

THE POLITICAL ECONOMIST

NEWSLETTER OF THE SECTION ON POLITICAL ECONOMY, AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

CO-EDITORS

JOHN AHLQUIST, MECUMI NAOI, & CHRISTINA SCHNEIDER,
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO


"Worth a Thousand Words"

When do the poor vote for right-wing parties and why?

Pavithra Suryanarayan

Assistant Professor, Johns Hopkins University

Figure 1: Right-wing vote share before and after Mandal



Notes: Figure 1 shows a dramatic rise in the vote-share for the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) before and after an announcement by the Prime Minister of India in 1990 to introduce affirmative action to lower castes in central government jobs and higher education - domains that had long been dominated by upper-caste Brahmins.¹ Right-wing vote share was calculated using the vote for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in state assembly elections in each period. To calculate the BJP vote share I focused on the votes received by the top 15 candidates/parties in an electoral constituency. I thank Francesca Jensenius for providing me with the state-level elections data. The source data is available at www.eci.nic.in.

1 The announcement was popularly known as "Mandal" as it was based on the recommendations of a report by the "Mandal Commission" in 1980 on how quotas and reservations could be used redress caste inequalities.

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Right-wing parties are making a resurgence worldwide with strong support from low-income voters. The popularity of right-wing parties amongst the poor is surprising because right-wing parties often run on anti-redistribution platforms. In a forthcoming article in *Comparative Political Studies*, I argue that cross-class support for right-wing parties emerge when there are challenges to status hierarchies in societies with high levels of social-status inequality. We see examples of hierarchical systems across the world due to the legacies of slavery, caste, apartheid, colonialism, and aristocracy. In these societies, individuals are born into high or low status groups. "High-status" individuals derive both psychic benefits from their rank, as well as material benefits from access to segregated goods and services. When "low-status" groups start to compete for access to institutions viewed as instrumental to maintaining group social rank, high-ranked groups face threats to their status. In such an event, status identity gains greater electoral salience making poor voters from high-status groups more susceptible to appeals by right-wing parties.

The specter of desegregation following the "Mandal" announcement galvanized upper-caste support for the BJP, a peripheral player in Indian politics up to that point. Using newly digitized data from the 1931 census, I show that the increase in support for the BJP was greater in places where upper-caste Brahmins had enjoyed greater status dominance. Affirmative action politics was not the only factor shaping partisan realignment in this period. The BJP also actively courted Hindu voters by resurrecting historical grievances against Muslims. The paper's novelty lies in showing that even controlling for the "Muslim threat", the status dominance of Brahmins explained a substantial increase in the BJP vote across the two periods.

Individual-level regressions, using survey data from the 2004 national elections corroborate electoral district-level findings. Importantly, the individual-level regressions show that poor Brahmins were more likely to vote for the BJP and held more anti-redistribution views compared to even wealthy Brahmins in constituencies with higher levels of Brahmin dominance in 1931. These results provide more direct evidence for the claim that anti-redistributive support emerges amongst poor upper-status voters in places with high status-inequality.

The findings of this paper helps us understand why resilient cross-class coalitions arise in multi-ethnic contexts as varied as the United States, India, and South Africa. These findings could also shed light on why public support for government-led redistribution is lower in some places than political economy models might predict.

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FROM THE CHAIR

This Fall 2017 Newsletter is published immediately after our annual meeting and gives me the opportunity to report on the most recent events of our section. At the annual meeting held in San Francisco, our section hosted 27 panels and 14 poster sessions. We are grateful to Alison Post (University of California Berkeley) and to Tom Clark (Emory University) for acting as program chairs.

The most important event at the business meeting was the presentation of the 2017 Political Economy awards. The best book award committee (Pablo Beramendi (chair), Ernesto Calvo and Rachel Wellhausen) recognized and honored two books. The 2017 best book award was awarded to *Marketing Sovereign Promises* by Gary Cox (Cambridge University Press 2016). The study provides a reinterpretation of the institutions established during the Glorious Revolution which constrained the discretion held by the sovereign in the formulation of fiscal decision. Cox highlights the importance of a set of institutional arrangements (called ‘monopoly brokerage’) which limited executive discretion, while maintaining the ability of the sovereign to initiate new legislation. The honorable mention was awarded to Kate Baldwin for *Paradox of Traditional Chiefs in Africa* (Cambridge University Press 2016). Baldwin examines the consequences of traditional hereditary institutions in Africa and the conditions under which such institutions can enhance accountability.

The Michael Wallerstein prize was awarded to Leslie Johns and Rachel Wellhausen for “Under One Roof: Supply Chains and the Protection of Foreign Investment” (*American Political Science Review* 2016). The paper examines the conditions under which multinational corporations can enhance their resistance to predatory behavior by hosts state and points to the importance of investments in supply chains. The Wallerstein award committee was chaired by Laia Balcells and included Alex Kuo and Boliang Zhu.

“Essays on Emigration and Politics” by Emily Sellars was distinguished Best Dissertation in Political Economy. Sellars examines the consequences of migration for a variety of outcomes such as institutional development, land reform and public service provision. The award committee (Margit Tavits (Chair), Yuen Yuen Ang and Charlotte Cavaille) praised the dissertation for its creative empirical design and for its ability to draw on historical data to speak to contemporary outcomes. Alexander Hertel Fernandez (Columbia University) won the Fiona McGillivray award for the best paper presented at the previous annual meeting. In “American Employers as Political Machines”, Hertel Fernandez documents the strategies of electoral mobilization of US employers and their efforts to influence electoral choices of their employees. The McGillivray committee was chaired by Monika Nalepa and included Yuhua Wang and Alberto Simpser.

The Political Economy Program Chairs for the 2018 annual meeting are Rory Truex, Princeton University and Victor Menaldo, University of Washington. We are looking forward to seeing you in Boston at the next meeting. Thank you for your contributions to the section.

Isabela Mares
im2195@columbia.edu



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FROM THE EDITORS

Informal governance is the theme of the Fall 2017 issue. Research on informal governance has flourished in the past two decades for reasons both theoretical and empirical. Theoretically, scholars have been fascinated by the stability of governance arrangements that do not require or imply centralized enforcement and coercion (Ostrom, 1990) or that emerged outside the state system (Fukuyama 2016). Empirically, we have seen state failures around the world, such as the poor provisions of basic human services in developed and developing economies, the emergence of terrorist organizations, environmental damage, and robust markets in prohibited goods, namely trafficking in drugs and people.

Despite continued interest, we still know relatively little about informal governance. What are the types of informal governance? When do patterns of informal governance emerge? What are general welfare and distributional consequences of informal governance? Does informal governance substitute, complement or compete against the functions performed by formal institutions? Can informal governance be democratic, encompassing, and fair? Methodologically, what are the measurement issues that have stagnated the progress of research on informal governance?

To shed more light on some of these questions, we asked three authors of award-winning books on informal governance to contribute to the current issue: **David Skarbek** (Brown University, winner of 2016 William Riker Book Award), **Melani Cammett** (Harvard University, winner of 2015 Giovanni Sartori Book Award) and **Stanislav Markus** (University of South Carolina, winner of 2016 Stein Rokkan Book Prize).

All three essays point to state failures in providing public or club goods as a pre-condition for the emergence of informal governance— resource-strapped state (Skarbek), patronage state (Cammett), and predatory state (Markus). Informal governance emerges to substitute (Skarbek), compete (Cammett), and constrain (Markus) governments. Skarbek sees informal governance in prisons, organized by Prison Gangs, as a solution to the resource-strapped state. He argues that the increases in the size and diversity of prison populations led to a declining role of reputation and decentralized sanctions in securing an order in prisons, and gave rise to highly-hierarchical and explicitly codified Prison Gangs, who enforce rules and provide safety and order in otherwise chaotic prison environment. Cammett, by contrast, deals with patronage states in the Middle East, where public and religious providers of public health services are captured by patronage networks. She argues that secular groups deliver health services in Lebanon that are of higher quality than the services offered by the public sector and religious groups, because secular groups attract staff members that are not incentivized to engage in patronage exchanges. Markus' analytical focus is on Eastern European business elites defending property rights from threatening states. He argues that informal governance can emerge to constrain predatory state agents (i.e., bureaucrats who try to confiscate assets for personal profits). We hope that you find these contributions as insightful and exciting as we did.

The winner of our “Worth a Thousand Words” is Pavithra Suryanarayan. Please keep sending nominations (self or other) to political.economist@ucsd.edu on data or theory visualization published in peer-reviewed outlets (a journal or book) that displays a relationship you believe section members will find particularly interesting and important.

John Ahlquist
jahlquist@ucsd.edu

Megumi Naoi
mnaoi@ucsd.edu

Christina Schneider
cjschneider@ucsd.edu

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FEATURE ESSAY

Varieties of Prison Social Order: Extra-legal Governance Behind Bars

David Skarbek, Brown University

How do communities devise and maintain institutions that facilitate peaceful, social cooperation? The state often provides these crucial functions, but that is not always the case. Nearly half of the world's countries fail to provide the basic institutions of governance (Leeson and Williamson 2009). About half of the world's workers are in the informal economy and cannot rely on government regulation (Neuwirth 2011, 27). At a global level, commerce and conflict between countries cannot rely on the decisions of a higher-level, third party to resolve disputes. Nevertheless, there is a high volume of economic and social activity taking place in these arenas. In the absence of credible and effective government, people often find alternative ways to govern themselves.

Prison, despite the common impression that they are places where the state surveils and controls nearly everything, are actually inundated with pockets of state absence. One common reason for this is that officials will not govern the underground economy for drugs, alcohol, and sex. Another reason is that there are simply too few staff members and too many prisoners to watch. The result is that much of life behind bars is self-governed by the prisoners.

Prison is a useful context to study the general question of the emergence of institutions of social order. Prisoners tend to be less cooperative, less patient, and more violent than the average population outside of prison. This is a tough case for self-governance institutions to emerge. Second, prisoners typically live in poverty. They cannot rely on significant financial resources to solve the problem of order. Third, prisoners have no exit options to flee bad actors or to discourage opportunism. Given each of these characteristics, one might assume that self-governance would fail, but my work finds that extralegal governance in prison is often quite robust.

Governance in prison takes several forms. Formal, government institutions often play an important role. Officials provide governance through staff members, rules and regulations, and a bureaucracy. However, prisoners can also create extralegal governance institutions that they organize and operate. Extralegal governance can be highly decentralized and informal, as in the case when gossip, shaming, and ostracism regulate social interactions. It can also be highly centralized and formalized, as it is with prison gangs. Prison gangs are prison-based groups with a corporate entity, that exist into perpetuity, and whose membership is restrictive, mutually-exclusive, and permanent. Prison gangs are extralegal groups, but they often have highly organized and formalized internal structures, such as written constitutions, detailed hierarchies, and their own bureaucratic procedures.

Empirically, there is substantial variation in how these different types of official governance and extralegal governance institutions manifest within prisons historically and across countries. For example, in some places, highly organized and racially-segregated prison gangs are a dominant influence on the prisoner society. In other prisons, they do not exist. In some facilities, prisoners have a substantial influence on the everyday life of their peers, and in others, very little. My research on prison social order argues that the scope and organization of extralegal institutions vary depending on (1) the quality of official governance, administrative effectiveness, and the resources provided by prison officials and (2) on the size and diversity of the prisoner community (Skarbek 2014; Skarbek 2016). The former explains whether prisoners require extralegal governance and the latter explains what form extralegal governance will take.

When officials govern prisons well, they are characterized by order and safety, suitable amenities (such as good food and clean cells), and services (such as educational opportunities and vocational training) (DiIulio 1987, 11-12). In prisons where officials provide these in abundance, prisoners have few reasons to duplicate these services. However, when officials fail to govern, prisoners often do. They do so because ungoverned prisons are chaotic, dangerous places, and prisoners can make themselves safer and more comfortable if they can overcome the collective action problem of producing social order.

Consider, for example, life in many Latin American prisons. It is common for facilities to be both overcrowded by prisoners and understaffed by poorly trained officers. These prisons are often in disrepair, with few amenities, unhygienic and dangerous living conditions, and mired in poverty. In the face of this state failure, prisoner efforts often play a significant role in the administration of the facility. Criminologist Sacha Darke (2013a; 2013b; 2014) documents the extensive role that prisoners play in organizing their own confinement. Not only do they carry out simple tasks like cleaning and repairing the facility and distributing meals, but they are also in charge of crucial security duties, including conducting searches for contraband, searching visitors, and completing the evening prisoner count. Prisoners rely on democratic elections to choose these prisoner leaders. In one Bolivian prison, there are no officials present within the prison. Instead, residents buy their own cells from each other, create democratic committees of governance, and participate in a thriving *laissez-faire* economy behind prison walls.

By contrast, the extralegal influence of prisons is extremely limited in facilities that provide significant material resources, are run by a high number of well-trained staff, and who have a credible and effective role in governing prison life. This is true of many prisons across Western Europe, and it is certainly true in the more extreme examples found in the Nordic countries (Pratt 2008). Scandinavian prisons are not overcrowded and usually have more staff than prisoners. While prisoners still complain about amenities, such as food (Ugelvik 2014, 134-7), they have access to far more material resources than prisoners in Latin America, including safe and clean living conditions and access to substantial educational, recreational, and vocational programs. Given the high-quality of state-provided

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governance, prisoners have few reasons for creating extensive or elaborate extralegal institutions of governance.

While the *scope* of extralegal governance varies, so also does the *organization* of extralegal institutions. When prison populations are small, prisoners rely on decentralized mechanisms to facilitate order. When one's social status is known by others, the threat of gossip, shaming, ostracism, and disorganized violence is sufficient to promote compliance with prisoner norms. However, when populations grow too large, it is too costly for prisoners to know most people. The result is that reputation effects carry little influence and prisoners act opportunistically. With the failure of decentralized mechanisms, prisoners turn to more deliberate and organized extralegal institutions, such as prison gangs.

The history of the California prison system provides a useful test of this claim. Prison gangs are currently a dominant influence on the everyday life of prisoners, but they have not always existed. From the prison system's founding in 1851 through 1956, there were no prison gangs. Prior to gang emergence in the late 1950s, the total size of the prison population and the typical size of prisons were sufficiently small to allow decentralized governance by norms to work well. A set of norms emerged within the prisoner population that they called the "Convict Code." To the prisoners, it outlined what constituted good behavior, including prohibiting theft, dishonesty, betrayal, and failure to repay debts. A prisoner who followed the Code would have a respected reputation and be in good standing with his peers. Being a "stand-up convict" offered safety through mutual support. A prisoner who violated the Convict Code had low status, and he would be isolated, unprotected, and often subject to violence. This extralegal governance regime was decentralized. It lacked clear leaders, written rules or protocols, and a person or group given responsibility to monitor for and punish deviations from the norms.

While this decentralized regime worked well, in the late 1950s and 1960s, the Code began to fail because of demographic changes (Irwin 1980; Skarbek 2014). The state prison population increased eight-fold between 1920 and 1970. By the late 2000s, California incarcerated more than 170,000 prisoners. Prison size also increased, growing from an average of 1,500 prisoners per prison in 1920 to more than 5,000 in the 2000s.

Larger populations undermined the ability for decentralized governance to work because people's reputations were too costly to learn and ostracism was ineffective. As a result, the late 1950s and 1960s saw increases in violence and rioting. Based on first-hand accounts of prisoners and prison staff at that time, the increasing levels of instability led prisoners to create the first prison gangs – groups like the Aryan Brotherhood and the Mexican Mafia – which served as sources of protection in a deadly environment.

Prison gangs are extralegal – yet centralized – sources of governance. They rely on written rules to inform new prisoners about what behavior is acceptable. Their internal organization is often based on written constitutions and by-laws, which detail systems of checks and balances, complaints procedures, impeachment procedures, and elections (Skarbek 2010). Many gangs issue questionnaires to new prisoners to learn their identity, criminal past, and how they can best serve the gang. Gangs maintain lists of prisoners who have violated gang rules in the past and deserve punishment. These procedures provide effective methods for collecting information and enforcing rules in large communities of strangers.

A key difference with the Convict Code era is that now the reputation of the group matters more than the individual's reputation. Gangs operate as a community responsibility system where each member of the gang is responsible for all of the other gang members' actions and obligations. For example, the gang is responsible for drug debts incurred by one of its members. The burden of monitoring prisoners' actions falls on those who can do so at lowest cost: one's fellow gang members. This system of gang-based governance facilitates social and economic interaction between groups.

The crucial role of the size of the prisoner community also seems to explain well variation elsewhere. First, it helps explain why the states with the biggest prison populations, California and Texas, have the most entrenched prison gang activity, while gangs are nonexistent or of less importance in states with smaller populations, such as Alabama or Vermont. Second, it seems to explain some of the variation across countries. For example, there are no prison gangs in England like those that exist in California (Phillips 2012). Instead, prisoners rely on decentralized governance mechanisms that resemble the Convict Code. The reason for this is that prisons in England and Wales are far smaller than in California. In 2015, the typical population per prison in England is only about 700 prisoners, compared to about 3,500 in California. In smaller communities, decentralized governance can be implemented at low-cost and is effective. In larger communities, these mechanisms fail, so prisoners invest in more centralized, and more costly, extralegal institutions to create order.

By identifying the importance of extralegal governance institutions, this work offers several broader lessons. First, for scholars studying prison, it offers a theoretical framework that is sufficiently analytical to explain temporal and spatial variation, rather than describing prisoner society at a single point in time. For scholars of mafias, it offers a new way of conceptualizing the subject. It changes the focus from the "business of organized crime" that emphasizes a firm-like structure and profit motive to a focus on collective action problems in producing local public goods. The resulting emphasis is then on the problem of governance and politics within and between cooperatives.

Finally, the study of prison social order contributes to three empirical debates. First, it supports North's hypothesis that growing populations are one of the causes of state formation and the centralization of political institutions (North 1987). Second, it provides

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an explanation for the historical and contemporary importance of clan-based societies. Like prison gangs, clans rely on community responsibility systems when living in large populations that cannot rely on strong, effective governments. They, too, wield tremendous in-group pressure – manifesting in part through restrictions of women’s liberties and honor killings – because the reputation of the group is considered more important than the individual. Third, it offers evidence on the effectiveness and robustness of self-governance. Many of the empirical cases focus on the rich and elite in life and business (Greif 1993; Ellickson 1991; Stringham 2015; Richman 2017). By contrast, prisoners are less cooperative, less trusting, and more dangerous. Nevertheless, in both decentralized and centralized forms, extralegal governance institutions are successful in promoting social order and economic activity.

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FEATURE ESSAY

"Informal Governance and Social Welfare"

Melani Cammett, Harvard University

Informal governance by public, private and non-state actors alike has an important impact on the delivery of social services and, hence, the well-being of populations (see, inter alia, Baldwin 2015, Boone 2014, MacLean 2010, Paller 2014, Singh 2015, Tsai 2007). By informal governance, I mean the ways in which uncodified rules, norms and shared expectations shape the formulation and implementation of decisions around the distribution and management of resources in a given community – or, put differently, the ways in which informal institutions affect governance (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). Formal institutions have important effects on the design of welfare regimes and social service delivery in the developing world (Huber and Stephens 2001). But a growing body of research on government performance and the quality of service delivery suggest that differences in the local contexts (Kosack and Fung 2014, Pritchett and Sandefur 2013), including distinct patterns of informal governance and community social ties (Lust 2016), mediate the effects of policies and interventions on social and economic outcomes.

My own work focuses on how sociopolitical factors, including manifestations of informal governance, affect access to social welfare. In some work, I focus on who or which categories of citizens receive services and which types of services they receive by non-state providers (NSPs). My focus here on NSPs, however, should not imply that informal governance solely pertains to the realm of non-state actors. To the contrary, informal practices such as clientelism or networks of social ties can equally if not more profoundly affect the design and implementation of state programs and policies. My more recent work expands the concept of access to include the quality of service delivery by public and non-state actors because services that are of low quality effectively limit or cut off access (Cammett and MacLean 2014, McGuire 2010). For practical purposes, when providers fail to come to work, teachers or medical professionals do not exert effort or lack proper training, or infrastructure and supplies are deficient, people cannot access services, even if social rights are officially guaranteed.

In *Compassionate Communalism: Welfare and Sectarianism in Lebanon* (Cammett 2014), I focus on how informal governance shapes which categories of citizens gain access to social services and the extent and stream of services they receive. In Lebanon, public welfare delivery is limited and non-state actors, especially sectarian political parties and religious charities, are big actors in the welfare regime. Although virtually all of these groups officially state that eligibility criteria for their services are nondiscriminatory, in reality informal norms and practices shape who gets preferential or more continuous care. In the book, I probe the conditions under which sectarian parties reach out beyond their own communities to serve out-group members and why some providers largely target hard-core supporters, whereas others offer services more inclusively to marginal supporters or even non-supporters.

I argue that two primary factors shape these outcomes. First, in-group competition for political representation of the community in Lebanon's power-sharing system incentivizes parties to favor in-group members in order to prove their chops as the greatest protector of the in-group's interests. Second, the type of political strategy adopted by the sectarian party affects whether it disburses benefits in an inclusive or exclusive manner. In some contexts, sectarian parties opt for a "state-centric" strategy, in which they prioritize participation in the formal institutions of the state, including electoral contests. Under other conditions, however, sectarian groups favor an "extra-state" strategy, in which they work outside formal state institutions and challenge state authority, often through militancy. Sectarian organizations that adopt a state-centric strategy are more likely to cultivate linkages with out-group members and to target in-group members beyond core activists. Those that opt for a militant, extra-state strategy are more likely to funnel benefits to the most committed supporters, who tend to be in-group members.

Multiple data sources and analytical approaches are essential for this research because it is notoriously difficult to obtain reliable information on how political organizations allocate discretionary goods. The combination of qualitative data, including archival documents and in-depth interviews with elites and non-elites, and quantitative data from a national survey and spatial analysis provides multiple perspectives on provider behavior. This data yields varied points of access to the provider-beneficiary relationship and assesses the degree to which patterns of organizational behavior operate systematically and are representative of national trends. To be sure, the non-codified norms and practices I highlight are in part shaped by formal institutions. For example, the consociational system in Lebanon stipulates that top government positions as well as electoral seats at the district level are allocated by sect. Based on winner-takes-all rules, successful candidates receive the plurality or majority of votes for seats allocated to their sects. As a result, the main axes of competition occur within rather than across sects, spurring parties to become the dominant representatives of their respective communities. These incentives generated by formal political institutions partially shape informal norms and practices of doling out welfare goods.

In the book, I do not examine in great depth the actual nature of services delivered in welfare institutions. Several of my new projects take up this question by focusing on the ways in which aspects of informal governance affect the quality of service provision. In collaborative research with Ellen Lust and Carmel Salhi, I aim to test more systematically how these local patterns of governance affect the quality of primary health care in public health centers in Tunisia. The bulk of research on community participation and service delivery focuses on grassroots citizen engagement. The general logic holds that bottom-up participation creates material and

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non-material incentives, eliciting greater provider effort and greater awareness of ways to improve social outcomes (Björkman and Svensson 2009, Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer 2015, Haley and Fessler 2005, Panagopoulos 2014, Gerber, Green, and Larimer 2008, inter alia). In part, we aim to extend this research by disentangling what precise bottom-up mechanisms of community engagement, if any, affect service delivery. Based on insights from fieldwork on high-performing service providers in Jordan and Morocco, we also plan to introduce an alternative, and heretofore largely untested, approach to community engagement focused on elite stakeholders. Elites play a central role in their communities, whether negative or positive, by serving as brokers for citizen access to public and private resources, distributing patronage, facilitating access to economic or other opportunities, commanding the respect of citizens, and serving as a focal point for claim-making, among other functions. During interviews with the directors of public health facilities in Morocco, several indicated that they work with local religious leaders, female religious guides (*murshidat*) and women who work in public baths (*hammams*) to disseminate health-related information to the community and encourage the uptake of health-promoting behavior (Belkâab and Cammett 2014). In Jordan, tribal sheikhs and local imams play an important outreach role by encouraging tribesmen to receive checkups and diagnostic tests and to comply with medical advice (Rabie et al. 2014). These findings inspired a second intervention in our study, which entails the establishment of elite boards within health centers aimed at assessing the ways in which elite connections to their communities shape the delivery of services and health outcomes.

The dynamics of informal governance in social provision are distinct in contexts with politicized ethnic or religious cleavages, and further vary depending on whether providers are public or run separate, non-state welfare programs. Studying the quality of service provision in such contexts raises new questions for the research program on diversity and development (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999, Easterly and Levine 1997, Habyarimana et al. 2009, Miguel and Gugerty 2005, Singh and vom Hau 2016, Tsai 2007). Do ethnic or religious groups exhibit a “welfare advantage,” or a demonstrated superiority in the quality of social services, over others in serving in-group communities? How, if at all, do individual and community-level social and political identities affect the quality of and access to social services supplied by different types of providers? What are the implications of non-state provision for well-being in the communities where diverse ethnic and religious providers operate?

In an initial cut at some of these questions, I focus on the ways in which the political context intersects with the missions of different types of providers to influence the quality of service delivery (Cammett and Şaşmaz 2017). Based on an initial study of primary health care in Greater Beirut, Lebanon, my co-author and I find that secular groups demonstrate an apparent welfare advantage over political, religious and public sector providers in both objective and subjective measures of health quality, which contradict the theoretical implications of some research on faith-based service provision (Ashraf, Bandiera, and Jack 2014, Reinikka and Svensson 2010, Summerskill and Horton 2015) and also empirical expectations, given that sectarian and religious groups operate large public patronage networks and enjoy the most extensive private resources in Lebanon. We use multidimensional measures of objective and subjective quality in order to capture both the actual nature of services delivered by distinct types of providers as well as the experience of service delivery (Donabedian 1988, Stelfox and Straus 2013, Das and Hammer 2014). For political scientists, perceptions of services should be of particular interest because people may feel indebted to institutions that provide or mediate access to services and, cognizant of these potential payoffs, state officials as well as non-state actors face incentives to deliver or claim credit for provision. Furthermore, in societies with politicized ethno-religious identities, the provision of basic services also helps to constitute a sense of group membership by establishing boundaries of inclusion and exclusion between those who do and do not benefit from social benefits and protection against risk (Cammett 2014, 2, 13-14).

Our explanation emphasizes that political context affects the quality of care through supply and demand processes. In a power-sharing system structured explicitly along religious lines, being an avowed secularist goes against dominant social and political trends and offers few if any material rewards because, unlike politically connected religious and sectarian organizations, such groups do not run patronage networks. As a result, secular organizations may attract staff members who are more inspired by intrinsic motivations, such as charitable considerations or a commitment to professionalism. Second, widespread citizen dissatisfaction with religious and sectarian organizations involved in national politics, may result in inferior evaluations of welfare programs run by these types of groups and, conversely, more favorable assessments of services provided by organizations that explicitly dissociate themselves from the corrupt political system.

A recently completed nationally representative scale-up of this project aims to advance scholarship on informal governance and the politics of service delivery by incorporating more rigorous tests of the impact of the political context on the delivery of services. In particular, we collect a more extensive set of measures and, in one instrument, we include a conjoint experiment, which is aimed at testing how intrinsic motivation as well as social and political attitudes and behavior affect doctor choices about the types of organizations where to volunteer their services (Cammett and Sasmaz 2017). This work will also contribute to studies of the ways in which intrinsic motivation and organizational mission affect service delivery (Ashraf, Bandiera, and Jack 2014, Besley and Ghatak 2005, Dal Bó, Finan, and Rossi 2013, Deserranno 2015). Finally, the project broadens social science research on diversity and development by analyzing the effects of social and political identities at the individual and community levels on the quality of social services.

As these examples from research on Middle Eastern cases suggest, informal governance affects multiple dimensions of access

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to social welfare and, ultimately, well-being. Non-state providers play a key role in welfare regimes in many developing countries, and may be less subject to accountability based on formal rules than public sector institutions. Furthermore, development research increasingly points to the ways in which informal governance modifies the effects of formal policies and programs. It is therefore all the more critical to consider the effects of informal governance on service delivery and on economic and social development.

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FEATURE ESSAY

Property, Predation, and Informal Governance*

Stanislav Markus, University of South Carolina

Conceptually, “informal governance” refers to stable sociopolitical or economic outcomes whose attainment is (1) at least partly realized by private, non-state actors (‘governance’ as opposed to ‘government’), or (2) at least partly guided by unwritten understandings or power relations (as opposed to rules codified and enforced by the state). The study of informal governance has expanded across all social sciences, from anthropology to economics, and across all levels of analysis, from regional to transnational. Such explosive growth of the research agenda is explained by serious theoretical, policy-oriented, and normative stakes. After all, informal governance profoundly affects the viability of formal institutions as well as the distribution of resources and power in society.

Successful governance implies that organizations, networks, or practices create public or club goods by constraining behavior, sharing information, or providing resources. Effective governance may require a functional state. Yet compelling studies have theorized informal governance *without* Leviathan’s backing in a vast number of domains – incl. contract enforcement, shadow banking, corporate governance, violence coordination, welfare provision, safeguarding the commons, mutual insurance, dispute resolution, etc. –, so much so that few exceptions exist in which the state is deemed an absolute *sine qua non*.

One such exception is the *security of private property rights*.¹

When it comes to modern governments, the literature echoes the pioneering works of Margaret Levi, Mancur Olson, Douglass North, and Barry Weingast: “When property rights institutions fail to constrain those who control the state, it is not possible to circumvent the ensuing problems [through informal governance]... to prevent future expropriation, because the state, with its monopoly of legitimate violence, is the ultimate arbiter...” (Acemoglu and Johnson 2005, 951).

The consensus on the impossibility of informal property rights’ protection partly derives from our *ruler-centric concept of the state as a powerful sovereign*, first vividly conceptualized in analytic narratives based on medieval Europe (Greif, 2006; North et al., 2009). Accordingly, the challenge of kleptocracies is conceptualized as one of “reining in the Prince” (Mesquita et al., 2003, 3).

The conventional diagnosis of top-down ruler-sanctioned predation generates the key prescription for sovereigns aiming to increase tax revenue and investment: institutional commitment constraining the upper executive. Overall, independent parliaments and encompassing sovereign-supported business associations are lionized as some of the most effective PR-securing commitment devices. Meanwhile, individual firms are portrayed as unable to improve PR security if the state fails to restrain itself. Faced with an unruly sovereign, firms must collude with state actors, hide, or turn to illegality. Bribes, capital flight, or the resort to mafias are the commonly discussed informal coping strategies for firms facing expropriatory states.

My book offers an alternative perspective on PR security and informal governance.² I conceptualize and empirically validate four ideal types of *state threats to private property*, and show that informal governance is a viable solution to a particularly pernicious – but understudied – threat type.

Figure 1: State Threats to Property Rights

Type of Threats	Organized	Disorganized
Type of Rights		
Income Rights	SKIMMING	SIPHONING
Ownership Rights	PRINCIPAL EXPROPRIATION	AGENT PREDATION

1 Two caveats: (1) scholars following the lead of Harold Demsetz, Elinor Ostrom, and Hernando de Soto have shown that property often becomes private in the first place via informal governance transforming communal ownership or open-access regimes; (2) we also know that private property in stateless settings can be protected informally, with examples ranging from the Kenyan rural clans to the mafias in quasi-failed states.

2 Markus, Stanislav. 2015. *Property, Predation, and Protection: Piranha Capitalism in Russia and Ukraine*. Cambridge University Press.

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State threats to private property vary along two dimensions (Figure 1). First, I differentiate between income rights and ownership rights being targeted: while threats to income streams generally do not jeopardize the continued operation of a firm (even if they reduce its profits), threats to ownership rights fundamentally restrict the ways in which the owners can manage their firm, at the extreme jeopardizing the very existence of the enterprise. Second, the degree of top-down “organization” of state threats indicates the extent to which state predation is sanctioned by the ruler (whether through explicit coordination or implicit forbearance). When state threats are disorganized, they are not subject to control by the state principal who, in this case, loses political and economic benefits of such predatory control.

The literature on property rights has focused on skimming and principal expropriation (think about Olson’s metaphor of “stationary bandit” versus “roving bandit”), while the literature on corruption has clarified the difference between skimming and siphoning (as in the seminal treatment by Shleifer and Vishny, 1993).

Agent predation – the *disorganized* state threats to *ownership* rights – is the theoretically consequential “hole” in this matrix. I argue that the most pervasive and devastating threats to PR arise less from the unchecked strength of the state ruler and more from state weakness: less from the executive center and more from the bureaucratic periphery (Markus, 2007). The most extreme manifestation of agent predation involves the so-called ‘raiding’ in which state agents fully annex a firm’s assets for private benefit. My book details the roles of specific state departments (including regulatory, taxation, and law enforcement) across the five stages of a typical raiding attack. In the 2005–11 period, *successful* raiding attacks proceeded at a *yearly* pace of more than 10,000 firms in Russia and 1,300 firms in Ukraine. Beyond raiding, agent predation can also manifest itself as financially ruinous extortion, or as interference with asset management.

The reason agent predation is more devastating than principal expropriation is twofold. On the one hand, echoing the ‘tragedy of the commons’ logic, disorganized predation is higher in the equilibrium than expropriation that is monopolized by the upper executive. On the other hand, my surveys show that the *firms themselves* display significantly higher propensity for predatory behavior when they perceive state threats as disorganized, probably because agent predation allows considerably more scope for the entry of new predators compared to principal expropriation.

Once “agent predation” is recognized as a key threat, *informal governance* emerges as a possible solution to insecure PR. On the one hand, state weakness makes it difficult for the state principal, i.e. the upper executive, to commit formally to PR security on behalf of state agents (Markus, 2016). On the other hand, a weak state can be disciplined by business actors informally more easily than a unified Leviathan. Companies can hold the state accountable through *alliances with their stakeholders*, including neighboring communities, labor, and foreign actors (such as investors, media, NGOs, governments, etc.).

Stakeholders can employ four *types of strategies* to increase the costs of attacking a firm for the state agents. First, a *financial* strategy makes the PR threat itself, or its consequences, more expensive and hence less profitable for the aggressors. For example, foreign investors as allies of the target enterprise can withdraw their investments from the region. Second, a *political* strategy decreases the power of the aggressor, i.e. her menu of feasible options: this can involve electoral pressure, public protests, or behind-the-scenes lobbying by the allies of the target firm. Third, a *framing* strategy engages the media and public relations. Given proper coverage, state agents can no longer expect that the public will remain indifferent towards agent predation. Fourth, a *physical* strategy is one of last resort: if the state agents show up at the enterprise door with a fabricated court order and a police unit in tow, the owners’ last hope are the workers physically present on the premises. These employees can form a human fence around the enterprise forcing media presence, a public discussion, or additional lawsuits, winning precious time for the firm owners and further de-legitimizing the attack.

My large-N surveys of firms support the efficacy of stakeholder alliances at PR protection (Markus, 2012). In Russia and Ukraine, firms with stakeholder alliances report significantly lower threats to their property rights, controlling for possible confounders. Regarding competing hypotheses, both survey analysis and case studies suggest that stakeholder alliances are more effective than *institutionalized commitment* by the sovereign, or firms’ investments in *connections with state actors*, at securing property against agent predation in modern developing states.

As a methodological aside, carefully worded survey instruments on informal governance in the PR sphere offer significant advantages as compared to the two main alternatives, namely *risk indices* and *behavioral proxies*. Risk indices (prepared by organizations such as Political Risk Services) are problematic because they (a) rely on the subjective opinions of relatively few experts; (b) are compiled according to a non-transparent methodology; (c) estimate the probability of ruler-coordinated expropriation ignoring the threats from unaccountable lower-level bureaucrats or private actors; and (d) do not vary at the subnational level.³ Meanwhile, behavioral proxies measure capital investments by private actors, which presumably indicate PR security. These proxies are problematic because: (a) like the risk indices, they do not differentiate between various sources of predation; (b) investment is contingent on macroeconomic, product-specific, and psychological factors unrelated to PR; and (c) self-reported behavioral proxies must relate to the specific respon-

3 In addition to these issues of concept validity, a severe problem with causal inference arises when risk indices are used to support theories of state commitment. Because the formal constraints on the executive are taken into account by experts assigning a risk rating to a country, the use of the resulting indices as an outcome variable by theorists of state commitment comes dangerously close to a tautology.

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dent and are prone to dissembling bias.

Will alliance-based informal governance facilitate the emergence of Weberian bureaucracies, or delay it by providing a second-best solution? Auspiciously, stakeholder alliances do not seem to decrease the “demand for law” by firms. When asked about the importance of independent courts, or democratic control over the government, both Russian and Ukrainian companies with alliances rate these aspects as more important than do firms without alliances. Furthermore, to attract foreign stakeholders, companies are more likely to implement stringent corporate governance standards (Markus, 2008). Overall, the mechanisms through which stakeholder alliances might be conducive to the rule of law taking hold involve (a) restraining the oligarchs; (b) institutionalizing transparency; and (c) counteracting the political apathy of small business owners.

Do the firm-based arrangements discussed here amount to more than being spatially limited and temporary solutions to the problem of PR insecurity? Yes, based on two factors. First, dynamic learning *across firms* occurs as enterprises that are more successful at defending their rights are emulated by others. As I show in the book, alliance-building is often used by firms as a *conscious strategy* to secure PR, and PR protection is no different from other business strategies that, as a rule, spread widely once shown effective. Second, learning occurs among the *state actors* too, leading to a gradual shift in the equilibrium from hostility and particularistic rent-seeking to mutually beneficial state-business arrangements featuring higher provision of public goods. The larger theoretical point is that the locus of contestation between owners and potential predators is shifting from ‘buying’ select bureaucrats to ‘buying’ *non-state groups that are relatively more encompassing* (communities, labor, etc.). In addition to being more durable, due to the incorporation of previously sidelined stakeholders, such arrangements also approximate Olson’s “by-product” theory of public goods’ provision. Overall, the islands of accountability established by firm-based alliances are not incommunicado; in striving to survive, they are learning – and expanding. As the predatory state agents take note, the primary function of stakeholder alliances shifts from conflict resolution to deterrence, from treatment to prevention. While the impact of stakeholder alliances occurs at the level of individual firms, the ramifications of this phenomenon are systemic.

Informal governance is clearly an attractive option for smaller firms which face disorganized state threats. But what about the largest companies, often owned by the so-called ‘oligarchs’ in post-communist settings?

Oligarchs are typically beyond the reach of independently acting lower-level bureaucrats; instead, they are a prime target for “sovereign expropriation,” as in the best-known case of Russia’s Yukos. Our analysis of an original dataset of 177 Ukrainian oligarchs suggests that the political power of big capital is most effective at protecting property when it is wielded *informally* (Markus and Charnysh, 2017). We track longitudinally the oligarchs’ political involvement, economic activity, and business wealth. Unlike other studies that have focused squarely on the payoffs to *formal* political office, we *compare* such payoffs to the benefits of *informal* political activity as well as *structural* power (asset mobility). We find, surprisingly, that the assumption of formal power by the oligarchs is ineffective at protecting their fortunes against shocks; instead, the informal strategies of *party support* and *media ownership* significantly protect business wealth. Informality accords the oligarchs *political adaptability* and *deniability*, crucial benefits that are lost with the formal assumption of government offices.

Non-state solutions can and do protect private property against predatory states. Property rights in weak states are secured through a process with substantial bottom-up initiative by the potential victims of PR violations, rather than a single top-down act (e.g. institutionalizing commitment) by the state executive. Overall, the exceptionalism with which the security of property rights is treated when it comes to informal governance seems no longer warranted.

The domain of PR security is but one instance highlighting the promise of deeper research on informal governance. To realize its full theoretical potential, however, this research agenda must do more to resolve its inherent empirical challenges. As most scholars realize, it is insufficient to measure the *outcomes* of informal governance. Instead, the greatest empirical challenges – but also theoretical payoffs – lie in the renewed focus on the *norms and goals* (‘mental maps’) of participants in informal governance, as well as on the consensual or adversarial *social processes* through which these mental maps are translated into governance routines. Nuanced survey instruments, process-tracing, and immersive case studies are some of the tools in need of further sharpening to advance this exciting research.

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GENERAL ANNOUNCEMENTS

SECTION AWARDS: CITATIONS

WILLIAM H. RIKER AWARD

(GIVEN FOR THE BEST BOOK ON POLITICAL ECONOMY PUBLISHED DURING THE PAST THREE CALENDAR YEARS)

We received over 50 nominations, many of which indeed are worthy of the award. The difficulty in making these calls is testimony of a discipline and a sub-field that is improving and expanding its scope at great pace, which is something to be celebrated.

Political Economy is about the rules that govern development and distribution, and we are giving an Award to honor a scholar, William Riker, that single handedly created a field (plausibly several) and led the discipline into what one could call analytical adulthood. The two books ultimately chosen by the committee honor this legacy and tradition with flying colors.

RIKER AWARD 2017:

Gary Cox: *Marketing Sovereign Promises*, Cambridge University Press (2016)

In his book, Gary Cox takes up a classical theme in Political Economy, namely the origin of effective institutions that facilitate the development of markets. It does so through an in-depth analytical study of England's economic and political institutions. Cox shows that markets and states developed jointly. This is contrary to the dominant view anchored in the North-Weingast paradigm, according to which England moved first into the industrial era because legal and political institutions prevented the state/monarch from preying on the economy.

The key lies in a particular set of institutions, *monopoly brokerage*, that give credibility to sovereign promises in exchange for subjects' revenues. These institutions develop very early on and in fragmented way across very different markets, and they become central to England's political economy when they enter Parliament – the arena in which promises are made and default punished.

This analysis allows Cox to reinterpret the importance of the Glorious Revolution and the moment in which the Parliamentarization of monopoly brokerage expand to three pillars of development: property rights, where it secures transferability of titles; taxation and public expenditure, where platforms and appropriations and their implementation are controlled by the annual budgetary reversal by MPs; and debt markets, where making debts parliamentary actually renders them credible. The Glorious Revolution consolidated and generalized a logic that had been developing since well before that time.

Ultimately, *Marketing Sovereign Promises* shows that constraining the sovereign was not simply a mechanism to deflect encroachment on private market actors but rather a reform that simultaneously built market and state capacity. This is particularly visible in Cox's insights on comparative budgetary developments: what makes executives accountable is the possibility of budgetary reversion (guaranteed by fixed-term budgeting); what makes promises manageable is the fact that executives keep the monopoly to propose. In the absence of either of these two conditions we observe lower levels of fiscal capacity (budgetary reversion is a positive predictor of capacity) or chaos (as in France's III Republic).

By reinterpreting the origin of credible commitment institutions, the book offers a major contribution on this critical case, forcing the field to reconsider well-established notions on the institutional origins of development and state capacity. The book is also exemplary in its combination of analytical rigor and parsimony and carefully crafted historical data.

Committee: Pablo Beramendi, Ernesto Calvo, and Rachel Wellhausen

HONORABLE MENTION:

Kate Baldwin: *Paradox of Traditional Chiefs in Africa*, Cambridge University Press (2016)

Baldwin's book demonstrates, in a convincing way, that even the most non-democratic institutions — hereditary institutions at the local level — can be democracy-promoting at the national level and function as a key link for development: traditional, hereditary chiefdoms are a source of institutional capacity.

The book focuses on these institutions in sub-Saharan Africa and explores in detail who these chiefs are, where their power comes from, and how they exercise influence over their communities. On this basis, it establishes as a key pillar of the argument, the distinction between *vote* and *development* brokers. On the basis of this distinction, the argument yields different expectations over electoral motivations, electoral consequences, and performance in public goods provision.

These expectations are then thoroughly tested through a clever combination of experimental, observational, and cross-national approaches, in addition to an in-depth study of Zambia. The variety of methods employed add up to be bigger than the sum of their parts.

We think this book is a huge contribution that complicates what we think of as the pros and cons of different regime types; that takes "mixed regimes" seriously; and that has substantial implications for policymakers, aid workers, and the scholarly understanding of the link between democracy and development.

This is an exceptional first book that illustrates the benefits of linking big questions to micro-questions and clever research designs, and it announces many great things to come.

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GENERAL ANNOUNCEMENTS

SECTION AWARDS: CITATIONS

MICHAEL WALLERSTEIN AWARD

(GIVEN FOR THE BEST PUBLISHED ARTICLE IN POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE PREVIOUS CALENDAR YEAR)

WALLERSTEIN AWARD 2017:

Leslie Johns and Rachel Wellhausen, “Under One Roof: Supply Chains and the Protection of Foreign Investment”

Government opportunism is a primary source of political risk for business, as expropriation and insecure property rights remain some of the most serious threats to firms doing business in the developing world. In their excellent APSR article, “Under One Roof: Supply Chains and the Protection of Foreign Investment”, Leslie Johns and Rachel Wellhausen make a compelling case that multinational corporations are able to enhance resistance to predatory behavior of the state by cultivating extensive supply chains in the host country and thus establishing a “common roof” for protection. After formally deriving conditions for such behavior, they provide a rich amount of evidence from a cross-national study of investment arbitration, a survey of U.S. multinationals in Russia, and case studies. This article makes an important and timely contribution to a wide array of political science literature on institutions, property rights protection, and economic interdependence and cooperation.

Committee: Laia Balcells (chair), Alex Kuo, and Boliang Zhi

MANCUR OLSON AWARD

(GIVEN FOR THE BEST DISSERTATION IN POLITICAL ECONOMY COMPLETED IN THE PREVIOUS TWO YEARS)

OLSON AWARD 2017:

Emily Sellars, “Essays on Emigration and Politics”

The Olson Best Dissertation award committee (Margit Tavits (chair), Yuen Yuen Ang, Charlotte Cavaille) received multiple nominations of very strong dissertations. After several rounds of deliberations, the committee unanimously decided in favor of Emily Sellars’ dissertation “Essays on Emigration and Politics.”

Emily Sellars’ three-paper dissertation explores the consequences of migration for institutional development and policy. More specifically, Sellars examines the effect of emigration on sending communities’ capacity to collectively organize. This is an important topic: migration is a significant issue in many parts of the world, making it highly relevant to better understand how out-migration affects social change in communities that stay behind.

One of the central theoretical insights of Sellars’ dissertation is that migration can act as a “pressure valve,” reducing the incentive of local authorities to be responsive to citizens. Ebbs and flows in migration can thereby facilitate or hinder social change in sending communities. To support her argument, Sellars draws on the historical and contemporary experience of Mexican emigration to the U.S.

Sellars’ first paper leverages the Great Depression as an exogenous increase in the relative cost of migrating to the US. Using a diff-in-diff design, she examines how agrarian reform proceeded before and after the recession. She concludes that land redistribution was comparatively lower in high-emigration areas, providing support for the pressure valve hypothesis.

In the second paper Sellars formally shows that an increase in emigration changes perceptions of collective efficacy among those left behind and, ultimately, makes collective action less likely.

The third paper uses micro-data to map emigration outflows onto public service provision. The literature often argues that labor migration and the remittances it provides will help improve local public services. Sellars’ data does not support this claim. Economists and pundits have called for the promotion of circular migration as a way to help sending countries develop (see Glen E. Weyl and Eric Posner, Doug Massey or Dani Rodrik). One can expect Sellars’ null findings to be scrutinized further in light of this important debate.

Sellars has used the Mexican-US case creatively and her data work is always very careful. The formal model presented in the dissertation ingeniously draws from an important class of models. Substantively, Sellars’ work speaks to contemporary debates on the political implications of emigration. These qualities make “Essays on Emigration and Politics” a worthy recipient of the 2017 Olson best dissertation prize. Congratulations Professor Sellars!

Committee: Margit Tavits (Chair), Yuen Yuen Ang, and Charlotte Cavaille

THE POLITICAL ECONOMIST

GENERAL ANNOUNCEMENTS

SECTION AWARDS: CITATIONS

FIONA MCGILLIVRAY AWARD

(GIVEN FOR THE BEST PAPER IN POLITICAL ECONOMY PRESENTED AT THE PREVIOUS YEAR'S APSA ANNUAL MEETING)

MCGILLIVRAY AWARD 2017:

Alexander Hertel Fernandez "American Employers as Political Machines"

The committee received many high quality submissions from scholars across different levels of seniority who interpret political economy in many different ways. The committee members---Monika Nalepa, Alberto Simpser and Yuhua Wang---read all the submissions carefully and in the end decided to award the Fiona McGillivray award to Alexander HERTEL-FERNANDEZ of Columbia University for 'American Employers as Political Machines.

The paper is a fascinating analysis of how employers in the US are responsible for engaging workers in the political process. It documents their use of job loss warnings as well as monitoring the behavior of employees in order to turn these employees into supporters of their preferred political candidates. Firms, in this account, essentially act no less as a political machine than unions and political parties. For someone who studies surveillance by authoritarian regimes, Alexander's findings are extremely troubling. Not only do employers attempt to mobilize voters to support politicians promising to implement employer-friendly policies, but they do this by monitoring political activities of their employees on Social media and issuing threats regarding job loss and cutting hours. Alexander demonstrates that particularly the most vulnerable employees---those in districts suffering from recession and unemployment---are most likely to respond to these threats. Alexander shows that firms are not only interested in increasing turnout, they in fact increase mobilization efforts when they track their employees voting behavior (so for those who know the clientelism literature and may have hoped that it is the milder, turnout buying form, it's not).

Alexander is also careful about overselling his contribution by stressing that he uses observational data. However, he arrives at his conclusions by analyzing two different data sources: firm level data (a survey of employers) as well as employee-level data. This as well as analysis using propensity matching increase confidence in his the causal relationship between employers efforts and resulting employee behavior.

This paper is not only an original contribution to the literature on voting behavior and American politics but also a powerful argument against classical notions of clientelism---that technology and development will make this phenomenon obsolete. As grim as its conclusions are, the insights for anyone in this room cannot be overstated.

Committee: Monika Nalepa (Chair), Alberto Simpser, Yuhua Wang.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMIST

GENERAL ANNOUNCEMENTS

CALL FOR NOMINATIONS

"WORTH A THOUSAND WORDS"

The *TPE* editors are accepting nominations for the new column, "Worth a Thousand Words." This column aims to highlight important new political economy research by reproducing (with permission) a graph or diagram from a recently published article or book that displays a particularly interesting, provocative, important, or controversial relationship of interest to our readers.

Nominations should include:

- The nominated image (only one per article or book chapter)
- A brief (<100 words) description of the image (i.e., define the axes and data points; bibliographic information for the source publication; one sentence describing its importance)
- A .pdf copy of the article. If a book then a link to the google books or Amazon site should suffice.

Some additional details:

- All nominations should be sent to political.economist@ucsd.edu. Please put the text "1000 words nomination" in the subject line.
- Nominated figures need not be from empirical work; they can reflect the results of a theoretical model or conceptual exercise.
- Self-nominations are welcome, as are nominations from section non-members.
- Nominated works must be published or accepted for publication in a peer-reviewed outlet. No working papers or dissertations.
- Please do not nominate graphics from publications more than 18 months old.
- We will review nominations on a rolling basis but publication decisions will be made every February & September, beginning February 2017.

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