National Institute of Mental Health, Planning for Creative Change in Mental Health Services.
and so on down the line. By taking steps to facilitate the exchange and the sharing of knowledge, information, and innovation, the whole process of knowledge utilization as it intimately ties into problem solving cannot help but be facilitated. By undertaking efforts aimed at maximizing existing expertise and consequently at facilitating new understanding and insights, and by making certain that such efforts are aimed at serving the public interest--science, knowledge, and understanding will have been brought into their proper role with respect to the needs of man; they will have been brought into the service of those needs.

The aims of the RANN Program

The RANN Program of the National Science Foundation has been developed as a means of stimulating research efforts which are more immediately and directly related to the problems of society than most research efforts being sponsored by government today.

The RANN Program would appear to have a potential which is now just barely being realized. Several recent conferences and a recent study have included recommendations and suggestions many of which if they were to be implemented would help RANN realize this potential. The conferences have yielded recommendations and

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1. Rogers and Shoemaker, Communication of Innovations, pp. 175 ff., see especially p. 182.

suggestions related to the adoption of a global orientation on the part of the RANN Program or the development of a RANN Program which was international in scope.\textsuperscript{1} The study alluded to here examines policy options for existing programs and recommends priorities.\textsuperscript{2}

The kinds of recommendations provided below encompass concerns similar to those in the two conference proceedings and the study--concerns for expanding the scope of RANN efforts and for redefining its priorities with a view to more effectively addressing pressing societal problems be they of a national or global scope. The recommendations provided below tend to deal in far more specific terms with the kinds of administrative and organizational mechanisms and arrangements needed to improve RANN effectiveness.

Recommendations on how the RANN Program could better realize its potential.

The RANN Program could play a far more significant role than it is at present in bringing research, knowledge, expertise, and experience to bear in addressing national as well as global needs and in finding and implementing solutions to major as well as minor problems of the day. The RANN Program could perform as a prime facilitator within government and serve as a major, if not the major developer of effective working linkages between government, the private sector, and the research and academic communities.

\textsuperscript{1}Center for International Studies, M.I.T., \textit{Priority Research Needs on Transnational and Global Technology}; and Albert Rubenstein et al., \textit{Research Priorities on Technology Transfer to Developing Countries}.

\textsuperscript{2}National Academy of Engineering, \textit{Priorities for Research Applicable to National Needs}.
The Program could serve as a most important broker of information, knowledge, skills, and expertise to a far greater extent than it presently does.

The present deficiencies of the RANN Program could be overcome and the potential of the Program could be met if the following kinds of initiatives and approaches were to be taken by the RANN Program:

1) **Leadership Role-Facilitative and Coordinative Functions.**
Assumption of a leadership role with respect to public and private sector efforts to address national needs, concentrating at first on solidifying efforts within the Federal government. This would entail the establishment of formal and/or informal coordinating mechanisms whereby Federal efforts to address national needs could become far more collaborative than they are at present. A major focus of this effort would be to keep key actors in any given problem area informed as to information services, research services and activities, technical assistance and knowledge utilization programs, etc., and to lay the basis for cooperation and collaboration between different agencies within the government and between governmental and non-governmental agencies and institutions.

2) **Leadership Role-Training and Continuing Education Functions.**
Assumption of a lead role in sponsoring training and continuing education programs which are designed to school and retool persons in government working in agencies actively addressing national and global needs. The focus of such training and education would be on the state of the art (with respect to both theory and practice) of knowledge utilization, information retrieval and
dissemination, technology transfer, technical assistance, problem solving, etc.

3) Expansion of Information, Communication, Utilization, and Technical Assistance Services. Vastly expanded information, communications, and technical assistance and utilization services are needed in RANN. Working links between these services and similar services in both the public and private sectors need to be developed. The focus of these efforts would be to help pull together in utilizable forms and modes relevant knowledge, research, expertise, and experience which could be brought to bear in addressing national and global needs. Materials and presentations with practical approaches need to be developed which take into consideration the perspectives, roles, and levels of expertise of differing groups of users in any given problem area. All forms of media approaches need to be considered. An active rather than a purely passive, library-retrieval approach to the dissemination of information needs to be adopted.

4) Maximizing Existing Expertise and Providing for Essential Linkages. Opportunities need to be provided to the key groups of persons in the problem solving process to help maximize their expertise and expand their understanding of specific problem areas, e.g., researchers, innovators, and theoreticians could be involved in brainstorming and workshop opportunities; similar opportunities could be provided for policy and program developers and implementors, decisionmakers--public officials and public administrators, and for the public generally. Most importantly, opportunities need to be provided for the interfacing of the key groups in the problem
solving process.

4) Problem-Focused Orientation Stressing Major as Well as Other Problems of National and Global Significance. A modification or amplification of the present focus of the RANN Program is needed to provide emphasis to problems of national as well as global significance (e.g., food, energy and the environment, natural resources, social and economic impacts—crime, health, addictions, alienation, education, housing, and development) and to areas of expertise essential to solving such problems (e.g., basic training in societal problem solving and change agency, technical assistance, knowledge utilization, technology transfer, administrative theory and practice, information retrieval and dissemination, innovation diffusion, and education and training.)

By further developing and orchestrating the outline presented here, the RANN Program could become the most vital and effective force both nationally and globally in helping address most pressing societal needs and in helping significantly improve the quality of life. It could do this by serving to pull together the key actors in the problem-solving process and by serving to facilitate their efforts in addressing the widest possible range of problems, including particularly the most pressing problems of the day.

The Importance of Knowledge-Oriented Organizations

The amelioration or solution of the major problems facing mankind may be seen to be in the hands of knowledge-oriented organizations and proactive, public interested administrators who provide them with creative leadership, vision, and impetus. Such an administrator
is the conductor, the organization and its interfaces in the world at large—the orchestra. The capacity of the conductor/orchestrator to see to it that all these parts mesh as they need to requires art, skill, expertise, understanding, and energy which few seem to have. It is nonetheless, only persons with such capacities and breadth of extraordinary vision who will be able to play a significant role in the amelioration and solution of major national and global problems.

There seem to be only a few persons who by nature or by training or experience exhibit these requisite capacities and attributes. Similarly there are few organizations which could, as now constituted, effectively serve as vehicles for helping ameliorate or solve the kinds of complex problem solving alluded to here.

The reasons for this are many including the absence to this time of a clear cut developmental, change-oriented, problem-solving-oriented philosophy of public administration, a philosophy which reflects a concern for serving the public interest, a philosophy which reflects values in life, health, and freedom. Elements of such a humanistic focus and orientation to societal change and problem solving are to be found in a primarily quiescent theoretical form in the Democratic Humanist Mainstream School of Public Administration and a more active form in the action oriented School of Development Administration. Equivocal expressions of such an orientation, generally far less goal-oriented, can be found in some aspects of the so-called New Public Administration School and in allied Schools of Organization Theory and Behavior.

The public administration in the public interest approach described here represents in part a synthesis of the more humanistic and problem-oriented elements of extant schools of public administration,
those approaches, kinds of orientations and administrative arrangements and foci which suit the practical purposes and support the values and the public interest aims of this approach to public administration.

Because so little of public administration theory has to date concentrated on societal change and societal problem solving, there has been little theory evolved which bears on the knowledge-oriented organization. Somehow the practical aspects of USDA's Extension Service, and other technical assistance efforts of USDA, the State Department (e.g., the Marshall Plan) and internationally-oriented assistance agencies, have failed to be highlighted as possible prototypic approaches, approaches central to the concerns of public administration. In terms of the public administration in the public interest approach, such concerns could be expressed as the use of resources and knowledge to accomplish societal aims, including the restoration, improvement, and enhancement of the quality of life.

A Summation

"Public administration in the public interest" may be seen as constituting a translation of normative theories--the theory of developmental change and the democratic humanist theory of the public interest--into practical action.

The extensive outlining of this approach to public administration and the presentation of pertinent theories concerned with change concerned with change, problem solving, and organizational orientations toward both--all would not have been necessary were it not for the fact that so little attention appears to be given in the literature to what Gross has called the "marriage of action and theory." ¹ Indeed, theory

¹Gross, Organizations and Their Managing, pp. 1-100.
seems to inform theory more often than it does practice and practice has come to be construed in exceedingly narrow terms, as routine operations, arrangements, and procedures. Practice has here been construed in a far broader sense. The prime focus of practice is seen here as being upon developmental change and societal problem solving, both of which have a definite relationship to the ideal goal of healthy development as healthy development depends both on the sustenance of life and the enhancement of its quality.
CHAPTER V

COMPARING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST

WITH OTHER APPROACHES TO PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Introduction

In Chapter V two tasks are undertaken. The first entails a discussion of the current character of American administrative culture. The critical issues of the times are enumerated and inferences drawn concerning their impact upon current trends in public administration theorizing and practice. The "operational code" mode of analysis employed here is intended to serve as a means of drawing comparisons between the different schools and the new approach to public administration outlined in the present study: the "public administration in the public interest" approach to public administration.

The Background Needed for Comparative Analysis

The Character of Contemporary American Administrative Culture

The idea of "administrative culture"

The idea of there being an administrative culture and a public administration subculture has been developed by Dwight Waldo in his paper "Public Administration and Culture." In that paper

Waldo has used the term "administrative culture" in an anthropological, social scientific sense to refer to what can be viewed in the strictest anthropological sense as a subculture, a component part of the larger, overall culture.\footnote{Waldo, "Public Administration and Culture," p. 41.}

Waldo poses many questions concerning this concept of an administrative culture (or subculture), chief of which for present purposes are the questions concerning the function that administrative culture(s) can be seen as having in terms of the larger culture. What can the (sub-) culture(s) function be seen as being with regard to "perpetuating and improving the larger cultural entit(ies)? and what are its (their) characteristics?\footnote{Ibid., "Public Administration and Culture," p. 61.}

Waldo, as was cited earlier, has written of administration as a means of guiding and shaping culture.\footnote{Idem, The Study of Public Administration, p. 11; fn. 2, p. 23 above.} In the "Public Administration and Culture" article, Waldo urges that we use our administrative culture to make that (total) culture more humane and less costly in important human values now ruthlessly attacked and shamefully wasted.\footnote{Ibid., "Public Administration and Culture," p. 61.}

\footnote{Waldo, is using the term "culture" to mean "the totality of distinctive ideas, symbols, patterned behavior, and artifacts of a human group; their way of life as a whole, but as consisting of parts that have something of a separate existence and also interact." ("Public Administration and Culture," p. 39). Waldo's use of the terms "subculture" is based on M.M. Gordon's definition of the term found in A Dictionary of the Social Sciences. "Subculture" is seen as a subdivision of the larger culture, a subdivision which is composed of a combination of factorable social situations such as class status, ethnic background, regional or urban residence, and religious affiliation, but forming in their combination a functioning unity which has an integrated impact on the participating individual." (Italics in original.) (M.M. Gordon as cited in "Public Administration and Culture," fn. pp. 40-41.)}
Very similar views concerning the function of administrative culture and public administrative subculture are reflected in the public administration in the public interest approach to public administration presented here.

In order to use administrative culture to accomplish such ends, in order for public administration to serve effectively in the capacity of societal change agent and societal problem solver, it is necessary that those engaged in administration as well as those impacted by it, gain deeper insight into the current nature of American administrative culture and the divergent trends within it. Such understanding is a necessary prerequisite to effecting significant change in and in reorienting most present approaches to administrative theorizing and practice.

**Toward a Description of the Current Character of American Administrative Culture**

Attempting to describe the current character of American administrative culture can be likened to trying to describe or capture the essence of an ever-changing kaleidoscopic scene at one given point in time. The dynamically changing character of the social environment and the dynamically changing character of human understanding, insight, and motivation render most difficult the task of trying to identify and characterize trends, main currents of thought and action. Such an attempt nonetheless needs to be undertaken as it is only through the understanding that may possibly result, that both the need for and the way to evolving and reorienting administrative thought and practice may be fully comprehended.
Divergence as the hallmark of American administrative culture

The hallmark of the times as well as the hallmark of American administrative culture would seem to be divergence—difference and disagreement. Webster's defines "divergence" in these terms and as "a drawing apart (as of lines extending from a common center)." The latter definition is particularly appropriate with respect to the present context because of the pertinence of such a notion to the directional theory of developmental change presented here. The "common center" could be seen as being the basic nature of man as a thinking and valuing being whose nature and potential is unfolded through a process of healthy growth, maturation, and development. That which diverges from this "common center" can be seen as leading away from the ideal goal of individual and societal development.

Cultures and subcultures may be markedly different from one another in many respects and yet reflect a common orientation to the goal of healthy growth and development. As was indicated earlier in Chapter II, such cultures and subcultures are not in effect at odds with others similarly oriented. However, they are at odds with and diverge sharply from those less healthy over- and underdeveloped cultures and subcultures which do not similarly reflect values in life, in health, and in healthy development, in individual and societal actualization, and in individual and social freedom.

In the preceding pages, in outlining, discussing, and analyzing the theory of developmental change and the democratic humanist theory of the public interest and the approach to public administration based
upon them, much has been said of the major points at which those cultures and sub-cultures with healthy orientations may be seen to diverge from those which lack healthy orientations. What follows is an attempt to take a closer look at the widely varying mix of characteristics that can be readily found within the contemporary main currents of administrative culture.

**Critical cultural issues and trends**

Prior to examining more closely the major currents in public administration and prior to outlining with greater specificity the distinctions that will be drawn with regard to a broad range of possible approaches, values and assumptions, perspectives, and purposes, some attention should be given to describing the critical cultural issues and trends which serve to define the administrative subculture.

**The turbulence of the times**

**Conflicting tendencies**

The mid-1970's is a time of undeniable confusion. Turbulent change, the turbulent character of the environment, are features of the time, with much change being not only multi-directional, but even directionless--or so it would seem. While certain changes that are occurring would seem to be leading to the brink of social chaos and anarchy, other changes seem to be leading in the direction of another form of regressive or arrested development, toward a primitive state of underdevelopment, a mode of existence which many would argue constitutes a most barbaric form of existence.

Other tendencies can also be identified in society today, tendencies which could conceivably lead toward a more human and more
civilized way of life, toward a better way of life for all. These
positive tendencies would seem to be all that is standing in the way
of counter tendencies which threaten the political, social, psychologi-
cal, and spiritual subjugation and dehumanization of mankind. Such
threats are embodied in the willing or unwilling adherence of man to
a wide range of anti-human assumptions, values, goals, and purposes.

Emerging problems

In the midst of all of these conflicting tendencies, problems
are emerging at an incredibly rapid rate. The roots of these problems
include unmet needs and unfulfilled aspirations of very vintage
imaginable from unmet basic survival needs to unmet needs for a sense
of meaning and purpose in life. These problems span the gamut from
alienation, nihilistic despair, and cynicism to drug use and alcoholism,
crime, poverty, overcrowding and overpopulation, to unemployment and
a lack of meaningful employment. They include as well problems relating
to health and welfare, subsistence and housing, education and develop-
ment, problems involving the undermining of the stability of
societal institutions from the family to all levels of government;
problems connected with urbanization compounded by alienation and
continuing threats to the quality of life; and failure to meet the
needs of an expanding population along with failure to use and care
for the ecosystem in such a way that these needs can be adequately
met. Other problems may be seen to involve social and political unrest
and strife; philosophical, religious, and racial, and other differences
and deep-seated enmities which give rise to such unrest and conflict;
acts of terrorism and acts committed out of sheer maniacal desperation;
threats of nuclear annihilation by design or accident; and the continuing decline and threats to the quality of life raised by the spectres of food, water, and energy shortages, the dwindling and wasting of natural resources, and the diminishing quality of the biosphere.¹

Mental, moral, and societal confusion and the growing complexity and dehumanization of modern life

These turbulent times are also characterized by mental, moral, and societal confusion. This confusion takes many forms, sometimes resulting in absurd and comic situations and sometimes leading to grotesques and nightmarish situations. A more humorous example of such confusion is well exemplified in an anecdote recounted by Harlan Cleveland about an applicant for Federal employment who when faced with the standard question "Do you favor the overthrow of the government by force, subversion, or violence? thought the question was multiple choice.²

Other examples of mental, moral, and societal confusion are found in a book entitled Sanctions for Evil. The groupthink syndrome is discussed there as well as other forms of self- and group delusion.³

¹Alvin Toffler has used the term "eco-spasm" to encapsulate the wide range of interconnected problems facing mankind. See his The Eco-Spasm Report (New York: Bantam Books, 1975). Also see Lester R. Brown's World Without Borders for a wideranging overview of major problems facing mankind.


The amoral and hypocritical character of many actions is captured in one of the chapter titles, "It Never Happened and Besides They Deserved It." (The chapter focused on the My-lai Massacre.)¹

The increasing complexing and dehumanization of modern life which serves to perpetuate this confused state of affairs may be seen as being both cause and effect. On the one hand these trends may be seen as being the result of the spread of technology and a growing reliance on a value neutral brand of science for the solutions to man's problems and the meeting of man's needs. They may be seen as well as being a result of the spread of values in material goods, the quest for material affluence and the failure as a result of these misplaced values and this misdirected energy and attention to come to terms with the most basic questions of meaning and value in life.

On the other hand the growing complexity and dehumanization of life may be seen as cause in the sense that such complexity and dehumanization can lead man further away from his own humanity and from goals or purposes which are intrinsically human. They can lead him down a variety of undesirable paths. They can lead him to a state of regressive or arrested development and atrophy—to anomie, despair, and alienation. They can lead him as well to a frenetic, and unilluminated search for meaning, a search uninformed by basic human values, a search motivated out of a longing for even a temporary

¹Edward M. Opton, Jr., "It Never Happened and Besides They Deserved It," in Sanctions for Evil, p. 49.

In far differing ways Franz Kafka, Albert Camus, and Joseph Heller have all sought to capture and depict certain of these aspects in their works: Kafka in The Trial (New York: Knopf, 1937); Albert Camus, The Fall, trans. Justin O'Brien (New York: Knopf, 1969); and Josephy Heller, Catch-22 (New York: Dell, 1961).
sense of meaning in life. The spread of this latter syndrome which has been aptly termed the "homeless mind" syndrome is one of the more frightening spectres in contemporary life.\(^1\) The "homeless mind" is ready to accept the easy answer, the quick solution, the way that provides a definite focus for one's mind and energies, but which too often has no grounding in basic human values. Such easy answers and solutions are typically rooted in anti-humanistic and anti-democratic values. While one may achieve a short-term illusion of meaning, one following such a course is bound to wind up either deeply disillusioned—if he is honest with himself—or hopelessly, and perhaps, permanently self-deluded. Such a state of self-delusion may be seen as constituting a threat not only to the individual's own health and welfare, but a threat to the health, welfare, and freedom of others.

A kind of middle-of-the-road mindlessness, characterized by moral equivocation, expediency, and self-servingness presents equal threats to life, health, and freedom.\(^2\) The syndromes of bureauopathology and pseudopolitics discussed earlier (Caiden and Bay respectively) also can be seen to characterize the person who exhibits such middle-or-the-road mindlessness.\(^3\) An example of this syndrome can be found in the recent George C. Scott movie, "The

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\(^1\)Peter Berger et al., The Homeless Mind.

\(^2\)Such "middle-of-the-road" mindlessness can be seen in Michael Harmon's "reactive man." See his "Personality and Administrative Style," pp. 22, 27, and 29.

\(^3\)Caiden, The Dynamics of Public Administration, p. 8 and Bay, "Politics and Pseudopolitics."
Hospital." "The Hospital" was a bureaucratic horror story which described the growing difficulties that today's institutions are having in addressing human needs in a human way. The failure to be responsive to human needs can be traced to uncaring attitudes on the part of those who make up the institution and to an absence of understanding and motivation that would cause these individuals to act otherwise.

Another example of middle-of-the-road mindlessness can be found in the journalistic account of the Centralia #5 Coal Mine Disaster.¹ Story lines similar to the one in this true account can be found in government and in institutions which in theory are there to serve the needs of people. "Centralia #5" is the account of bureaucratic inertia, bungling, and red tape which resulted in the unnecessary death of one hundred and eleven coal miners when an unsafe coal mine blew up.

The Hal Holbrook movie, "Clear and Present Danger" told of the confronting of a similar bureaucratic inertia and disinterest in attempts to alert those in positions of responsibility to a potentially disastrous situation involving a prolonged air pollution attack. Other examples today can be found in efforts to call attention to threats to the biosphere, including threats posed by nuclear radiation, and the irreparable damage being done to the food chain by the use of DDT and other similarly harmful toxic substances. Examples also include efforts to call attention to more direct threats involving mass starvation wrought by drought and other factors including dire

economic conditions and inadequate production or provision for
distribution of food. A different order of example involves efforts
to call attention to threats to human "resources," threats to the
growing millions of youth and adults who have ruined or who stand
to ruin their health, if not their lives through the non-medical
use of drugs and the intemperate use of alcohol.

Perhaps the tendencies in so many contemporary schools of
public administration to skirt such nitty-gritty problems and to
attend instead to matters concerned with process, form, and structure--
routine kinds of concerns--stem from a reluctance to recognize and
face up to the implications of the problems presently facing mankind.
To concentrate attention on such problems in a truly human way can
require sensitivity, strength of character, determination, initiative,
energy, honesty, and understanding that few would seem to have or
seem inclined to cultivate.

Understanding the nature
of the confusion

In order to understand the nature of a majority of man's
problems today, it is necessary to understand the nature of the
several centuries old upheaval in values. This upheaval in values
officially launched in the 15th and 16th centuries seems only now
to be reaching crisis proportions. The crisis is one created as
much, if not more, by acts of omission than acts of commission.¹
The acts of commission are those acts which have been irresponsibly
inspired out of what in Bay's terms could be called "pseudopolitical"

¹In The Anglican Book of Common Prayer a reference is made
to "sins of commission" and "sins of omission." These phrases have
inspired the use of "acts of commission" and "acts of omission" here.
considerations. They are reflective as well of bureauopathological disorders.

The acts of omission which in the end may provide even a more decisive factor in man's fate, include those responsible acts which could have led (and could lead) to the amelioration or solving of problems or the averting of problems or crisis, but which fail to be conceived and/or carried out.

The acts of omission also include those responsible acts which could have been (and could be) instrumental in guiding, initiating, nurturing, and bringing about healthy developmental change.

Constructive and reconstructive trends

Despite this dismal picture, despite the more specific litany of problems that has been recited above, there have been constructive and (or) reconstructive trends and tendencies as well. The constructive developments include the following:

1) the reaffirmation of that which is intrinsically human--in part a legacy of existentialist and subsequent intellectual as well as spiritually oriented movements; the move toward an integration of Eastern wisdom and Western knowledge, the clearing of the path to an understanding of Siu's concept of human-heartedness and its importance in human society;\(^2\)

2) the move toward what is in effect a global consciousness;

\(^1\) Bay, "Politics and Pseudopolitics."

\(^2\) Siu, The Tao of Science on human-heartedness, p. 129 and pp. 143-144 especially.
3) the growing recognition of the importance of and the need for psychological and social health and the recognition of the need for a developmental approach based on an understanding of human needs and aspirations, directed toward the securing of individual and social health and well being;

4) a growing awareness of man's capacity to give shape to his own existence, individually and socially;

5) a recognition of the need for other than superficial meaning and purpose in life, the unfolding of new perspectives;

6) the most fundamental questioning of the basic values and assumptions which are informing contemporary life and the beginning of efforts to supplant erroneous assumptions, false values, and the anomalous paradigms and perspectives built upon them with substantial values and assumptions, sound perspectives and paradigms;

7) a recognition of the essential elements required for the enhancement of the quality of life and the sustenance of civilization; the recognition of the need for cooperative endeavors informed by other than self-serving motives; a deepening awareness of the interdependent character of man's life individually and societally, an awareness which is coincident with the evolution of a global consciousness.

New sources of values, new perspectives which are fundamentally healthy and balanced, new concerns and purposes are all beginning to spread during these times.

All of these trends and tendencies have helped give rise to what Waldo has called "the revolution of lowering expectations,"
a revolution which can in ways be seen as a counter revolution—counter to "the revolution of rising expectation," the latter revolution involving the seeming quest for affluence and material wealth as ends in themselves.¹

The "revolution of rising expectations" has been heralded by the unbridled rise of technological progress and spurred on by the knowledge explosion and the electronic and media revolution and other factors accompanying it. These factors along with prior materialistic tendencies and propensities for acting on the basis of primary mentality assumptions have contributed to the present trends towards overdevelopment, trends found both in the "free" and "non-free" worlds.

The "revolution of lowering expectations" constitutes a marked shift in the direction of secondary mentality assumptions toward a basic valuing or revaluing of the quality of societal existence, the survival and enhancement of the global environment, the survival and improvement of the quality of life for mankind in general.

The "revolution of lowering (self-serving and materialistically oriented) expectations" constitutes a significant reorientation away from overdevelopment and toward human values, the preservation and enhancement of life, and the ideal goal of healthy development.

The importance of the existential perspective to understanding contemporary culture and the current administrative crisis

What must be one of the major ironies of the time is that

few people seem to see that the primary reason for the cross
currents and the counter currents—the problems and the dilemmas
that characterize the times—lies in the failure of individuals as
well as mankind collectively to come to grips with basic questions
of value and purpose, meaning and direction in life.¹ How can
any individual, group, or society, let alone mankind collectively
expect to move in any definite direction, toward any goal, with
any purpose or meaning in view, if the most basic questions concerning
value, purpose, meaning, and direction are not faced and if no at-
ttempt is made to find answers?² Perhaps cultivation and an under-
standing of the existential perspective would help illuminate the
underlying causes which appear to be perpetuating the present
confused and confusing state of affairs since it is the existentialists
who have grappled with such basic questions of meaning.

Two most helpful existential concepts in this regard would
seem to be found in existential contributions to psychology and
psychiatry. These would be concepts of "ontological guilt"—the
absence of an adequate sense of being—and "rigid moralism"—the rigid
focusing of energies so as not to have to come to terms with these
basic questions concerning meaning.³ The administrative crisis, the
absence of a sense of positive direction that it reflects can be seen

¹Feinberg's thesis concerning the connection between mankind's
failure to solve his problems and his failure to define longrange goals
for himself has been alluded to above in the Foreword. See his The
Prometheus Project.

²As was also noted in the Foreword, the theories and approach
to public administration presented here as a democratic humanist paradigm
of public administration have been based on answers to these most
basic questions.

³These existential concepts have been alluded to above and are
described by May in Existence, pp. 45-47.
as being a result of the same sort of evasion of basic questions concerned with meaning.

Whether questions regarding values and meaning are rejected or ignored out of fear, disinterest, skepticism, cynicism, disdain, ignorance, or conscious or unconscious avoidance, it is these questions with their metaphysical or existential implications upon whose answers the survival of mankind would seem to turn. The failure to address these basic questions is in fact a failure to come to terms with the problematic character of the human situation. It is reflective of the kind of unhealthy approach to problem solving described in the work of Margaret Thaler Singer and Lyman C. Wynne as described in the previous chapter. Such an unhealthy approach entails the ignoring or failure or refusal to recognize a problem, the problem in this instance having to do with coming to terms with the meaning of the human situation itself.

American Administrative Culture: Present Status, Tendencies, and Trends

Contemporary administrative culture reflects many of the same tendencies, trends, confusions, problems, and dilemmas that are to be found in the culture generally. Just as universities and the rest of what could be seen as the educational subculture can be seen as being islands removed in time and space from cultural, societal, political, administrative, and organizational realities, so too can administrative culture be seen as being similarly and selectively removed from the various realities of existence.

While certain schools of public administration theory and practice within the larger administrative culture would seem to be keenly
aware of the need to keep in touch with certain, if not all aspects of the rapidly changing cultural context, some schools would seem to have become increasingly out of touch with cultural and societal realities. The reluctance or failure on the part of adherents of such schools to keep in touch with cultural and societal realities may well be related to the high intellectual, if not emotional investment such adherents have in the perspectives they presently hold. Because of their investment and because of the inflexibility which typically characterizes their approach, they are apt to continue on in the same vein as before regardless of the irrelevance or the inappropriateness of their values, assumptions, and perspectives to the rapidly changing and emerging needs and problems of the times.

Maintenance of a Theoretical Distance from Real World Problems

For the most part the leading schools of public administration theorizing and practice have been able to maintain a considerable theoretical distance between themselves and the realities with which their theories might be expected to deal. This distance is particularly apparent in the behaviorally-oriented schools of public administration. Such schools began to emerge during the 1940's and 1950's as a result of the growing influence of the behavioral mode of thinking in the social and political sciences.

The overall character of the administrative culture can be better understood in terms of the sharply divergent behavioral, non-behavioral, and partially behavioral approaches to theory which can be found in contemporary political and social theorizing. Susser in a recent retrospective article on behavioralism provides a helpful
overview concerning the nature of these diverging approaches. ¹

Pre-Behavioralism, Behavioralism, and Post-Behavioralism

The pertinence of Susser's typology of the phases of behavioralism to an understanding of administrative culture

Susser has differentiated between three periods of political thought--the pre-behavioral, the behavioral, and the post-behavioral. ² These can be distinguished from one another by the different basic assumptions and values that inform each of the three approaches.

Political philosophy which may be seen as being most nearly synonymous with Susser's "pre-behavioralist" category, can be seen as focusing on values, on questions of what should or ought to be. It can be seen as relying on a deductive approach to reasoning.

"Political theory" on the other hand, synonymous here with Susser's behavioralist category, can be seen as being concerned with what is, with establishing, discovering through rational and empirical means, truths and facts relating to social and political phenomena. It is concerned with the predictive and explanatory value of such a systematic approach to knowledge. Political philosophy can be further differentiated from political theory in that the latter seeks to separate facts from values and sees values as being relative and man-made. Political


² Susser has characterized these three "phases" of behavioralism in "The Behavioral Ideology" in the following way:
-Pre-behavioralism: independent criticism without precision
-Behavioralism: precision without criticism
-Post-behavioralism: precision with criticism (p. 288.)
philosophy does not seek to separate facts from values and tends to see values as being transcendent in character.

Those who see the continued separation of pre-behavioral and behavioral schools as a beneficial separation would seem to be expressing a belief that the empirical approach to political inquiry must be kept purely scientific. The consequences of this attitude, the implications for the future of the discipline, have been discussed at length by many. Strauss has been a particularly adamant opponent of the pure science school. Some of his arguments are that the pure science school gives rise to a moral obtuseness insisting as it does on the separation of facts and values. Strauss has argued that adherence to the tenets of behavioralism results in moral nihilism, indifference, and philistinism. He points out that behavioralists do not (in his view) see that truth is an option that must determine the choice of alternatives. Eulau's rejoinder to him is that these arguments are non-sequiturs and belie a lack of comprehension of the very nature of truth or facts and a refusal to accept the empirical principle of verifiability as a test for ascertaining fact from non-fact.

Susser along with others have argued that the empirical approach tends to make political inquiry a handmaiden of the status quo. (Further


2Strauss, "What is Political Philosophy?" See especially pp. 98-101 and 107-108.


discussion of the implications of the behavioralist stance for action will be found in the final chapter.)

In terms of Susser's overview, post-behavioral schools can be seen as reactions in part to pre-behavioralism and behavioralism. Some of the strains within post-behavioralism can be seen as well as an effort at synthesis of prior paradigms, an effort at constructing new paradigms, or simply an attempt to point out the anomalies and the inadequacies of the prior paradigms.¹

Many pre-behavioralists as well as many post-behavioralists would concur with Strauss' assessment. Many of these would argue that in their quest for precision, the behavioralists have sacrificed understanding. The behavioralists have also precluded the development of a new paradigm, one that is relevant to the turbulent character of the times, one which begins to address in a meaningful manner, the problems and dilemmas of the times. It can well be argued that the contemporary social or political scientist who has embraced behavioralism is ill-suited to develop such a paradigm, apparently being far more inclined to be a paradigm-worker, rather than a paradigm-constructor or modifier.

Because of what seems to be a disposition to cling to the assumptions and values which underlie the behavioralist position, certain strains within public administration theorizing and practice appear to resist change and evolution. It is understandable in such cases why such resistance to change would be found--change would entail a questioning of most basic assumptions and values, assumptions and values which have served as the basis of years of

¹These kinds of concerns are discussed in Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).
scholarly, theoretical, and practical effort. If such assumptions
and values are found to be direly lacking, then the efforts of years
of labor can be seen to be similarly lacking. The apparent resistance
to change which can be found within certain schools of public admini-
stration may well reflect such concerns and fears.

Laying the Basis for the Creation of Composite Pictures of
Four Major Contemporary Schools of Public Administration

Drawing upon Existing Historical Overviews

Scholars in the field of public administration have provided
in recent years a number of very useful historical overviews of the
field.¹ These historical overviews coupled with an abundance of
source material emanating from each of the major schools in the
field make the task of the would-be synthesizer somewhat easier. The
existence of current historical overviews render unnecessary here
any extensive reiteration of what can be found elsewhere. Howard
McCurdy's overview of the field will be touched on here, however,
because of the extremely succinct way in which he has summarized and

¹ Especially see Caiden, The Dynamics of Public Administration;
Gross, "Planning in an Era of Social Revolution," Public Administration
Review 31 (May/June 1971):269-296; Howard E. McCurdy, Public Administra-
tion: A Bibliography (Washington, D.C.: The American University, 1972);
Allen Schick, "The Trauma of Politics," paper presented at the Annual
Conference of the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and
Administration, Syracuse, New York, 3 May 1974; Dwight Waldo, "Some
Thoughts on Alternatives, Dilemmas, and Paradoxes in a Time of Turbu-
-lence," in Public Administration in a Time of Turbulence, ed. Dwight
Waldo (San Francisco: Chandler, 1971); Dwight Waldo, "Developments in
Public Administration;" and Dwight Waldo, "Education for Public Admini-
stration in the Seventies," paper presented at the Annual Conference
of the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administra-
tion, Syracuse, New York, 4 May 1974.
depicted developments in the field.

McCurdy's map of the field

In the introduction to his Bibliography and in a subsequent work, McCurdy has sought to map the historical evolution of the discipline and to identify the characteristic main ideas, values, and themes which may be seen to characterize the different periods of this history. His map of the field is reproduced here as Figure 22 because of the quick visual overview it supplies. Schools and sub-schools dealt with in the present work and not included on the original version of the map have been added by the present author. The added entries appear in italics. The dotted lines have also been added.

The unique kind of overview called for here

The existing historical overviews of the field of public administration can be used as a steppingstone to further synthesis and analysis. The focus of the present study can then be turned to

1 The three periods that McCurdy has delineated are The Orthodox Period 1887-1943; The Politics Period 1944-1963; and The Program Period 1963 to the Present.

For The Orthodox Period the central idea may be identified as being that of functionalism, the most important value--efficiency, and the theme--principles (later to be dismissed by Simon as folklore.)

For The Politics Period the main idea may be seen as shifting to that of political realism, the value to knowledge, and the central theme to democratic pluralism and equilibrium.

In The Program Period the central idea can be seen as shifting from realism to relevance; the main value from knowledge to a concern for delivery models, for implementation of policies concerned with societal problems; and the major theme may be seen as centering around policy formulation and analysis, as well as evaluation, and a continuing and deepening interest in and preoccupation with scientific management techniques and approaches. (Howard E. McCurdy, Public Administration- A Bibliography and idem, Public Administration (Forthcoming).
Fig. 22. McCurdy's Map of the Field of Public Administration
(Italicized entries and dotted lines added)¹

building composite pictures of the major schools of public administration, composite pictures based on both the historical overviews and the source materials that can be found. These composite pictures can then be used in providing an overview sketch of the major trends within the administrative culture. Such an overview should help to illuminate both the nature of the administrative crisis and the way out of this crisis by revealing the serious deficiencies in most present trends and approaches and by revealing the strengths and merits of a humanist and democratic approach and thereby suggesting an alternative to present trends and approaches.

A form of "operational code" analysis will be employed here as a means of focusing on those factors and elements which characterize each given school and that serve to reveal its nature, the direction in which it is moving, the values and assumptions which underlie it, the parameters within which it sees itself operating and the general responsiveness of the given school to the existing cultural and societal trends.\(^1\)

The Delineating of Four Major Schools

The schools of public administration which will be focused on here include the following:

1) The Democratic Humanist Mainstream School

2) The New Public Administration School

3) The Public Choice School

4) The Scientific Management and Decision-Making School

The Subschools of Rational and Extra-Rational Policy Analysis will

\(^{1}\) The "operational code" has been described in the Introduction, Chapter I above.
also be discussed in connection with the Scientific Management and Decision-Making School.

The viewing of each school in terms of a spectrum of possible basic approaches, values, and assumptions, perspectives, and purposes

Each school will be viewed in terms of its stance with respect to the spectrum of possible basic approaches, values and assumptions, perspectives and purposes that may be seen to apply to the field of public administration as it is being broadly defined here. This spectrum is seen here as including the three general areas: knowledge and values; administrative style; and change and goals.

An outline of the spectrum of possible basic approaches, values, perspectives, and purposes

1) Knowledge and Values

a) Approaches to knowing and valuing—What approach to cognition and valuing is either implicit or explicit in a given school of thought and/or practice? Is the approach primarily of a rational/empirical character? Are intuition, common sense, experience, and extrarational sources of knowledge seen as valid sources of knowledge or valid ways of knowing? Are Siu's concepts of "no-knowledge" and "human-heartedness" reflected or allowed for in the given school? ¹

b) Applicable phase of behavioralism—Which of Susser's three phases of behavioralism may be seen to be most applicable

¹Siu, The Tao of Science, p. 129 and pp. 143-144.
to the given school?\(^1\)

c) **Approach to knowledge and action**—What approach to the wedding of knowledge and action is implied, if any?\(^2\)

d) **Stance with respect to values**—What kind of stance does the given school reflect with respect to values? Is the natural right view of values as being transcendent rejected or precluded? Is the possibility of existentially deriving a set of values in life, health, and freedom recognized or precluded? Or is it rejected as invalid? Are values seen as being relative and man made? Is the approach to valuing implicitly or explicitly nihilistic? What values are implied?

2) **Administrative Style**

a) **Character of administrative style**—In terms of Harmon's typology of administrative style, what style or styles, if any are implied or expressly indicated by the school in question?\(^3\)

b) **Models of man**—In terms of the typology of rational and self-actualizing models of man, which model(s) of man is (are) implied by the school in question?

c) **Mentality assumptions**—Does the given school reflect primary or secondary mentality assumptions or a mix of the two (Shepard)?\(^4\)

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\(^2\) The notion of the "wedding of knowledge and action" is taken from Gross' *Organizations and Their Managing*, pp. 1-100.

\(^3\) Harmon, "Personality and Administrative Style."

\(^4\) Shepard, "Changing Interpersonal and Intergroup Relationships in Organizations."
d) **Approach to rationality**--Does the given school reflect a narrow or broad approach to rationality or a mixture of the two (Gross)?

1

e) **View of power**--Does the given school reflect or implicitly or explicitly promote or perpetuate a "power over," "power equal" and/or "power with? approach to power? Does it reflect or promote an approach to power which sees power as a self-generating capacity (McGregor, Leavitt, Frederickson, Maslow, Follett)?

2

3) **Change and Goals**

   a) **Type of approach to change or action**--Does the given school reflect an approach to social action or change that could be characterized as laissez faire, disjointed incrementalism, goal-oriented planning and action (short-range, long-range, or developmentally oriented), or a closed-system, total or comprehensive approach to change or action (Blackman and Blum, and Gross)?

3

   b) **Accompanying focus on practical action, if any**--If the given school is concerned with practical action, is it concerned with practical action, is it concerned with organizational and administrative arrangements and mechanisms for

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2 These concepts have been dealt with above and are described in McGregor, *The Human Side of Enterprise*; Leavitt, "Applied Organizational Change in Industry;" Frederickson, ed., *A Symposium on 'Social Equity and Public Administration'"; Maslow, *Eupsychian Management*; and Follett, *Dynamic Administration*.

effectively utilizing knowledge? Is it concerned with problem solving in a narrow sense, in a broad sense or a mixture of both? What sorts of problems are addressed? Are large scale societal problems seen as falling within the purview of the given school? Is the approach taken by a given school appropriate to large scale societal change or problem solving?

c) View of the public interest, if any—Does the given school reflect a distinguishable philosophy or approach to the public interest? If so, how can such an approach be characterized in terms of Leys' typology?\(^1\)

d) Focus with respect to the generation of high or low synergetic qualities—Does the given school implicitly or explicitly promote a state of affairs in which the best interests of the individual and the best interests of the larger social whole are brought into alignment or considered in terms of one another (Benedict, Maslow)?\(^2\)

e) View of organizational purposes and organizational milieu—Does the given school reflect a definable focus on a specific type of organization in terms of Suojanen's typology of

\(^1\) Leys, "The Relevance and Generality of 'The Public Interest';" see especially pp. 238-239.

\(^2\) As was noted earlier, Ruth Benedict's concept of synergy is discussed briefly in Margaret Mead, Antropologist at Work, p. 351 and is discussed extensively both in Benedict's and Maslow's terms in Maslow's Eupsychian Management and "Synergy in the Society and the Individual." Also see Benedict, "Synergy: Patterns of the Good Culture," American Anthropologist 72 (1970):320-333.
crisis-oriented, routine-oriented, and knowledge-oriented organizations? Is the given school concerned with the responsiveness of the organization to the immediate and larger societal contexts? Does it reflect a cognizance of the rapidly changing character of that environment?

f) Administrative and organizational goals—What are the implicit or explicit goals or aims of the given school, e.g., survival, maintenance, social change, technological/scientific progress, material gain, effectiveness and efficiency, or fulfilment of human needs, change agentry, and societal problem solving? Can the goals and aims be seen as being conducive to bureau pathology (Caiden)? Or can the school be seen as being pseudopolitical in its orientation (Bay)? Can the goals and aims be seen as being in consonance with the aims of the theory of developmental change or can they be seen as being conducive to over-development, arbitrary undirected change, or underdevelopment?

The Creation of Composite Pictures of Four Major Schools and Two Subschools of Public Administration

The Democratic Humanist
Mainstream School

Dwight Waldo, Paul Appleby, Frederick Mosher, Emmette Redford,

1Suojanen, The Dynamics of Management, see especially pp. 4-11 and 20.

2Caiden, The Dynamics of Public Administration, p. 8.

3Bay, "Politics and Pseudopolitics."
and Gerald Caiden are considered here as being among those who are a part of the Democratic Humanist Mainstream School. In terms of McCurdy's historical overview of the field (Figure 22), this school may be seen as coming under the Woodrow Wilson lineage with the major shaping of its philosophy occurring in the late 1940's and extending into the 1950's and beyond.

Knowledge and values

With respect to knowledge and values, the approach of the Democratic Humanist Mainstream School can best be described as being pre-behavioral in its orientation. The implicit and often explicit expression of the values and assumptions upon which the Democratic Humanist Mainstream School may be seen to rest ally this school with idealistic, humanistic, and democratic schools of political philosophy. The approach to values then can be seen as being positive in terms of the definition given "positive" here.2

Because of the implied acceptance of a transcendent source of values or, at least fixed values, democratic humanists may not be said to be basing their approach to knowing and valuing on a solely

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2 See Foreword above.
rational and empirical basis. Rather they may be seen as incorporating in their approach the basic elements found in Siu's spectrum of ways of knowing, therefore reflecting a rudimentary form of what he has called "human-heartedness."\(^1\)

While the Democratic Humanists would not seem to preclude the validity of an existential derivation of values, for the most part, with the possible exceptions of Caiden and Waldo, they do not seem to be very closely tuned to such concerns.\(^2\)

Concern for the wedding of knowledge and action would seem to find greatest expression in Caiden and Waldo as well. Both Caiden and Waldo have expressed a sensitivity to and an awareness of the polarities of re-action and proaction, evidencing a sympathy particularly for proactive approaches to planning and action.\(^3\)

Administrative style

With respect to Harmon's typology of administrative style, those in the Democratic Humanist School would seem to fall in between the reactivist and the proactivst with Waldo and Caiden being most closely attuned to the proactivst style. Their approaches also may be seen to more strongly emphasize the need for movement in the...

\(^1\)Siu, The Tao of Science, p. 129 and pp. 143-144.


\(^3\)Caiden, The Dynamics of Public Administration, pp. 275-297, see especially p. 285 and Waldo "Developments in Public Administration," see especially pp. 238-239.
direction of Shepard's secondary mentality assumptions. Similarly they may be seen as being the most strongly oriented in the direction of Gross' broad rationality approach and the rightward approaches emphasizing secondary mentality assumption type approaches to power.

Change and goals

With respect to change and goals the general approach of this school may be seen as encompassing propensities for favoring "jointed incrementalism" and goal-oriented action and approaches to change.

While Caiden has been interested in the practical aspects of effecting change, for the most part others in this school who have been noted above would seem more concerned with the political aspects of change and broad policy issues rather than in the actual actions which would in effect bring change about.

Waldo has made an important contribution to the field by raising most basic questions concerning change.¹ He has been practically alone in raising these questions. The questions have not been raised (certainly not in as extensive and intensive a manner) by others within the Democratic Humanist School, let alone others outside. The reason for this may be that only the context of the Democratic Humanist School of public administration would be conducive to the raising of such questions and only the most existentially oriented questioner would be inclined to raise them.

With respect to societal problem solving Caiden and Waldo seem

¹See especially Waldo's "Public Administration and Change."
to have had most to say.\textsuperscript{1} While their approach tends toward a concern for large scale societal problem solving, the approaches found among the others noted in this school do not preclude a focus on such concerns, but neither do they emphasize such concerns.

In terms of Leys' typology the Democratic Humanist Mainstream School may be seen to fall into the public good, normative approach to the public interest, implying an affinity for the kind of societal and individual goals which would be conducive to the evolution of a high synergy type of society.

While members of this school have not in general been conscious or vociferous crusaders for developmentally-oriented change, their general approach to public administration can be seen as being in consonance with the goal of developmental change.

Because of a general absence of focus on meta-level concerns involving the practical side of social change and problem solving and the wedding of theory and practice, there does not seem to have been a great deal of concern among the members of this school for the kinds of interests found in Suojanen's work.\textsuperscript{2} This could change, however, if a more practical dimension were to be incorporated in the thinking of those comprising this school. Bertram Gross who may be seen as being included at least on the periphery of this school would seem to have

\textsuperscript{1}See Caiden's The Dynamics of Public Administration and Waldo's "Developments in Public Administration" and "Some Thoughts on Alternatives, Dilemmas, and Paradoxes in a Time of Turbulence," in Public Administration in a Time of Turbulence.

\textsuperscript{2}The reference intended here is to Suojanen's interest in types of organizations and his resulting typology of crisis-oriented, routine-oriented, and knowledge-oriented types of organizations in his The Dynamics of Management.
incorporated such a concern for the practical in his work.\textsuperscript{1}

Overall the approach to public administration fostered by this school can be seen to have a political rather than a "pseudo-political" orientation and to be conducive to bureaucratic health rather than bureauopathology.

The New Public Administration School

The New Public Administration School is of very recent vintage dating as it does to 1968 when a group of young scholars in the field met at the Minnowbrook conference site of Syracuse University to present papers and exchange views concerning public administration. While there was considerable diversity of opinion within this group, the resulting collection of papers have come to be viewed as the embodiment of some basic perspectives concerning the field, perspectives which together have been given the name, the New Public Administration.\textsuperscript{2}

Knowledge and values

The approach to knowledge and values found in the New Public Administration can be generally characterized as constituting a departure from the behavioralist school. The approach can be characterized as being at once humanistic and existential or phenomenological in its orientation, while seeking to retain at least some elements of

\textsuperscript{1}Both of the works by Bertram Gross cited here reflect such a concern for the wedding of the theoretical with the practical: Organizations and Their Managing and "Planning in an Era of Social Revolution."

\textsuperscript{2}Frank Marini, ed., Toward A New Public Administration: The Minnowbrook Perspective.
an empirical and rational orientation. The stress on the affective domain can be seen in part as a reaction to behavioralism's general rejection of such concerns. The epistemological basis of the New Public Administration perspective is then, an imperfect mix of assumptions, values, and beliefs, reflecting the desire to evolve an approach which strives to be "relevant" while yet retaining some degree of "empirical" and "scientific legitimacy." The result is, in effect, an imperfect marriage of epistemologies: fragmentary elements of the behavioral epistemology mixed with fragmentary elements of non-behavioral epistemologies. The would-be incorporation of non-behaviorally-oriented assumptions can be seen as being a reaction to the anomalies and inadequacies which the members of this school have found or sensed in the behavioral perspective.

The approach of the New Public Administration to action may be seen as being more proactive than re-active in orientation.

Its stance with respect to values because of the imperfect union of behavioral and non-behavioral assumptions is equivocal. It would seem to take a positive stance with respect to values while trying at the same time to retain at least the appearance of the value neutrality of behavioralism.

The major problem with the New Public Administration perspective can be seen to lie in the absence of a sound epistemological and axiological base. The efforts to rationally justify the value of justice, the value of social equity, can be seen as reflecting such an epistemological dilemma.¹ This can be seen as being a very cumbersome

¹Several examples of such efforts can be found in H. George Friedrichson, ed., "A Symposium on 'Social Equity and Public Administration.'"
attempt to rationalize or otherwise justify values which the existentialist in contemporary man intuits as being right, the humanist in contemporary man feels to be right, but the behavioralist in contemporary man feels basically uncertain about.

The New Public Administration School while seeking to be more relevant than the Democratic Humanist Mainstream School, ends up being far less consistent and caught up in a most intellectually trying moral doublebind. It is as if one were trying to build a humanism on the foundation of empirical assumptions and values.\(^1\)

Administrative style

The administrative style fostered by those in the New Public Administration School tends to be proactive in its orientation, with those in this school who are most firmly wed to behavioral assumptions tending more toward the prescriptive technocrat approach.\(^2\)

The kinds of mentality assumptions fostered seem to be a mix of primary and secondary. While some concentrate on movement in the direction of secondary mentality assumptions, others appear to be emphasizing what are seen as the constructive uses of conflict and encounter.\(^3\)

The approach to rationality tends to be broad in its orientation, although those who retain a tighter hold to behavioral assumptions may

\(^1\)The impossibility of accomplishing such a feat should become clear in the last chapter.

\(^2\)A prime example of such a propensity is found in Todd R. LaPorte, "The Recovery of Relevance in the Study of Public Organizations," in Toward a New Public Administration.

be seen as adhering more closely to a narrow rationality approach.¹

With respect to power, the New Public Administration School
seems to focus most strongly on the notion of power as "power equal,"
this being evident from the emphasis found on "distributive justice"
and "social equity."² Power tends to be seen in political terms.
While strong humanistic inclinations toward the concept of "power
with" can be found among many of those who make up this school,
even the concept of "power with" seems to be seen in terms of social
equity, and hence understood in a narrow political sense rather than
in a broad political sense--as a necessity in itself because of its
relevance to human and democratic values, to individual and societal
actualization.

Change and goals.

No well enunciated philosophy of change seems to be found in
the writings of those who comprise this school. Change in fact tends
to be approached in something of a neutral way as a good in itself.
New Public Administration theorizing does not as a consequence lend
itself to other than short term goal-oriented change or arbitrary,
undirected change.

Those in this school would seem to see process and structure
as being key to the effecting of change. This orientation is shared

¹See Todd R. LaPorte, "The Recovery of Relevance in the Study
of Public Organizations," in Toward a New Public Administration as an
example: his stance with respect to the operationalization of the concept
of the public interest.

²This emphasis is abundantly obvious in the earlier as well as
the more recent writings of individuals in this school. For examples
see Frank Marini, ed., Toward a New Public Administration and H. George
Friedricikson, ed., "A Symposium on 'Social Equity and Public Administra-
tion.'"
by many of those who make up the School of Organizational Theory and Behavior as well. It is perhaps this tendency toward preoccupation with process and structure that has tended to keep those in the New Public Administration School (as well as those in the School of Organizational Theory and Behavior) from coming to terms with larger, overriding philosophical questions relating to the goals of change and the solving or ameliorating of societal problems. The tendency to focus on non-problems or pseudoproblems, inhibits an effective expression of concern for larger problems.¹

While the New Public Administration would seem to be seeking to help infuse the field with relevance, with awareness for larger societal issues, adherents of this school do not seem to have approached the task in a manner that is likely to yield results. They do not appear to have effectively sorted out the political from the pseudopolitical and they do not appear to have determined how they can take an effective stance with respect to bureaucratic health and bureauopathology. Major contributions have been made by many; among them are contributions which have shed important light on areas which have been neglected within the public administration field. Aside from the insights into proaction, there have been important insights into organizational behavior which occurs within a turbulent environmental context.²

¹Pseudoproblems in this context would include focusing on matters involving process or structure and failing to focus on the ends of change and the solving and amelioration of societal problems, the addressing of human and societal needs.

²A most noteworthy example is the article by Robert P. Biller, "Adaptation Capacity and Organization Development," in Toward a New Public Administration, pp. 93-121.
Lacking a sound focus as to what constitutes the public interest and what constitutes the public good, it is difficult to imagine the possibility of members of this school making any truly far reaching and significant contribution to the field, unless they are successful in coming to terms with these most basic deficiencies and inconsistencies. The effort to come to terms with such deficiencies and inconsistencies would in itself constitute a most significant contribution to the field.

The Public Choice School

The Public Choice School like the New Public Administration School is of relatively recent vintage. Key works in which the major themes of this school have been enunciated have primarily been published since 1965.\(^1\)


For Waldo's discussion of the roots of what has evolved into the Public Choice School of public administration, see "Developments in Public Administration," pp. 235-236. Other historical overviews are to be found in Vincent Ostrom and Elinor Ostrom, "Public Choice A Different Approach to the Study of Public Administration" and V. Ostrom, *The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration*. The article by the Ostrom's include an extensive bibliography focusing on the literature which pertains to the Public Choice School.
The primary focus of the Public Choice School can be characterized in terms of Ley's aggregationist or utilitarian "sum of" approach to the public interest. In this way the Public Choice School can be seen as being quite overtly political in its orientation or as Christian Bay might classify it "pseudopolitical."\(^1\)

Knowledge and values

The approach to knowledge and values taken by those in the Public Choice School (e.g., Vincent and Elinor Ostrum and Mancur Olson) would seem to have an unclear epistemological and epistemological basis. The approach can be seen to be neither purely pre-behavioral nor behavioral in its orientation, which would place it in the post-behavioral camp.

The approach to action in terms of this approach to knowledge would seem to most aptly be characterized as reactive in orientation. The stance with respect to values in terms of the definitions used here is neutral in that arbitrary values are in effect being advocated. At the meta-level value is being placed on the aggregationist orientation to the political and administrative process, not on any "positive" goal which directly reflects values in life, health, and freedom.

The approach would seem to be based in a relativistic view concerning the nature of values, a view which also does not seem to reflect a recognition of the existence of the "validity" of an existential perspective.

Administrative style

The administrative style which would appear to be fostered by this school would seem to be that of Harmon's middle range reactive style. The mentality assumptions underlying this approach can be seen as being companionably primary, the approach to rationality predominantly narrow.

The view of power found in this school can be seen as encompassing both the primary mentality orientation of "power over" and the more liberal political concept of distributive justice and "power equal" relationships.

Change and goals

The approach to change implied in this school is one which favors disjointed incrementalism.

In that an aggregationist approach is taken to the concept of the public interest, the focus of this school cannot be seen as being necessarily conducive to the evolution of a high synergy society. In fact, it would seem to be far more conducive to the evolution of a low synergy society, stressing as it does private interest.

Owing to the incrementalistic orientation and the absence of a public good concept of the public interest, one does not expect to find an orientation toward developmental change or large scale societal problem solving. The practical aspects, the administrative and organizational mechanisms and arrangements necessary for effecting large scale societal change do not therefore fall within the purview of this approach. Also absent would appear to be a concern for the health of public organizations, the focus on what is perceived as being
the political and economic character of administration apparently precluding concern for such matters.

The Scientific Management and Decision-Making School

The Scientific Management and Decision-Making School can be seen to have had its roots in McCurdy's Frederick Taylor lineage (Figure 22). This school, however, developed as a school in an apparent effort to create a new paradigm for public administration at a time in the late 1940's when other schools, other prevailing paradigms, particularly the pre-behaviorally oriented paradigms, were found to be seriously lacking. Herbert Simon can be seen as being the key constructor of the alternative paradigm.¹

What can be seen as being the most important defining characteristic of this school is its rooting in logical positivism and hence in the same underlying assumptions, values, and beliefs that can be seen to inform behavioralism.² The implications that this set of values, assumptions, beliefs hold for public administration, the way in which it is defined and employed, will be touched only in this section. These implications will be discussed at greater length in the last chapter.

¹Simon's Administrative Behavior published in 1947 can be seen as having been the first iteration of this paradigm. Other words that can be seen as being representative of this school include: David W. Miller and Martin Starr, Executive Decisions and Operations Research (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1960); Herbert A. Simon, D.W. Smithburg, and V.A. Thompson, Public Administration (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950); James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action: The Social Science Bases of Administrative Theory (New York: McGraw Hill, 1967); and Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm.

²The Simon, Drucker and Waldo exchange of replies and comments to Waldo's article, "Development of Theory of Democratic Administration,"
Knowledge and values

The approach to cognition and valuing found in the Scientific Management and Decision-Making School is decidedly a rational/empirical orientation. In terms of Susser's typology, it constitutes a behavioral orientation.

The approach to action which follows from such an epistemological and axiological orientation can be seen as being primarily反射式的 in orientation. The stance of this school with respect to values can be seen as being negative or neutral in character with both the natural right and the existential derivation of values precluded.

The primary values can be seen as being in efficiency and economy and underlying these, a value in rational and empirical knowledge and science and technological progress.

Administrative style

This approach may be seen to foster a range of administrative styles, beginning with the prescriptive technocrat and the reactivist and extending to the rationalist.

The assumptions which seem to primarily inform this approach to administration would appear to be primary mentality assumptions. The accompanying model of man upon which the approach is based is the rational model of man approach.

Gross' narrow mentality assumptions can be seen as being

most applicable to this approach, as can the primary mentality assumptions orientation to the nature and use of power.

Change and goals

The type of change fostered by this approach can be seen as being primarily of a disjointed incremental kind, although some who also can be seen as fitting in this school who subscribe to a closed systems orientation, may foster a total/comprehensive approach to planning, action, and change.

Owing to the more typical disjointed incremental orientation and to an apolitical orientation, large scale societal problems are not typically seen as falling within the purview of this approach to administration. When such problems are addressed, there is no way of prioritizing them according to importance as the approach to change reflects no orientation to values in life, health, or freedom. When such problems are addressed in a consequently random or arbitrary manner, they tend to be unsuccessfully addressed. This is owing to the propensity of those employing this approach to define problems in terms of symptoms. Their lack of success can also be seen to derive from the way in which they tend to approach problem solving, trying to control or manipulate symptoms or trying to apply puzzle-solving approaches to the solutions of complex societal problems. In general their lack of success can be seen to derive from their failure to address in a comprehensive and effective manner the underlying causes that give rise to problems in the first place and that will continue to perpetuate problems if they are unaddressed. Their tendency to employ deficient approaches to problem solving would seem to be closely related to their reliance on a rational/empirical approach to
knowing.

Of the three typologies suggested by Leys, members of this school would seem to fall most aptly into either the first or second types, either an aggregationist/utilitarian approach or a process-oriented approach.

Lacking a normative approach to the public good, the approach fostered by this school could only accidently serve to assist in the evolution of a high synergy society. Because of the absence of a normative orientation in the direction of the goal of individual and societal development and because of an absence of an orientation to human values, this school can be seen as fostering change which would lead in the direction of overdevelopment.

The tendency of this school to place authority above service, process above purpose, from above reality, and precedence above adaptation leads to its fostering, if inadvertently, the defining attributes of bureauopathology.\(^1\) The rooting of this approach in primary mentality assumptions and a narrow approach to rationality coupled with its focus on self-serving rather than other-serving goals causes it to be "pseudopolitical" in its orientation.

The Subschools of Scientific Management
and Decision-Making: Rational and
Extra-Rational Policy Analysis

Rational Policy Analysis

The Subschool of Rational Policy Analysis may be seen to comprise a spectrum of approaches to public administration.\(^1\) These

\(^1\)The attributes of bureauopathology listed here are those identified by Caiden in The Dynamics of Public Administration, p. 8.

\(^2\)Representative works of adherents to this subschool can be seen
approaches, however, can all be characterized along lines similar to those just described in connection with the School of Scientific Management and Decision-Making. Chief differences between certain contributors in this School and contributors (or members) of the Scientific Management and Decision-Making School lie in the tendency of many members of the former school to be politically oriented in their approach. This view of the public interest implicit in such an approach is typically either of an aggregationist/utilitarian or process-oriented kind.

Extra-Rational Policy Analysis

The chief exponent of this approach would be Yehezkel Dror.¹ His approach differs in some rather fundamental ways from that of members of the Rational Policy Analysis Subschool just described.¹ Most importantly he is basing his approach to knowledge in epistemological and axiological assumptions which would excluded no ways of knowing. That is, he does not limit his approach to knowing to that which can be known rationally and empirically, but rather would include extrarational approaches to knowing as valid means of acquiring knowledge.

Dror bases his approach in broad rationality assumptions and does not narrowly confine himself to a primary mentality assumptions

¹See especially Yehezhel Dror, Public Policymaking Reexamined.

orientation to understanding man, a rational man model of man.

Dror also differs markedly not just from those in the Rational Policy Analysis Subschool, but from most others in the field of public administration by virtue of his attempt to deal with meta-level concerns involving the nature and potential of comprehensive approaches to policy analysis and policy planning.

Dror's normative approach to the public good would also set him apart from most others in the Rational Policy Analysis Subschool.

Other Schools of Public Administration

Features or Emphases of Other Schools of Particular Relevance Here

The School of Organizational Theory and Behavior

The School of Organizational Theory and Behavior may be seen as being an early offshoot of McCurdy's Scientific Management and Administrative Science lineage (Figure 22). The earliest contributors to this lineage--May, Roethlisberger and Dickson and Follett--may also be seen as being to a greater or lesser degree precursors of the humanistic strain within organizational theory and behavior.¹ This humanist orientation became increasingly pronounced in the 1950's and 1960's with the evolution of the school and the contributions of Maslow, McGregor, Schein, Likert, and others.²

¹Elton Mayo, Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization (New York: The Viking Press, 1933); F.J. Roethlisberger and William J. Dickson, Management and the Worker (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939); and Follett, Dynamic Administration.

The several strains that have evolved within the School of Organizational Theory and Behavior have not however all been of a similar humanistic orientation. The School includes a broad range of orientations from field theory to psychoanalytic and Gestalt-oriented approaches, to approaches emphasizing change and development techniques and process, to approaches which have a strong behavioral and empirical orientation.¹

It is not possible therefore to make broad generalizations concerning this area of emphasis within the field of public administration in that this area may be seen as comprising many differing subschools.

For present purposes it is not necessary to attempt a detailed analysis beyond pointing out the generally limited parameters of these subschools which come under the general heading of the School of Organizational Theory and Behavior. Owing to the limited focus and the absence of an underlying philosophy of organization or philosophy of change or development, none of these schools can be seen as encompassing the breadth of concerns that should be a defining

¹Included in this spectrum would be the various subschools of organizational development and the subschools of organization theory which focus on the character of the organizanizational environment and the nature of the interaction between the organization and the environment. The latter subschools would include the contribution of E.J. Miller and A.K. Rice, Systems of Organization: The Control of Task and Sentient Boundaries (London: Tavistock Publications, 1967); Paul R. Lawrence and Jay W. Lorsch, Developing Organizations: Diagnosis and Action (Reading, Pa.: Addison Wesley Publishing Co., 1969); and Joan Woodward, Management and Technology (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1958).

For an overview of the major defining characteristics of field theory and psychoanalytic and Gestalt-oriented approaches as well as other approaches to organization development, see Larry Kirkhart and Orion F. White, "The Future of Organization Development," Public Administration Review 34 (March/April 1974): 129-140.
characteristic of a school of public administration. Such concerns would include a philosophy or approach to the concept of the public interest and a philosophy of change and development.

The few contributors to the field of organizational theory, e.g., Follett and Maslow among others, who have concerned themselves with such matters implicitly, if not explicitly, may be seen to have one foot in the Subschool of Humanistic Organizational Theory and Behavior and one foot in the Democratic Humanist Mainstream School. This successful integration of complementary perspectives has helped pave the way for the evolution of the theory of developmental change and the public administration in the public interest approach presented here.

The Bureaucracy School

With respect to the Bureaucracy School of Public Administration, one must focus on Max Weber's contribution to the field of public administration and in particular the field of organization theory. The ideal rationalist model of organization which Weber elaborated has influenced drastically the direction and evolution of organization theory and development. Present organization development efforts can in many instances be seen as being reactions against the industrial rationalism of the Weberian bureaucratic model. An appreciation of the model and of its problems and shortcomings are imperative to the understanding of the current status of the field and prospects for transformation within both theory and practice.

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It is important to understand in this connection the key values implicit in the bureaucratic model and the historical roots of these values. Weber's view was that materialism and nationalism would lead governmental and corporate institutions to adopt principles of administration that focused upon economy and efficiency.\(^{1}\) There is an obvious and inherent conflict between the values and principles of economy and efficiency and those of democratic freedom, representative democracy and government designed to serve the public interest, government designed to provide for the "common welfare" and to secure the "blessings of liberty" provided for in the constitution.

The Bureaucracy School in its Weberian form has tended to emphasize the following attributes as intrinsic to the bureaucratic model: permanency, fixed jurisdiction, secrecy, hierarchy, impersonal-ness, specialization, rules, and a career ladder. These attributes are in sharp contrast with the anti-bureaucratic movement found especially among adherents of the New Public Administration School. The organizational attributes which are emphasized there tend to be of an entirely different order, one which is based on other than a rational model of man, one that is based on an open systems rather than a closed systems approach to organizational development and behavior.\(^{2}\) The types


of organizational orientation fostered by those belonging to the
anti-bureaucratic school feature or emphasize the temporary character
of organizations (required because of the environmental turbulence
which characterize the times) the problem-solving and task orientation
of the organizations; their orientation to purpose and service, their
necessary fluidity, interdisciplinary and open character, their
recognition of the need for and the merits of mobility; and their
valuing of ability over authority.\footnote{1}

While Downs has based his approach to organizations on the
bureaucracy model, and while he has sought to refine this model and
make it more scientific, those who have been anti-bureaucratic in
their orientation have sought to replace the bureaucratic model with
an organizational orientation along the lines just described.\footnote{2}

The Bureaucracy School in a similar way to the Scientific
Management School has followed out the logic of the rational man
model of individual and organizational behavior. And anti-bureaucratic
reactions ranging from Thayer, Dvorin and Simmons, to Caiden, Argyris,
and Bennis and those in the New Public Administration School have all
been tending toward the rejection of the rational man model as a basis
(certainly as the sole basis) for either individual or organizational
behavior.\footnote{3} Many of these individuals have also been arguing for the

\footnote{1} These types of orientation can be found discussed in the
Minnowbrook papers just cited, in Frank Marini, "The Minnowbrook Per-
spective and the Future of Public Administration," pp. 346-367, in
Toward a New Public Administration, and in the historical overviews
of Caiden, Waldo, and others.

\footnote{2} Anthony Downs' refinements of the bureaucracy model are to
be found in Inside Bureaucracy.

\footnote{3} Such a propensity is found in Thayer, An End to Hierarchy! An
End to Competition!; E.P. Dvorin and R.H. Simmons, From Amoral to Humane
expansion of the parameters of organizational or bureaucratic theory, an expansion which would make room for the dimension of social relevance. They have raised very basic questions concerning the focus and direction of organizational endeavor. In doing so they have been edging closer toward the kinds of normative concerns which have characterized those in the Democratic Humanist Mainstream School and those in the more humanistic subschool of organizational theory, just noted. They have even moved closer to the concerns of the School of Development Administration in that they have been evolving a perspective which as much in common with this school. Indeed, the similarities of these perspectives have been noted in the literature.\(^1\)

The importance of the Bureaucracy School is then two-fold: 1) It constitutes a logical extrapolation of the rational man model of individual and social behavior and 2) Understanding this school is necessary to an understanding of current counter trends in public administration theorizing, particularly the New Public Administration School and trends in Organizational Theory and Behavior Subschools. Contemporary anti-bureaucratic schools in their reactive stance have tended to limit their own scope by virtue of the fact that they have been

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more re-active than proactive in their orientation. Instead of focusing on what organizations must do to be responsive to societal needs, they have tended to remain bogged down in criticizing what is wrong with the prevalent model. In other words their disenchantment with what is has tended to keep them from more fully and less reactively focusing on what should or might be.

The Schools of Development Administration and Comparative Administration

The School of Development Administration has been described in Gerald Caiden's *The Dynamic of Public Administration* as being "fused with political science." He sees development administration as that aspect of public administration (which) focuses on government-influenced change toward progressive political, economic, and social objectives, once confined to recipients of foreign aid, but now universally applied.

Caiden further describes the nature of development in the following way:

(Development administration) is grounded in normative concepts—that development is desirable; that development can be planned, directed, or controlled in some way by administrative systems; that improvements in the quality and quantity of societal products is desirable; that obstacles to development can be overcome, that macroproblems handicapping societal progress can be solved. Because the conditions of mankind are so obvious, so real, and so compelling, development administration is also grounded in reality—the practical solution of human problems, the nitty-gritty of public administration, the real world of people, the practitioner's domain.

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1 Caiden, *The Dynamics of Public Administration*, p. 269.
3 *Idem*, *The Dynamics of Public Administration*, p. 264.
The meshing of the theory and practice of public administration in the public interest may be seen to share much in common then with the Development Administration School of Public Administration.

The School of Development Administration can be seen and has been cited in the literature—as being the applied side of the more methodologically-oriented School of Comparative Administration.¹ No purpose would be served here in providing a full description of this sister school to Development Administration.² All that is necessary here is to point out that the character of the concerns of the Development Administration School and the Comparative Administration School has served to differentiate them from the other prevalent schools of public administration. The major point of difference between them and other schools may be seen to lie both in the concerns upon which they are focused and the ways in which they are focused upon those concerns.

As for comparison with one another, both schools can be seen to share a concern for the character and direction of social and/or organizational change. While the Development Administration School tends to be normative and practical in its orientation to change, the Comparative Administration School tends to foster a more objective and


²Aside from the overview provided by Caiden in his The Dynamics of Public Administration, see Ferrel Heady and Sybil L. Stokes, Papers in Comparative Public Administration (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1962) and Nimrod Raphaeli, ed., Readings in Comparative Public Administration for collections of representative works.
methodologically oriented approach to their concern with change. Despite this objectivity, however, the very concern of those in the Comparative Administration School implies a value in understanding the nature of change. In the more normatively oriented of this persuasion, it reflects as well a value in enlisting such understanding in the effecting of positive changes, changes which will serve in turn to help in bringing about improvements in the quality of life.

Rejecting as they do a narrow or specialized focus, they have geared their theoretical and/or practical endeavors to a less wieldy level of concern, less wieldy than that of most other schools. Many of those who are of a behavioral persuasion may well be expected to reject such a perspective out of hand just because of its unwieldy normative character, the relatively diffuse nature of its focus, diffuse at least when compared with more narrow foci such as decision-making, planning, or organizational processes.

Comparing the Leading Contemporary Schools of Public Administration with Public Administration in the Public Interest

Unlike the majority of the schools discussed here, the public administration in the public interest approach is based in a set of assumptions and values all of which can be seen to be in consonance with the goal of serving and maximizing the public interest as "public interest" has been defined above.

Public Administration in the Public Interest in Terms of the Spectrum of Possible Approaches, Values, and Assumptions, Perspectives, and Purposes

A composite picture of public administration in the public interest; a basis for comparison
Knowledge and values

The public administration in the public interest approach may
be more fully described in terms of the outline of approaches, values
and assumptions, perspectives, and purposes provided above in this
chapter. This approach may be described as being based in an approach
to knowing and valuing which allows for the rational as well as the
subjective and extrarational—including the intuitive, the experiential,
the common sensical. It allows as well for the existential perspective
for those who have no basis for knowing or believing in a transcendent
source of values.

The public administration in the public interest approach can
be seen as being a form of updated version of pre-behavioralism,
having perhaps more in common with pre-behavioral than post-behavioral
approaches. The public administration in the public interest approach
can be seen as being based in a consistently pre-behavioral-like set
of basic assumptions and values. Post-behavioral schools on the other
hand, tend to be based on generally unstated, but nonetheless implicit,
assumptions and values which represent an ill-wed mix of pre-behavioral
and behavioral assumptions and values and more contemporary existential
and phenomenological assumptions and values.

Administrative style

With respect to administrative style the public administration
in the public interest approach may be said to reflect a cognizance
of the importance of both the rational and self-actualizing models
of man. This approach reflects as well a reliance on broad rationality,
and a decided weighting toward the secondary mentality assumption side
of Shepard's mentality assumptions model. In keeping with this orientation,
the approach may also be seen as being geared toward a secondary mentality assumption approach to power à la Follett and Maslow. With respect to action and the proactive approach based on the self-actualizing model of man best typifies the public administration in the public interest approach. In terms of Harmon's typology, the administrator employing this approach would fall into the "proactive man" category. The approach to action would also be informed by positive values in life, health, and freedom and therefore be geared to the wedding of theory and practice aimed at responding to societal needs and promoting development directed toward the ideal goal of development. Public administration in the public interest focuses then on developmental change and on the solving and ameliorating of societal problems, problems which arise from unmet needs and unfulfilled aspirations and potentials. The approach to societal problem solving is identical to the approach outlined above in Chapter IV. This approach will not be elaborated upon further here.

Change and goals.

With respect to change and goals the public administration in the public interest approach, based as it is on the developmental theory of change, is designed to foster development, development which is consonant with the public interest as it has been described above. The approach to the public interest in terms of Ley's typology falls into the category of the public good, normative type of approach.
The approach to change being developmental in its orientation may be seen as encompassing what Gross has called "jointed incrementalism" and longrange goal-oriented planning and administration. The "incrementalism" in this context however, differs decisively from "disjointed incrementalism" in that movement in the case of "jointed incrementalism" (as it is being used here) would be in the direction of the goal of ideal development. In the case of "disjointed incrementalism" as that term is typically used, no similar long term ideal goal is implied and change in effect may be arbitrary with respect to direction or it may be oriented in the direction of overdevelopment or underdevelopment. Only inadvertently in such cases may it be seen to lead to the ideal goal of development.

It is important to note here that schools of public administration which have other than a public good orientation to the public interest, may nonetheless inadvertently move at times in the direction of the ideal goal of development, but such movement, when it does occur, is necessarily haphazard in character. The public administration in the public interest approach is intended to make such movement intentional and as constant as humanly possible.

The public administration in the public interest approach is "political" in its orientation in the sense that Bay and Wolin have each used that term. It also may be seen as being geared toward the fostering of individual, as well as organizational and societal health. In this sense it can be seen as being the antitheses of the approaches to public

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1Gross, "Planning in an Era of Social Revolution."

administration which directly or indirectly foster bureauopathy.

The Drawing of Comparisons with Specific Schools

The Democratic Humanist Mainstream School and the School of Development Administration

The public administration in the public interest approach then may be seen as being most closely aligned with the philosophical orientation of the Democratic Humanist School and with the practical/action orientation of the School of Development Administration.

The New Public Administration School

The public administration in the public interest approach may be seen as being only tangentially related to the New Public Administration School, sharing as it does certain similar kinds of concerns, but failing to share wholly similar basic epistemological and axiological assumptions.

The Public Choice School

The public administration in the public interest approach may be seen to differ most importantly from the Public Choice School because of a difference in focus as well as a difference in basic assumptions and values. The basic difference with regard to focus can be found in the stance each takes with respect to the concept of the public interest. While the Public Choice School tends to focus on the aggregationist, "sum of" approach, the public administration in the public interest approach is focused on a public good, normative approach. The approach of the latter is explicitly defined in terms of the fostering and maximizing of the values of life, health, and freedom. The approach
of the Public Choice School is not based on any such values.

The School of Organization Theory and Behavior

The public administration in the public interest approach differs from the subschools of the School of Organization Theory and Behavior by virtue of the fact of the differences in scope and purpose that may be seen to typify (or fail to typify) these approaches and schools. The tendency of the subschools of the School of Organization Theory and Behavior is to focus narrowly on process and structure and the nature of individual and organizations, excluding any overriding concern for purpose. Such a concern for purpose can be seen to be at the core of the public administration in the public interest approach. (As was noted earlier, the humanistic strains within the School of Organization Theory and Behavior constitute an exception, in that they do reflect a humanistic and developmental focus with respect to larger purposes, e.g., Follett and Maslow.)

The Schools of Development Administration and Comparative Administration

Public administration in the public interest can be seen as being similar to both the School of Development Administration and the School of Comparative Administration with respect to the overlapping of similar areas of concern. The similar practical action and purposive approaches of the public administration in the public interest approach and of the School of Development Administration, however, makes the former approach most closely allied with the School of Development Administration.
A Summation

The tendency of most major contemporary schools of public administration has been to concentrate in fragmentary ways on various aspects of organizational and/or administrative behavior, theory, and practice. These main currents of public administration have with few exceptions failed to even acknowledge that which constitutes the overriding concern of the public administration in the public interest approach—the direction and focus of administrative endeavor.

Only the Development Administration School seems to have concerned itself with the overriding issues of the purposes of change, the character of developmental change, the solving or ameliorating of far-reaching nitty-gritty societal problems.

The present approaches to public administration with their neglect of or lack of concern for direction and purpose, would seem to be anomalous within the context of American Democracy. They would seem to be divorced from the purposes and values of democracy.

The essence as well as the promise of American Democracy can be seen to lie in its direction and its focus. The essence of American Democracy can never be seen as residing in structure and process per se, and certainly not when such structures and processes are considered apart from the values and assumptions which should inform and give direction to public administration in a free democracy. Such assumptions and values define the essence of the public interest.

Public administration in the public interest may then be seen as an approach to public administration which strives to integrate those elements of other approaches which can be seen as being in consonance with the theory of developmental change. It can be seen as an attempt to do
what other schools appear to have failed to do--provide a clear-cut orientation to theory and action--an orientation which constitutes a melding of ideal normative goals and values and the practical means of achieving those goals and expressing and realizing those values.
CHAPTER VI

THE METAPHYSICS OF CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION THEORIZING AND PRACTICE-
A CLOSER LOOK AT BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

Introduction

The focus of Chapter VI is on what is seen here as being the major impediment standing in the way of the reorientation of public administration theorizing and practice along democratic humanist lines. The major impediment to such a reorientation is identified here as being the set of values, assumptions, and beliefs which has been called the "positivist metaphysic."

The implications of the "positivist metaphysic" for public administration theorizing and practice are traced out and analyzed. Comparisons are drawn between the "democratic humanist metaphysic" which may be seen to underlie the democratic humanist paradigm of public administration and the "positivist metaphysic" which informs so much of contemporary social and political theorizing.

A Basis for Understanding the Essential Differences between Democratic Humanist Approaches to Public Administration and Approaches Rooted in Positivist Assumptions

Enlarging the Context of Discussion

A closer look at the contributions of R.G.H. Siu

227
By way of enlarging the context of the discussion, it would
be most helpful to look more closely at the work of R.C.H. Siu.\footnote{Siu, The Tao of Science. See especially the chapter entitled "No-Knowledge," pp. 69-84.}
Siu has developed a typology of approaches to knowing. These approaches are as follows:

**Rational approaches**: those approaches which are rational or empirical in character;

**Intuitional approaches**: those approaches to knowing which involve intuition; and

"No-knowledge" approaches: approaches to knowing based upon a non-rational sensibility which Siu refers to as "no-knowledge." ("No-knowledge" is defined by Siu as "nature's ego as shared by all.")\footnote{Idem, The Tao of Science, pp. 69-84, see especially p. 79.}

Siu sees rational knowledge as the means whereby man relates to science; intuition as the binding element in the relationship of man to man, and "no-knowledge" as the binding element in the relationship between man and nature.\footnote{Ibid.}

Empiricism, contemporary Western science, in Siu's view, focuses solely on the rational to the denial of intuition and "no-knowledge." He sees this divorce as having dire implications and consequences for the future of man. "Human-heartedness" according to Siu is the quality which can only be attained when all of the capacities of man, all of these ways of knowing--are in synchronization.\footnote{Idem, The Tao of Science. Siu speaks of human-heartedness on pp. 129, 143-144, 159, and 166.}
The present exclusion by empiricists and rationalists of the intuitive realm and the realm of "no-knowledge" are seen as leading to the continuing fragmentation of the psyche of man and the continuing incapacitation of man as an effective problem solver.¹

In the pages which follow an attempt will be made to show how the acceptance and even dogmatic adherence to certain assumptions concerning the nature of knowledge have affected the ways in which problems are defined and acted upon—not to mention the ability to recognize a problem in the first place. An attempt will be made simultaneously to show how these same assumptions have severely limited man's understanding of his own capacities and potential by limiting understanding of his own nature. A case will then be made for the reinstatement of common sense, experience, and intuition, all of which need to be exercised along with "rational" knowledge if man is to begin to realize his "human-hearted" nature and his potential and if he is to begin to address his problems in a "human-hearted" way.²

¹Siu points to the reasons man cannot succeed in his activities without cultivating "human-heartedness." He writes,

In directing his activities along the path of human-heartedness, cannot succeed by restricting his compass to rational and intuitive knowledge. He must enrich his reservoir of no-knowledge. The requirement does not stem from the inability of rational and intuitive knowledge, if practiced to perfection, to attain the object of human-heartedness. It is necessitated by the fact that man always falls short of his ideal and fails to exploit his utmost capabilities...If attained, no-knowledge provides him not only with a sensitive and responsive communion with his fellow creatures...Falling short, however, he may still acquire the sense of human heartedness toward men. (The Tao of Science, pp. 143-144.)

²"Intuition" will be used as a shorthand here and throughout the remainder of the work in a way which is intended to encompass both of Siu's categories of intuition and no-knowledge. No-knowledge is being viewed here as a refinement, a fine tuning of intuitive sensibilities.
Understanding the Role Basic Assumptions Play in Current Approaches to Public Administration Theorizing and Practice

The critical factor of basic assumptions

Because of the role that assumptions concerning knowledge can play in determining what constitutes knowledge and what is known and knowable, and because of the role that assumptions can be seen as having in determining what the sources of valuing and the nature of valuing are, it is particularly important that the assumptions underlying rational and empirical approaches to knowing be identified and understood. This is especially important because of the relevance of such understanding to comprehension of the current hostility toward normative theory and self-avowedly value-based approaches to practice and action. Such understanding may also be seen as being essential to understanding how to deal with the administrative crisis that confronts us.

Assumptions defined

All theoretical and philosophical perspectives can be seen as being grounded in assumptions. Assumptions are implied as well in any epistemology or axiology. Assumptions can be viewed as being unproved statements. In Frohock's view such statements are used to avoid infinite regresses. Assumptions, in other words, allow the theorist to get off the ground, avoiding the prospect of making explicit every underlying assumption. Herein lies the basis for

critical error in evaluating or seeking to understand any theoretical or philosophical perspective. Such evaluation and understanding can only be accomplished if the assumptions underlying such perspectives are themselves identified, evaluated, and understood.

If a perspective is rooted in fallacious assumptions; then that perspective--however wide its acceptance, however sound it heretofore appeared to be --cannot continue to be viewed as sound. A rethinking and reformulation of such a perspective, beginning with a rethinking and reformulation of basic assumptions and an appreciation of all that those assumptions imply, is required if a perspective is to be understood in its entirety. Such understanding is prerequisite to viewing a perspective as sound or unsound.

"Positivist" versus "Metaphysical" Perspectives: the "Positivist Metaphysic" versus the "Democratic Humanist Metaphysic" ¹

The Underlying Assumptions: Their Nature and Their Differences

From the point of view of the positivist, there are basically

¹"Positivist" is used here as shorthand for that set of assumptions, values, and beliefs that can be found in various forms of scientism, behavioralism, empiricism, rationalism, and positivism. This common core of assumptions, values and beliefs is here being given the name "the positivist metaphysic." "Positivist approaches" in this shorthand sense would be synonymous with Siu's "rational" approach to knowing category; "metaphysical" approaches would be seen as being approaches to knowing that extended beyond Siu's first category. One form of metaphysical approach could encompass all three of Siu's categories. The democratic humanist metaphysic may be seen as encompassing all three approaches to knowing and as constituting such a metaphysical approach. A variation of this would be an existentially derived humanistic metaphysic.

"Metaphysical" is being used in the dictionary sense of the term, "relating to the transcendent or supersensible." "Metaphysic" refers to a discernible set of assumptions, values, and beliefs which are implicit or expressly indicated in any given philosophical or theoretical approach.
two approaches to knowledge—a positivistic or empirical approach and a metaphysical approach. To the positivist, the approach which is not purely positivistic is to a greater or lesser degree metaphysical in character. The positivist sees the metaphysical approach as one characterized by personal, experiential, emotive, intuitive, idealistic, or otherwise normative reactions and modes. To some that which goes beyond the purely rational or empirical is regarded as art or even mysticism, art and mysticism being regarded derogatorily by many as being anti-intellectual and anti-scientific.

The positivist, on the other hand, sees himself as being primarily concerned with observable phenomena. His concern is that the statements he makes regarding phenomena be verifiable. This stricture obviously limits the range of what the positivist considers to be knowledge. The expressed objectives of the positivist are consistency, verifiability, and certainty, all of which he views as providing a common ground for communication with other individuals who share his positivistic orientation. From the perspective of the positivist, the non-positivist or metaphysically oriented individual, by basing his approach on non-empirically "testable," non-verifiable or non-replicatable data" is forsaking certainty, clarity, consistency, and verifiability and therefore is forsaking as well a common rational and empirical ground for communication.

The positivist also differs from many "metaphysicians" in that the positivist has typically adopted a relativistic view concerning values. The positivist tends to see values as being "made by man" and to reject the notion or belief that values are transcendent in character. He also tends to preclude or overlook the possibility that fundamental values might be derived through logic and common sense—natural
reason—if one were to follow out an existential perspective to its logical conclusion.  

Assumptions concerned with knowledge and values

The assumptions that the positivist makes concerning knowledge and values are deserving of closer examination. Implicit in the positivist approach are assumptions concerning the character of knowledge as well as its parameters and the nature of its acquisition. The stricture that knowledge—in order to qualify as knowledge—be verifiable through empirical observation is accepted by positivists as a given. The value of seeking knowledge which is defined in this narrowly circumscribed manner is also accepted by positivists as a given and likewise, the value of adopting a "non-normative" approach.

Yet despite such care in the building of a "non-normative" and hence scientifically sound (sound in the view of the positivist) foundation for inquiry, theory building and behavioral scientific pursuits; the positivist perspective is nonetheless rooted in certain metaphysical assumptions about valuing and the nature of value, the nature of knowledge, the nature of meaning, and the nature of man. By ascribing a certain character to the nature, the purpose and the very essence of inquiry, all manner of assumptions are being made concerning what has value and what has meaning and what has not. Yet, these assumptions have not been empirically verified in accordance with positivist requirements, nor could they be. It is because of this inherent flaw in the very foundation of the positivist position that positivists are as "guilty" as the "metaphysicians" whom they decry for grounding their approach on

1The latter mode of deriving values was discussed in the Foreword to this work.
unverifiable "arbitrary" normative assumptions.

Indeed, positivism is based on unverifiable normative assumptions. While there are positivistically oriented individuals who are well aware of this, others seem to be ignorant of it.\(^1\) Few of those who are aware appear to be concerned with the implications of these assumptions, preferring evidently to simply accept them as givens without questioning them. Few therefore seem to realize that positivism is not only not free from metaphysics, it indeed is based in metaphysical assumptions. These assumptions and the perspective they effectively shape--can be viewed as the "positivist metaphysic."

Both the positivists and the "metaphysicians" are operating on the basis of metaphysical orientations. The metaphysical orientation of the former is only less apparent to most.

Assumptions that science can be and should be value neutral\(^2\)

\(^1\)Eugene F. Miller writes of this awareness in "Positivism, Historicism, and Political Inquiry," *American Political Science Review* 66 (September 1972):796-817:

We see that the antipositivist movement in the philosophy of science has reinterpreted modern science, including natural science, in light of the characteristic assumptions of historicism. It suggests that the guiding presuppositions of scientific inquiry are variable from one context to another and are ultimately arbitrary inasmuch as they have no absolute basis in reason or experience. Even some opponents of this movement have come to agree with certain of its basic assumptions, for example, the assumptions that modern science rests on arbitrary presuppositions (Nagel). Yet if modern science rests on presuppositions that are finally arbitrary, one must wonder if there is any basis whatever for defending it as superior in principle to the modes of inquiry that its proponents have, from the outset, repudiated. (P. 806.)

\(^2\)For general discussion of values, scientism, and value neutrality as they impact social and political inquiry or action, see Michael Scriven, "Value Claims in the Social Sciences," Publication 123 of the Social Science Education Consortium, Purdue University, Lafayette, Indiana, 1966. Also see Millikan, "Inquiry and Policy: The Relation of Knowledge to Action."
Of all the assumptions which can be seen as being basic to the positivist metaphysic, the most important for the purposes of the present discussion is the normative assumption (which can be implicit or explicit) which concerns the necessarily value neutral character of positivist pursuits. The making of the value judgment that knowledge must be free of value judgments (or that the acquisition of knowledge must be free of value judgments) is itself a value judgment. A value is being placed on the absence of value. A value is, in effect, being placed on not valuing. As standing on one's own shoulders is not possible, neither is this axiological feat; unless one considers the resulting supine contortion success.

If the positivist position is based on fallacious notions concerning values and the nature of making judgments concerning values and if the positivist position is furthermore grounded in erroneous assumptions concerning the nature of man, the nature of knowledge, and the nature of truth or Truth; then all that has been and all that is being predicated on those assumptions can be seen as being lacking. Theories and theoretical approaches which are based on erroneous assumptions, assumptions which foreclose many avenues of inquiry, many approaches to understanding—can obviously result in uninformed, misinformed or otherwise misguided and ill-founded action and practice. More seriously, however, the positivist metaphysic, in denying a proper role to human experience, commonsense, and intuition, and in attempting to adopt a stance of value neutrality, is inevitably leading to a

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denial of a sense of responsibility and a concern for fundamental human values.

In effect, not only are energies and resources wasted and misspent because of the inadequacies inherent in the limited perspective of the positivist, but the basic humanity of man (what Siu calls "human-heartedness") which should rightly embue all human endeavor, be it of a theoretical or practical character—is denied expression.

The positivist approach, based on the positivist metaphysic, has had and is continuing to have a most profound impact upon many of the most critically important facets of human and social existence, particularly with respect to the way man looks at societal problems and attempts to deal with them. It is therefore most important that the implications of this approach to knowledge, inquiry, and action be understood and through understanding be significantly altered along the lines suggested above. So long as man fails to acknowledge the necessity for such a reorientation, so long as he fails to undertake such a reorientation, he will continue to be an incompetent societal problem solver, unable to grasp either the nature of the problems which beset man, or the nature of their solutions. It is only by applying human understanding to such problems, understanding which is not limited to the solely rational and empirical, that man can competently and humanly address the critical problems facing mankind. It is only by cultivating human-heartedness that he can respond to problems in a human way.

Should the positivist metaphysic and its implicit denial of man's unique nature and the constellation of attributes, potentials,
and abilities that characterize him and define his humanness, become
the prevailing approach to knowledge and action, both democratic
freedom as we now know it and man's essential humanity will have been
sacrificed at the secular altar of value neutral scientism.¹

Assumptions implicit in the
Newtonian and Darwinian
paradigms

Basic to an understanding of the implications of the assumptions
reflected in the positivist metaphysic is an understanding of the
implications of the Newtonian and Darwinian paradigms for the sciences
and especially for the "irregular subjects"—the social sciences.
Michael Scriven has clearly delineated these implications and has
provided the basic ingredients for a convincing argument for the
inapplicability of the Newtonian paradigm for the "irregular" sciences.²

The pure scientist (or the positivist) tends to subscribe
to the Newtonian paradigm and proceeds on the assumptions that there
are certain universal and discoverable laws underlying the behavior
of physical phenomena as well as human and social behavior. In
making this assumptions, such an individual is making a metaphysical
leap of faith by ascribing to the human realm the same lawlike

¹Abraham Kaplan in speaking of the "danger of scientism"
equates this danger with the "pernicious exaggeration of both the
status and function of science in relation to our values." "Scientism"
is being used in this same sense here. Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry

²Scriven, "Explanation and Prediction as Non-Symmetrical:
Explanation and Prediction in Evolutionary Theory," in The Nature
and Scope of Social Science: A Critical Anthology, ed. L.I. Krimerman
character that he sees typifying the physical realm.

Even if one subscribes to currently predominating views concerning laws governing natural phenomena and accepts these views as the last word on the subject, there is no empirical way of knowing (by any means likely to be acceptable to positivists) that similar laws with virtually the same characteristics govern human behavior as well. After all the subject is of a wholly different order. There is always the possibility that the realm of natural phenomena and the human realm are guided by distinctly different sets of laws, if both are indeed governed by laws. There is also the possibility that if the foregoing were to prove to be the case, that two such sets of laws could still be related to one another by certain underlying principles, principles that might only be understood from what could be characterized as other than a traditionally acceptable scientific basis.

To the less than omniscient observer, there would seem at first glance to be little, if any, way of ascertaining whether or not all that transpires in the realm of natural phenomena and all that takes place in the human realm are guided by the same laws. Matter, after all, would at least appear to lack consciousness and will power as well as conscience and the emotional and mental makeup that human beings possess. It also should be borne in mind that even the higher primates differ markedly from man with respect to these latter attributes. Man is without question unique.

Because of the intrinsic and what must be obvious differences

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between human beings and matter, there would seem to be no grounds for believing that the same law-like generalizations we can now make concerning the behavior of natural phenomena would be sufficient to apply to the human realm. The positivists are in effect subscribing to a very narrow view of the nature, scope, and applicability of what could prove to be a very limited spectrum of law-like generalizations. In their attempt to avoid any taint of anthropomorphism and cultural "contamination," they appear to have grossly overcompensated by trying to understand the behavior of all phenomena, human and non-human, in terms of law-like generalizations that have apparent applicability to non-human phenomena.¹

The quasi-religious character of positivist assumptions²

A quasi-religion has evolved which has as a focal point or basis neither man, God, a Universal mind, or anything of the like. The focus of this quasi-religion is a kind of science which in effect seeks to maintain an objective distance from that which is human. Its purpose and its reason for being would appear to be the pursuit of knowledge and the discovery of law-like generalizations. In its purest form this pursuit seems to be for its own sake--science becoming the end-all and the be-all of existence. The result seems to be the deification of empirically verifiable knowledge and the sanctification

¹Such overcompensation calls to mind the maxim of James Thurber that "bending too far over backwards is the same as falling flat on your face."

²The term "quasi-religious" is used here to connote the kind of zealousness and dogmatism which may be seen as characterizing the most fervent forms of religiosity.
of the process of its acquisition. The purpose or the value of such acquisition is generally not questioned but taken as given.

It is important to note here that the worldviews and even the lives of many contemporary scientists may be seen to revolve around such premises, beliefs, and assumptions. The very questioning of the purpose or value of scientific pursuits of this order can be so anxiety arousing as to render coherent discussion impossible. The purpose and value of such value neutral pursuits and the purpose and value of one's life can be so intertwined that questioning the former can precipitate an existential crisis in which the moorings of one's entire world can suddenly become unalterably shaken. The phenomenon of cognitive dissonance is one which can be seen to be operating in such instances.¹

The absence of a true dialogue concerning the purpose and value of purely rational and empirical approaches to science, can be seen as being severely impeded by such cognitive dissonance and the personal defense mechanisms that typically accompany it. As a result any serious and fundamental questioning of values and purposes is avoided because of the deep and even all-embracing emotional and psychological investment an individual has in what he thinks.²

¹Leon Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance is explained in his A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Evanston, Ill.: Row Peterson, 1957).

²A similar point has been made by Leo Rosen concerning the rigidification of thinking. In his CBS interview with Eric Sevareid, ("Conversations with Eric Sevareid," August 24, 1975), he observed that "many people...seem incapable of listening and threatened by ideas. Many do not want to be communicated with because they have a deep emotional investment in what they think."
The implications of this psychological and ontological rigidity and defensiveness for the future of civilization are most serious. More human bases for thought and action must be found if mankind's problems are to be even recognized, let alone understood, ameliorated and solved. Yet a very delimited and humanly stultifying set of assumptions, values, and beliefs is keeping many of the most intelligent people from making a truly human contribution to the survival or the enhancement of mankind.

It is because of the dire implications that continuing adherence to the positivist metaphysic can be seen to have for the future of mankind, that this present discussion of the positivist metaphysic is included here. The majority of prevailing approaches to public administration can be seen as being in part, if not in toto based on such positivist assumptions, values, and beliefs. Such approaches can be seen as doing more to threaten and undermine the best interests of mankind than they are doing to serve those interests. If man is to become more human-hearted, if he is to evolve an understanding of himself and of the world in which he lives and begin to act on the basis of such understanding, it is essential that he open himself to more human approaches to knowing and valuing. The democratic humanist metaphysic has been proposed here as a humanly oriented alternative to the positivist metaphysic.

Ways of viewing laws which have been foreclosed by positivists

The quasi-religious character of the search for and the consequent ascription of a certain character to the nature of whatever laws that may be found may well prevent a discovery of the true
character of the laws that do exist. Indeed, it may prevent discovery of the nature and scope of all laws that may exist. The possibility that there are supervening orders of laws and that there are unique laws pertaining to human existence have apparently been foreclosed by those of a positivistic inclination.

If additional laws are found which have an applicability to the phenomenal world, many scientists may one day view the phenomenal world in vastly different terms. The positivist of today errs or at least potentially errs in foreclosing significant possibilities. He does this in a variety of ways:

1) by presuming that law-like generalizations which appear to hold for natural phenomena necessarily have explanatory and/or predictive value with respect to human behavior;

2) by presuming that the relativism which appears at present to characterize the realm of natural phenomena necessarily also characterizes the human realm; and

3) by presuming that all so-called anthropomorphic notions concerning causality and the nature of the universe, etc., are completely incorrect and that positivistic notions concerning such matters as knowledge and causality are correct. The positivist would appear to fail to see that whether or not God exists in any form, caprice and whim could still operate; and that with God or some form of lawfulness in the universe, grace or intentional intervention based on laws supervening all other laws could in fact be operating or operate.

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1Meher Baba posits supervening orders of laws in Beams, pp. 53-43.
Intentional intervention on the part of man acting or expressing himself in currently unforeseen or not understood ways—is also a possibility which is foreclosed by those subscribing to the positivist perspective. The success of efforts at intentional intervention (particularly if such intervention were large scale and of the kind described in the present work) is also a possibility which many positivistically inclined individuals would view as being highly unlikely. They would have arrived at such a conclusion on the basis of their belief that the past is necessarily a predictor of the future, reasoning that since there are no examples of such large scale altruistically oriented intervention efforts in modern recollection, that large-scale guided change of this sort is not likely to become a reality in the future given the nature of man and the nature of societal realities. If one denies that something can happen, it stands to reason that that individual would not be a good candidate for trying to make it happen. It also stands to reason that he would not be a good predictor of its coming to pass, if he inflexibly believed that it would not, or could not come to pass. Just as planning and successfully activating a plan requires imagination, acting in new ways requires similar imagination and ingenuity. If one does not believe that something can be done, he literally cannot imagine it, and therefore stands little chance of successfully doing the thing in question. And just as entering uncharted terrain can require some degree of initiative, courage, risk-taking and "pre-vision." The limited time horizon and the predisposition toward fragmentation (dealing with parts instead of wholes, the reductionist syndrome) may be seen as being a part
of a kind of conservative bias which keeps the positivist from engaging in bolder, holistic thinking and action.

Assumptions concerning laws and the notion of causality

If law-like generalizations can be found which appear to explain many things concerning the behavior of natural phenomena, the question at least must be raised as to whether or not there might be laws which govern the uniquely moral universe of man. Positivists, behavioralists, and empiricists, who have adopted the positivist metaphysic have by definition rarely been concerned with man's moral nature. Those who have shown such interest have tended to base their inquiry on very narrow views of man; they have tended to view him as a being whose behavior is determined by factors external to him rather than as one who is a potential or actual shaper of his own destiny, or to put it in others terms, as one who through self reliance and the exercise of personal judgment is able to be what the existentialists call an "authentic actor."¹

Based on such biases and focusing on certain kinds of individuals, certain law-like generalizations have been found to apply—to some extent at least—to those whose lives are guided primarily by forces external to them, those who, for whatever reason, do not assume full responsibility for their own actions. The reason for this could well be that the moral natures and personalities of the

¹Rollo May, Existence, p. 118. May refers here to the "authentic modality" of existence.

Deterministic modes of thinking can be seen as being rooted in a very narrow view of human nature. May has written in Existence, p. 44, of the tendency to see the ego as weak, passive, and determined. Such a view owes much to the influence of scientistic thinking and the acceptance of the Newtonian paradigm.
vast majority of individuals have up until modern times been fairly uniform, the exceptions having been regarded as anomalies. Viewed in light of prior discussion concerning the nature of man, one could say that the "rational" man model, and Shepard's primary mentality assumptions have tended to most aptly describe modern man. Other law-like generalizations of another order, however, might be found or recognized as applying to the lives of those to whom the rational man model does not apply, those whose natures are, if not more developed, can be seen as being developed along different lines than those of "rational" man. Such individuals would be among the "authentic actors" just alluded to. They might also be described by Maslow's term--"self-actualizing." Siu's concept of human-heartedness could also be seen to apply to the "self-actualizing" model of man.\(^1\)

If law-like generalizations can be discovered which have consistent applicability to individuals who fall into the category of the self-actualizing model of man, then the search behavior of many contemporary scientists is not apt to lead to their discovery. The basic assumptions of those who are positivistically inclined concerning the nature of man, the nature of existence, the nature of knowledge, the legitimacy of ways of knowing other than the purely rational or empirical, and the legitimate province of science, all place restrictions on what they perceive the nature and scope of any laws to be. Because of their preconceptions concerning the nature and scope of laws, they are not likely to concern themselves with the moral domain or with what Robinson has referred to as "the transcendent social standpoint."\(^2\)

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1. Rational and self-actualizing models of man are discussed more fully in Chapter I above.

Nor are they likely to be inclined to accept the possibility of there being moral laws or fundamental moral values which apply or can be applied to the lives of human beings and their interactions with one another. \(^1\)

The possibility of there being moral laws which apply to the lives of human beings and their interactions with one another--has been raised here with several purposes in mind:

1) to help underscore the fact that foreclosure of the possibility of such laws existing effectively prevents their discovery or recognition by those who subscribe to positivist or behavioralist assumptions and doctrine;

2) to introduce the notion that human existence may be far more complicated than many are inclined or prepared to believe or accept; and

3) to argue that if this is indeed a moral universe with laws and purposes, then it is highly unlikely that the quest for knowledge as narrowly defined by the positivist is the sole or even a primary reason for being and that if this is the case, that the positivist approach stands little chance of yielding real "knowledge" or meaning unless it undergoes successive self-correction, radical revisions, and reorientation which lead to the supplanting of the basic assumptions, values, and beliefs upon which the positivist approach has been based.

The inconsistencies inherent in positivist assumptions concerning values.

Three ways of looking at values have been noted above. They are: 1) seeing values as transcendent—the natural right view; 2) seeing values as man made and hence relative; and 3) seeing values—basic values in the sustenance and enhancement of life, and health, and of personal and social freedom—as being derivable through following the existential perspective to its logical conclusion and applying common sense.

The positivist, if he is consistent in the application of his epistemological assumptions to his personal life as well as to his more purely intellectual pursuits, is typically inclined to reject the natural right view that values are transcendent in character. To the extent the positivist rejects experience and common sense as ways of knowing, he is apt as well to reject the existential perspective and the conclusions which that perspective can yield. The assumptions the positivist makes concerning the legitimacy of other than rational or empirical ways of knowing would preclude his arrival at an existential perspective wherein the question of the meaning and value of life itself would be raised as the most fundamental and important question. The positivist is most typically inclined to see values as man made and as relative. Yet one can see that the positivist's tendency to believe that his explanatory and predictive pursuits can be extended into all realms of human existence, implies an absolute value, if that value only resides in such value-free explanatory and predictive pursuits in and of themselves. The positivist position may then be seen to contain certain serious
contradictions and unresolved questions with regard to questions of values.

On the one hand the positivist is acting on the assumption that there are no values other than relative values; on the other hand he is engaged in discovering laws and in making law-like generalizations which will have explanatory and predictive value with respect to all aspects of human behavior, including presumably the moral aspects of human behavior. The most serious question that this stance raises with respect to the administering of human affairs if the positivist persuasion were to come to permeate the thinking of all persons, or a vast majority of persons in responsible positions in public life, is this: What values would guide action?--Who would mind the store? As Edgar Robinson has pointed out, "If we were to halt scholarship and action at the outer boundaries of empiricism, much of the world's thinking would remain undone."\(^1\) It could be added that this precisely describes the direction that the apparent growing acceptance of the positivist metaphysic is leading us to today, particularly in the Western world. Indeed, this tendency is at the heart of the administrative crisis.

Not only are thinking and action being strait-jacketed by the tacit acceptance of the values, assumptions, and beliefs implicit in the positivist metaphysic, the character of thinking and action that is being done is being done in the service of values which fail to reflect a concern for human values or human freedom. The values reflected are instead concerned with empirical consistency, efficiency, material affluence, and technological progress, all of which presumably

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\(^1\) Edgar Robinson, Personal Communication, July, 1975.
will allow man to control existence, but all of which actually are leading man in the direction of overdevelopment away from basic human values and human goals.

The all important questions appear to be ignored: Control--to what end? for what purpose? At what cost in human and societal terms? In the name of what human values? With what regard for individual and political freedom? With what regard for the realization of the potential of man individually and collectively? All of these questions lead to one larger question: May not man's obsession with control be seen as a means for him to escape coming to terms with his intrinsic freedom?

The momentum of the positivist movement can be explained in several ways. Just as Marxist and Communist assumptions and dogma are finding ready homes in the minds of those who are grasping for meaning and a sense of purpose in life, so too are positivist assumptions and "dogma" exerting similar seductive powers on the mind of man, particularly upon the intelligensia who are not existentially inclined and whose minds have been rendered "homeless" by the modern recognition of the severance of ties with transcendent sources of values.¹

In both cases, that of the adherence to Marxist or Communist doctrine, and that of the adherence to positivist assumptions--however different the pathways generally travelled in reaching such positions and however dissimilar the immediate concerns of the adherents to such perspectives--the implications of these positions

¹A similar view is found in Peter Berger et al., The Homeless Mind.
are similarly negative with respect to the hopes for the future of mankind. This is owing to the fact that adherents of these perspectives fail to view man in terms of his humanity, his human-heartedness, and his full potential as a human being. In neither perspective are the highest of values placed on life and freedom.

The aborted view Marxists and Communists have of the nature and the potential of man and society and the anti-humanistic, anti-life means that are and would be employed in the attainment of the goals of Marxism and Communism—can be viewed in existential terms as being derived from an inadequate sense of being.¹ Adoption of "moral rigidism" which one sees in the adoption of Marxism and Communism can be seen as a way of escaping coming to terms with the facts of one's existence.²

Similarly, adherence to the positivist metaphysic keeps one from coming to terms with basic existential questions. Rigid moralism just as any frenetic, unexamined, unquestioned behavior can be seen as being a means of evasion. In the case of positivism, it is a matter of avoiding basic questions of value, meaning, purpose, and responsibility, indeed, of freedom as well. If the positivist forced himself to examine the impoverished assumptions and values upon which he bases his pursuits, he could not help but arrive at an existential perspective. For there is an implicit nihilism in positivism. To deny this or to fail to deal with this fact once it is recognized is the height of intellectual dishonesty. In the final analysis, the exercise of

¹"Moral rigidism" is discussed by May in Existence, pp. 45-47.
²Ibid.
intellectual honesty and acumen may become most important to the survival of civilization because it is these attributes which alone may lead present adherents of the positivist metaphysic to a valuing of life, health, and freedom.¹

A major way, if not the only way to restore basic values in the sustenance and enhancement of life, health, and freedom, short of the acceptance of a transcendent source of values, would seem to be via the existential path wherein such values can be evolved out of a basic affirmation in the valuing of life itself.

Implications following from the "rigid moralism" of the positivist

"Rigid moralism" which derives from an inadequate sense of being, from what in existential terms is called "ontological guilt," has an all important bearing on mental and social health.² The attempt to gain control, to exercise power over all aspects of man's life or social existence, can be seen as being a manifestation of "rigid moralism." Such a disposition can be seen as being characteristic of immature and un-self-actualizing individuals. Because there is an implicit denial of reality in such a disposition, most serious forms of mental illness and meanl imbalance can result. To seek "power over" others is not an attribute cultivated by a mentally healthy and well balanced person.³ To exercise arbitrary

¹Jonas Salk in his The Survival of the Wisest (New York: Harper and Row, 1973) speaks in a related way of the importance of wisdom to the survival of mankind.

²May, Existence, pp. 45-47.

"power over" the lives of others, in terms of their living and dying, and in terms of their personal and political freedom, is similarly not an attribute of a mentally healthy and well balanced person. To seek "power with" others, when power is used in Follett's sense of being a self-developing capacity can be seen as being a sign of mental health, emotional balance, and maturity.\footnote{\textit{Follett, Dynamic Administration}, p. 110.} Such an approach to power is the one which underlies the theory of developmental change and the overall democratic humanist paradigm of public administration presented here.

"Rigid moralism" and the loss or absence of basic human values has implications as well for judging and interpreting the behavior and mental health of others. By rejecting or becoming cut off from basic human values in the worth of life, health, and freedom, more and more persons have lost the guideposts and the standards by which they can view and judge or interpret the behavior of others. While most persons readily discern that Hitler was a mad man, there is doubtlessly less unanimity concerning the nature of the typically more subtle forms of mental imbalance found in and perpetuated by authoritarian and totalitarian regimes and authoritarian leaders, managers, and administrators. The serious implications that such mental imbalance holds for those societies and groups and individuals directly and indirectly effected seems to be eluding a majority of observers and actors, be they of a passionate or dispassionate orientation.

The reason that such implications seem to be eluding so many would seem to be related to the pervasiveness of the positivist
metaphysic. The positivist metaphysic with its denial of a value frame of reference provides no basis for understanding human and societal behavior in the light of mental and social healthiness or unhealthiness. The democratic-humanistic metaphysic which describes the set of assumptions and values which underlie the theory of developmental change and the approach to public administration in the public interest presented here, can be seen to provide such a value frame of reference.

Assumptions concerning the nature of man implicit in the positivist metaphysic

In order to fully understand the implications that the positivist metaphysic holds for approaches to knowing and action, and hence for administration and problem solving, it is important to gain a deeper understanding of the assumptions concerning the nature of man which are implicit in the positivist metaphysic.

In writing on what he considers to be the poverty of psychology, Arthur Koestler speaks of the "Four Pillars of Unwisdom." The fourth of these pillars bears particularly on the present discussion:

-that the only scientific method worth that name is quantitative measurement, and consequently, that complex phenomena must be reduced to simple elements accessible to such treatment, without undue worry whether the specific characteristics of a complex phenomenon, for instance man, may be lost in the process.  

The allegation that today's positivist has failed to acknowledge the complexity and vicissitudes of human nature is usually greeted with the rejoinder that patterns can be readily

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found in many areas of human behavior and that further investigation will doubtlessly reveal more patterning than has already been identified. By putting the argument in these terms, one is in effect implying that what is past is necessarily prelude; that because certain behaviors appear to be a direct result of certain factors, that they are apt to be similarly determined in the future; that what has been necessarily will continue to be. What such an argument fails to consider is that because much of human behavior has been or is apparently more determined by factors external to individuals, that this does not mean that all behavior has been, is, or will be similarly determined. Man has proved capable of transcending his conditioning and his conditions in the past; indeed man could not have endured had he not been able to do so. He would either have destroyed himself or died off through lack of any transcendent meaning or lack of will to live or survive.

Deterministic philosophies concerning the nature of man and social existence whether their roots be Newtonian, Marxian, Freudian, or whatever, fail to give man and man's potential their due. Human nature is complex. Human beings can act in totally unpredictable and idiosyncratic ways. Human beings can find in or ascribe to life a myriad of transcendent meanings. By failing to acknowledge the complicated and dynamic manifestations of human existence, the determinist has decreased the realism and relevance of his efforts considerably. He has done this by

1) tending to select only certain kinds of behavior to investigate;
2) tending to falsely generalize concerning the applicability of his results to larger populations or to entire populations;
3) operating on the fallacious assumptions that explanations of human behavior can somehow be divorced from an understanding of the human situation, of human nature, and of the varieties of human experience, including love.

His failure of inability to acquire these latter kinds of understandings has impeded his ability to make a meaningful contribution to the understanding of human behavior or to human and social change and development.

The positivist in his application of empirical methodology typically fails to take into account the vicissitudes of human nature. He also quite regularly appears to fail to discern the impact and effect that an increasingly turbulent and hence unpredictable social environment have on the generalizability of any conclusions he might reach, or of any tendencies or indicators he might identify.¹ The dynamically changing character of the environment can render attempts at inquiry and experimentation difficult at best, and impossible and useless at worst. Research conducted at the "true experimental" level requires that the researcher have significant control over the experimental arrangement, including both the stimuli and the subject.²


"Quasi-experimentation" requires a lesser degree of control of the subject and the experimental arrangement generally. In the case of the "true experiment," historical factors alone can easily render experimental efforts internally invalid and impossible to replicate. In the case of experiments at the quasi-experimental level—in terms of the "rules of the game"—problems of the external validity of research efforts are simply impossible to surmount.

The positivist assumption of ceteris paribus

The one phrase which pinpoints the dilemma of the would-be replicator is ceteris paribus, the Latin for "other things being equal." Purely and simply, in matters involving the human realm, things cannot be viewed as being equal in any objectively verifiable sense. (While the same could be said of the physical realm, far greater regularity can be shown to exist there.) With respect to the human realm, particularly, what has happened will never happen again in exactly the same way with all the same factors operating. In fact, the greater the disequilibrium in the social environment and the greater or less fathomable the gyrations, aspirations, motivations, or vicissitudes of the human spirit, the smaller will

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1 Ibid.


be the explanatory (let alone the predictive) value of any true or quasi-experimentation.

Despite the increasing inappropriateness of the method of inquiry typically employed by those of a positivist persuasion--to dynamically and irregularly changing subjects living in an equally dynamic environment, the positivist continues on as if his methods were not only useful in terms of his purposes (explanation and prediction, being two), but also applicable to dynamically changing subjects in a dynamically changing environment. This is not to argue that attempts to explain and understand events and activities, social and human phenomena--are without worth. It is, however, by way of pointing out that another approach based on assumptions which are not constricting would be far more likely to yield useful insights. Even the partial accounts such as those which can be obtained through traditional methodological means can provide some insights and information that can have significant bearing upon understanding and action. However, the kind of influence that any account, partial or complete, has or might have, is contingent upon the assumptions that are made concerning human nature, the nature of knowledge and inquiry, and upon the capacity of the researcher to make appropriate inferences on the basis of his findings. The same partial account may mean one thing to a person who has a deterministic view of man and something totally different to a person with a non-deterministic view of man. The same account that may be used to control and manipulate people can also be used for educational purposes, helping people understand what they have been doing and helping them bring about changes which would lead to the enhancement of the quality of life and the realization of individual and societal
potentials.

The positivist metaphysic—with its deterministic approach to man appears to be more concerned with using knowledge to predict, control, and manipulate. By comparison the "democratic humanistic metaphysic" which describes the set of assumptions and values underlying the theory of developmental change is concerned with using any and all forms of knowledge and understanding (not just rational and empirical approaches to knowing) to bring about changes directed toward the sustenance and enhancement of life, health, and freedom.

The Bearing of Assumptions on Knowledge and Action

Reaction, non-action, and pro-action

The tendency of the contemporary scientific researcher would seem to be to adopt a reactive or non-active pose with respect to social behavior and action. His concern with social phenomena would appear to emanate from a desire to understand certain things about the possible patterning of such behavior. He may also be interested in such patterning because of the promise of control over future behavior that such knowledge would seem to provide him or others. Most significant in this approach is the fact that the researcher of positivist persuasion or the researcher who shares most if not all of the same basic assumptions and values found in the positivist metaphysic, has assumed an "after-the-fact" role; he has not assumed a "proactive," "before-the-fact" anticipatory or prescriptionist role. His actions have not typically been concerned with the generation of understanding which is in the service of developmental or goal-oriented change, for consideration of the kind of value-based
goals which have been spelled out in connection with the theory of
developmental change has no consistent place in the methodology of
one who subscribes to the positivist metaphysic. The positivistically
inclined researcher is concerned with description. He views or
tends to view prescription (at least in theory) as being the legiti-
mate province of the policymaker and politician; even though,
ironically, positivist assumptions have begun to infect the thinking
of policymakers and politicians so that such persons are hesitant
to be prescriptive unless they can back up their prescriptions with
validatable "evidence" supporting the approach they are prescribing.

This phenomenon reflects the existence of an increasingly
incestuous relationship between those espousing positivist methods
of inquiry and those engaged as practitioners or politicians in
policymaking and implementation. Both inquiry and practice have
become incremental in character—in effect, if not in intent. Both
in effect are conservative in that neither significantly impacts
the status quo in any sweeping way. Certainly no longrange, develop-
mental goals are implied in such incremental approaches.

The positivist as inadvertent
prescriptionist

The positivist methodologist is not interested in develop-
mental or goal-oriented change as a rule. His methods are not only

1 For an overview of differences between incremental, goal-
oriented and other approaches, see Blackman with Blum, "Approaches
to Social Change and Their Consequences for Planning," in Henrik
L. Blum and Associates, eds., "Notes on Comprehensive Planning for
Health, pp. 2.02-2.16.

For a discussion of the conservative orientation of behavioralists
toward social action, see Susser, "The Behavioural Ideology."
ill-suited to such concerns, his methods and the assumptions under-
lying them simply preclude any possible involvement in such blatantly
prescriptive endeavors.

Despite this, his own methods in effect serve incremental
change and are in fact prescriptive—though less obviously so than
other forms of prescription. The self-contradiction obvious in the
valuing of non-valuing is also apparent in the valuing of description
and explanation over prescription, as the positivist who engages
in this particular brand of description and explanation is in effect
adopting and fostering conservative and incremental approaches to
change.¹

To claim then that the positivist is not intentionally
prescriptive in what he does, is to avoid the reality of the actual
effect his endeavors have. The avoidance of policy considerations
or concerns can in itself profoundly influence the policy-making
process.

The positivist's interest in description and explanation
to the professed exclusion of prescription might change if he were
to realize that his efforts in effect are serving incremental change.
He might begin to see that despite his best intentions to keep his
endeavors free from prescription, that he is in fact contributing

¹Edgar Robinson has noted that the status quo implications
of the positivist position raise the question of whether or not
those who have gravitated to this position might not have been drawn
to such a position because of a conservative or otherwise cautious
make-up. (One can add to this observation that the positivist
appears to be wed to the use of what Gross calls narrow rationality.
He also seems to reject out-of-hand the self-actualizing view of
to change, a particular kind of non-directed incremental change. Realizing this, he might well assume a greater responsibility for the fruits of his labors and become more interested in the results of what he does.

With such a realization others shifts might well take place. The positivist's interest in patterns that can be found in behavior might change to a deeper interest in latent manifestations of behavior and causes underlying behavior. He might well strive to develop a greater understanding of the nature and character of behavior, including the meanings and purposes the actors have ascribed to their behavior. Beyond this he might become interested in trying to understand how changes might be brought about so that behavior which was not in the best interest of individuals or of society might be redirected along more positive and more human lines.

In this way, major steps will have been taken in meeting and dealing with the administrative crisis. If instead, the positivist continues in his present course, he will be contributing to small incremental changes which serve no longrange goals or purpose and which reflect little understanding or concern for what is happening and what ends these changes serve. Were the positivist to continue in this latter course, he would be exacerbating rather than helping to alleviate the administrative crisis.

The Implications Following from the Acceptance of a Value Neutral Scientistic Frame of Reference

A way of seeing as a way of not seeing

Poggi has observed that "a way of seeing is also a way of not
The scientific method as it has evolved through the years is a cognitive system which reflects certain distinguishable beliefs and values. These include beliefs in order, in empiricism (the empirical assumption that knowledge is acquired solely through the senses), and in causality. Implicit values include values in knowledge, particularly knowledge of cause and effect relationships, of order, patterns, and regularities; a value in the community of persons who hold similar values and beliefs who can corroborate findings through intersubjective verifiability procedures; and a value in human progress which science— it is believed— can be instrumental in securing. \(^2\) (Some also believe that progress can be equated with modification and/or control of human and social behavior, e.g., those engaged in forms of behaviorism and operant conditioning on the one hand—an example being Skinnerian psychology—and those who advocate so-called comprehensive and total planning of societal arrangements on the other hand.)

In Kafkaesque, Orwellian, and Huxleyesque way, such persons have followed the assumptions of positivism and behavioralism to their "logical" and inhuman prescriptive conclusions. The positivist metaphysic would, if its "logic" were to be followed out, lead to such an inhuman "Brave New World" type of existence. It would seem essential, if such an eventuality is to be averted that people become as discerning as possible concerning the basic assumptions and values which underlie the positivist metaphysic and follow out their implications, and seeing their deficiencies set about to supplant


\(^2\) I am indebted to several professors at the American University whose succinct characterization of behavioralism is drawn upon here.
the positivist metaphysic with one which is based in values and assumptions which favor the sustenance and enhancement of life, health, and freedom.

In all, the scientific method has become a way of seeing which those who adhere to it believe allows them to systematically discover the relationships which they believe underlie the phenomenal world, including all aspects of human behavior. This erroneous belief obscures rather than illuminates understanding.

A way of defining problems as a way of obscuring other problems

Lynd, like Poggi, has also acknowledged the implications that the scientific frame of reference holds for the solving of problems. He has written that

the controlling factor in any science is the way it views and states its problems. Once stated, a problem can yield no further insights than are allowed by the constricting frame of its original formulation; although, in a negative sense, the data discovered may serve to point out the inadequacy of the original frame of reference.¹

Abraham Kaplan makes a similar point concerning the way in which a scientist's preference for certain techniques may lead him to formulate problems in a manner "which requires for their solution just those techniques in which he himself is especially skilled." He calls this propensity "the law of the instrument."² He formulates this law in the following way:

²Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry, pp. 28-29.
Give a small boy a hammer, and he will find that everything he encounters needs pounding.\(^1\)

Eugene Miller in his description of Thomas Kuhn's views provides in effect a further elaboration of these ideas of Lynd and Kaplan. Miller writes:

The paradigm shapes observation itself, reducing the likelihood that scientists will even perceive data that are contrary to expectations that the paradigm engenders.\(^2\)

The rose-colored filter lens of positivist methodology

Friedrich Juenger takes a somewhat different tack, examining the motivations of scientists, particularly natural scientists, and accusing them of delimiting their science by taking refuge in method out of psychological insecurity. He writes in *The Failure of Technology*:

The natural scientist will always exhibit a tendency to delimit his science as sharply and as narrowly as possible, to make it completely methodical, to systematize it. Natural science thus limits itself to what can be proved mathematically, or to that which the law of causality applies, or to the purely functional. These efforts which, like every heavy fortification of national borders, often give an impression of fear originate psychologically in a desire for security.\(^3\)

Those scientists who adhere to such limited and limiting approaches tend necessarily to limit their consideration to surface

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\(^1\)Ibid. Methodological techniques as well as technical expertise can both have an equally stultifying effect on problem solving. If one is trained in advanced systems of energy technology, one is not apt to go looking for answers to the energy problem in the growing of biomass (plants and trees) for fuel.


issues and pseudo-problems in that the constricted character of their approach keeps them from acquiring a comprehensive understanding of the nature and scope of the problem they would understand.

**Methodological strait-jacketing**

Leo Strauss, who also has been concerned about the constricting character of methodology currently employed in political science has written:

> The goal is taken as a matter of course without a previous investigation as to whether the subject matter with which political science deals admits of adequate understanding in terms of "laws" or whether the universals through which political things can be understood as what they are must not be conceived of in entirely different terms.¹

Kenneth Boulding, in approaching the subject of the constricting potential of scientific methodology asserts that science itself "might almost be defined as the process of substituting unimportant questions which can be answered for important ones which cannot."²

¹Strauss, "The Social Sciences Cannot Be Value-Free" in The Nature and Scope of Social Science, p. 739/

Whatever the conscious or unconscious basis for adherence to a positivistic methodological approach, the fact remains that the chosen frame of reference is in effect constricting in that it seriously impedes or interferes with what should be a goal-oriented process of problem solving. Whether or not most researchers realize how constricting the frame of reference is is not clear. One can only surmise that either they realize it and continue to use it, or they do not realize it and use it out of habit or because it has come to be regarded as being irrefutably valid by those who number among its "true believers."

Whether adherents of positivist approaches subscribe to certain restrictive methodological approaches because of uncritical acceptance, blind faith, or a belief that this is the only way to do research, or whether they will be open to new approaches which better allow them to meet their goal of increased knowledge—are questions that could be discussed at length. Of greatest importance, however, to the present discussion are the implications that adherence to the positivist metaphysic has for social and political speculation and theorizing; for the identification, recognition, and selection of problems and questions to be addressed; and for societal problem solving and advocacy.

The Epistemological Schizophrenia Inherent in the Positivist Position--Its Etiology and Implications

The metaphysical doublebind

Just as the positivist is in a metaphysical doublebind--a victim of epistemological schizophrenia and axiological doublethink--so too are increasing numbers of those in decision-making
positions falling prey to the same sorts of pathology and aberrant and morally anaesthetized ways of thinking. The symptoms appear to be spreading and affecting the very ordering of society. The sharply delineated differences that have come to distinguish the scientist from the doer—the researcher from the policymaker or political actor—all are symptomatic of a deepening pathology and abrogation of moral responsibility for personal and social action. (The fact that many persons appear to base certain aspects of their lives on metaphysical assumptions and beliefs and attempt to apply totally counter assumptions and beliefs to other parts of their lives—is also similarly symptomatic, being the defining characteristic of "epistemological schizophrenia.")

With increasing numbers of persons who have been trained as scientists, analysts, and engineers entering the ranks of policymakers, administrators, etc., they are supplanting the dwindling numbers of persons who have been educated in the "old school" where common values were taken as given and where such values applied to all one did and thought. It is a different story with many of the recently trained, as well as the untrained persons, now entering the ranks of policymakers and administrators.

While little attention has been given in the literature to making clear and explicit the democratic humanistic metaphysics of the old school, less attention seems to have been given to making clear and explicit the assumptions, values, and beliefs implicit in

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1The term "epistemological schizophrenia" was a term used and possibly coined by a graduate student at the American University. The term "morally anaesthetized" is borrowed from James Eayrs, Right and Wrong in Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966) as cited in I.L. Horowitz, The Use and Abuse of Social Science, pp. 8-9/
the positivist position.\footnote{The school of thought in public administration which could be called the Democratic Humanistic Mainstream School was discussed in Chapter V above. This school may be seen to include Dwight Waldo, Paul Appleby, Frederick Mosher, Emmette Redford, and Gerald Caiden, among others.}

An understanding of these to distinct positions is seen here as being necessary to an understanding of the current administrative crisis we face and to an understanding of the steps that can be taken to help extricate ourselves from the critical situation we are in.

The genesis of moral\footnote{Strauss, Natural Right and History, pp. 166–202; see especially p. 182.} equivocation and cynicism

In order to grasp more fully the gravity of the present administrative crisis, it would be helpful to study more closely the genesis and implications of the nihilism, value relativism and moral equivocation implicit in the positivist metaphysical persuasion and hence in so much of contemporary public administration thought and practice as well.

The moral equivocation which has become rife throughout society in our times is a legacy of the Age of Enlightenment and the intellectual history of the Western world that has followed. In his Natural Right and History, Strauss had pointed to Hobbesian thought as marking the turning point in history when the natural right view of the transcendental character of right and wrong was rejected and supplanted with the "scientific" and relativistic view that values are made by man.\footnote{The school of thought in public administration which could be called the Democratic Humanistic Mainstream School was discussed in Chapter V above. This school may be seen to include Dwight Waldo, Paul Appleby, Frederick Mosher, Emmette Redford, and Gerald Caiden, among others.} The full implications of this breaking
with the classical and religious humanistic heritage of Western civilization seem yet to be in the process of being assimilated by Twentieth Century Man.

Perhaps it has been the existentially oriented thinkers who more than any other contributors to Western intellectual history—have been the ones to most fully assimilate the implications of the rejection of the natural right view of the transcendent character of right and wrong, good and evil. If one has no basis for believing in God, if one does not know of the existence of God, then if one rejects the natural right view of right and wrong, one is left to create one's own values. Followed to the logical extreme, such a perception of the relativity of values leads ultimately to the questioning of the very value and purpose of existence. It constitutes an open invitation to the existential dilemma.

How one who finds himself at the outer limits of existential inquiry is forced to raise and answer the most basic questions of value was discussed earlier.¹ In that discussion, the attempt was made to show that if one continued to value intellectual and personal honesty, that it was possible—if one decided that life was worth living—to build upon that valuing of life a set of moral values, humanistic and democratic values which placed importance on the sustenance and enhancement of life, of health, and of personal and societal freedom. (If one harbors a limited view of the nature of man and the nature of social existence, a view in which for instance man's social needs are seen as his highest needs—one can end up a so-called Marxist "humanist". In the context of such a perspective,

¹See the Foreword above.
however, "humanist" is an inappropriate term in that life itself is not seen as being an inalienable right and value. In the democratic humanistic perspective, the valuing of life is fundamental and the term "humanistic" is therefore appropriate.)

As it is possible to arrive at democratic and humanistic values, by way of an existential logic, albeit a somewhat circuitous route, one needs not believe that values are transcendent (in the classical or religious sense) in order to embrace such values.

Those who have gravitated to or accepted the positivist metaphysic, however, appear not to have followed out the logical implications of the Hobbesian rejection of the natural right view of the transcendent character of values, let alone the implications of Lacke's "tabula rasa" empirical approach to knowing.¹ They seem instead to have replaced the "absolutism" of a theory of transcendent values with an "absolutism" of a theory of relative values.² Classical and religious norms and values have been supplanted by man-made values. The question "Who's to say what is right?" provides a most succinct summation of the positivist view of valuing. In effect, the positivist metaphysic can be seen as being an effort to fill the void left by the waning of classical and religious norms and values. As with other morally rigid doctrines, it may be seen as

¹The implications of Locke's views are discussed in Strauss, Natural Right and History; see especially pp. 225-231.

²Strauss notes the absolutism of anti-absolutism in Natural Right and History, p. 5.
being reflective of an inadequate sense of being, the "ontological guilt" mentioned earlier.¹

The existentialists have attempted to assuage this guilt. The more successful and consistent of them have not been driven into a reactive or defensive intellectual posture as the result of the Hobbesian rejection of the theory of natural right and the waning of classical and religious values and ideals. Many of them, believing that there were no transcendent sources of values, created a morality building on what they perceived were available to them as givens; the fact of being--the fact of living--and the fact of death.

This all calls to mind Boulding's statement concerning the tendency of many persons to address the small questions which are answerable, and ignore the big questions which may not be answered or not be easily answered.² The existential humanist personified by Albert Camus addressed the larger questions.³ Those who have embraced the positivist metaphysic seem to have chosen to deal with the smaller questions. The positivist has effectively attempted to force closure on the raising of larger questions by adopting a set of basic assumptions and values that rejects the raising of such issues as the value or meaning of life because no answer could possibly meet the standards of verifiability which adherence to positivistic methodology requires. They have failed to see as

¹See especially Camus' The Rebel and "The Myth of Sysyphus."
Flathman so clearly states: "(Q)uestions of value are not amenable to rational, transsubjective, scientific analysis."¹

Most important and fundamental questions such as those concerned with the meaning and value of life can then be viewed by positivists as non-questions or unanswerable questions not worthy of attention. The skirting of fundamental and basic questions and the focusing instead on questions of lesser significance and scope leads the positivist toward incrementalism and a fragmentary and shotgun approach to the understanding of human affairs and away from a holistic consideration of the human situation and society.

The reactive and defensive posture of those who subscribe to the positivist metaphysic is limiting in yet other ways. The rejection of the theory of transcendent values leads as well to the rejection of other basic human values and ideals all of which relate to basic values of right and wrong, good and evil. The embracing of value relativism gives rise on the other hand to the antithesis of idealism—cynicism. For if there is no basis for discriminating between right and wrong, and if one assumes that others are similarly at sea with regard to moral guideposts in their lives, then it is natural for one to assume that life in society will be characterized by niggardliness, self-servingness, a dog-eat-dog mentality. Such cynicism concerning the nature of man is found in Shepard's primary mentality assumptions of coercion, compromise, and cut-throat competition; it is found as well in the rational model of man and even in the conservativism and short time frame perspective found in Gross'¹

¹Flathman, The Public Interest, p. x.
narrow rationality.\(^1\)

The moral cynicism then which began to permeate political theory and inquiry beginning with Hobbes and Machiavelli (in effect, if not by design) has come now to permeate social and political theorizing and endeavor as well as much of administrative theorizing and practice. Roszak has written of the pervasiveness of such cynicism in his charge that government has come to be a "shabby form of social engineering based on conditioned reflexes and institutionalized cynicism."\(^2\) Such cynicism may be seen to play a major role in perpetuating and exacerbating the administrative crisis.

Those in the political realm no less than those in the administrative and organizational realm would seem to be most regularly concerning themselves not with what should or ought to be, but instead with what is and with how incremental adjustments can be made in what is. To be more--to do more--requires values and projection of goals and purposes. Since the time of Hobbes and Machiavelli, the value frame of reference for political and social inquiry and action has degenerated with respect to values and goals. Administration and organizational theorizing and practice has been similarly affected by the same cynicism and value impoverishment.\(^3\)

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1Shepard, "Changing Interpersonal and Group Relationships in Organizations" and Gross, Organizations and Their Managing, pp. 543-549.


The widespread character of such cynicism and value impoverishment can be seen as being at least in part responsible for the uphill battle which normatively oriented theorists, activists and practitioners have been having to wage for the past several decades. Positivist assumptions concerning the nature of knowledge, the positivist "invalidation" of ways of knowing other than rational or empirical ways of knowing--have of course also played a major role in sustaining the war against normative theory and avowedly "value-laden," value-based, or idealistically oriented thought, practice, and action.

The deeply ingrained cynicism concerning the nature of man and the possibilities of societal improvement and the value impoverished state of the value frame of reference informing most forms of contemporary theorizing and practice have a most deadening effect on man's hopes, his ideals, and his very humanity. Such cynicism has most serious implications for the future of mankind in that it serves to militate against the setting of idealistic or value-based goals and against the directing of efforts toward the sustenance and enhancement of life, health, and freedom.

The questions which positivists raise concerning values

When those subscribing to the positivist metaphysic come up against those who are operating on the basis of democratic and humanistic metaphysical assumptions, the same questions concerning values are repeatedly asked. For those who are positivistically inclined, there is not likely to be an adequate answer to any of these questions: How are we to determine what is best? Whose values get prescribed? Who is to make that determination and how? These
questions will remain unanswered for those who are positivistically inclined so long as they fail to come to grips with the full implications of the assumptions and values underlying their approach to theory, inquiry, action, and practice. The questions get answered amorally by default, value-neutral action, and inaction.

By limiting "knowledge" to what they can know empirically or rationally, the positivists deny themselves the opportunity to gain any real understanding of the needs, qualities, and aspirations which can be seen to characterize man. By adhering to their "absolutist" view that there are no absolute values, including a value in life itself, the positivists are rejecting not only the possibility of there being transcendent values in life, they are rejecting what their common sense and experience would lead them to see--were they to honestly follow out the nihilistic implications of their positivism.

Through their failure or reluctance to assume a responsible role, those who maintain a positivist position through inaction and non-participation, accede by default to the will of those who do assume responsibility for action, those who do concern themselves with the outcome of their action and who undertake to act in the first place because of the values they would serve. In a sense those who fail to assume an actively responsible role are accessories to what happens even in their failure to act.

The nihilistic implications of ethical neutrality

The subject/object split which tormented early existential thinkers through the middle of this century has given rise to ethical
nihilism and relativism. Such nihilism and relativism is with us today in a new and more morally vacuous form. Ethical neutrality has been supplanted with a more obvious nihilism. Just as refusing to formulate a policy in effect can be viewed as being a policy, the refusal to formulate a "positive" (humanistic and democratic) value frame of reference can be viewed as in effect perpetuating certain values, impoverished though those values may be.\(^1\) These are the value of not valuing, the value of ethical nihilism or neutrality, the value of doing nothing, the value of letting be, and the value of not assuming a responsible role. The deficiencies of this stance have been pointed out by Dvorin and Simmons in their book on moral responsibility and contemporary amoral trends in administration, *From Amoral to Humane Bureaucracy*. They write,

> (T)o administrate without aiming toward moral imperatives is to exercise power without moral responsibility.\(^2\)

Were the implications of such values (non-values, negative values, or anti-values) clear to those who effectively espouse and perpetuate them, it is likely that they would perceive the internal contradiction in their position and reject it as it fails to reflect the rationality and to meet the standards for logical consistency which they so highly value.

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\(^1\)"Positive" value is being used here in the sense the term was used in the Foreword above.

\(^2\)Dvorin and Simmons, *From Amoral to Humane Bureaucracy*, p.9.
Adherence to the non-ethics of value-neutral scientism appears to be spreading. As it has spread, policymakers have looked increasingly to the scientific community for answers and the scientific community has come to exercise increasing influence on the character and direction of societal problem solving and action. The problems with this trend are legion. Not only is science, as it is now most often viewed, supposedly non-normative and non-prescriptive in its orientation, it also rejects common sense, intuition, and experience. The gradual shift in the direction of such a view of science has thereby ushered in a gradual demise of belief in or reliance upon common sense and experience, moral values and ideals.¹ Those who continue to believe in or rely upon these find themselves falling prey to the epistemological schizophrenia mentioned earlier. Despite their knowing what is required to deal with a problem situation, they feel as if they are required to seek counsel from those who can only offer partial scientific assessments which are formulated in a value frame of reference which is in fact anathema to their own. Despite their being goal-oriented and their having values and standards, many have come or are coming to rely on the opinions and assessments of others who are proceeding as if there were no goals, no values or standards. Knowing what is needed and knowing what has to be done, they seek to scientifically validate their intuitive assessments using methods or relying on persons who use methods and approaches

¹It was no doubt the trend toward the "sanctification" of positivism and scientism that led Laski to note that the spreading belief in expertise has rendered us in capable of seeing that which is right in front of our noses. (Harold J. Laski, "The Limitations of the Expert," Fabian Tract No. 235, as cited in William Chapman, "Scholars Examine Value of Social Scientist in Public Policy," Washington Post, 18 February 1973, p. A2.)
which deny the possibility of knowing what is needed or of knowing what has to be done.

As increasing obeisance is paid scientism, everyday wisdom and common sense, experience and understanding is being swept aside in the name of scientific objectivity, and related value neutral causes--administrative rationality, efficiency, cost effectiveness, and the like. Captivation with the tenets of scientific management has become so pervasive that application of these tenets has come to be viewed by many as being far more important than substantive understanding of any given problem area. This is despite the fact that liberal amounts of understanding and conversancy with a subject area are essential to the solution of any problem. The growing preoccupation with process rather than purpose and with form rather than reality--can be seen as legacies of the value neutral scientific approach to administration.

Conclusion

The value neutral orientation of the "positivist metaphysic," of "scientism," is threatening to undermine most basic human values. At the same time political and social ideologies which at their root and in their application deny such values and strait-jacket the human spirit and prohibit or inhibit the realization of human and societal potentials are threatening to supplant by default, if not overtake by force, the free and democratic way of life. In the process man's capacities to act as a responsible agent of healthy change and as a solver and ameliorator

1The allusions to process and purpose, form and reality are drawn from Caiden's definition of bureau pathology, The Dynamics of Public Administration, p. 8.
of mankind's problems--are being eclipsed. Through his inability or lack of opportunity or inclination to act in a free and responsible way, based on the dictates of his mind, heart, and conscience, he has given up his rightful role as shaper of his own destiny.

The threatened undermining of most basic human values, the threatened prohibition or inhibition of the realization of human and societal potentials--can all be met through the revitalization of basic values, and the expression in words and actions of such values. Through such a revitalization of basic values and through the expression of such values, man can assume his rightful responsible role.

The democratic humanist paradigm of public administration that has been outlined in Chapters II, III, and IV of this work, is being offered here as a map, a map which would point the way to the realization of human and societal potentials. At the same time this paradigm of public administration has been offered as a means of arresting and turning back present trends toward "overdevelopment," trends which are leading man and society far afield from basic human values and worthy human and societal goals. The aim of the paradigm presented here is to address human and societal needs in such a way as to preserve and enhance rather than deny, ignore, or eradicate the values in life, health, and freedom.

In keeping with the values and assumptions underlying this paradigm, the attainment of the goals of human and societal actualization is seen as being best assured through the employment of educational and non-coercive strategies, strategies which are reflective of the highest, most selfless, and idealistic attributes and propensities of man. In keeping with this paradigm, the very working toward the ideal goal of
development is seen as being necessary to the very survival of civilization.

The aim of the democratic humanist paradigm of public administration presented here is to make up for the deficiencies and inadequacies of the majority of the currently prevailing schools in the field of public administration, to—above all—seek to provide a holistic perspective and practical approach to man's shaping of his own individual and societal destiny. Such a perspective and approach would be intended to supplant present fragmentary and reactive perspectives and approaches.

The aim of the democratic humanist paradigm of public administration is seen as being that of restoring or reasserting what is viewed here as being the proper focus of public administration. Such a focus is seen as being reflected little in contemporary theory and even less in contemporary practice. It is a focus which can be described as being value-based and goal-oriented, oriented in the direction of an ideal state of individual and societal development. Unless the approaches of currently prevailing major schools of public administration begin to be reoriented along such developmentally oriented lines, there would seem to be little hope of meeting and surmounting the administrative crisis facing us. As administrators assume their rightful roles as agents of goal-oriented developmental change and as solvers of societal problems, they will be exercising the responsibility that is primarily theirs to exercise—by virtue of their roles in society, their skills, and training and the nature and scope of their endeavors.

Success in surmounting the present administrative crisis can be seen to turn on the reinstatement of the same sense of purpose and
direction that may be seen to have informed the efforts of the Founding Fathers. The current crisis is a crisis arising out of a failure to settle on a direction for our efforts. The dilemma which defines the administrative crisis is not so much not knowing how to do things; it is rather not knowing why something should be done, not knowing that something needs to be done.

Abraham Maslow's statement concerning the relation of the ends and means of education in America seems particularly germane here. He wrote in *Eupsychian Management* of the need to define the goals and "ultimate ends" of education. The "means questions" will then, he said, "settle themselves overnight."¹ The way out of the current administrative crisis may be seen in exactly the same light. We are challenged to define the goals and "ultimate ends" of administration.

With problems proliferating at the national and global levels, there would seem to be no option but to attempt to rise to the challenge of the situation. It is becoming abundantly clear that something has to be done and done soon to begin to address the problems that are threatening to engulf and destroy civilization or push civilization back into a dark age. Such a dark age, an age

The passage from which these quotes are taken reads as follows:

The trouble with education today, as with so many other American institutions, is that nobody is quite sure of what the goals and the ultimate ends of education are. Once the goals of democratic education are clearly set forth, then all the means questions will settle themselves overnight. Here we must be very bold; the the goals of democratic education, once we leave aside the question of technological training can be nothing else but development toward psychological healthy. That is, education must be eupsychian or else it is not democratic.
of "technological regress," could be ushered in by a continuing unbridled, unthinking and inhuman application of, reliance on, and obeisance to technology. Man, if he continues on this path, is destined to become a tool of his own tools, a fate seen even by Thoreau in his time.¹

At this time in human history, we must take stock of our situation; we must be ready to examine the values and assumptions upon which we have been basing our actions. Given the gravity of the present situation, we can ill afford to continue operating on the basis of half understood or totally misunderstood or unquestioned values and assumptions. To do so would mean we care little for the future or the quality of our lives and the lives of others in the present. The values and assumptions of value-neutral scientism, the values and assumptions which make up the positivist metaphysic present as great a threat to man today as any Hitler or Stalin, for while the latter represents the subjugation of man by man, the former constitutes the subjugation of man by his own tool, science. Science is a tool which should free rather than subjugate, a tool which should be used in human ways to meet human needs, not to deny and effectively destroy man's intrinsic humanness and render his life meaningless and sterile.

The democratic humanist paradigm of public administration is designed to help establish or reestablish a basic set of values and assumptions which are identical in substance to the values, ideals,

and principles upon which American Democracy was founded. The difficulties in seeking what can be seen as a return to or a revitalization of such values, ideals, principles, and purposes are obviously quite great. The difficulties in seeking such a transformation or reformation toward the humanistic and away from the scientific and anti-humanistic are obviously equally great. Inspite of the obstacles, it would nonetheless seem urgent to seek such change because of what stands to be lost if such change, such transformation, or reformation is not forthcoming. Man's future, man's very humanity are at stake.
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