Aristotle’s Biopsychosocial Model of Psychology & Conceptualization of Character: Points of Congruence with Modern Models of Psychology

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The primary objective that has been selected for this dissertation is to present the argument that Aristotle formulated a multidimensional, biopsychosocial and dynamic model of psychology and conceptualization of character that prefigured and is congruent with many aspects of contemporary models of psychology. Since ancient times, Aristotle’s work has provided an elaborate, detailed, and highly operationalized model of psychology and conceptualization of character that is in congruence with and/or conceptually related to theoretical, operationally defined and empirically researched constructs found in contemporary clinical psychology. The various constitutive elements of Aristotle’s model of psychology (e.g., sensation, perception, judgment, wish, biologically-based passions, habituated emotional responses, opinion, will, imagination, memory, recollection, and rational thought) are reviewed and explicated, and an explanation is offered as to how these constitutive elements are woven together to form his conceptualization of character.

Aristotle’s model of psychology and conceptualization of character will be pieced together from an analysis of English translations of his surviving works. This will be necessary because Aristotle’s writings on the subject matter of psychology are scattered throughout a number of his works. Selections from medieval and contemporary moral philosophy that focus on Aristotle’s work are
also utilized. Additionally, using empirical studies and theoretical works from contemporary psychology, points of congruence between Aristotle’s model of psychology and contemporary models of psychology are identified and explicated.

While there have been other works that have explored various aspects and implications of Aristotle’s model of psychology (Carson, 1996; Gelso, 1991; Green, 1998; Hillerbrand, 1988; Jääskeläinen, 1998; Linden, 2003; Loukas, 1932; Macdonald, 2004; Millon, 2004; Robinson, 1999; Saugstad, 2002; Sherman, 1989; Silverstein, 1988; Tigner & Tigner, 2000; & Waterman, 1993), there are several aspects of this dissertation that make it unique. One unique dimension is that a comprehensive overview of Aristotle’s model of psychology and conceptualization of character is systematically described. A special emphasis is placed on identifying points of congruence between Aristotle’s model of psychology and models of psychology that inform the practice of contemporary clinical psychology. Illustrating these points of congruence will contribute to making Aristotle’s model of psychology more accessible to students and practitioners of clinical psychology.

Aristotle prefigured several concepts found in contemporary psychology (e.g., clinical psychology, evolutionary psychology, social learning theory). For example, in his model of psychology, Aristotle indicated that nature had endowed
animals with innate/unlearned instinctual responses that function in a teleological manner to secure the ends of either survival or reproduction. This is a significant point of congruence with evolutionary psychology which also posits that instincts are teleological in nature and have the ends of either survival or reproduction (Bereczkei, 2000; Cosmides & Tooby, 1999; Cosmides, Lieberman and Tooby, 2003; Siegert & Ward, 2002). Additionally, throughout both the results and the discussion sections, points of congruence are identified between Aristotle’s model of psychology and biological, behavioral, and cognitive models found in modern clinical psychology. For example, Aristotle’s model of psychology posits that some pain and pleasure reactions and consequent behaviors are innate, while others are learned through habituation or elicited through the operations of the intellect. Both the results and the discussion section will also identify Aristotle’s prefigurement of aspects of developmental psychology, social psychology, and the work of Alfred Adler.

Aristotle’s conceptualization of character encompasses both ends of the characterological continuum; that is, he described strengths and virtues as well as weaknesses and vices. By describing characterological strengths, virtues, weaknesses and vices, Aristotle developed a model of psychology that includes a conceptualization of both characterological health and characterological illness.
The relevance of these issues to clinical psychology, particularly in regard to characterological disorders, is explored.

Clinical psychology has a long and fruitful history of turning to classical and modern philosophy for insight and inspiration. In fact, philosophy has profoundly influenced both the theory and the practice of psychology and psychotherapy. Phenomenological, Existential, and Constructivist perspectives have all originated in philosophy, and have gone on to significantly influence psychological theory, empirical research, and the practice of psychotherapy. The contributions of a particular school of philosophy to a particular theory and therapeutic approach within clinical psychology has been, at times, so significant that the names of several psychological theories and therapies refer back to the philosophical origins of the particular theory and therapy (e.g., Existential and Humanistic psychology and psychotherapy).

The ongoing dialogue between philosophy and psychology is facilitated by the existence of several associations and journals. The Association for the Advancement of Philosophy and Psychiatry (AAPP), the Royal College of Psychiatrists Philosophy Group (U.K.), and the Royal Institute of Philosophy (U.K.) are all affiliated with the publication of the journal *Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology*. Additionally, the journal *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*
provides a forum to continue the fruitful dialog between philosophy and the social sciences.

Classical philosophy, in particular, has had a profound impact on both the theory and the practice of clinical psychology. Aaron Beck (1979) acknowledged the debt to both classical Western philosophy and Eastern philosophies when he wrote:

The philosophical origins of cognitive therapy can be traced back to Stoic philosophers, particularly Zeno of Citium (fourth century B.C.), Chrysippus, Cicero, Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius. Epictetus wrote in The Enchiridion: “Men are disturbed not by things but by the views which they take of them.” Like Stoicism, Eastern philosophies such as Taoism and Buddhism have emphasized that human emotions are based on ideas. Control of most intense feelings may be achieved by changing one’s ideas. (p. 8)

Albert Ellis (1975) described how both his theory and his practice of clinical psychology have been shaped or inspired by philosophy when he wrote:

For our purpose continues: to take the best wisdom about “human nature” from the past and present—and particularly from somewhat neglected philosophic writings of Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, John Dewey, and Bertrand Russell—and to make it widely available, with suitable revisions and additions, to present day troubled people. (p. ix)

It is in line with this multidisciplinary tradition that within the current project the works of Aristotle are examined to illustrate the congruence that exists between his work and various perspectives within the field of psychology.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

There were four distinct component areas which were compiled for the literature review and they are presented in this chapter. The first component area included reading selected English translations of Aristotle’s surviving works. The second component included the works of the medieval philosopher, theologian, and noted Aristotelian scholar Thomas Aquinas. For the third component area a framework was designed to guide a review of selected readings from contemporary philosophy on the topics of Aristotle’s philosophy, psychology, and conceptualization of character. The fourth component area was developed from the use of several databases (i.e., PsycINFO, PsycARTICLES, FirstSearch and EBSCO) to identify theoretical and empirical articles from the discipline of psychology that are related to the topic of the investigation.

The works of Aristotle have been the focus of intense scholarly activity for over twenty-four hundred years, and these works continue to be regularly assigned readings for undergraduates and high school students. Regarding the quantity of written work that has been produced concerning Aristotle’s works Barnes (1995) wrote:

Aristotle’s writings have been subjected, ever since antiquity, to profound and continuous critical attention. Learned articles and learned books, scholarly commentaries and popular accounts, philosophical inquiries and philosophical investigations, the products of solitary reflection and the
proceedings of conferences and colloquia and symposia—scribble, scribble, scribble, for two thousand years, and never faster than in recent decades….a bibliography on Aristotle which included only eminent items would run to several hundred pages. (p. xii)

Due the quantity of material, the present review of the literature can only include a small sampling of the available material, which is consistent with Robinson’s (1989) sentiment:

Aristotle’s contributions over the widest range of subjects are often so original and insightful that he has tended to be treated as a contemporary in every age of scholarship; to such an extent that philosophical and scientific reputations have been made over the centuries by corrections and qualifications of works composed by Aristotle a thousand or two thousand years earlier. Any attempt, therefore, to compress his wide-ranging and deeply informed Psychology into a book of manageable length and accessible to the nonspecialist is doomed at the outset. One hopes only to fail well! (p. ix)

Component Area One—Reading English Translations of Aristotle’s Works

Phase one involved reading English translations of the surviving works of Aristotle that contains elements of his model of psychology. According to Aristotle (1984), the traditional collection of Aristotle’s works (corpus aristotelicum) contained several works that were certainly or probably not written by Aristotle; consequently, individual works are categorized into one of the following three categories: (a) works thought to be written by Aristotle, (b) works with questionable authenticity, and (c) works that are almost certainly spurious. There are forty-seven works that are traditionally included in the corpus
aristotelicum, out of which, thirty-one works are considered to be authentic, 
three are considered to have serious questions regarding their authenticity, and 
thirteen are considered to be clearly spurious (Aristotle, 1984). Table 2.1 
summarizes how the works traditionally included in the *corpus aristotelicum* are 
categorized according to authenticity in Aristotle (1984).
Table 2.1
Authenticity of Books Traditionally Included in the *Corpus Aristotelicum* (Aristotle, 1984).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Considered Authentic Categories</th>
<th>Questionable Authenticity Problems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>De Interpretatione</td>
<td>Magna Moralia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior Analytics</td>
<td>Economics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posterior Analytics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sophistical Refutations</td>
<td>Considered Spurious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physics</td>
<td>On the Universe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the Heavens</td>
<td>On Breath</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Generation and Corruption</td>
<td>On Colors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meteorology</td>
<td>On Things Heard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the Soul</td>
<td>Physiognomonics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense and Sensibilia</td>
<td>On Plants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Memory</td>
<td>On Marvelous Things Heard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Sleep</td>
<td>Mechanics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Dreams</td>
<td>On Indivisible Lines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Divination in Sleep</td>
<td>The Situations and Names of Winds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Length and Shortness of Life</td>
<td>On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Youth, Old Age, Life and Death, and Respiration</td>
<td>On Virtues and Vices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of Animals</td>
<td>Rhetoric to Alexander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parts of Animals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement of Animals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progression of Animals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation of Animals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metaphysics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicomachian Ethics</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Eudemian Ethics</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rhetoric</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poetics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitution of Athens</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Following the guidelines of authenticity found in Aristotle (1984), only the works that are considered to be authentic have been used for this dissertation. Those works that are considered to be spurious or of questionable authenticity have been excluded from the reading list for the literature review and are not referenced here.

When considering English translations of Aristotle’s works, it is important to keep in mind that each of these translations differs somewhat in regard to how the Greek is translated into English; consequently, what each offers is a uniquely nuanced translation of Aristotle’s works. Revisions of translations also differ substantively in terms of translating the Greek into English. The differences between an original English translation and a later revision can be, at times, quite significant. Table 2.2 offers a side-by-side comparison of an original translation’s text (Aristotle, 1908) and the revised translation that is found in Aristotle (1984).
Table 2.2 Comparisons of Different English Translations of Aristotle’s Work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Virtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time), while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, whence also its name (ethike) is one that is formed by a slight variation from the word ethos (habit).</td>
<td>Excellence, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual excellence in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time), while moral excellence comes about as a result of habit, whence also its name is one that is formed by a slight variation from the word for 'habit'.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The selected text for this example is the opening sentence of Book II of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Note that in the revised translation the word virtue has been replaced by excellence. Using the word excellence instead of virtue is a significant departure from the traditional translations that use the term virtue. One potential problem with the change of word usage is that individuals may not make the connection between excellence and the vast quantity of literature that has been produced in several disciplines (e.g., philosophy, theology, psychology) that focuses on the topic of virtue.

It is with the above mentioned issues in mind that several English translations of Aristotle’s surviving works were used and referenced for the review of the literature. This allowed for cross-referencing of different translations or revisions of the English translations of Aristotle’s works.
It was decided that the various translations would be differentiated by the year of publication. In other words, Aristotle is identified as the source and the year refers to a specific translation or revision of a translation. Table 2.3 illustrates the citation method that was selected.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citation</th>
<th>Referenced Work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

In addition to using printed texts of Aristotle’s surviving works, a database from the InteLex Corporation was utilized that contains the full text of Aristotle (1984). The electronically searchable database made it possible to conduct a number of keyword searches of the entire text.

Table 2.4 identifies the various works of Aristotle that were read in their entirety, as well as some of the topic areas found in each of the works.
Table 2.4  Aristotle’s Works That Were Read for the Literature Review

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work</th>
<th>Topic Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Categories</td>
<td>System of logical classification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Interpretatione</td>
<td>Analyses of the elements of language and the nature of truth and falsehood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior Analytics</td>
<td>Deductive reasoning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posterior Analytics</td>
<td>Inductive reasoning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the Soul (De Anima)</td>
<td>Biopsychosocial model of psychology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense and Sensibilia</td>
<td>Sensation and perception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Memory</td>
<td>Memory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Sleep</td>
<td>Sleep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Dreams</td>
<td>Dreams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Divination in Sleep</td>
<td>Dreams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicomachean Ethics</td>
<td>Dynamics of character, virtue, vice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eudemian Ethics</td>
<td>Dynamics of character, virtue, vice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>Politics &amp; man a political animal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhetoric</td>
<td>Cognitive aspects of emotion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Component Area Two—Use of Works of Thomas Aquinas*

Thomas Aquinas is a noted medieval philosopher and theologian who made a significant contribution to the integration of Aristotle’s work into the intellectual tradition of Western Civilization. Aquinas’ respect for Aristotle is illustrated by the fact that he refers to Aristotle simply as “The Philosopher” throughout his historically significant work the *Summa Theologica* (Aquinas, 1915). The works of Thomas Aquinas were included due to their historical significance and the multidisciplinary significance of his work (e.g., the impact that Aquinas had on Scholastic theology and philosophy). Aquinas (1915) was utilized to examine
Aristotle’s model of psychology and conceptualization of character from a distinct and historically significant perspective. Aquinas (1993) was also utilized to provide insight into a Thomistic interpretation of Aristotle’s conceptualization of character, virtue and vice.

Component Area Three — Readings from Philosophy

The identification and selection of a small sample of philosophical works from contemporary writers that directly address Aristotle’s model of psychology and/or his conceptualization of character was the primary consideration for the selection of books or journal articles to be included in the reading list for the literature review.

Several books were selected that addressed issues relevant to the objectives for this dissertation. For example, McKinnon (1999) provided insight into contemporary virtue ethics. According Hursthouse (2003), “Virtue ethics is currently one of three major approaches in normative ethics. It may, initially, be identified as the one that emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach which emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or that which emphasizes the consequences of actions (consequentialism)” Annas (1993) highlighted how the goal of classical moral philosophy and modern virtue ethics is happiness, a topic that is clearly of great significance to clinical psychology as well. Sherman (1989) was selected because of its focus on the contributions of
both emotion and cognition in Aristotle’s conceptualization of the dynamics of character. Robinson (1999) was selected because of its focus on the Aristotle’s model of psychology. Kemp (1996) was selected because it examines the impact of Aristotle’s thought on medieval and modern theories of cognition.

*Component Area Four—Searches of the PsycARTICLES and PsycINFO*

*Electronic Databases*

The Online Computer Library Center’s *FirstSearch* service was used to conduct keyword searches of multiple databases to locate articles relevant to the objectives of this dissertation. Some of the keyword search results are listed in Table 2.5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Keyword</th>
<th>Database(s)</th>
<th>Limiter</th>
<th>Number of Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aristotle</td>
<td>WorldCat</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>22,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TI Aristotle</td>
<td>WorldCat</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>3,959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aristotle</td>
<td>Periodical Abstracts</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1,589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TI Aristotle</td>
<td>Periodical Abstracts</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aristotle</td>
<td>ArticleFirst</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aristotle</td>
<td>ECO</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TI Aristotle</td>
<td>ECO</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aristotle</td>
<td>WilsonSelectPlus</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TI Aristotle</td>
<td>WilsonSelectPlus</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ArticleFirst, ECO, and WilsonSelectPlus database search results were reviewed to identify articles from philosophical journals that focused on Aristotle’s works and that were relevant to the objectives of this dissertation.
Keyword searches were for the keyword “Aristotle” and various combinations (i.e., Aristotle, Aristotle’s, and Aristotelian). The initial search of PsycARTICLES and PsycINFO for the keyword “Aristotle” identified 663 citations. When the search was limited to citations with Aristotle (TI Aristotle) in the title there were 142 citations. These initial results included authored books, edited books, chapters, journal articles, peer reviewed journal articles, dissertation abstracts, reviews, and comments. The joint search of the PsyARTICLES and PsycINFO databases allowed for the duplicate results shared by both databases to be eliminated; however, to be able to further analyze the results using limiters that were database specific, additional searches were conducted with limiters specified (see Table 2.6).
An analysis of the results identified that some of the citations were not relevant to the objectives of this dissertation. The first cut to eliminate irrelevant citations was based on the citation being included in the keyword search results for obviously irrelevant reasons. For example, there was a citation that referred to a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.6</th>
<th>PsycARTICLES and PsycINFO Database Searches Conducted on 9/20/05</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Keyword</td>
<td>Database(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aristotle</td>
<td>PsycARTICLES &amp; PsycINFO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TI Aristotle</td>
<td>PsycARTICLES &amp; PsycINFO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aristotle</td>
<td>PsycINFO</td>
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<td>TI Aristotle</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aristotle</td>
<td>PsycINFO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
computer program named Aristotle as well as citations that were included due to authors being affiliated with Aristotle University of Thessaloniki.

There were several criteria that were used to select the particular articles that were included in the reading list for the literature review. There was an intentional effort to identify journal articles from within the discipline of psychology that focused on Aristotle and his model of psychology and conceptualization of character. Articles were also selected if they explicitly compared Aristotle’s work to particular approaches within the field of psychology (e.g., Jääskeläinen, 1998; Tigner & Steven, 2000). Articles were also selected if they empirically investigated one of Aristotle’s concepts (e.g., Bukowski, Nappi & Hoza, 1987).

*Aristotle’s Biographical Sketch*

Aristotle lived during a remarkable and turbulent age that witnessed the meteoric rise of the kingdom of Macedonia under King Phillip II that culminated in the conquests of Alexander the Great and the dawning of the Hellenistic Age. Aristotle was personally involved with such historical colossuses as Phillip II the King of Macedon, Alexander the Great, and Plato. The brief twinkling of history in which Aristotle lived still reverberates throughout Western Civilization.

Aristotle was born in 384 B.C. in the town of Stagira located on the Thracian peninsula of Chalcidic. Aristotle’s father, Nicomachus, was a physician of the
Macedonian King Amyntas II, the father of King Phillip II of Macedon and the grandfather of Alexander the Great. Aristotle’s mother, Phaestis, came from Chalcis. Both of Aristotle’s parents had died by the time he was ten years old. After the death of his father, Aristotle was under the guardianship of Proxenus of Atarneus, who is thought to have been either an uncle or a family friend.

At the age of 17, Aristotle was sent by Proxenus to study at Plato’s Academy in Athens. The Academy that Plato founded in 387 B.C. continued as a center of learning for over 900 years until being closed by the Roman Emperor Justinian in 428 A.D. It was here that Aristotle spent the next twenty years of his life learning and teaching. As a student, Aristotle was recognized as a great intellect and was given, by Plato, the nicknames “the learner” and “the reader.”

Aristotle left Athens after the death of Plato in 347 B.C., and went to Atameus on the coast of Asia Minor with some fellow students from the Academy. Aristotle knew Hermias, the ruler of Atameus. Aristotle married Hermias’ niece and was given land to found a school at Assos. In 345 B.C., Hermias was murdered by political opponents and it was no longer safe for Aristotle to remain at Assos. Aristotle and his family fled to the home of Theophas tus, one of his friends from the Academy, in Mytilene on the island of Lesbos. Aristotle remained on the island for approximately the next three years.
In 343 B.C., Aristotle was invited by King Phillip II of Macedonia to teach his son Alexander. Aristotle accepted the invitation and moved his family to Pella, the capital of the Macedonia. Aristotle was Alexander’s tutor for over three years. Aristotle remained in Pella for approximately eight years.

Aristotle returned to Athens in 335 B.C., and founded his own school, the Lyceum. The Lyceum became a significant center of learning that would continue in existence for over seven hundred years. Aristotle would remain in Athens for the next twelve years and many of his important works are considered to have been written during this period.

When Alexander the Great died in 323 B.C., there was a backlash against the Macedonian hegemony that Phillip II had established and that Alexander had reestablished and consolidated. Aristotle’s relationship with Phillip II and Alexander made the change of political climate quite problematic for Aristotle. Like Socrates before him, Aristotle was charged with impiety. Knowing the fate that befell Socrates, Aristotle left Athens and went to Chalcis where he had an estate. Aristotle was sixty-two years old when he died at his estate in Chalcis in November of 322 B.C.

The above mentioned biographical material was gathered from a variety of sources (e.g., Barnes, 1995; Robinson, 1999) and represents generally agreed upon biographical information. A significant ancient source of Aristotle’s
biographical information can be found in Laertius’ work *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* (Laertius, 1925).
Chapter 3: Methodology

There are four major methodological dimensions to this dissertation that are described in this method section. These four methodological dimensions correspond to the four components that are found in the literature review. The first involved the reading of English translations of the surviving works of Aristotle that are considered authentic. The second involved the use of the works of the noted medieval philosopher and theologian, Thomas Aquinas. The third involved the use of contemporary works from moral philosophy to contribute to the illustration of various aspects of Aristotle’s model of psychology and conceptualization of character. The fourth involved the use of works from contemporary psychology to illustrate points of congruence that exist between Aristotle’s model of psychology and conceptualization of character and contemporary models. The content or results of these four methodological dimensions will be presented in the body of the results section. What is contained in the following paragraphs of the method section is a description and overview of these four methodological dimensions.

Methodology Dimension One: Use of English Translations of the Works of Aristotle

It was decided that English translations of the works of Aristotle would be used as primary source material in order to ensure that this dissertation represents
an accurate description of what Aristotle actually wrote regarding his model of psychology and conceptualization of character. The use of English translations of Aristotle’s work presented several significant issues that required the following methodological considerations.

Each translation of Aristotle’s work is uniquely nuanced due to the variation of the Greek-to-English word selection. In order to avoid the limitations of using only one translation, the writer made a conscious and methodical effort to utilize several English translations of Aristotle’s work and frequently examined particular citations side-by-side to take into consideration the various nuances that the different translations contained. There are also significant differences between an original translation and later revisions. These differences can also be quite profound. These differences are often quite significant and will be explored in further detain in the results section.

The author made a conscientious effort to utilize English translations of the actual works of Aristotle to avoid the distortions that may intrude into secondary source materials. One of the distortions that the author was aware of and made a point of avoiding was what Rorty (1997) referred to as the read-and-raid approach to the works of Aristotle, “The read-and-raid school of interpretation often constructs intriguing ‘Aristotelian’ positions that Aristotle himself did not
There are numerous works of Aristotle that contain material that illustrate his model of psychology and conceptualization of character; therefore, it was decided that a broad selection of Aristotle’s work should be read and studied in their entirety. Reading a broad selection of Aristotle’s work is significant for a variety of reasons. One reason is that Aristotle’s work is part of an organic collection of writings that represents his unique philosophical system. Having a broad-based understanding of Aristotle’s work is an important aspect of having a scholarly approach to his work and to identifying his model of psychology and conceptualization of character.

The writer purchased a software program from the InteLex Corporation that contains the full text of The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation (1984). The software includes a searchable database of the complete text and made it possible to conduct a number of keyword searches of the entire text. Keyword searches allowed the writer to identify how many times a keyword appeared in the The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation (Aristotle, 1984), as well as allowing rapid access to each appearance of the keyword in the actual body of the text. These keyword searches also allowed for the identification of similar keyword search terms. The software also allowed for
rapid comparisons of various translations, which was very helpful considering that *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation* (Aristotle, 1984) is a two-volume set containing 2,487 pages.

Several criteria were utilized to select the specific works of Aristotle that would be selected for more in-depth analysis and consideration. The first inclusion/exclusion criterion was that this dissertation would only use the works that are considered to have been actually written by Aristotle (see table 2.1). Another criterion utilized was determining the relevance of the material included in a particular work. For example, the titles of some of the works clearly illustrate that the work contains relevant material (i.e., On the Soul, Sense and Sensibilia, On Memory, On Sleep, & On Dreams, On Length and Shortness of Life, On Youth, Old Age, Life and Death, and Respiration).

The relevance of some of the works that were selected was not as obvious and required some degree of familiarity with either the work or the topic. For example, Eudemian Ethics and Nicomachean Ethics are works of moral philosophy, and as such they deal explicitly with human nature. These two ethical works represent a form of moral philosophy called virtue ethics, which focuses on the interaction of character, experience and behavior. Rhetoric was selected because in the process of describing how to use rhetoric to influence the emotion of the listener Aristotle illustrates his understanding of the role of
cognition in the production of emotion. Prior Analytics was selected because it is Aristotle’s work that provides an analysis of deductive reasoning, and Posterior Analytics was selected because it is his analysis of inductive reasoning.

It was important to read a broad selection of Aristotle’s works in order to appreciate several significant aspects of his thinking regarding human nature. For example, it was decided to include Aristotle’s Politics because it was in this work that Aristotle made several seminal observations regarding the significance of the social dimension of human experience. For example, in Book I of Politics Aristotle wrote, “…it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal” (Aristotle, 1984, p. 1987).

Several works were selected because they represent different aspects of Aristotle’s analysis of animals (i.e., History of Animals, Parts of Animals, Movement of Animals, Progression of Animals, Generation of Animals). These works were considered important in understanding Aristotle’s model of psychology because Aristotle taught that man belongs to the genus animal, “the individual man belongs in a species, man, and animal is a genus of the species…” (Aristotle, 1984, p. 4).

Other works were selected because they are considered to be foundational elements of Aristotle’s thought and provide valuable insights into his methodology. For example, Categories was selected because it contained
Aristotle’s basic classification system which is a foundational element of his methodology. Metaphysics and On Interpretation were also selected because they are considered foundational elements of Aristotle’s work. Table 3.1 identifies the works and corresponding topic areas that were selected to be read and utilized.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.1</th>
<th>Aristotle’s Works and Related Topic Areas That Were Selected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aristotle’s Work</td>
<td>Topic Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Categories</td>
<td>Contains essential material related to Aristotle’s method or system of logical classification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Interpretatione</td>
<td>Provides analyses of the elements of language and the nature of truth and falsehood as it is interpreted by the individuals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior Analytics</td>
<td>Focuses on <em>deductive reasoning</em> and provided a detailed description of the phenomenology of deductive reasoning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posterior Analytics</td>
<td>Focuses on <em>inductive reasoning</em> and provides a detailed description of the processes and dynamics of inductive reasoning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the Soul (De Anima)</td>
<td>Contains Aristotle’s biopsychosocial model of psychology that provides the foundation for his understanding of emotion &amp; behavior and overall human phenomenology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense and Sensibilia</td>
<td>Provides Aristotle’s model of sensation and perception.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Memory</td>
<td>Examination of role and dynamics of memory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Sleep</td>
<td>Sleep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Dreams</td>
<td>Dreams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Divination in Sleep</td>
<td>Dreams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicomachean Ethics</td>
<td>Aristotle’s description of the dynamics of character, virtue, vice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eudemian Ethics</td>
<td>Dynamics of character, virtue, vice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>Aristotle work on politics that identifies man a political animal and the state as being created by nature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhetoric</td>
<td>In providing instruction on rhetoric Aristotle identifies the cognitive aspects of emotion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Length and Shortness of Life</td>
<td>On the length and shortness of life.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Youth, Old Age, Life and Death, and Respiration</td>
<td>Aristotle’s lifespan analysis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Methodology *Dimension Two: Works of Thomas Aquinas*

The writer decided to utilize the works of Thomas Aquinas due to the historical significance and the multidisciplinary nature of his work (e.g., the impact that Aquinas had on both theology and philosophy). Aquinas and his mentor Albert Magnus played an important role in the integration of Aristotle’s thought into the intellectual tradition of Western Civilization. Aquinas’ work provides significant insight into how Aristotle’s model of psychology and conceptualization of character was integrated into the Catholic theological and philosophical tradition in a manner that offered a complex and surprisingly modern model of psychology and conceptualization of character. Aquinas’ work has had and continues to have a profound influence on Catholic theology and philosophy.

The writer utilized Aquinas’ *Summa Theologica* to examine Aristotle’s model of psychology and conceptualization of character from a distinctly Thomistic perspective. Aquinas (1993) was also utilized to provide insight into a Thomistic interpretation of Aristotle’s conceptualization of character, virtue and vice.

Aquinas integrated the works of Aristotle with the works of other classical philosophers, as well as the works of several eminent Christian theologians. In Aquinas’ profoundly influential work the Summa Theologica he referred to Aristotle simply as “The Philosopher.” The works of Thomas Aquinas are
utilized to illustrate how extensive and profound an influence Aristotle had on Catholic philosophical and theological conceptualizations of character and human nature.

In the results section, the author utilizes the works of Aquinas to develop flowcharts for several of the virtues and vices that Aristotle wrote about to provide an illustration of a distinctly Thomistic extension and integration of Aristotle’s thought. Aquinas’ integration of Aristotle’s conceptualization of virtue offers insight into the profound influence that Aristotle’s model of psychology and conceptualization of character have had on Catholic philosophy and theology. Aristotle’s model of psychology and conceptualization of character impacted the intellectual life of Western Civilization both through Aristotle’s works directly and through the philosophical and theological works of Thomas Aquinas.

Methodology Dimension Three: Works from Contemporary Moral Philosophy

Several works from contemporary moral philosophy were included in the literature review and are cited in the results section to contribute to the illustration of Aristotle’s model of psychology and conceptualization of character. Some of these selections were made as the result of keyword searches of various databases, while others were selected because the author is considered to be a recognized expert on various aspects of Aristotle’s work. It should be noted that the active
study of Aristotle’s works has been going on for over two thousand years and is showing no signs of abating.

One of the inclusion/exclusion criteria was that the topic matter of selected books and articles be relevant to the focus of this dissertation. Several books, written from the perspective of modern moral philosophy, were selected on the basis of their being directly related to Aristotle’s model of psychology and conceptualization of character. For example, books such as *Character, Virtue Theories, and the Vices* by Christine McKinnon (1999), Julia Annas’ (1993) book *The Morality of Happiness*, Nancy Sherman’s (1989) book *The Fabric of Character: Aristotle’s Theory of Virtue*, Daniel Robinson’s (1999) book *Aristotle’s Psychology*, and Simon Kemp’s (1996) book, *Cognitive psychology in the middle ages* were selected because the manifest content of each of these books is directly related to Aristotle’s model of psychology and conceptualization of character.

The Online Computer Library Center’s FirstSearch collection of electronic databases was used to conduct keyword searches of multiple databases to locate articles written from the perspective of contemporary moral philosophy and that were relevant to the objectives of this dissertation. Keyword searches were done using keywords such as Aristotle, character, virtue, and vice. The details of the
keyword searches and their results are described in the literature review and results sections.

Methodology Dimension Four: Identifying Empirical and Theoretical Correlates from Psychology

There are several facets to the way in which selected empirical and theoretical works from contemporary psychology were utilized in this dissertation. One method involved the identification of constructs that have been the focus of empirical study and which are conceptually-related to Aristotle’s work. For example, Aristotle’s construct of continence is conceptually related to empirical constructs such as self-control and behavioral inhibition. A similar approach has been used by Peterson and Seligman (2004) in their classification of strengths and virtues. Some of the related empirical constructs were found using the same terms in keyword searches that are found in the English translations of Aristotle’s work (e.g., anger, fear, courage, hope, and despair). Using these methods keyword searches were conducted of various electronic databases such as PsycARTICLES and PsycINFO in order to identify conceptually-related and operationally defined, empirical constructs. The details of the keyword searches are found in the literature review and results sections.

Another method involved the use of theoretical works from contemporary clinical psychology to illustrate points of congruence between Aristotle’s model
of psychology and conceptualization of character and modern models that are found in contemporary clinical psychology. Citations from theoretical works were used to illustrate points of congruence between Aristotle’s model and cognitive behavioral therapy, rational emotive behavioral therapy, behavioral perspectives, biological perspective, object relations, and evolutionary psychology. The major criterion for the selection of theoretical constructs was to identify theoretical constructs that were conceptually related to constructs that are found in Aristotle’s model of psychology and conceptualization of character. The selection of conceptually related theoretical constructs (e.g., the role of biology, conditioning, and cognition in the generation of emotions and behavior) relied heavily upon the author’s educational background in clinical psychology and extensive reading of various theoretical models.

Integration and Theoretical Analysis

The results of the analysis of the selected works of Aristotle, the works of Thomas Aquinas, the selected works from contemporary moral philosophy, and the theoretical and empirical materials from contemporary psychology were analyzed, and conceptually related points of congruence are identified and explicated in the results section. The contents, references and results of this analysis are integrated throughout the body of the results section in a manner appropriate to a theoretical analysis dissertation.
Chapter 4: Results

*De Anima: Concerning the Soul*

For over two thousand years, Aristotle’s works on human nature have been prominent in the academic tradition of Western Civilization. Aristotle’s work *De Anima* (Aristotle, 1984) served as a psychology textbook before the academic discipline of psychology or even the word psychology came into being. According to the Oxford English Dictionary (2003), the first recorded use of the word psychology did not occur until the 16th Century. The etymological meaning of the word psychology is study of the soul. With the first part “psych” having its origins in the Greek *psuchê* meaning breath, life, or soul; and the suffix “ology” which indicates “the study of,” as is seen in the names of various sciences (e.g., anthropology, biology, sociology, zoology). Duvall (1998) pointed out how the word soul has often been used interchangeably with the term self.

In fact, in terms of both content and organization, *De Anima* is strikingly similar to the content and organization of the textbooks frequently found in introduction to psychology courses (e.g., Wood, Wood, & Boyd, 2005). In *De Anima* Aristotle examines such phenomena as sensation, perception, affect, cognition, behavior, the nature of conditioned affective and behavioral responses, and man’s classification as a species of the genus animal. It is in *De Anima* that Aristotle also described the mechanisms, processes, and dynamics that are the
constitutive elements of human perception, affect, behavior, thought, and overall phenomenology, establishing the foundation of his holistic and teleological model of the human nature.

Aristotle (1984) differentiated three different kinds of soul: the nutritive soul, sensitive soul, and rational soul. Aristotle’s use of the term soul is an important concept in his model of psychology. In fact, it is in Aristotle’s conceptualization of soul that we see the foundations of his biopsychosocial model of psychology that has so many important points of congruence with contemporary biological, cognitive, behavioral, and evolutionary models of psychology. Table 4.1 provides an illustration of Aristotle’s differentiation of the three types of soul.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nutritive Soul/Faculties</th>
<th>Sensitive Soul/Faculties</th>
<th>Rational Soul/Faculties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Responsible for nutrition, growth and reproduction</td>
<td>All animals (including humans) have at least some of the sensitive faculties</td>
<td>Is unique to humans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All plants and animals (including humans) possess the nutritive faculties</td>
<td>Specific sensibles: sight, hearing, touch, smell and taste</td>
<td>Passive intellect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The nutritive faculties are the differentia between inanimate and animate</td>
<td>Common sensibles: o Movement o Rest</td>
<td>Active intellect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innate, automatic processes that are necessary for survival and reproduction</td>
<td>o Number o Figure</td>
<td>Allows humans to reason, deliberate, and utilize the various powers of the intellect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imagination</td>
<td>o Magnitude</td>
<td>Memory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Imagination</td>
<td>Passions (emotions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Memory</td>
<td>Appetitive faculty</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Even though the word psychology itself refers to the study of the soul, contemporary usage of the word tends to include connotations to the word soul that can easily lead to a misunderstanding of Aristotle’s intended use of the term. This being the case, the word soul is often thought of as only referring to the nonmaterial or spiritual aspects of man. This characterization of the term soul is different from Aristotle’s use of the term, which he uses to illustrate his holistic understanding of the unity of mind and body and the composite nature of matter and form.

Aristotle (1984) illustrated the importance and value he placed on the study and knowledge of the soul when he wrote:

> Holding as we do that, while knowledge of any kind is a thing to be honoured and prized, one kind of it may, either by reason of its greater exactness or of a higher dignity and greater wonderfulness in its objects, be more honourable and precious than another, on both accounts we should naturally be led to place in the front rank the study of the soul. (p. 641)

The loftiness of Aristotle’s appraisal regarding the value and dignity of the study of the soul is matched by his appraisal of the difficulty with which the knowledge of the soul is obtained. Aristotle (1984) wrote, “To attain any knowledge about the soul is one of the most difficult things in the world” (p. 641). Additionally, Aristotle’s writings on the soul have a reputation for being rather difficult to understand. The Arab commentator, Averroës, wrote that his own contemporaries, “…dismiss the books of Aristotle…especially that on the soul,
believing that this book is impossible to understand” (as cited in Kemp, 1996, p. 30).

Having described the importance, value, and difficulty involved in the study of the soul, Aristotle then proceeds to outline what an inquiry into the nature of the soul will entail and what such an inquiry should answer. Aristotle (1984) wrote:

First, no doubt, it is necessary to determine in which of the summa genera soul lies, what it is; is it 'a this-somewhat', a substance, or is it a quale [quality] or a quantum [quantity], or some other of the remaining kinds of predicates which we have distinguished? Further, does soul belong to the class of potential existents, or is it not rather an actuality? (p. 641).

An understanding of Aristotle’s Ontology (i.e., study of being) and the system of categorization, which he outlines in his work titled The Categories is necessary for an understanding of the above quotation. In The Categories Aristotle explains his belief that a systematic rational analysis of all that is can be categorized under the following ten summa genera: (a) substance, (b) quantity, (c) quality, (d) relation, (e) action, (f) passion, (g) place, (h) time, (i) situation and (j) habit.

Aristotle’s understanding of soul is shaped by his metaphysics; therefore, in order to adequately illustrate his definition of soul we must first illustrate a key point of his ontology. In Aristotle’s metaphysics he considered being itself in a manner that does not exist in reality. In other words, being in actuality is never separate from thinghood, for once matter is in actuality a thing, it possesses form.
Concerning his necessarily heuristic differentiation of matter and form,

Aristotle (1984) wrote:

We say that substance is one kind of what is, and that in several senses: in
the sense of matter or that which in itself is not a this [matter considered
separately], and in the sense of form or essence [form considered separately
without matter], which is that precisely in virtue of which a thing is called a
this, and thirdly in the sense of that which is compounded of both [form &
matter]. (p. 656)

It is in a similar and necessarily heuristic vein that he explored the soul.

Aristotle’s analysis of soul divides soul into various parts; however, he made it
explicitly clear that this differentiation is primarily for heuristic purposes that are
useful for gaining insight into the nature and various constitutive elements of soul.

He was very clear about the fact that the various parts of the soul are not actually
considered the soul as a composite of matter and form, “Of natural bodies some
have life in them, others not; by life we mean self-nutrition and growth and decay.

It follows that every natural body which has life in it is a substance in the sense of
a composite” (p. 656). Aristotle’s understanding of soul as being a composite of
form and matter is the foundation of his holistic understanding of the human
person. In this composite of matter and form, the soul is the form of the body,
and the body is the matter of the form (or soul):

Now given that there are bodies of such and such a kind, viz. having life,
the soul cannot be a body; for the body is the subject or matter, not what is
attributed to it. Hence the soul must be a substance in the sense of the form of a natural body having life potentially within it. But substance is actuality, and thus soul is the actuality of a body... Now there are two kinds of actuality corresponding to knowledge [first actuality] and to reflecting [second actuality]. It is obvious that the soul is an actuality like knowledge; for both sleeping and waking presuppose the existence of soul, and of these waking corresponds to reflecting, sleeping to knowledge possessed but not employed, and knowledge of something is temporally prior.

That is why the soul is an actuality of the first kind of a natural body having life potentially in it. The body so described is a body which is organized. The parts of plants in spite of their extreme simplicity are organs; e.g. the leaf serves to shelter the pericarp, the pericarp to shelter the fruit, while the roots of plants are analogous to the mouth of animals, both serving for the absorption of food. If, then, we have to give a general formula applicable to all kinds of soul, we must describe it as an actuality of the first kind of a natural organized body. That is why we can dismiss as unnecessary the question whether the soul and the body are one: it is as though we were to ask whether the wax and its shape are one, or generally the matter of a thing and that of which it is the matter. Unity has many senses (as many as 'is' has), but the proper one is that of actuality. (Aristotle, 1984, pp. 656-657)

Aristotle’s metaphysics and his understanding of the composite nature of matter and form have significant implications that shape his understanding of the relationship between the mind and the body. His metaphysics, when applied to the exploration of the relationship between the mind and body, led him to develop a holistic model of psychology that is truly biopsychosocial in nature.

Aristotle’s conceptualization of the unity of matter and form and its composite nature is in marked contrast to Plato’s separation of form and matter and the subsequent dualism of the Platonic separation of mind and body which is often referred to as the Platonic error. This issue of the relationship between matter and
form is of great significance. Historically, the Platonic separation of matter and form has contributed to the emergence of models of psychology and theology that have taken a pejorative view of such things as pleasure and the emotional life of man. Aristotle, on the other hand, presents a holistic understanding of matter and form that leads him to formulate a holistic understanding of such things as pain, pleasure, emotion, behavior, cognition, and overall phenomenological experience. This difference between dualism and holism has had profound impact on the unfolding drama of man’s quest to know himself in the history Western Civilization.

*The Three Types of Soul*

Aristotle’s conceptualization of three types of soul forms the foundation of his multi-domain, biopsychosocial model of psychology. Each of the types of soul represents a particular domain or level of analysis and contains a cluster of faculties/powers that are involved with particular functions or processes. The nutritive soul contains the innate faculties/powers responsible for growth, nutrition, and reproduction that are found in all plants and animals. The sensitive soul contains the faculties/powers involved with such things as sensation, perception, emotion, and imagination. The rational soul contains the faculties/powers of the intellect and is unique to humans.
Aristotle’s conceptualization of soul is foundational to his classification of all living things. Aristotle taught, “…what has soul in it differs from what has not in that the former displays life” (Aristotle, 1984, p. 658). In other words, for Aristotle, it is possession of soul and its associated faculties/powers that differentiates living things from inanimate objects. The association of soul with living things is reflected in the English words animate and inanimate, having as they do the Latin root of anima, meaning soul. Aristotle (1984) wrote, “…provided any one alone of these is found in a thing we say that thing is living--viz. thinking or perception or local movement and rest, or movement in the sense of nutrition, decay and growth” (p. 658).

According to Aristotle all living things can be divided into one of three categories: (a) those that possess a nutritive soul, (b) those that possess a sensitive soul, and (c) those that possess a rational soul. It is important to note that Aristotle’s conceptualization of the three types of soul is hierarchical in nature in that, the possession of each of the higher types of soul (i.e., sensitive and rational) requires the possession of the faculties/powers found in the lower types of soul (i.e., nutritive and sensitive).

Aristotle identified five powers or faculties (dunameis) of the soul: (1) the nutritive, (2) sensitive, (3) appetitive, (4) locomotive, and, (5) the rational faculties. Of these, the nutritive, sensitive, and rational faculties are at times
referred to as types of soul and at other times are referred to as faculties. To avoid confusion it may be useful to think of these as types of soul when considering differences between species or genuses (i.e., plants, animals, and humans) and grouping of certain faculties or powers of the soul when differentiating or examining the various powers or faculties within a particular genus or a particular species (e.g., differentiating within man the various powers/faculties).

During the early days of the discipline of psychology as a science, there was an intentional effort to remove what was referred to as a faculty-based understanding of human nature (Kosits, 2004). This was done in part to differentiate the emerging field of psychology from philosophy and theology, which had their own models of human nature. According to Kosits (2004), the emerging discipline of psychology was referred to as the “New Psychology” and was differentiated from earlier philosophical and theological models, which were referred to as the “old” psychology or faculty psychology. Kosits (2004) wrote that William James thought that there were two primary problems with the old faculty psychology:

The problem with the faculty approach, according to James, was twofold. First was the problem of reification, or treating an abstraction (the “faculty”) as if it had an independent and real existence. Second, the reified faculty was then treated as possessing causal efficacy; that is, the faculty was understood to be the cause of its own actions; it was self-determined. (p. 341)
Reification happens when one thinks of the intellect, memory, or the will as actual things rather than heuristic terminology used to illustrate various causal dynamics. The terms power and faculty are frequently used interchangeably in the literature, yet each term contains significant interpretive nuances. For example, when the term faculty is used it may appear to imply the existence of a dedicated thing or structure. When the term power is used it carries the connotation or implication that what is being described is a process or phenomenon that may not have a dedicated physical structure. Aristotle made it very clear that what can be divided for heuristic purposes may not be divisible in reality; therefore, it should be kept in mind that the use of the term faculty is a heuristic device that allows one to examine various processes or powers.

The Nutritive Soul and Nutritive Faculties

In Aristotle’s hierarchical understanding of soul, the nutritive soul is the most basic or foundational type of soul and is found in all living things. He wrote that the, “… nutritive soul is found along with all the others [i.e., the sensitive and the rational] and is the most primitive and widely distributed power of soul, being indeed that one in virtue of which all are said to have life” (Aristotle, 1984, p. 661). Elsewhere he wrote that the nutritive faculty is, “…the originative power the possession of which leads us to speak of things as living…” (Aristotle, 1984, p. 658). In other words, all things that are living have at least one of the nutritive
faculties (i.e., the faculties of nutrition, growth, and reproduction). The possession of a nutritive soul is considered the *differentia* between that which is animate from that which is inanimate.

The nutritive faculties are found in all plants and animals and are involved in the processes of growth, nutrition, and reproduction. The nutritive faculties operate on an automatic basis and are not learned or acquired functions. In animals, including humans, the nutritive faculties can be thought of as operating on a physiological level. In Aristotle’s biopsychosocial model of psychology the nutritive faculties/powers are part of the biological/physiological domains or levels of functioning. The nutritive faculties, which are located in the body, represent a sub-domain within the physiological domain. According to Aristotle (1984), these innate, automatic and unlearned processes of the nutritive faculties play a significant role in the production of emotion and the origination of behavior.

Aristotle’s conceptualization of the nutritive soul has many points of congruence with perspectives of modern models of psychology that posit or recognize the role of innate, unlearned, instinctual processes that influence both the experience and the behavior of human beings. Aristotle belief that animals are equipped by nature with the innate, instinctual processes (i.e., the powers and faculties of the nutritive soul) that serve the teleological purpose of survival,
growth, and reproduction has several important points of congruence with modern psychological models that draw upon Darwin’s theory of evolution (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 1999; Bereczkei, 2000; and Siegert & Ward, 2002). While Aristotle does not discuss the process of evolution in terms of natural selection, he does identify human beings as having an animal nature that serves the teleological aim of survival and reproduction. Aristotle also makes it clear that man’s animal nature plays a significant role in his affective and behavioral experience.

The nutritive soul/faculty is one domain or level of analysis in Aristotle’s multi-domain model of psychology. It is the domain that contains the innate or instinctual faculties/powers that are involved in growth, nutrition, and reproduction. We will examine the dynamic role of the nutritive soul/faculties in greater detail when we examine the appetitive faculties and the dynamic role of emotion.

The Sensitive Soul and Sensitive Faculties

The second of the three types of soul that Aristotle identifies is the sensitive soul. He taught that possession of the sensitive faculties or the sensitive soul is the differentia that distinguishes animal life from plant life. According to Aristotle, all animals, including humans, have at least the sensitive faculty of touch. He wrote that,
It is the possession of sensation that leads us…to speak of living things as animals; for even those beings which possess no power of local movement but do possess the power of sensation we call animals and not merely living things. (Aristotle, 1984, p. 658)

Aristotle believed that the sensitive and nutritive faculties are part of man’s animal nature. The fact that Aristotle believed that man has an animal nature that actively shapes his emotions, behavior and overall phenomenology is an important point of congruence between Aristotle’s model of psychology and modern psychological models that consider man to be a species of animal.

The powers of sense are produced by the sensitive faculties. Aristotle differentiates two types of powers of sense: (a) the specific sensibles and (b) the common sensibles. Each of the specific senses is associated with a particular sense (i.e., sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch) and a specific sense organ (i.e., eyes, ears, nose, tongue, skin). The common sensibles, on the other hand, are not associated with a particular sense organ and utilize, integrate, or combine the input from two or more of the specific sensibles. He identifies the five specific sensibles as, “…sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch…” (Aristotle, 1984, p. 676) and wrote that the, “Common sensibles are movement, rest, number, figure, magnitude; these are not special to any one sense, but are common to all.” (Aristotle, 1984, p. 665). The input of the various specific sensibles are integrated in the common sensibles in the process of perception. Table 4.2 illustrates
Aristotle’s differentiation of the specific and the common sensibles.

Aristotle’s formulation of the common and specific sensibles shares many aspects of modern psychology’s differentiation between sensation and perception. The process of perception also involves imagination and mental imagery, both of which we will examine in greater detail when we examine the dynamic role that the imagination plays in perception. For now, let us return to the discussion of the place of the sensitive soul/faculties in Aristotle’s hierarchy of soul.

Aristotle (1984) taught that touch is the most foundational sense and that it is possessed by all animals, “The primary form of sense is touch, which belongs to all animals” (p. 658). He wrote that some animals possess more senses than others but that all have the sense of touch, “some classes of animals have all the senses, some only certain of them, others only one, the most indispensable, touch” (Aristotle, 1984, p. 659). The sense of touch plays a foundational and dynamic

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Table 4.2</th>
<th>Aristotle’s Differentiation of the Specific and Common Sensibles</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specific Sensibles</td>
<td>Common Sensibles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sight</td>
<td>- Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Hearing</td>
<td>- Rest</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Taste</td>
<td>- Number</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Smell</td>
<td>- Figure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Touch</td>
<td>- Magnitude</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
role in Aristotle’s understanding of the human experience because the sense of touch makes possible the capacity to experience pleasure and pain: “where there is sensation, there is also pleasure and pain, and, where these, necessarily also desire” (Aristotle, 1984, p. 659). The capacity to experience pleasure and pain is, according to Aristotle, a prerequisite for the appetitive faculties and the passions (emotions). Aristotle (1984) wrote:

If any order of living things has the sensory, it must also have the appetitive; for appetite is the genus of which desire, passion, and wish are the species; now all animals have one sense at least, viz. touch, and whatever has a sense has the capacity for pleasure and pain and therefore has pleasant and painful objects present to it, and wherever these are present, there is desire, for desire is appetition of what is pleasant. (p. 660)

Aristotle taught that the nutritive and sensitive appetites are involved in the production of the passions (emotions) in all animals. This point has significant implications regarding the role that man’s animal nature plays in the shaping of his biological processes, affect, behavior, character, and overall phenomenology. The sensitive faculties are considered to be of the body and represent another dimension of the physiological domain in Aristotle’s biopsychosocial model. Both the nutritive and the sensitive souls/faculties are of the body and are considered part of man’s animal nature. All animals possess the nutritive and the sensitive faculties. We will examine these aspects of Aristotle’s model in detail when we examine the appetitive faculties.
The Rational Soul and Intellectual Faculties

As mentioned previously, it is the possession of faculties and powers of the rational soul that differentiates humans from the rest of the animal kingdom. Possession of the rational soul is unique to man and contains the faculties/powers of the mind or intellect that allow men and women to engage in activities that are considered uniquely human. It is the rational faculties that allow men and women to engage in such uniquely human activities as thinking, reasoning, and philosophizing. The possession of the rational faculties presupposes the existence or possession of the lower levels of soul because the intellectual or rational faculties depend upon the functioning/processes of the sensitive and nutritive faculties for their operation.

According to Aristotle, there is nothing that is in the intellect or rational soul that wasn't first in the sensitive faculty. Imagination is considered a power of the sensitive faculty; therefore, even when one imagines things that do not actually exist in the real world, he/she is using the sensitive faculty in the process. Aristotle taught that the operations of the intellect are preceded and accompanied by the operations of the sensitive faculties (e.g., imagination, hearing, seeing, and touching). The process of thinking itself requires sense experience and images, both of which are functions of the sensitive powers and are considered to be of the body. Aristotle's holistic understanding of the relationship between the mind and
the body is clearly evident in his understanding of the operations of the intellect. He believed that all emotions are of the body, that memory is in the body, and that no thought occurred without images that are enmattered. Some of these points are examined in the section of this chapter devoted to the dynamic role of the emotion.

*The Active Intellect and the Passive Intellect*

Aristotle differentiated two types of mind or intellect: the passive intellect and the active intellect. Basically, the passive intellect receives and perceives the sense perceptions of particulars, while the active intellect perceives abstractions or forms. These two types of mind or intellect correspond to two different types of thinking or cognition. Thomas Aquinas referred to these two types of thinking as *sense cognition* and *rational cognition* (Aquinas, 1915).

Sense cognition refers to being cognizant of sense perception, and as such is always concerned with the particulars. According to Aristotle (1984), we do not perceive universals through sense perception but only the particulars. Sense cognition allows us to perceive a physical object of a certain shape and color before us (i.e., the sense representation of shape and sense representation of color). Sense perception does not allow one to understand the abstract dimension that what is being seen is a certain shape (e.g., rectangle), class of vehicle (e.g., bus) or a particular color (e.g., yellow). According to Aristotle’s model, the
operations of the intellectual soul/faculties are required in order to understand
that a particular sense representation of an object belongs to a class of objects
named vehicles.

Rational cognition, being cognizant of the universals or forms, allows us to
know that the object before us is a certain type of object such as a vehicle or that
it has a particular quality such as the color yellow. Aristotle described how these
two forms of mind or thinking are differentiated according to their respective
objects when he wrote:

Knowledge and sensation are divided to correspond with the realities,
potential knowledge and sensation answering to potentialities, actual
knowledge and sensation to actualities. Within the soul the faculties of
knowledge and sensation are potentially these objects, the one what is
knowable, the other what is sensible. (Aristotle, 1984, p. 687)

And elsewhere:

Since in every class of things, as in nature as a whole, we find two factors
involved, a matter which is potentially all the particulars included in the
class, a cause which is productive in the sense that it makes them all (the
latter standing to the former, as e.g. an art to its material), these distinct
elements must likewise be found within the soul. (Aristotle, 1984, p. 684)

Here we return to Aristotle’s understanding of matter and form and how it applies
to the faculties of the intellect. The mind has two types of cognition that respond
respectively to matter and form.
The active intellect is not actually thought of as being a thing, so it is not considered to be enmattered. In the following passage, Aristotle wrote that the faculty of the active intellect is not actually enmattered, when he wrote:

Thus that in the soul which is called thought (by thought I mean that whereby the soul thinks and judges) is, before it thinks, not actually any real thing. For this reason it cannot reasonably be regarded as blended with the body: if so, it would acquire some quality, e.g. warmth or cold, or even have an organ like the sensitive faculty: as it is, it has none. It was a good idea to call the soul 'the place of forms', though this description holds only of the thinking soul, and even this is the forms only potentially, not actually. (Aristotle, 1984, p. 682)

Although Aristotle believed that all thinking occurs along with an image that is of the body, he also believed that certain aspects of thought are not actually enmattered. Speaking of this aspect of rational cognition he wrote, “Thought in this sense of it is separable, impassible, unmixed, since it is in its essential nature activity…” (Aristotle, 1984, p. 684). In other words, the very nature of the active intellect is activity—hence the name active intellect. From this perspective, rational thought is conceived of as activity and, therefore, does not contain substance or matter.

As has been stated previously, the various types of soul are hierarchically arranged; therefore, the possession of the intellectual soul/faculties presupposes the possession of the nutritive and sensitive soul/faculties. This is, in part, due to the fact that the rational soul utilizes the faculties and processes of the sensitive
soul in its operations. According to Aristotle, images produced by the sensitive faculty are required for abstract thinking to occur. In the process of abstract thinking, images are produced by the sensitive faculties in response to the activity of the intellect. These images can be manipulated or shaped to form representations of objects that don’t in reality exist. Aristotle wrote, “To the thinking soul images serve as if they were contents of perception (and when it asserts or denies them to be good or bad it avoids or pursues them). That is why the soul never thinks without an image” (Aristotle, 1984, p. 685).

The work of the active intellect depends on sense perception to be able to carry out its operations of both concrete and abstract thought. Aristotle wrote:

Since it seems that there is nothing outside and separate in existence from sensible spatial magnitudes, the objects of thought are in the sensible forms, viz. both the abstract objects and all the states and affections of sensible things. Hence no one can learn or understand anything in the absence of sense, and when the mind is actively aware of anything it is necessarily aware of it along with an image; for images are like sensuous contents except in that they contain no matter. (Aristotle, 1984, pp. 686-687)

The dynamic interaction and interdependence that exists between the sensitive and rational faculties is reflective of the Aristotle’s belief in the essential unity of matter and form. Clearly then, Aristotle’s differentiation of the sensitive and intellectual faculties is not a dualistic separation of body and mind. Aristotle’s understanding is, in fact, antithetical to a dualistic separation of mind and body, due to the fact that all thinking requires the operation of the sensitive faculty. We
will examine further how intimately related the intellect and the body are in Aristotle’s model when we examine the dynamic role of imagination.

The Appetitive Faculty: The Interaction of the Nutritive, Sensitive, and Rational Faculties in the Dynamics of Emotion

The emotional life of man figures prominently in Aristotle’s model of psychology. In fact, Aristotle viewed emotion as the wind in the sails of behavior. According to Aristotle’s model of psychology, emotional dynamics are involved in all human and animal behavior. Aristotle’s model of psychology posits that emotion is teleological in nature, in that emotions (i.e., passions) have the purpose of generating movement toward or away from certain objects and are, therefore, considered as having ends. His model of emotion is biopsychosocial in nature and plays a foundational and dynamic role in his holistic conceptualization of the human person. He believed that the passions or emotions are produced by the appetitive faculty and are elicited in response to the operations of the nutritive, sensitive, and rational faculties. He described how the passions or emotions can be elicited by one or more of the following processes which correspond to the aforementioned faculties or types of soul: (a) inborn, automatic, biological/physiological processes involved with survival or reproduction (nutritive faculty); (b) the operation of the senses (sensitive faculty); and (c) cognitive processes, such as deliberation or practical reason (rational faculty).
Aristotle believed that the emotions are teleological in nature, and that they have the purpose of generating movement toward or away from objects. The English word *appetite* itself comes from the Latin word *appetitus* meaning *desire toward*. Thus, the meaning of the word appetite captures Aristotle’s understanding of the function of the appetitive faculties: to furnish the desires, wishes, and passions (emotions) that originate movement toward or away from objects. Aristotle (1984) wrote that, “…no animal moves except by compulsion unless it has an impulse towards or away from an object” (p. 687).

If we consider the etymology of the English word *emotion*, we find that it reflects Aristotle’s understanding of the dynamic role that emotion plays in the origination of behavior or movement. The Latin origins of the word emotion come from the Latin *emotionem* (of action). According to the *Oxford English Dictionary* (2003), the word emotion has its origins in the French word *emovere*: *e-* (to come out of) and *movere* (meaning move), which forms the meaning—*movement coming out of*. It is interesting to note that the English word emotion also contains the word *motion*, which signifies movement. These root meanings are illustrative of Aristotle’s teleological understanding of emotion as having the purpose of *moving* us towards apparent goods and away from apparent evils.

Aristotle identified what he considered to be eleven principal passions: love, hate, joy, sorrow, desire, aversion, hope, despair, fear, daring, and anger. Six of
these emotions he categorizes as concupiscible (i.e., love, hate, joy, sorrow, attraction, and aversion) and five are categorized as irascible (fear, daring, despair, hope, and anger). All the other passions (emotions) are conceptualized as being variants of these principle passions.

All of the passions, according to Aristotle, are involved in the elicitation of approach or avoidance behaviors. Without the passions that result in approach or avoidance there is no movement. The appetitive faculty is the faculty that furnishes these impulses toward or away from objects through the production of the passions; therefore, passions are thought of as having the purpose of moving all animals, including humans, toward or away from objects. The passions are considered to be teleological in nature because they have the purpose of creating movement toward or away from some object and are therefore, considered as having an end.

Aristotle’s model posits that all of the passions have the basic teleology of approach or avoidance. The passions that are produced by the appetitive faculty are elicited in response to the operations of the nutritive, sensitive, and rational faculties. Modern evolutionary psychology also posits that many emotions have a teleological nature aimed at ensuring survival and reproduction and that pleasure seeking (approach) and harm avoidance (pain) play a foundational and dynamic role in the behavior and overall subjective experience of man. We will examine
these and other similarities or points of congruence that exist between Aristotle’s model of psychology and evolutionary psychology in greater detail in following sections.

In order to illustrate the various constitutive factors of emotion and emotional experience, Aristotle, for heuristic purposes, differentiates three types of appetitive faculties, each being associated with one of the three central faculties of nutrition, sensation, and intellect (i.e., the nutritive appetite, the sense appetite, and the rational appetite). Aristotle’s differentiation of the appetitive faculties mirrors his taxonomic categorization of plants, animals, and humans: plants having the nutritive appetite; animals possessing the nutritive and sensitive appetites; and man alone possessing all three—the nutritive, sensitive, and rational appetite. It should be emphasized that Aristotle’s differentiation of the appetitive faculties is for heuristic purposes only, and he makes it clear that, in reality, there is really only one appetitive faculty (i.e., the three appetitive faculties are heuristic constructs used by Aristotle to refer to processes or dimensions of the appetitive faculty), and that it is located in the body. What Aristotle succeeds in illustrating through his heuristic differentiation of the various types of appetite is how the emotional life of man is a multifaceted phenomenon that is shaped or constituted simultaneously by such things as his
animal nature, biologically-based temperament, his experience, culture, conditioned associations, free-will, etc.

Aristotle’s model illustrates how both volitional and nonvolitional elements or processes constitute man’s emotional life. The nonconscious, automatic processes originate from both the biological processes that are part of his animal nature and the habituated emotional and behavioral responses that are the consequent to his experience. The conscious or volitional factors that constitute man’s emotional life involve such things as the intentional use of mental imagery, free-will, and the various operations of the intellect.

The Appetitive Faculty

It is important to emphasize that Aristotle conceptualized the appetitive faculty and the passions themselves as being of the body and part of the animal nature of human beings. He taught that the appetitive faculty can produce passions in response to the operations of the intellect, but that the appetitive faculty and the passions themselves are located in the body. The passions, therefore, may be elicited by the operations of the intellect, but are, along with the appetitive faculty, of the body. Aristotle identified that there are physical changes that accompany emotions. Aristotle (1984) wrote:

It seems that all the affections of soul involve a body--passion, gentleness, fear, pity, courage, joy, loving, and hating; in all these there is a concurrent affection of the body. In support of this we may point to the fact that, while
sometimes on the occasion of violent and striking occurrences there is no excitement or fear felt, on others faint and feeble stimulations produce these emotions, viz. when the body is already in a state of tension resembling its condition when we are angry. Here is a still clearer case: in the absence of any external cause of terror we find ourselves experiencing the feelings of a man in terror. From all this it is obvious that the affections of soul are enmattered accounts. (pp. 642-643)

Aristotle was limited by his era’s archaic understanding of the underlying biological, neurochemical, and physiological aspects of emotion; nevertheless, his assertion that all of the affections, passions, or emotions of the soul are enmattered, influenced by physiologically-based temperamental factors, and considered to be produced by bodily processes contains significant points that are in congruence with modern models of psychology that stress the important role that biological, neurochemical, and physiological processes play in the generation of emotion and of behavior.

Aristotle believed that man both shares and transcends the animal nature that he holds in common with the rest of the animal kingdom. Aristotle’s analysis of the various appetitive faculties illustrates his biopsychosocial understanding of emotion, and the dynamics of how emotions are elicited by biological processes, the operation of the senses, and the operations of the intellect or the rational faculties. Table 4.3 provides an overview of Aristotle’s heuristic differentiation of the three types of souls with their corresponding appetites.
### Table 4.3 Aristotle’s Heuristic Differentiation of the Three Types of Appetite

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Three Types of Soul</th>
<th>The Appetitive Faculty</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nutritive Faculties</strong>&lt;br&gt;The nutritive faculties are responsible for innate biological processes responsible for nutrition, survival and reproduction.</td>
<td><strong>Natural Appetite</strong>&lt;br&gt;Produces <em>unconditioned</em> passions that are elicited by the operation of the nutritive faculties. These passions are necessarily involved with the generation of behavior that has the purpose or teleology of survival and reproduction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sensitive Faculties</strong>&lt;br&gt;The sensitive faculties are the faculties involved with sensation and perception which includes both the specific and the common sensibles. All animals, including humans, have at least one of the sensitive faculties.</td>
<td><strong>Sense Appetite</strong>&lt;br&gt;Produces both the <em>unlearned</em> and <em>learned or conditioned passions</em> that, after being habituated, are passively elicited by the operation of the specific and common sensibles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rational Faculties</strong>&lt;br&gt;The rational faculties are the faculties of the intellect or mind. The rational faculties are only possessed by man.</td>
<td><strong>Rational Appetite</strong>&lt;br&gt;The rational appetite produces the passions that are elicited by the operations of the intellect. Rational appetite produces only learned responses. Rational appetite produces the emotional impetus that is required for the will.</td>
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</table>
The Natural Appetite

Aristotle’s conceptualization of the natural appetite described how nature has endowed man with innate and automatic emotional responses that operate to attain nature’s ends of survival and reproduction. His model posits that man’s emotional life, behavior, and overall phenomenological experiences are partially constituted by that part of his nature that he/she holds in common with the rest of the animal kingdom. As we shall see, this aspect of Aristotle’s model of psychology has several points of congruence with modern theories of psychology—particularly those that fall under the rubric of evolutionary psychology.

According to Aristotle, there is only one appetitive faculty; however; in order to illustrate the dynamics of how desires or emotions are elicited by the operations of all three of the domains (i.e., nutritive, sensitive, and rational faculties/powers), Aristotle develops his heuristic differentiation of the three kinds of appetite. The heuristic differentiation of the natural appetite illustrates the role that innate, unconditioned and automatic emotional responses play in the shaping of behavior and the overall phenomenological experience of man. These passions produced by the nutritive appetite are commonly referred to as instincts or biological drives in modern terminology. The passions produced by the natural appetite are considered natural passions, in that they are unlearned or unconditioned
emotional responses. According to Aristotle, the passions of the natural appetite are teleological in nature and have the purpose or ends of survival and reproduction. These unlearned and automatic emotional responses provide the emotional impetus that elicits the approach or avoidance behaviors, which cause movement toward or away from objects or objectives that are related to an animal’s survival or reproduction. If the passions are produced in the manner of a conditioned response, then they are not considered as coming from the natural appetite (e.g., a conditioned gluttonous response that is not actually originating in the individuals need for nutrition or hydration). Natural, unlearned, unconditioned stimuli are such things as hydration levels or the need for nutritional intake. Only the sensitive and rational appetites allow for conditioned or learned responses.

The passions produced by the natural appetite are elicited by the functioning of inborn and automatic biological processes. These passions, which are teleological in nature, operate according to a biologically-based teleology and have the ends of survival and/or reproduction. In other words, the natural appetite produces passions that have the purpose of generating movement to achieve the teleological objectives of the body. The natural appetite represents a sub-domain within man’s animal nature that produces the instincts or emotional impetus that elicits instinctual behaviors with the end or purpose of survival and/or reproduction.
Unlike the sensitive appetite, which is also part of man’s animal nature, the natural appetite does not produce conditioned emotional or behavioral responses. The natural appetite only produces unlearned or unconditioned responses that are related to survival and/or reproduction.

Aristotle’s conceptualization of the natural appetite offers some penetrating insights into the role of emotional dynamics in the elicitation of instinctually-based behavior. According to his model, all behavior, including instinctual behavior, is elicited by emotion; therefore, there must be some form of emotional impetus involved in the elicitation of instinctual behavior. According to Aristotle, it is the natural appetite that produces the emotional impetus that elicits instinctual behaviors. In animals, including humans, it is the natural appetite that furnishes the passions required for the generation of instinctually-based behavior necessary for sustaining life (e.g., obtaining sufficient food and water) and the perpetuation of the species (e.g., instinctually-based aspects of sexual reproduction).

The desire for food resulting from an animal’s need for nutrition is a good example of a natural desire produced by the natural appetite. When an animal is in need of nutrition, the nutritive appetite will produce a certain degree of desire and/or pain until the animal’s physical needs are satiated. These passions provide the emotional impetus or feeling states that move the animal to seek the food it requires for its survival and are, therefore, considered teleological in nature.
The passions produced by the natural appetite are another example of the unlearned or unconditioned responses that are elicited in an animal that becomes dehydrated. In response to a state of dehydration, an animal’s nutritive appetite will automatically produce the desire for hydration, which provides the emotional impetus for the animal to seek (i.e., move toward) the necessary hydration required for its survival. The natural appetite also produces the pain that is associated with thirst that results from dehydration, as well as the pleasure associated with the consumption of appropriate fluids. Adequate hydration is necessary for the survival of the animal and is considered the end for which the passions were generated. The natural appetite produces passions in response to automatic biological processes and states occurring in the body.

According to Aristotle, all passions are accompanied by some degree of pleasure and/or pain. For example, an animal in need of food experiences hunger as painful, and the same animal experiences eating food as pleasurable. The pleasure and pain produced by the natural appetite operate as nature’s reinforcers or unconditioned emotional responses and can be thought of as the emotional dynamics behind unconditioned responses. These unlearned or unconditioned emotional dynamics elicit approach or avoidance behaviors in animals. Pain resulting from exposure to potentially harmful heat (e.g., fire) is an example of a passion produced by the natural appetite that elicits avoidance or withdrawal.
behaviors. The pain the animal experiences due to the heat, along with the unconditioned response of pain-avoidance, illustrates how nature has equipped animals, including humans, with instinctual responses to avoid what is harmful or potentially dangerous.

Bereczkei (2000), Cosmides & Tooby (1999), Cosmides, Lieberman and Tooby (2003), and Siegert & Ward (2002) have written about a model of psychology called evolutionary psychology. Evolutionary psychology applies and integrates the theory of evolution into its model of psychology. The importance that Aristotle places on innate emotional dynamics related to reproduction and survival is astonishingly similar to modern evolutionary perspectives. Aristotle’s model and modern evolutionary psychology both posit that nature has equipped man with instincts that have a biologically-based teleology with the ends of survival and reproduction. Both models also posit that instincts, which are rooted in man’s animal nature, play a dynamic and constitutive role in the shaping of man’s emotional life, behavior, and overall phenomenological experience.

In evolutionary psychology, emotions are thought of as belonging to our genetic heritage which has been shaped by the process of natural selection. From this perspective, emotions are considered to be manifestations of inborn and biologically-based strivings that increased the chances of survival and
reproduction. Though Aristotle was restricted by his era’s limited understanding of the physiological and neurochemical aspects of emotion; nevertheless, he succeeded in formulating a multi-dimensional model of emotion that places significant emphasis on man’s animal nature which he considered as being of the body. His formulation of the emotional dynamics that are constitutive of instinctual behavior is strikingly modern and contains multiple points of congruence with modern evolutionary perspectives.

It is clear that Aristotle’s conceptualization of the passions produced by the nutritive appetite has important implications regarding the emotional, behavioral, and phenomenological life of man. The emotional dynamics of the nutritive appetite figure prominently in Aristotle’s conceptualization of character, a point we will be examining in greater detail when we examine the role and nature of character, but for now we will turn to examine the dynamics of the sensitive appetite in greater detail.

*The Sense Appetite*

Proceeding up the heuristic hierarchy of the appetites, we come to the second type of appetite, the sense appetite. Like the nutritive appetite, the sense appetite also produces passions or emotions that have the purpose of generating movement toward or away from objects. For Aristotle, the operations of the five senses (*specific sensibles*) elicit from the sense appetite corresponding passions that are
teleological in nature and have the purpose of generating movement to obtain perceived goods (e.g., pleasure) or to avoid perceived evils (e.g., pain).

Unlike the passions of the nutritive appetite, the passions evoked by the operation of the senses may be of an unconditioned or conditioned nature. The traditional terminology described some passions as being natural (unconditioned) and others as being unnatural or learned (conditioned). The passions produced by the sense appetite are passive, in that they are automatically elicited in response to the mere apprehension of sense perception. Even though the passions of the sense appetite are passively elicited, they are active in that they have the purpose of creating approach or avoidance behaviors regarding the objects that are apprehended by the senses.

Another factor that distinguishes the passions produced by the nutritive appetite from those produced by the sensitive appetite is that the passions of the sense appetite are elicited from the operation of at least one of the five senses (i.e., touch, sight, sound, smell, or taste); whereas, the nutritive appetite may produce passions involving biological processes that do not involve one of the five senses (e.g., emotions generated from low blood sugar).

To illustrate how passions originating from the sense appetite can be unconditioned or conditioned in nature, consider the dynamics of hunger. According to Aristotle’s model, a man’s experience of the desires and pains
associated with hunger can be both learned and unlearned. A man may experience hunger that is unrelated to external sensory stimuli due to his body’s biological need for nutrition. This type of hunger response is unlearned and is consequent to the individual’s physiological need for nutrition (i.e., it is a physiologically-based response that is unconditioned and which arises from the nutritive appetite). Another type of hunger response (i.e., desire for food) can be elicited by the familiar scent of a favorite dish. This type of hunger is not, necessarily, due to the need for nutrition. If the hunger is due to a habituated response to the smell of a favorite dish, it is considered to be a learned or habituated response, which arises from the sensitive appetite. The key differentiation between whether the nutritive or the sensitive appetite is involved is whether there is a biological need or instinctual response for the consumption of the food.

The process Aristotle posits for the shaping of the learned responses of the sense appetite is called habituation. Aristotle’s conceptualization of habituation has several important similarities to behavioral psychology’s formulation of conditioned responses. These natural (unconditioned) and the unnatural (conditioned or learned) desires of the sense appetite figure prominently in Aristotle’s model of human emotion and character, a point we will examine in greater detail later.
The third and hierarchically highest type of appetite Aristotle calls the rational appetite or the will. The rational appetite (will) corresponds to the intellect as the sense appetite corresponds to the senses. In other words, the rational appetite produces passions in response to the intellect’s apprehension of perceived good or perceived evil in the same manner that the sense appetite produces passions in response to sense perception.

The rational appetite produces the desires, passions, or emotions that are elicited by the intellect’s apprehension of something as an apparent good or an apparent evil. The desires of the rational appetite are considered rational passions due to the fact that they are elicited from the appetitive faculty by the operations of the intellect. Concerning the differentiation between the passions of the rational appetite and the non-rational passions of the nutritive and sensitive appetites, Aristotle (1984) wrote:

Of the appetites some are irrational, some associated with reason. By irrational I mean those which do not arise from any opinion held by the mind. Of this kind are those known as natural; for instance, those originating in the body, such as the appetite for nourishment, [namely hunger and thirst] and a separate kind of appetite answering to each kind of nourishment; and those connected with taste and sex and sensations of touch in general; and those of smell, hearing, and vision. Rational appetites are those which we are induced to have; there are many things we desire to see or get because we have been told of them and induced to believe them good. (p. 2181)
For an example of a rational passion, consider a man who desires to know the etymology of a word. The man is said to have a desire to know. The desire to know the word’s etymology is due to his intellect’s apprehension of obtaining that knowledge as a good (The man could also have a desire to know the etymology of the word to avoid an apparent evil such as being embarrassed for not knowing the origins of the word). The intellect’s apprehension of a good elicits from the rational appetite a desire to obtain the apprehended good. This desire to know may move the man to look up the word in a dictionary to discover its origins. This type of desire belongs to the rational appetite, because the desire is elicited from the rational appetite in response to the operation of the intellectual faculty. In other words, cognition can elicit and shape emotion.

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<tr>
<th>Table 4.4</th>
<th>Aristotle’s Differentiation of Three Kinds of Desire and Three Kinds of Pleasure</th>
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<tr>
<td>Natural/Unlearned Desires</td>
<td>Habituated/Learned Desires</td>
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<tr>
<td>Natural Pleasures</td>
<td>Habituated/Learned Pleasures</td>
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</table>

The rational appetite produces more than just a hunger or desire for knowledge. It produces those passions or emotions that result from the operation of the various intellectual powers (e.g., knowledge, understanding, opinion, and
practical reason). As with the passions of the nutritive and sensitive appetites, the passions of the intellectual appetite are teleological in nature, in that they have the purpose or end of attaining some good and/or of avoiding some evil.

For example, consider a man who has knowledge of the benefits of eating healthy foods. The individual’s knowledge and understanding of the benefits that can be obtained by maintaining a healthy diet, along with his understanding of what constitutes a healthy diet constitutes an apprehended good (i.e., eating healthy food to obtain the pleasures or benefits of eating healthy food and avoiding the pains associated with eating unhealthy food). This understanding of the good that can be obtained and the evil that can be avoided by consuming healthy food, in turn, may elicit from the rational appetite a desire to consume healthy foods (e.g., rice cakes) and an aversion of to eating unhealthy foods. These desires to eat healthy foods and avoid unhealthy foods are based on the operations of the intellect and do not arise out of the operation of the nutritive or sense appetites.

Following his knowledge and understanding, the individual may actually forego eating foods far more desirous to his sense appetite (i.e., foods that when apprehended by the senses elicit unconditioned/conditioned responses of desire in the individual). These desires produced by the rational appetite compete with the conditioned and unconditioned desires to eat unhealthy foods.
The rational appetite is also referred to as the will. Hence, we say that a person who avoids the food they love, in order to avoid sickness and obtain health, is using his will to make that choice. It is the individual’s belief that eating healthy but less savory food will obtain some future pleasure (e.g., health) and/or avoid some future pain (e.g., sickness) that is the cause of the passions that result in the movement toward the healthy food and away from the unhealthy food. The knowledge of what constitutes a healthy diet and the benefits a healthy diet will provide (i.e., health and the avoidance of illness) makes the choice of eating a rice cake a perceived good that is not based upon sense perception alone. The choice of rice cakes over foods that have been determined to be unhealthy (but which, nonetheless, elicit desires when perceived by the senses) involves practical reason and imagination, both of which will be examined in greater detail later.

*The Dynamics of Pleasure and Pain*

The dynamic influences of pleasure and pain figure prominently in Aristotle’s understanding of human behavior as well as the behavior of the entire animal kingdom. Aristotle (1984) wrote, “…every passion and every action is accompanied by pleasure and pain” (p. 1744). Aristotle also wrote that, “…pleasure and pain are the principal end in respect of which we say that this is an evil, and that a good…” (as cited in Aquinas, 1915, p. 1435).
According to Aristotle, the dynamic role of pleasure seeking and/or pain avoidance are/is operative in all of the passions originating from the nutritive, sense, and rational appetites. Aristotle taught that the capacity to experience pleasure and pain is present if a soul possesses the sensitive faculty. He also taught that it is the possession of the sensitive faculty that differentiates animal life from plant life; therefore, all life that is considered to be animal life necessarily possesses the capacity for pleasure and pain.

Pleasure and pain are central to the origination of movement. According to Aristotle (1984), “where there is sensation, there is also pleasure and pain, and, where these, necessarily also desire” (p. 658). Aristotle’s conceptualization of the preeminence of pleasure and pain in the shaping of all animal behavior, including human behavior, shares the emphasis on pleasure and pain that is found in Freud’s pleasure principle, behaviorist understandings of reinforcement, and psychological insights drawn from the study of evolution. Pleasure and pain being foundational to the dynamics of these models and being operative in the approach or avoidance behaviors in these models.

According to Aristotle, human beings experience two types of pleasure and pain: one that is held in common with all animals and one that is peculiar to humans. The first type of pleasure and pain is called natural pleasure and natural pain. Natural pleasure and natural pain are considered to be produced by an
animal’s very nature, and are by definition involved with survival and
reproduction. Aristotle wrote, “whatsoever is in conformity with nature is
pleasant, and all animals pursue pleasure in keeping with their nature.” (Aristotle,
1984, p. 923). In other words, all animals, including humans, have automatic and
inborn tendencies to experience pleasure in response to that which is good for
them according to their nature (e.g., pleasure when consuming necessary food and
water) and pain in response to that which is harmful to them according to their
nature (e.g., pain in response to potentially dangerous heat).

As we have seen, natural pleasures and natural pains are thought of by
Aristotle as being necessary for survival and reproduction and therefore, are
thought of as originating from the natural appetite. It is interesting to note that
Aristotle defines natural pleasures and pains as those that must by definition be
involved in survival and reproduction. This heightens the congruence with
biological and evolutionary conceptualizations of instincts and drives. Natural
pleasures and pains are involved in the dynamics of what we now refer to as
instincts or drives. According to Aristotle, natural pleasure and natural pain play
a dynamic role in the operation of instinctual behavior. For example, an animal in
physiological need of food and water experiences hunger and thirst, both of which
involve some degree of pain. This desire for food and water is an unconditioned
or natural desire that is necessary for survival and belongs to both the natural and the sensitive appetites.

Humans, being a species of animal, experience the natural pleasures and pains that arise from the natural and sensitive appetites as do the rest of the animal kingdom. In man, as in the rest of the animal kingdom, these natural pleasures and pains are operative in the dynamics of all innate instinctual phenomena. Aristotle’s emphasis on the role of both pleasure seeking and pain avoidance in the dynamics of approach and avoidance behaviors is a significant aspect of his psychological model and a significant point of congruence with many modern psychological theories influenced by the theory of evolution, which also posit the existence of instinct-driven approach or avoidance behaviors (Millon & Davis, 1996; Millon, 1999; Millon, Davis, Escovar, & Meagher, 2000; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985; Beck, 1999).

There are two types of unnatural pleasure and pain: those that involve just the sensitive faculties and those that involve both the sensitive and rational faculties. The unnatural pleasures and pains are called unnatural because they are learned or conditioned associations to pleasure or pain. The first type of unnatural pleasure and pain are produced by the sensitive faculties. In regards to learned, unnatural, or conditioned pleasures or pains, Aristotle described a habituation process that is involved in determining what a person or animal comes to associate with pleasure
or pain. Habituation involves action and avoidance of action, and it is the repeated choice of particular actions or avoidance of particular actions, along with the attendant consequences or experiences that establishes what we associate with pain and pleasure (Sherman, 1989).

The second type of unnatural pleasure and pain is unique to humans because it involves the operations of the rational faculties. This type of pleasures and pains are sometimes referred to as rational pleasures and rational pains because they are elicited by the operations of the intellect and arise out of the rational appetite. This uniquely human type of pleasure and pain is shaped and constituted by such factors as culture, childhood experiences, habit, repetition, deliberative processes, personal choice, and cognition. Aquinas (1915) wrote, “Concupiscences [pleasures] of the second kind [rational pleasures] are proper to men, to whom it is proper to devise something as good and suitable, beyond that which nature requires” (p. 720).

The Dynamics of Pleasure and Pain: Aristotle & Modern Models of Psychology

The dynamic role that pleasure and pain play in Aristotle’s model of psychology is a significant point of congruence between his model and several modern models of psychology. Several prominent theorists and theories have viewed pleasure and pain as playing central roles in the generation of human behavior. For example, Freud posited the pleasure principle, Adler described
moving from a felt minus to a felt plus, and behaviorism conceptualizes pleasure and pain as being central dynamics involved in reinforcement.

Regarding the ubiquitous and primary role that pleasure and pain play in models of psychology, Higgins (1997) wrote:

People are motivated to approach pleasure and avoid pain. From the ancient Greeks, through 17th- and 18th-century British philosophers, to 20th-century psychologists, this hedonic or pleasure principle has dominated scholars' understanding of people's motivation. It is the basic motivational assumption of theories across all areas of psychology, including theories of emotion in psychobiology (e.g., Gray, 1982), conditioning in animal learning (e.g., Mowrer, 1960; Thorndike, 1935), decision making in cognitive and organizational psychology (e.g., Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Edwards, 1955; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), consistency in social psychology (e.g., Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1958), and achievement motivation in personality (e.g., Atkinson, 1964). (pp. 1280-1281)

Aristotle’s conceptualization of the dynamic role of pleasure and pain is examined more detail in the following section.

*Emotional Dynamics and the Importance of Early Childhood:*

*The Foundations of Pleasure & Pain*

Aristotle shared developmental psychology’s insights into the importance of early childhood experience and taught that these early life experiences are central to the shaping of one’s character, emotional life, and overall phenomenological experience. In particular, he emphasized the importance of associating pleasure and pain to the right things from our youth. In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle (1984) wrote:
Again, it [pleasure] has grown up with us all from our infancy; this is why it is difficult to rub off this passion, engrained as it is in our life. And we measure even our actions, some of us more and others less, by pleasure and pain. For this reason, then, our whole inquiry must be about these [pleasure and pain]; for to feel delight and pain rightly or wrongly has no small effect on our actions. (p. 1745)

Aristotle’s teachings regarding the importance of childhood experience has much in common with what we now consider as belonging to the behavioral and social learning models. Aristotle model has significant similarities to modern social learning theories and the construct of observational learning regarding how human beings learn through modeling or imitating others. Aristotle (1984) wrote, “Imitation is natural to man from childhood, one of his advantages over the lower animals being this, that he is the most imitative creature in the world, and learns at first by imitation. And it is also natural for all to delight in works of imitation” (p. 2318).

Aristotle, like many modern theorists, highlights the importance of society and culture in the shaping of a person’s character. He taught that culture has a significant impact on character development and advocated taking steps to create the social conditions that foster or facilitate the development of healthy character, by helping individuals come to associate pain and pleasure to the right things from their youth. He considers it imperative that one come to associate pleasure and pain to the right things, for it is the underlying, automatic, and habituated
associations and consequent responses of pleasure and pain that actively shapes
or constitutes one’s character, phenomenology, behavior, and emotional
experience. Aristotle (1984) wrote, “…every study both of virtue and of politics
must deal with pleasures and pains, for if man has the right attitude toward them,
he will be good; if the wrong attitude he will be bad” (p. 38). In Nicomachean
Ethics, Aristotle emphasized that, “…we ought to have been brought up in a
particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as both to delight in and to
be pained by the things we ought; for this is right education” (Aristotle, 1984, p.
1744). Right education, for Aristotle, involves the training or conditioning of
both one’s affective faculties and one’s intellectual faculties (e.g., practical
reason, deliberative ability), so that one’s affective responses and cognitive
processes are in line with what right reason would dictate.

Aristotle believed that the pleasure and pain that accompanies all action and
emotion can offer a glimpse into the ordering of an individual’s character. He
wrote of how, “An index to our characteristics is provided by the pleasure or pain
which follow upon the tasks we have achieved” (Aristotle, 1962, p. 36). In other
words, the pleasure and pain that we experience when we do or don’t do certain
acts is not only a constitutive factor of behavior and character, but also provides a
gauge by which character can be evaluated. In a virtuous individual, the
associations of pleasure and pain are in accord with the dictates of right reason.
In the virtuously ordered character, one’s emotional dynamics, rooted as they are in pleasure and pain, habitually provide the emotional impetus for virtuous behavior. In fact, character itself refers to habits and mechanisms that regulate the affective or emotional life of man. All behavior is initiated by emotion; consequently, character, which shapes and regulates the affective experience of man, is also responsible for initiating, constituting, and regulating behavior.

For Aristotle, characterological health involves the congruence of affective experience, right reason, action, and objective truth. Incongruence or conflict between one’s emotion, cognition, or behavior and that is in accord with right reason is considered to be opposed to virtue and hence, opposed to characterological health. We will be examining this issue in greater detail when we examine the dynamics of character. For now, it is enough to note that Aristotle believed that in characterologically healthy individuals (i.e., virtuous individuals) emotion, cognition, and behavior are in congruence with one another and operate in accordance with right reason and objective truth.

Aristotle identified several ways that an individual can be adversely impacted by an association of pleasure and/or pain that does not conform with right reason and objective reality. Aristotle (1984) outlines some of these ways when he wrote,
…every state of soul has a nature relative to and concerned with the kind of things by which it tends to be made worse or better; but it is by reason of pleasures and pains that men become bad, by pursuing and avoiding these—either the pleasures and pains they ought not or when they ought not or as they ought not, or by going wrong in one of the other similar ways that reason can distinguish. (p. 1745)

In the above quote, Aristotle identifies three ways that one can go wrong in regards to pain and pleasure: (a) an individual can pursue or avoid pleasures or pains that he or she should not pursue or avoid; (b) an individual may pursue or avoid pains or pleasures when they should not; and (c) an individual may pursue or avoid pleasure or pain in a manner that they ought not. This was not an exhaustive list of ways that pleasure and pain can lead one astray and Aristotle makes a point of stating that reason can distinguish similar ways that man can go wrong in regards to habituated responses to pleasures and pains.

The dynamics of pleasure and pain underlie or form the basis of an individual’s subjective appraisal of an object being an apparent good or an apparent evil. Apparent goods are associated with pleasure, and apparent evils are associated with pain. This brings us to an important aspect of Aristotle’s model: the difference between apprehended good and evil and objective good and evil.

**Love (Attraction/Approach) and Hate (Aversion/Avoidance): Apprehended Good and Evil and the Role of Objective Truth**
Aristotle differentiates apprehended good and evil from actual good and evil. This issue is of central importance because one’s apprehensions of reality can be in congruence with reality or incongruent with reality, not in terms of being cognizant of all of reality, but rather regarding the limited particular apprehensions. One can come to associate pain and evil with that which is objectively good for an individual, and/or an individual can associate pleasure and good with that which is objectively evil. The truth about good or evil refers to an objective truth that transcends mere apprehension. For Aristotle, it is the objective truth regarding good and evil that is of paramount importance because it will be that truth that will determine the outcome. Aquinas (1915) wrote:

Just as a thing may be apprehended as good, when it is not truly good; so a thing may be apprehended as evil, whereas it is not truly evil. Hence it happens sometimes that neither hatred of evil nor love of good is good. (p. 714)

It should be noted that what is referred to as an objective good or an objective evil is relative to the subject and object in question. In some cases, it is also relative to the context. For our purposes, it may be useful to sidestep the connotations that are frequently associated with good and evil (which in fact are moral issues outside of the discipline of psychology) by thinking in terms of something as being useful or useless, or even good or bad in relation to the achievement of our ultimate goals and objective, which according to Aristotle’s
account is happiness. Good choices or useful choices will contribute to our happiness; while bad choices will have the opposite effect. In other words, the usefulness or uselessness of the action is related to the outcome.

Love and hate are two of the foundational passions elicited by the three appetites (i.e., the natural, sensitive, and rational appetites), and each is elicited by the apprehension of apparent good or evil, respectively, according to the operation of each of the specific appetites. Aquinas (1915) described the operation of the various faculties and appetites (i.e., nutritive, sensitive, and rational) in the production of love and hate and how these are elicited by the apprehension of good and evil:

Since the natural appetite is the result of apprehension (though this apprehension is not in the same subject as the natural appetite), it seems that what applies to the inclination of the natural appetite, applies also to the animal appetite, which does result from an apprehension in the same subject…. Now, with regard to the natural appetite, it is evident, that just as each thing is naturally attuned and adapted to that which is suitable to it, wherein consists natural love; so has it a natural dissonance from that which opposes and destroys it; and this is natural hatred. So, therefore, in the animal appetite, or in the intellectual appetite, love is a certain harmony of the appetite with that which is apprehended as suitable; while hatred is dissonance of the appetite from that which is apprehended as repugnant and hurtful. Now, just as whatever is suitable, as such, bears the aspect of good; so whatever is repugnant, as such, bears the aspect of evil. And therefore, just as good is the object of love, so evil is the object of hatred. (p. 714)

It is important to note that Aquinas described apprehended good as being that which is apprehended as suitable and apprehended evil being that which is
apprehended as hurtful and repugnant. Therefore, the object of love is an apprehended good, while the object of hate is an apprehended evil. It is important that one understands that the objects of love and hate are *apprehended* as good and evil. In other words, an apprehended good or evil is an apparent good or evil, and not necessarily good or evil in an objective sense.

Being, itself, is not considered good or evil, but only insomuch as it relates to a particular object and a particular subject’s end. Aquinas (1915) wrote:

> Being, as such, has not the aspect of repugnance but only of fittingness; because being is common to all things. But being, inasmuch as it is this determinate being, has an aspect of repugnance to some determinate being. And in this way, one being is hateful to another, and is evil; though not in itself, but by comparison with something else. (p. 715)

The objective criteria for whether an apparent good is an objective good or whether an apparent evil is an objective evil is very clear in some cases. For example, if a man comes upon a body of water and wishes to quench his thirst, he may apprehend the consumption of the water as an apparent good. If, however, the water is in reality toxic, the objective truth is that its consumption is an objective evil that will end in death.

Aristotle refers to common sense, or at other times, to right reason in the determination of good and evil. We will explore the intricacies of these issues involving apparent good and evil and of objective good and evil in greater detail.
later. At the present, let us turn to a more detailed analysis of the passions that are produced by the above mentioned appetitive faculties.

As mentioned previously, the passions are the impulses for movement furnished by the appetitive faculties. These impulses are typically referred to in modern terminology as emotions. According to Aristotle, the experience of emotion is not a strictly human phenomenon, although some emotions are considered strictly human (i.e., those that are produced by the operations of the intellect). Humans, as well as the rest of the animal kingdom experience emotion, and all that is considered animal life is animated by emotion (emotion being necessary for movement). The fact that Aristotle’s model has man sharing all but the rational faculties with the animals is of no small importance. In fact, it is due to this sharing of the various faculties (i.e., nutritive, sensitive, appetitive, locomotive) that animal-based research is so relevant to modern advances in our understanding of the biological, neurochemical, and psychological functioning of human beings.

Man is a species of the genus animal and, as such, he shares with all animals an animal nature. Man’s shared nature with the animals, as well as his unique powers of the intellect or mind, are reflected in Aristotle’s holistic understanding of the dynamics of emotion. He explains how man both shares and transcends the faculties common to the rest of the animal kingdom (specifically, in this case, in
terms of the dynamics of emotion). Aristotle taught that the passions are furnished by the appetitive faculties and that they have the purpose of producing movement toward or away from apprehended goods or evils. However, in the case of the nutritive appetite, there may not actually be apprehension of a conscious nature, but the body “apprehends” the need for such things as food and water.

The passions (emotions), as mentioned above, are produced by the appetitive faculty and are differentiated according to their actions and objects. Emotions are considered to have actions in that they are teleological in nature and have the purpose of causing movement toward or away from perceived good and evil.

*Thomas Aquinas and the Division of the Concupiscible and Irascible Passions*

Thomas Aquinas played an important role in the integration of Aristotle’s philosophy into the intellectual life of Western Civilization. This is particularly true when it comes to the topic area of human nature, emotion, behavior, habit, character, virtue and vice. For this reason, a closer examination of how Aquinas added to Aristotle’s conceptualization of emotion is warranted.

In *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle (1984) identified what he considered to be eleven principle passions: love, hate, joy, sorrow, desire, aversion, hope, despair, fear, daring, and anger. Aquinas (1915) further divides the genus of the passions into two distinct species: the concupiscible and the irascible. Six of these
emotions Aquinas categorized as concupiscible (i.e., love, hate, attraction, aversion, joy and sorrow) and five are categorized as irascible (fear, daring, despair, hope, and anger). All the other passions (emotions) are conceptualized as being variants of these principle emotions. Neither Aristotle nor Aquinas consider the concupiscible passions or any of the passions as good or bad in and of themselves. According to both Aristotle and Aquinas, emotional experience is not something to be merely transcended or repressed; on the contrary, emotions are seen as being an essential element of all animal behavior—including human behavior.

The concupiscible passions derive their name from the Latin word *concupiscentia* meaning to covet, aim at, or desire eagerly. The irascible passions take their name from the Latin word *irascibilis* meaning to angry. According
to Aquinas (1915), one of the main differentiations between the concupiscible and irascible passions is that they each have different objects and actions.

Regarding the dynamics of the concupiscible and the irascible passions Aquinas (1915) wrote:

In order, therefore, to discern which passions are in the irascible, and which in the concupiscible, we must take the object of each of these powers….The object of the concupiscible power is sensible good or evil, simply apprehended as such, which causes pleasure or pain. But, since the soul must, of necessity, experience difficulty or struggle at times, in acquiring some such good, or in avoiding some such evil, in so far as such good or evil is more than our animal nature can easily acquire or avoid; therefore this very good or evil, inasmuch as it is of an arduous or difficult nature, is the object of the irascible faculty. Therefore whatever passions regard good or evil absolutely, belong to the concupiscible power; for instance, joy, sorrow, love, hatred, and such like: whereas those passions which regard good or bad as arduous, through being difficult to obtain or avoid, belong to the irascible faculty; such are daring, fear, hope and the like. (p. 694)

In other words, the concupiscible emotions result from the apprehension of an apparent good or evil, while the irascible emotions result from the apprehension of the difficulty that is involved in obtaining an apparent good or avoiding, overcoming, or escaping an apparent evil. It is important to note that both the concupiscible and the irascible passions involve the apprehension of apparent goods and evils, which, as was previously stated, are different from actual goods or evils.

Aquinas (1915) indicated that the concupiscible passions (i.e., love, desire, and delight/joy/happiness) have for their objects the good, simply apprehended as
Aquinas (1915) illustrated the interrelated dynamics that exist between love and the other concupiscible passions that have the apprehended good as their objects when he wrote the following:

… the first change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object is called "love," and is nothing else than complacency in that object; and from this complacency results a movement towards that same object, and this movement is "desire"; and lastly, there is rest which is "joy." (pp. 704-705)

Aristotle’s categorization of man as a species of the genus animal is reflected in his model of emotion. Animals experience both the concupiscible and the irascible emotions. In both man and the other animals, the irascible emotions find their end in the concupiscible emotions. Aquinas (1915) wrote that,

…the irascible faculty is bestowed on animals, in order to remove the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible power from tending towards its object, either by making some good difficult to obtain, or by making some evil hard to avoid. The result is that all the irascible passions terminate in the concupiscible passions: and thus it is that even the passions which are in the irascible faculty are followed by joy and sadness which are in the concupiscible faculty. (p. 694)

_Aristotle’s Object Relations: Natural and Unnatural Love_

One’s emotional state of relatedness or emotional disposition in relation to object representations figures prominently in Aristotle’s dynamic model of psychology. It is one’s emotional state of relatedness to objects that results in movement toward or away from objects. By emotional state of relatedness, I am referring to the emotional association or disposition of love or hate that a subject
experiences in relation to object representations. Indeed, it is this emotional state of relatedness (i.e., love or hate) to apprehended objects that is the source of and dynamic behind all movement and behavior. Love and hate are passions associated with pleasure and pain respectively. Aquinas (1915) described love as complacency that the subject experiences in relation to an object. The first definition of complacency as defined in the Oxford English Dictionary (2003) is: “The fact or state of being pleased with a thing or person; tranquil pleasure or satisfaction in something or someone” (Electronic reference). In other words, love is an emotional state or emotional orientation in relation to objects that involves the association of pleasure with the loved object.

Each of the three appetitive faculties (i.e., nutritive, sensitive, and rational) produce love and hate in relation to specific objects. The love and hate that arise from the nutritive appetite are necessarily involved with survival/reproduction and are considered innate and automatic responses that are not learned or conditioned. Table 4.6 provides an overview of Aristotle’s heuristic differentiation of the three types of love that correspond to the three types of appetite.
There are two types of love and hate that are considered unnatural or learned:

(a) the habituated or conditioned love and hate that arise out of the sense appetite in response to the operation of the senses, and (b) the love and hate that are elicited by the operations of the intellect and arise out of the rational appetite as a result of the operation of the intellectual faculties.
The love and hate produced by the sensitive appetite may or may not include natural love and natural hate. Unlike the love and hate produced by the nutritive appetite, the love and hate of the sensitive appetite may be learned or conditioned responses that are shaped and elicited by the operation of the senses. As we have mentioned before, the process of habituation is involved in the shaping of what comes to be associated with pleasure or pain. It is this underlying association of pleasure and pain that subsequently forms the foundations of learned or habituated love and hate that arises out of the sensitive appetite.

The love and hate that is elicited by the apprehension of the intellect is a product of the intellectual appetite and is considered to be rational love and hate. Habit and habituation is also operative in the intellectual faculties, a point that we will examine in greater detail when we focus on the intellectual virtues. Additionally, it should be emphasized that, according to Aristotle, Rational love is what is referred to as the will. What is important to keep in mind is that all of these types of love and hate have the underlying association with pleasure or pain that we discussed earlier and arise from all three of the appetites (i.e., nutritive, sensitive, rational).

As we have indicated, the love and hate that a subject experiences can be \textit{natural} (unconditioned) or \textit{unnatural} (learned or conditioned). According to Aristotle, love and hate are natural when they are due to a subject’s very nature
and when they play a role in survival or reproduction. This is a significant point of congruence with evolutionary psychology which posits that much of man’s affective experience is shaped by innate instinctual programming that has the teleological end of ensuring survival and/or reproduction. Animals, including humans, are hard-wired to love certain things that are necessary for their survival and the perpetuation of their species. They are also hard-wired to hate that which is contrary to their survival and reproduction. For example, a certain temperature range is connatural to man and therefore is an object of natural love. On the other hand, when the temperature falls below or rises above certain points it becomes contrary to his nature and therefore will be the object of natural hatred. Natural love and natural hate are usually thought of as instincts in modern terminology. They illustrate Aristotle’s understanding of the dynamic influence that man’s animal nature has on his experience and behavior. Natural love and natural hate originate in man’s natural appetite. Aquinas (1915) wrote,

Now, with regard to the natural appetite, it is evident, that just as each thing is naturally attuned and adapted to that which is suitable to it, wherein consists natural love; so has it a natural dissonance from that which opposes and destroys it; and this is natural hatred. (p. 714)

The love and hate that originate from the operation of the senses, are elicited from the sensitive appetite, and can be natural or learned. The unnatural, habituated responses (i.e., the learned associations of love and hate) of the sense
appetite figure prominently in Aristotle’s understanding of man’s emotional life, behavior, subjective experience, and the process of character development.

Love that originates from the rational appetite or will is referred to as rational love. Essentially, rational love is elicited as the result of the intellect’s apprehension of something as a good. This type of love is unique to humans and is acquired or learned. Rational love creates rational desires or rational concupiscences. Rational love differs from irrational love in terms of origination (i.e., irrational love coming from the nutritive or sensitive appetites, and rational love being elicited by the operations of the intellect and the rational appetite).

Aquinas (1915) wrote,

…according as a thing is apprehended as suitable, either by absolute apprehension, whence arise natural concupiscences, which the Philosopher calls "irrational" (Rhet. i, 11); or by apprehension together with deliberation, whence arise those concupiscences that are not natural, and which for this very reason the Philosopher calls "rational". (p. 720)

The Concupiscible Passions: Love, Hate, Desire, Aversion, Joy, and Sorrow

As we have seen, Aquinas (1915) lists three concupiscible passions that have as their objects the good simply apprehended as such: love, desire, and happiness. Love being a state of emotional relatedness toward the apprehended good; desire being the nutritive, sensitive, or rational appetites yearning for an apprehended good, and happiness being a kind of repose after one has obtained an apprehended good. Love, be it natural or intellectual, learned or unlearned, is a dynamic state
of emotional relatedness towards the loved object resulting from the apprehension of the object as an apparent good. Love elicits desire when the loved object is absent. Desire is a yearning for the attainment or realization an apprehended good. It is desire for the loved object that causes movement necessary for the subject to obtain the good it desires. The actual attainment of the beloved object results in delight, joy, pleasure, happiness, etc. These dynamics of the concupiscible emotions play a significant role in the development of approach behaviors are inherently reinforcing due to the pleasure that accompanies these passions.

The three concupiscible passions that are elicited by apprehended evil are hate, aversion, and sorrow. Hate consists of the natural (unlearned/unconditioned) as well as the unnatural (learned/conditioned) responses that are elicited from the appetitive faculties in response to apprehended evil. Hate, aversion, and sorrow all have an underlying association with pain. Along with hatred for an object, comes the passion of aversion, which generates movement of the subject to avoid the hated object. Aversion is the contrary of desire and plays a central role in all avoidant behaviors. When a hated object is unavoidable or already present, sorrow is elicited from the appetitive faculties. Each of the concupiscible passions is considered to have a contrary passion. Hate is the contrary of love, aversion is the contrary of desire, and sorrow is the contrary of joy.
It is important to note, that even passions that are considered passive in nature are, nonetheless, dynamic in terms of action. Passions are considered passive in nature when they are elicited without effort on the part of the subject. Even though the elicitation is passive (i.e., they do not require conscious activity on the part of the subject), their purpose and activity is actually quite active. For example, natural concupiscence (desire) is elicited through mere sense apprehension. The elicitation is considered passive in that it is the result of the mere apprehension of the sense perception of connatural objects. The result of natural concupiscence, however, is quite active, in that, it results in movement toward the desired object. In other words, the cause of natural concupiscence is considered passive while the action of natural concupiscence is active and teleological in that it moves a subject to obtain or avoid that which is necessary to obtain or avoid for survival or reproduction.

*The Irascible Passions: Fear, Daring, Hope, Despair, and Anger*

The irascible passions serve the purpose of mustering an animal’s resources to obtain a good that is difficult to obtain or to avoid or overcome an evil that is difficult to avoid or overcome. Aquinas (1915) identified the five primary irascible passions as: (a) daring, (b) fear, (c) hope, (d) despair, and (e) anger. As with the concupiscible passions, all of the irascible passions except anger are
thought of as having a contrary passion: fear being the contrary of daring, and despair being the contrary of hope.

The Dynamics of the Irascible Passions

According to Aquinas (1915), there are two types of contrariety regarding the passions. The first kind of contrariety is the contrariety of apprehended objects (i.e., apprehended good or evil). The second type of contrariety is that of approach or withdrawal. Regarding these two types of contrariety Aquinas (1915) wrote:

…there is a twofold contrariety in the passions of the soul: one, according to contrariety of objects, i.e. of good and evil; the other, according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term. In the concupiscible passions the former contrariety alone is to be found; viz. that which is based on the objects: whereas in the irascible passions, we find both forms of contrariety. The reason of this is that the object of the concupiscible faculty… is sensible good or evil considered absolutely. Now good, as such, cannot be a term wherefrom, but only a term whereto, since nothing
shuns good as such; on the contrary, all things desire it. In like manner, nothing desires evil, as such; but all things shun it: wherefore evil cannot have the aspect of a term whereto, but only of a term wherefrom. Accordingly every concupiscible passion in respect of good, tends to it, as love, desire and joy; while every concupiscible passion in respect of evil, tends from it, as hatred, avoidance or dislike, and sorrow. Wherefore, in the concupiscible passions, there can be no contrariety of approach and withdrawal in respect of the same object.

On the other hand, the object of the irascible faculty is sensible good or evil, considered not absolutely, but under the aspect of difficulty or arduousness. Now the good which is difficult or arduous, considered as good, is of such a nature as to produce in us a tendency to it, which tendency pertains to the passion of "hope"; whereas, considered as arduous or difficult, it makes us turn from it; and this pertains to the passion of "despair." In like manner the arduous evil, considered as an evil, has the aspect of something to be shunned; and this belongs to the passion of "fear": but it also contains a reason for tending to it, as attempting something arduous, whereby to escape being subject to evil; and this tendency is called "daring." Consequently, in the irascible passions we find contrariety in respect of good and evil (as between hope and fear): and also contrariety according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term (as between daring and fear). (pp. 694-695)

In other words the irascible passions are elicited by the difficulty or arduous nature of some good that is desired or an evil that is to be avoided. These dynamics will be discussed more thoroughly in the paragraphs that follow.

*Fear Considered Specifically*

According to Aristotle fear is one of the primary irascible passions and, as such, it plays a dynamic role in the shaping of behavior and experience.

Concerning fear Aristotle (1984) wrote that:

Fear may be defined as a pain or disturbance due to imagining some destructive or painful evil in the future… fear is caused by whatever we feel
has great power of destroying us, or of harming us in ways that tend to cause us great pain. Hence the very indications of such things are terrible, making us feel that the terrible thing itself is close at hand; and this—the approach of what is terrible—is danger. (p. 2202)

Aristotle’s understanding of the holistic nature of the mind-body relationship is clearly evident in his conceptualization of fear. The passion of fear, as with the other passions and the appetitive faculty itself, is considered to be rooted in the body, but can be elicited by the operations of the intellect (e.g., the anticipation of danger). Aristotle (1984) noted that fear is accompanied by changes in the body such as blanching of the face, and changes in heart rate, blood flow, and breathing. Additionally, he noted that fear is often accompanied by such things as tremulousness of the voice, hands, and lower lip.

As with the other passions, fear is not considered good or evil in itself. Fear, in fact, when experienced at the right time, to the right extent, and over the right things is considered an important part of healthy characterological functioning. In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle (1984) wrote:

…plainly the things we fear are terrible things, and these are, to speak without qualification, evils; for which reason people even define fear as expectation of evil. Now we fear all evils, e.g. disgrace, poverty, disease, friendlessness, death, but the brave man is not thought to be concerned with all; for to fear some things is even right and noble, and it is base not to fear them—e.g. disgrace; he who fears this is good and modest, and he who does not is shameless. (p. 1760)
Fear, along with the other passions, “…should be defined as a certain mode of movement of such and such a body (or part or faculty of a body) by this or that cause and for this or that end” (Aristotle, 1984, p. 642). Fear, having an end, is, therefore, teleological in nature and has the purpose of mustering an animal’s resources to avoid an apparent future evil (e.g., an animal is moved by fear to take flight from an approaching predator). Fear, when appropriate, is important for healthy functioning in humans as well. Appropriate fear helps man to be cautious and to avoid things that can cause physical, psychological, material, and/or social harm.

Aristotle taught that nature has equipped animals, including man, with a natural fear of that which is contrary to their nature. Natural fear is rooted in the subject’s nature and is aimed at ensuring the animal’s survival. Natural fear, according to Aristotle, arises out of the nutritive appetite and is, along with all of the passions of the nutritive appetite, unlearned or unconditioned. In modern terminology, natural fears are typically thought of as instincts. Nature has equipped animals, including man, with fears that are hard-wired into their physiology to help ensure their survival.

An example of natural fear would be the startle response that is elicited from recently born infants in response to unexpected, loud noise. Evolutionary psychology suggests that the elicitation of a startle response in an infant has an
evolutionary purpose (i.e., teleological purpose) of facilitating survival. This response elicits crying from the infant that may alert his/her mother who, being physiologically responsive to the unique cry of her offspring, is alerted to her infant’s distress and has the opportunity to respond to potential dangers.

Now, because the startle response is an innate response there must be innate dynamics that operate to produce the response. From Aristotle’s perspective, the baby’s startle response will have an underlying association with pain; more precisely, the underlying pain associated with the infant’s startle response must be a natural pain due to the fact that the startle response is an innate, unlearned response. Natural fear with its underlying association with natural pain provides the innate dynamic, which produces the startle response (i.e., the baby’s crying). An example of a natural pain that underlies the startle response is the infant’s innate and painful sensitivity to loud noises that in the real world may represent impending danger (e.g., a lion’s roar).

In addition to natural fears, Aristotle (1984) taught that certain fears are learned or habituated. These fears are acquired through both experience and learning. These acquired fears are formed by such things as early childhood experiences, education, and culture, all of which will contribute to the habituation process that has the aforementioned underlying association with pleasure and pain. These learned fears are habituated or conditioned and may be elicited from
either the sensitive appetite or the rational appetite. For example, a dog that has been punished by being swatted with a rolled up newspaper will begin to cower at the sight of his master holding a rolled up newspaper. The dog's fear is a learned or conditioned response and the fear is elicited by the sight of his master holding a newspaper. Since the fear is both learned and elicited by the dog's specific sensible of sight, the passion is considered to be from the sensitive appetite. Only man can have rational fears that are elicited from the rational appetite because only man has the rational/intellectual faculties. An example of a fear that emanates from the rational appetite is a man’s fear that if he is not thorough with the reporting of his taxes he will likely make errors and then be fined and have to pay the I.R.S. additional money. In order for the man to conceptualize the possible outcome of a lack of thoroughness he will need to utilize his deliberative imagination to visualize potential consequences he may encounter due to his lack of thoroughness.

Aristotle’s work on Rhetoric illustrates his understanding of the cognitive and experiential aspects of emotion by illustrating how the rhetorician can induce feelings in individuals through rhetoric. Aristotle (1984) wrote:

Let us now describe the conditions under which we ourselves feel fear. If fear is associated with the expectation that something destructive will happen to us, plainly nobody will be afraid who believes nothing can happen to him; we shall not fear things that we believe cannot happen to us, nor people who we believe cannot inflict them upon us; nor shall we be
afraid at times when we think ourselves safe from them. It follows therefore that fear is felt by those who believe something to be likely to happen to them, at the hands of particular persons, in a particular form, and at a particular time. People do not believe this when they are, or think they are, in the midst of great prosperity, and are in consequence insolent, contemptuous, and reckless--the kind of character produced by wealth, physical strength, abundance of friends, power; nor yet when they feel they have experienced every kind of horror already and have grown callous about the future, like men who are being flogged to death--if they are to feel the anguish of uncertainty, there must be some faint expectation of escape. This appears from the fact that fear sets us thinking what can be done, which of course nobody does when things are hopeless. Consequently, when it is advisable that the audience should be frightened, the orator must make them feel that they really are in danger of something, pointing out that it has happened to others who were stronger than they are, and is happening, or has happened, to people like themselves, at the hands of unexpected people, in an unexpected form, and at an unexpected time. (p. 2203)

Daring Considered Specifically

The contrary of fear is daring or confidence, which is a passion that steadies or calms a person in the face of danger. Daring, being one of the irascible passions, has the purpose of mustering a subject’s resources to overcome or escape an apparent evil that is difficult to overcome or avoid. Aristotle (1984) described some of the cognitive and experiential factors that contribute to daring in the following:

As for our own state of mind, we feel confidence if we believe we have often succeeded and never suffered reverses, or have often met danger and escaped it safely. For there are two reasons why human beings face danger calmly: they may have no experience of it, or they may have means to deal with it: thus when in danger at sea people may feel confident about what will happen either because they have no experience of bad weather, or
because their experience gives them the means of dealing with it. We also feel confident whenever there is nothing to terrify other people like ourselves, or people weaker than ourselves, or people than whom we believe ourselves to be stronger—and we believe this if we have conquered them, or conquered others who are as strong as they are, or stronger. Also if we believe ourselves superior to our rivals in the number and importance of the advantages that make men formidable—plenty of money, men, friends, land, military equipment (of all, or the most important, kinds). Also if we have wronged no one, or not many, or not those of whom we are afraid. And when we are being wronged; and generally, if our relations with the gods are satisfactory, as will be shown especially by signs and oracles for anger makes us confident and, anger is excited by our knowledge that we are not the wrongers but the wronged, and that the divine power is always supposed to be on the side of the wronged. Also when, at the outset of an enterprise, we believe that we cannot fail, or that we shall succeed. So much for the causes of fear and confidence. (p. 2204)

In the preceding quote, Aristotle identified that such things as experience, possession of the means with which one can successfully deal with a dangerous situation, the assessment or cognitive appraisal that we are stronger than the presenting danger, the belief that we have been wronged, and the passion of anger, can all contribute to the elicitation of confidence.

**Anger and fear: Aristotle’s Formulation of the Fight or Flight Response**

Now nature has a twofold tendency: first, to govern each thing in itself, secondly, to withstand outward assailants and corruptives: and for this reason she has provided animals not only with the concupiscible faculty, whereby they are moved to that which is conducive to their well-being, but also with the irascible power, whereby the animal withstands an assailant. (Aquinas, 1915, p. 1402)

Aristotle’s understanding of the passions of fear, daring, and anger has much in common with modern formulations of the fight or flight response. In the
modern understanding of the fight or flight response, animals, including humans, are equipped with an instinctual physiological response that mobilizes an animal’s physiological resources to overcome or escape an apparent threat or danger. This response involves physiological changes such as the release of adrenaline, increased heart rate, etc. Aristotle taught that all passions are accompanied by changes in the body. In particular he noted that changes in breathing, heart rate, body temperature, and blood flow accompany both fear and anger. This bodily transmutation is an important point of congruence between Aristotle’s understanding of the irascible passions and modern formulations of the fight and flight response. Not only does Aristotle’s model posit the same purpose or teleological end for anger and fear as the flight or fight response (i.e., to muster an animal’s resources to avoid or overcome an apparent evil), but it also recognizes many of the same observed changes in the body (e.g., changes in breathing, heart rate, blood flow, blanching or flushing of the face, and changes in body temperature).

The fact that the irascible passions are shared by man and animal, is another significant point of Aristotle’s model that is in congruence with modern evolutionary theory and the biological sciences. The irascible emotions muster an animal’s resources to obtain the good that is difficult to obtain and to avoid or overcome the evil that is difficult to avoid or overcome. Aristotle’s formulation
of the irascible passions is similar to modern formulations of the fight or flight response. In the modern understanding of the fight or flight response, animals, including humans, are equipped with an instinctual physiological response that mobilizes an animal’s physiological resources to overcome or escape an apprehended evil. As with the other passions, fear can be natural or learned. Nature has equipped animals with a natural fear of that which is contrary to their nature, but man may also develop fears that are learned or habituated. An example of natural or unlearned fear would be the startle response that is found in infants. An example of a learned or habituated fear would be the fear of dishonor that Spartans were taught to have if they were to abandon their shield and flee from battle.

The Dynamic Role of Temperament

In similar situations, individuals frequently emote and behave differently from one another. In fact, it is not uncommon for the same individual to emote and behave differently to similar situations at different times. Aristotle attributes some of this variance of emotion and behavior to variances of physiologically-based temperament among individuals. According to Aristotle, there is a great deal of variance regarding physiology from one person to another. This variance of physiology produces variance in temperament, which in turn contributes to
differences in affective experience, behavior, and overall phenomenology. He identifies several temperament types that are based on the “neurochemistry” of his day.

Aristotle’s archaic physiological explanations for temperament involved such things as the quantity and temperature of black bile in an individual’s body; the temperature of the blood; the thickness or thinness of the blood; whether the blood was turbid or clear; and how much of the basic elements of earth, water, fire, or air are involved. Due to our present purposes, we will not be going into any significant detail regarding classical philosophy’s physiological explanations for differences in temperament. What is important is to highlight the point that although Aristotle did not have access to modern insights into neurochemistry, he nevertheless attributed differences in temperament to physiologically-based factors and believed that temperament has a significant impact on emotion, behavior, and overall phenomenological experience.

Aristotle adopted classical philosophy’s temperament typology that identified four prototypical temperament types and their associated emotional, behavioral, and phenomenological correlates. The four temperament types were the sanguine, choleric, atrabilious (melancholic), and phlegmatic (moist). According to Aristotle each of the various types of temperament represents a physiological substrate of emotional, behavioral, and overall phenomenological experience.
Individuals with the prototypically sanguine temperament are temperamentally inclined toward being cheerful, enthusiastic, passionate, warm, pleasant, confident, ardent, optimistic, and hopeful. The temperamentally-based hopefulness associated with the sanguine temperament is a constitutive element of the natural courage and optimism that are characteristic of sanguineous individuals. Classical philosophy attributed differences in blood temperature to be the primary cause of the sanguine temperament (Aristotle, 1984).

Natural courage can be considered a natural virtue. Natural virtue is that virtue that is attributable to one’s physiologically-based temperament or nature. For example, one individual may temperamentally be more inclined to respond courageously than another. Natural virtue can be considered as a physiological substrate of virtue. It is not considered virtue in its fullest sense because it lacks the knowledge of the good and a degree of intent in its development and execution. Natural virtue can be thought of as the physiological substrate that predisposes one for the development of virtue in its fullest sense.

Individuals with a prototypically choleric temperament are characteristic or temperamentally irritable, irascible, hot-tempered, querulous, aggressive, and bold. Aristotle believed that the choleric temperament was the result of such things as the quantity of bile in a person's body, the temperature of the bile, and the presence of more earthy matter in the blood. These physiologically-based
factors were thought to produce the prototypal temperamental characteristics of the choleric temperament type. Regarding the role that blood plays in the choleric temperament, Aristotle (1984) wrote:

…animals, on the other hand, as have thick and abundant fibres in their blood are of a more earthy nature, and of a choleric temperament, and liable to bursts of passion. For anger is productive of heat; and solids, when they have been made hot, give off more heat than fluids. The fibers therefore, being earthy and solid, are turned into so many hot embers in the blood and cause ebullition in the fits of passion. (p. 1013)

In the immediately preceding quote, we see that Aristotle believed that temperament has a reciprocal relationship with the passions. He believed that physiologically-based temperament plays a role in the production of one’s emotional experience, and that one’s emotional experience can impact the physiological factors responsible for temperament. For example, when an individual with a choleric temperament becomes angry according to the dynamics of the nutritive, sensitive, or rational appetite his/her anger will become more intense due to the reactive nature of his or her temperament. A similar dynamic is described by Millon (1999) where he posits that in some individuals there is a functional dominance of the sympathetic nervous system that inclines them to be more physiologically and therefore emotionally reactive. What is important here is to understand that Aristotle’s model posits a reciprocal relationship between emotion and temperament. In his model, emotional experience can be triggered
by temperament, but emotions that originally were not the result of unique temperamental characteristics or dynamics will interact with temperament and become qualitatively altered in terms of intensity and subsequent behavioral expression.

Another of the prototypical temperaments is the melancholic (atrabilious) temperament. This type of temperament was thought to be the result of a preponderance of black bile. Black bile was thought to be responsive to temperature in that it was susceptible to becoming very hot or very cold; consequently, the manner in which a person is impacted by a melancholic temperament will be determined by such things as the quantity of black bile, the temperature of the black bile, and the involvement of the element of air. When the black bile is cooled it makes individuals more timid, fearful, cowardly, dull, stupefied, depressed, and lethargic. For, “...the force which gives rise to such a condition is the temperament according as it contains heat or cold. If it is cold beyond due measure, it produces groundless despondency...” (Aristotle, 1984, p. 1501).

When the black bile in a person’s body is heated, it has quite different effects. The heat-induced effects that black bile has on an individual’s affect, behavior, and overall phenomenology depends on the degree to which it is heated. When the black bile is overly heated relative to the mean, it causes individuals to
become “…frenzied, or clever or erotic or easily moved to anger and desire…” (Aristotle, 1984, p. 1501). Elsewhere Aristotle (1984) wrote:

In respect too of facing dangers an atrabilious state causes great variation, in that many of those who are in this condition are inconsistent under the influence of fears; for they vary from time to time according to the state in which their bodies happen to be in respect of their atrabilious temperament. Now this temperament is itself also inconsistent, just as it produces inconsistency in those suffering from the diseases which it causes; for, like water, it is sometimes cold and sometimes hot. And so the announcement of something alarming, if it occurs at a time when the temperament is rather cold, makes a man cowardly; for it has already prepared a way for the entrance of fear, and fear has a chilling effect (as is shown by the fact that those who are greatly alarmed tremble). If, however, the temperament is inclined to be hot, fear reduces it to a moderate temperature and causes a man to be in his senses and unexcited. So too with the despondency which occurs in everyday life (for we are often in the condition of feeling grief without being able to ascribe any cause for it, while at other times we feel cheerful without knowing why)… (p. 1502)

Aristotle uses the more transient effects of alcohol consumption to illustrate the effect that temperament has on affect, behavior, and overall phenomenological experience. He points out that although Dionysian indulgence is more ephemeral in duration than the more enduring and trait-like effects of temperament, nevertheless, there are several similarities between the two. Aristotle (1984) wrote:

One can easily see that wine has a variety of effects by observing how it gradually changes those who drink it; for, finding them chilled and taciturn as the result of abstinence, a small quantity makes them more talkative, while a larger quantity makes them eloquent and bold, and, when they proceed to action, reckless, and a still larger quantity makes them insolent and afterwards frenzied, while outrageous excess enfeebles them and makes
them stupid like those who have been epileptic from childhood, and very similar to those who are exceedingly atrabilious. As, therefore, …an individual as he drinks and takes wine in different quantities changes his character, so there are men who embody each character. For the temporary condition of one man when he is drunk is the permanent character of another, and one man is loquacious, another emotional, another easily moved to tears; for wine has this effect also on some people…Others become compassionate or savage or tacitum; for some maintain a complete silence, especially those atrabilious subjects who are out of their minds. Wine also makes men amorous; as is shown by the fact that a man who is drinking is induced to kiss those whom, owing to their appearance or age, no sober person would kiss. Wine then gives a man extraordinary characteristics, but for a short time only, while nature gives them permanently for the period of a lifetime; for some men are bold, others tacitum, others compassionate, and others cowardly by nature. (pp. 1499-1500)

In the preceding quote, Aristotle described how men are endowed by nature with a physiologically-based temperament that is trait-like. In other words, temperament is a physiologically-based template of emotion, behavior, and overall phenomenological experience. An individual is born with a variety of affective and consequently behavioral proclivities. It is important to keep in mind that, according to Aristotle, all behavior is elicited by the passions; therefore, if an individual’s temperament contains affective proclivities which have a teleological purpose of generating movement or behavior, then affective proclivities also produce behavioral proclivities. It is interesting to note that emotional dynamics are also responsible for instinctual behavior.
We will be exploring the concept of *natural virtue* in more detail later, but for now it is sufficient to point out that, according to Aristotle, temperament is a major component of his model of psychology, and that it provides an inborn or natural physiological substrate for emotion, behavior, and phenomenological experience. Although Aristotle attributes significant importance to the influence of nature in regards to the constitution of temperament, his understanding of temperament is not a form of biological reductionism or biological determinism. He attributes great significance to the role of temperament, but at the same time emphasizes the importance of experience and of the dynamic role of regulatory mechanisms (e.g., the moral virtues) that compensate for or regulate one’s inborn or natural proclivities.

Aristotle did not think that a particular individual’s temperament has a constant and invariable effect upon his or her affect and behavior. On the contrary, he thought that temperament can fluctuate within a particular individual. Variation of one’s temperament is thought to change the way one’s temperament impacts his or her affect and behavior. Such things as illness, alcohol consumption, and temperature interact to produce changes in emotion and behavior. Aristotle (1984) wrote:

To sum the matter up, owing to the fact that the effect of black bile is variable, atrabilious persons also show variation; for the black bile becomes very hot and very cold. And because it has an effect upon the character (for
heat and cold have such an effect to a greater extent than anything else in us), like wine mingling in a stronger or weaker form in the body, it gives us our own special characters. Now both wine and black bile are full of breath [air]. And since it is possible for a variable state to be well tempered and in a sense a favourable condition, and since it is possible for the condition to be hotter and then again cold, when it should be so, or to change to the contrary owing to excess, the result is that all atrabilious persons have remarkable gifts, not owing to disease but from natural causes. (p. 1502)

The preceding quote warrants some additional examination. Aristotle believed that variability of temperament can be a favorable phenomenon. He believed that a variable temperament can be more responsive to the needs of a particular situation. A variable temperament can enhance adaptability to environmental circumstances due to its capacity to generate a greater range of emotional responses. A greater range of emotional responses, in turn, produces a greater range of behavioral responses. He thought that the variability of the atrabilious or melancholic temperament was due to the capacity of black bile to become very cold or very hot. He also believed that this variability of the melancholic temperament allowed for greater adaptability to the needs of a given situation.

Aristotle believed that the melancholic temperament had advantages beyond that of the increased variability of affect and behavior. He wrote that, “Those in whom the excessive heat dies down to a mean temperature are atrabilious, but they have more practical wisdom and are less eccentric and in many respects superior to others either in education or in the arts or in public life.” (Aristotle,
Additionally, Aristotle believed that the melancholic temperament is more common in those who excel in philosophy, politics, poetry, and the arts. Aristotle (1984) wrote:

> Why is it that all those who have become eminent in philosophy or politics or poetry or the arts are clearly of an atrabilious temperament…Any many others of the heroes seem to have been similarly afflicted, and among men of recent times Empedocles, Plato, and Socrates, and numerous other well-known men, and also most of the poets. For many such persons have bodily afflictions as the result of this kind of temperament, while some of them obviously possess a natural inclination to affections of this kind; in a word, they all, as has been said, are naturally atrabilious.” (pp. 1498-1499)

Aristotle’s belief that a melancholic temperament is more common among artistically inclined individuals is supported by some modern empirical investigations. Wood, Wood, & Boyd (2002) cite several studies in which mood disorders have been found to have high rates of occurrence in writers and artists (Jamison, 1995; Schildkraut et al., 1994), as well as in composers, and entertainers (Ludwig, 1995, 1996). Additionally, there have been serious ethical questions raised about the ethical implications of the use SSRI antidepressant medications. Kramer (1997) also shares Aristotle’s view of the contributions that a melancholic temperament may make to society and the arts when he pointed out how a variety of seminal thinkers appear to have drawn from their melancholic temperaments insights that contributed to their work. Kramer (1997) also went on
to discuss the ethical implications of what has been referred to as cosmetic pharmacology which tinkers with the temperament of individuals.

One possible ethical implication that was raised by Kramer (1997) is that there may be benefits both for individuals and society as a whole that are, at least partially, influenced by a touch of melancholy; consequently, if modern advancements in science and medicine eradicates all forms of melancholy the benefits may be lost as well. Another issue that warrants consideration is that some forms of depressed mood and anxiety may be existential in nature and may make significant contributions to an individual’s depth, growth, and maturity. Is there an ethical issue that involves trying to determine if an individual is experiencing an existential, neurotic, or a biological mood disturbance, or a combination of all three? Does medicating an existential mood disturbance assuage existential angst, thereby removing the discontent that may end up producing the changes that lead to a deeper and more meaningful existence?

It is important to note that Aristotle believed that there are varying degrees of each particular type of temperament. Some individuals may be slightly choleric, while others are extremely so, in regards to their emotional experience and expressive behaviors. These varying degrees of temperament may be due to the quantity of the humor involved, or may be due to a variety of other factors such as environment, habit, diet, temperature, etc. Additionally, the various humors were
thought to exist in everyone and to play an important role in the physiological processes that produce affect. It is the preponderance of one of the basic humors that is constitutive of the prototypical variants of temperament. Regarding how the humors are responsible for the physiological processes of emotion and of how temperament can be thought of as falling on a continuum in terms of degree to which one’s temperament deviates from the mean and toward a prototypical humor-based temperament (i.e., sanguine, melancholic, phlegmatic, and choleric), Aristotle (1984) wrote:

…such feelings and those usually called superficial feelings occur to a slight degree in every one, for something of the force which produces them is mingled in everyone; but those who are thoroughly penetrated by them acquire them as a permanent part of their nature. For as men differ in appearance not because they possess faces but because they possess certain kinds of faces, some handsome, others ugly, others with nothing remarkable about them (those, that is, who are naturally ordinary); so those who possess an atrabilious temperament in a slight degree are ordinary, but those who have much of it are quite unlike the majority of people. For, if their condition is quite complete, they are very atrabilious; but, if they possess a mixed temperament, they are men of genius. (p. 1501)

Although Aristotle believed that physiological factors are significant constitutive elements of temperament, he also believed that a variety of additional factors such as experience, environment, habituation, and illness can significantly impact a particular individual’s temperament. Aristotle’s understanding of how experiential factors can impact temperament positions his model of psychology as
an integrative and holistic approach regarding the ongoing nature vs. nurture debate within the discipline of psychology.

Aristotle also believed that one’s chronological age is a factor that has a significant impact on emotion, behavior, and overall phenomenological experience. According to Aristotle men of different chronological ages characteristically have different temperamental characteristics. Aristotle (1984) wrote that, “Young men have strong passions, and tend to gratify them indiscriminately” (p. 2213). This he attributes to at least three factors: (a) young men have qualitatively different physiologies than middle aged and older men and therefore have different temperaments due to age-related physiological factors; (b) their age makes them more future-oriented in outlook than those of other age groups; and, (c) they lack the experience necessary for the development of the regulatory mechanisms (e.g., moral virtues) and the intellectual insights which are necessary for the mature regulation of affect. Aristotle (1984) wrote:

To begin with the youthful type of character. Young men have strong passions, and tend to gratify them indiscriminately. Of the bodily desires, it is the sexual by which they are most swayed and in which they show absence of self-control. They are changeable and fickle in their desires, which are violent while they last, but quickly over: their impulses are keen but not deep-rooted, and are like sick people's attacks of hunger and thirst. They are hot-tempered and quick-tempered, and apt to give way to their anger; bad temper often gets the better of them, for owing to their love of honour they cannot bear being slighted, and are indignant if they imagine themselves unfairly treated. While they love honour, they love victory still more; for youth is eager for superiority over others, and victory is one form
of this. They love both more than they love money, which indeed they love very little, not having yet learnt what it means to be without it… They look at the good side rather than the bad, not having yet witnessed many instances of wickedness. They trust others readily, because they have not yet often been cheated. They are sanguine; nature warms their blood as though with excess of wine; and besides that, they have as yet met with few disappointments. Their lives are mainly spent not in memory but in expectation; for expectation refers to the future, memory to the past, and youth has a long future before it and a short past behind it: on the first day of one's life one has nothing at all to remember, and can only look forward. They are easily cheated, owing to the sanguine disposition just mentioned. Their hot tempers and hopeful dispositions make them more courageous than older men are; the hot temper prevents fear, and the hopeful disposition creates confidence; we cannot feel fear so long as we are feeling angry, and any expectation of good makes us confident. (p. 2213)

In the above-mentioned quote, Aristotle identifies age-related physiological factors, cognitive factors, and behaviorally conditioned factors that are experiential in nature as having an impact on temperament. These factors create qualitative differences in affective experience, which in turn create qualitative, as well as quantitative differences, in behavior and one’s overall phenomenological experience.

As we have seen, Aristotle’s model of psychology has a holistic understanding of the human person. It posits that even though emotion can be elicited and shaped by the operations of the intellectual faculty, all emotion is, nevertheless, considered to be of the body. Aristotle understanding of the physiological domain is multifaceted in regards to how physiology impacts the emotional life of man. He believed that the physiological factors shaped temperament, which is a
constitutive element of emotion, and through emotion impacts the phenomenological and behavioral life of man. Temperament represents one of the facets or components of the physiological domain and is considered by Aristotle to be one of the most significant factors that shape emotional experience. In other words, temperament contributes to affective experience, which in turn plays a constitutive role in shaping an individual’s phenomenological experience, behavior, and overall characterological development and functioning.

If we consider Bipolar disorder from the perspective of Aristotle’s model we can call it a disorder or condition of the affective faculty. Aristotle description of the affective, behavioral, and phenomenological dynamics of the melancholic temperament has some striking similarities to the bipolar nature of the affective, behavioral, and phenomenological features of the bipolar disorders. As will be seen in the following quotation, Aristotle described symptoms of both depression (e.g., psychomotor retardation) and mania. Aristotle (1984) wrote:

Now black bile, which is naturally cold and not on the surface, being in the condition mentioned above, if it abounds in the body, produces apoplexy or torpor or despondency or fear; but when it is overheated, it produces cheerfulness accompanied by song, and frenzy, and the breaking forth of sores, and the like… But those who naturally possess an atrabilious temperament immediately develop diverse characters in accordance with their various temperaments; for example, those who are originally full of cold black bile become dull and stupid, whereas those who possess a large quantity of hot black bile become frenzied or clever or erotic or easily moved to anger and desire, while some become more loquacious. Many too, if this heat approaches the region of the intellect, are affected by
diseases of frenzy and possession; and this is the origin of Sibyls and
soothsayers and all inspired persons, when they are affected not by disease
but by natural temperament. (p. 1502)

The Dynamic Role of Imagination: The Interaction of the
Sensitive and Rational Faculties

Aristotle’s model of psychology places great emphasis on the role that
imagination plays in the dynamics of such things as perception, emotion,
motivation, dreams, memory, thinking, behavior, and the subjective nature of
experience. According to Aristotle, the imagination (phantasia) produces the
mental images (phantasma) that play an essential role in the dynamics of the
above-mentioned phenomena. According to Aristotle (1984), “…imagination is
that in virtue of which an image arises for us…” (p. 680).

Two Types of Imagination: The Sensitive and Deliberative Imagination

Aristotle differentiated two kinds of imagination or mental imagery: sensitive
imagination and deliberative imagination. Aristotle (1984) wrote that the,
“Sensitive imagination… is found in all animals, deliberative imagination only in
those that are calculative…” (p. 690). In other words, the sensitive imagination
like the sensitive faculty is common to all animal life, including humans, while
the deliberative imagination is unique to human beings. The deliberative
imagination is unique to humans because it involves the use of the rational
intellect or rational cognition.
The *sensitive imagination* produces the mental images that accompany sense perception. To understand the role and content of the images of the sensitive imagination, we must review the role of the specific and common sensibles in the process of perception. For Aristotle the specific sensibles (i.e., sight, hearing, taste, touch, and smell) work in conjunction with what are referred to as the common sensibles (e.g. movement, rest, figure, magnitude, number, and unity). Each one of the specific sensibles is associated with its own sense organ while the common sensibles are not associated with a specific sense organ. Input from the specific sensibles is integrated by the common sensibles to create the images that form the content of perception. These images are thought of as the sense imagination. For example, when a man perceives a dog, he experiences an integrated representation of the dog that we refer to as perception. He perceives that the dog has four legs (number), that the dog is of a certain size (magnitude), that the dog is of a certain shape (figure), and hears that the dog barks (sound).

According to Aristotle, the integrated object representations that form the contents of perceptions are images produced by the imagination.

The *deliberative imagination*, as we have said, is found only in humans and provides content for the operations of the intellect. Imagination, for Aristotle, is a necessary component of thinking in that it provides the raw content that is utilized in the processes of thought. Aristotle (1984) wrote, “To the thinking soul images
serve as if they were contents of perception (and when it asserts or denies them to be good or bad it avoids or pursues them). That is why the soul never thinks without an image” (p, 685). In other words, according to Aristotle, humans think in images. These images are object representations that are utilized in a variety of ways to provide the content for the various activities of the intellectual faculty (e.g., reasoning). The process of thinking involves the manipulation of these images or object representations. Table 4.8 illustrates Aristotle’s differentiation of the sensitive and deliberative imagination.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.8</th>
<th>Aristotle’s Differentiation of Two Types of Imagination</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sensitive Imagination</strong></td>
<td><strong>Deliberative Imagination</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Produces the images that accompany sense perception</td>
<td>• Provides the content of necessary for thought and the operations of the intellect</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Found in all animals</td>
<td>• Found only in humans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Forms the content or object representations of sense perception</td>
<td>• Rational thought utilizes the images of the deliberative imagination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Forms perception from the input of the specific sensibles (sensation)</td>
<td>• The images of the deliberative imagination are necessary to attach meaning to words used in language</td>
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</table>

To illustrate how the process of rational (ratiocinative), or deliberative thought utilizes mental imagery consider the following example of a man who has decided
to build a house for himself. It is through the production and manipulation of mental imagery that the man is able to intentionally envision what the house will look like when it is finished. In order to accomplish the task of building the house, the man must be able to imagine what can exist potentially (the house to be built) in order to take the steps necessary for the house to become an actuality. When he considers or deliberates where he should obtain the required materials, he intentionally imagines his options by drawing forth from his imagination images that represent his options. When considering how to go about getting a supporting beam into place, he again intentionally utilizes mental imagery as he reviews in his mind the necessary steps that will be required. If he begins to deliberate what may go wrong and imagines that the support beam may not fit, he may measure the log to ensure the proper length and then can proceed with confidence. It becomes evident that mental images that are deliberately elicited are involved throughout the building process. At each step in the process of building a house that is not yet built, one must be able to visualize what is needed to make what exists potentially in image an actuality in reality. This accompaniment of imagery with deliberative thought, logic, or reason is referred to as the deliberative imagination.

Aristotle’s holistic understanding of the human person is clearly represented in his understanding of the interactive relationships that exist between sense
perception, imagination, and thinking. He believed that everything that exists in the intellect and the imagination must have first been in the senses.

Furthermore, Aristotle thinks of images as being the very content matter of thought. Aristotle (1984) wrote:

> Since it seems that there is nothing outside and separate in existence from sensible spatial magnitudes, the objects of thought are in the sensible forms, viz. both the abstract objects and all the states and affections of sensible things. Hence no one can learn or understand anything in the absence of sense, and when the mind is actively aware of anything it is necessarily aware of it along with an image; for images are like sensuous contents except in that they contain no matter.” (p. 687)

Aristotle taught that humans have the ability to consciously evoke and manipulate mental images in a variety of ways. Aristotle (1984) wrote, “For imagining lies within our own power whenever we wish (e.g. we can call up a picture, as in the practice of mnemonics by the use of mental images)” (p. 680).

Aristotle’s assertion that man has a degree of volition control over the images in his imagination has important implications for the role of mental imagery in the psychological processes of man. For example, as Aristotle pointed out, man can consciously link images with specific information to help him to retain knowledge, as occurs with the use of mnemonic learning or recollection strategies. Humans can also combine elements of one image with elements of other images to create new combinations that do not actually exist in reality (e.g., centaurs, harpies, minotaurs, & mermaids). Imagination, therefore, provides the
raw content or material for such things as creative activity, the arts, and practical planning. It is the volitional control of the deliberative imagination that allows man to consciously direct the use of images. In other words, Aristotle taught that the imagination, which he indicated is of the body, responds to the direction of the rational faculties. This represents a significant dimension of his understanding of the interaction between the physiological and intellectual domains.

*Imagination and Language*

For Aristotle, communication using spoken language depends upon the ability to associate sounds with corresponding mental images that link sound and meaning. Concerning the accompaniment of imagination with the spoken word, Aristotle (1984) wrote, “…what produces the impact must have soul in it and must be accompanied by an act of imagination, for voice is a sound with a meaning...” (p. 679). In other words, upon hearing the sounds that constitute a particular word, an individual’s imagination produces meaning-laden images that link those particular sounds with specific meanings. For Aristotle it is the imagination’s storehouse of sound/word-related images that makes spoken language possible. An extension of Aristotle’s thought would have imagination playing the same role for the written language, which is particularly evident in the ancient pictographic forms of written language. In pictographic forms of written
language, the writer uses symbols or written images to represent various meanings. In this example the written image would elicit from the imagination a mental image of what the pictograph represents, thereby making written language possible.

*Imagination and Memory*

According to Aristotle, images also provide the contents of memory. In his work *On Memory*, Aristotle (1984) wrote, “…memory even of intellectual objects involves an image and the image is an affection of the common sense…” (p. 714). For example, if a man, who had perceived a dog, were to close his eyes and call forth from his memory the scene he had just perceived, we would say that he is remembering the scene. In the process of remembering, he will elicit an integrated image of the dog. This integrated image would contain the input from the specific sensibles (i.e., sight, sound, etc.) and the input of the common sensibles (i.e., magnitude, number, figure, etc.). It is the summoning forth of the mental image that allows him to remember what the dog looked like, sounded like, etc.

The faculty of imagination is considered to be one of the common sensibles and produces the integrated object representations that form the contents of memory. The common sensibles, according to Aristotle, are of the body but respond to and can be directed by the processes of the intellect. The role that
imagination plays in memory is additional evidence of his holistic understanding of the relationship between the mind and body.

**Imagination and Emotion**

Aristotle taught that imagination also plays an important role in the operations of the appetitive faculties and the dynamics of emotion. Aristotle (1984) wrote that thinking and mental imagery elicit emotion, “For thinking and imagination…produce that which brings about the affections, since they produce the forms which bring them about” (p. 1096). In other words, images can be objects of the appetite in a manner similar to actually seeing a desirable object. Aristotle (1984) described how a man can intentionally summon a mental image of a desirable object by using his deliberative imagination, and that the mental image then becomes an object of the appetite “…as it were present to the eye of imagination” (p. 2183). Consider, for example, how it is an image that is presented to the appetite when a man thinks of a future good that exists as a potentiality, but does not yet exist as an actuality. If one is to contemplate a potential good that is not present to the senses he must use his imagination. Imagery is also involved when passions are elicited from sense perception because of the above mentioned role that mental imagery plays in the integration of the input of the specific sensibles in the processes of the common sensibles.
Aristotle’s understanding of the role images play in the affective experience of man has important implications for man’s ability to shape his emotional experience, behavior, and overall phenomenology. As we have seen above, man has some volitional control over his imagination and can evoke and shape the images that he experiences. These images in turn have the ability to elicit emotion which in turn elicits movement or behavior; therefore, by consciously shaping and evoking certain images, man has the ability to elicit certain passions or emotions that are central in the processes of motivation and behavior. In other words, by consciously evoking or shaping mental imagery, man can impact both his emotions and his behavior.

Aristotle’s understanding of the role that images play in the mental, behavioral, and affective life of human beings is very similar to certain aspects of Beck’s (1979) cognitive-behavioral therapy and Ellis’s (1975) rational emotive behavioral therapy. Aristotle, Beck, and Ellis all have imagery playing a role in the elicitation of affect and behavior (Aristotle, 1984; Beck, 1979; Ellis 1975). Aristotle conceptualization of the role and content of mental images also has several similarities to Beck’s (1979) conceptualization of the content and role of schema. Aristotle’s understanding of how mental images are object representations that influence emotions and behavior also has much in common with modern object relations theory (Millon, 1996, 1999, & 2000).
Deliberation, Choice, and Opinion

In order to illustrate Aristotle’s psychodynamic and holistic understanding of psychology and human behavior, we must first examine his conceptualization of deliberation, choice, and opinion because these are constitutive elements of uniquely human behavior and experience. These constitutive elements of human behavior and overall phenomenological experience involve the whole person, in that they involve the interaction of the rational and irrational parts of man. In describing these phenomena Aristotle provides a very specific and detailed account and description of the various constituents of human consciousness and overall phenomenology. One could even say that in his account of these and other phenomena Aristotle is providing operationalized definitions of his model of psychology.

Deliberation

According to Aristotle, deliberation is a power or process of the intellectual/rational faculty, and as such it is unique to human, because humans are the only species of animal that possess the intellectual faculty. The ability to deliberate allows humans to engage in distinctly human behaviors that are qualitatively different than the behaviors of the rest of the animal kingdom. Deliberate behaviors are those behaviors that are elicited or initiated by the process of deliberation. The process of deliberation involves thinking about
things that are within one’s ability to do or accomplish. Deliberation is an act or process of the intellectual faculty and the passions that elicit deliberate behaviors are considered to be of the rational appetite or will. Aristotle (1962) makes three important points in Nicomachean Ethics where he wrote: “… (a) man is the source of his actions; (b) deliberation is concerned with things attainable by human action; and (c) actions aim at ends other than themselves” (p. 62).

Deliberation is an important part of Aristotle’s conceptualization of human beings as being free, self-creating and self-constituting individuals. According to Aristotle (1962), “…we deliberate about matters which are done through our own agency…” (p. 61). Aristotle indicated that deliberation involves the use of rational cognition concerning what means to employ to obtain a particular end. Aristotle’s use of the term deliberation refers to the thinking, reasoning, discernment, or analysis that an individual undertakes prior to initiating particular actions or means to obtain a particular end. Through a process of rational deliberation, an individual reaches a decision regarding which means to select to attain a desired end. Once a means to the end has been decided upon, the decision elicits from the appetite the deliberative desire or choice that will motivate the individual or provide the desire that is required to generate movement. Rational deliberation is an inseparable constituent of choice. Aristotle (1962) said this succinctly when he wrote:
Since then, the object of choice is something within our power which we desire as a result of deliberation, we may define choice as a deliberate desire for things that are within our power: we arrive at a decision on the basis of deliberation and then let the deliberation guide our desire. So much for an outline of choice, its objects, and the fact that it is concerned with means rather than ends. (p. 63)

In his analysis of deliberation, Aristotle makes a special point of identifying what deliberation and the subject of deliberation is and is not. He makes the point that not all kinds of rational thinking is deliberation, but only the thinking or reasoning about certain things that are within one’s power to do or not to do and which admit to being done differently. According to Aristotle one may wish or dream about accomplishing things that are beyond one’s ability to obtain, but one does not deliberate about things that one cannot accomplish by their own efforts.

According to Aristotle, these so called deliberate acts carry the weight of responsibility because they are acts that have been deliberated upon and chosen prior to being acted upon. This weight of responsibility has significant implications because the possession of agency means that we play a constructive role in the shaping of our behaviors, and that the deliberate desires that we experience are our own creations as are our deliberate behaviors. This aspect of Aristotle’s thinking is another significant point of congruence between Aristotle’s model of psychology and phenomenological/existential philosophies, theories and therapies, which will be discussed in greater detail in the discussion section.
Choice & the Necessity of Deliberation

Choice is another constitutive element of uniquely human behavior. Choice, as mentioned above, is always preceded by deliberation, or as Aristotle (1984) put it, “...choice cannot exist without thought” (p. 1683). Deliberation is a power/process of the intellectual faculty, and according to Aristotle’s model, human beings alone possess the intellectual faculty; therefore, choice is unique to humans. Choice involves the production of emotion or desire that is elicited by the process of deliberation and, therefore, is considered rational desire that arises out of the rational appetite. The decision that is reached through the process of deliberation elicits desire, which in turn, unless otherwise frustrated, will lead to deliberative behavior. In Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle (1984) wrote:

The same thing is deliberated upon and is chosen, except that the object of choice is already determinate, since it is that which has been decided upon as a result of deliberation that is the object of choice. For every one ceases to inquire how he is to act when he has brought the moving principle back to himself and to the ruling part of himself; for this is what chooses....The object of choice being one of the things in our own power which is desired after deliberation, choice will be deliberate desire of things in our own power; for when we have decided as a result of deliberation, we desire in accordance with our deliberation. (pp. 1756-1757)

Aristotle makes it clear that choice involves both deliberation (thinking) and the emotion that is elicited by the deliberative process. The deliberative process produces rational desires that elicit rationally derived behaviors. Aristotle’s understanding of the cognitive and affective nature of choice is another clear
example of his holistic understanding of the relationship between the mind and the body. It should be kept in mind, that while the operations of the intellect are thought to elicit rational desires, the desires themselves and the appetitive faculty which produces them are considered to be of the body.

*Wish: A Rational Desire*

A wish, according to Aristotle, is a kind of desire that can elicit behavior. He wrote, “What prompts us to action is desire; and desire has three forms--appetite, passion, wish.” (Aristotle, 1984, p. 1878). Aristotle differentiates wish from choice and makes a point of stating how wish is teleological in nature and has an end as its object, while choice has the means as its object rather than the ends.

In *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle described the relationship between wish and apprehended good and apprehended evil. Aristotle (1984) wrote,

> That wish is for the end has already been stated; some think it is for the good, others for the apparent good. Now those who say that the good is the object of wish must admit in consequence that that which the man who does not choose aright wishes for is not an object of wish (for if it is to be so, it must also be good; but it was, if it so happened, bad); while those who say the apparent good is the object of wish must admit that there is no natural object of wish, but only what seems so to each man. Now different things appear so to different people, and, if it so happens, even contrary things.

If these consequences are unpleasing, are we to say that absolutely and in truth the good is the object of wish, but for each person the apparent good; that that which is in truth an object of wish is an object of wish to the good man, while any chance thing may be so to the bad man, as in the case of bodies also the things that are in truth wholesome are wholesome for bodies which are in good condition, while for those that are diseased other things are wholesome--or bitter or sweet or hot or heavy, and so on; since
the good man judges each class of things rightly, and in each the truth appears to him? (pp. 1757-1758)

There are several key elements from the above quotation that warrant additional consideration. The first is that Aristotle raises a problematic issue that was raised by Socrates. According to Socrates, people only wish for the good; however, this creates a problem, because clearly people don’t always wish or choose what is good. Aristotle, maintains that people only wish for the good; however, according to Aristotle, what is actually wished for is an apprehended good of some kind and not necessarily an objective good. He points out how this explains how different people wish for different and even contrary things. The fact that an apprehended good is the object of wish rather than an objective good also explains how individuals may wish for what is objectively harmful.

Another significant point that Aristotle made is that each state of character has its own ideas of what is noble and pleasant. Here we also see that Aristotle made an explicit link between the ability to perceive truth and healthy characterological functioning. In other words, there is an interaction between beliefs and character that shapes not only emotional and consequently behavioral responses, but it also shapes one’s cognition or ideas. Aristotle (1984) wrote:

For each state of character has its own ideas of the noble and the pleasant, and perhaps the good man differs from others most by seeing the truth in each class of things, being as it were the norm and measure of them. In most things the error seems to be due to pleasure; for it appears a good
when it is not. We therefore choose the pleasant as a good, and avoid pain as an evil. (pp. 1757-1758)

**Opinion**

Opinion is another constitutive element of uniquely human acts. According to Aristotle (1984), “…opinion involves belief for without belief in what we opine we cannot have an opinion… Further, every opinion is accompanied by belief, belief by conviction, and conviction by discourse of reason…” (p. 681). Aristotle taught that opinions may be either true or false and that humans form opinions about things that may be otherwise. Opinion, itself, is comprised of belief and imagery.

**Voluntary and Involuntary Actions**

Aristotle identifies several mitigating factors that need to be considered when determining the responsibility attributed to chosen actions. For Aristotle, freedom is a necessary component of responsibility. From Aristotle’s perspective the weight of moral responsibility is present only when actions are voluntary in nature, “Therefore, it is I dare say, indispensable for a student of virtue to differentiate between voluntary and involuntary actions, and useful also for lawgivers, to help them in meting out honors and punishments” (Aristotle, 1962, p. 52). In other words, Aristotle believed that not only is the concept of voluntary and involuntary actions indispensable for understanding virtue, but also that the
“psychological” understanding of what constitutes voluntary and involuntary actions provides a basis for law. The psychological basis for law and individual culpability continues, today, to be an inherent part of our legal system and is clearly illustrated by the frequent use of the expert testimony of psychiatrists and psychologists as well as by the body of law that exists regarding juveniles.

Regarding involuntary acts, Aristotle (1984) wrote:

Those things, then, are thought involuntary, which take place under compulsion or owing to ignorance; and that is compulsory of which the moving principle is outside, being a principle in which nothing is contributed by the person who acts or is acted upon, e.g. if he were to be carried somewhere by a wind, or by men who had him in their power. (p. 1752)

According to Aristotle the circumstances of the moment must be considered when considering if an act is voluntary or involuntary. Aristotle (1984) wrote:

But with regard to the things that are done from fear of greater evils or for some noble object (e.g. if a tyrant were to order one to do something base, having one's parents and children in his power, and if one did the action they were to be saved, but otherwise would be put to death), it may be debated whether such actions are involuntary or voluntary. Something of the sort happens also with regard to the throwing of goods overboard in a storm; for in the abstract no one throws goods away voluntarily, but on condition of its securing the safety of himself and his crew any sensible man does so. Such actions, then, are mixed, but are more like voluntary actions; for they are worthy of choice at the time when they are done, and the end of an action is relative to the occasion. Both the terms, then, 'voluntary' and 'involuntary', must be used with reference to the moment of action .... Such actions, therefore, are voluntary, but in the abstract perhaps involuntary; for no one would choose any such act in itself. (p. 1752)
Pleasure and pain play important roles in both Aristotle’s model of psychology and in his conceptualization of character, virtue, and vice. Aristotle (1984) taught that, “…every passion and every action is accompanied by pleasure and pain” (p. 1744). According to Aristotle what one comes to associate pain and pleasure to is an important constitutive element of character.

According to Aristotle (1962), “…all beasts and all men pursue pleasure…” (p. 209). However, “…since no single nature and no single characteristic condition is, or is regarded, as the best [for all], people do not all pursue the same pleasure, yet all pursue pleasure” (Aristotle, 1962, p. 209). In other words, different people find different things to be pleasurable, but all people still seek that which they find to be pleasurable.

Aristotle believed that pleasure seeking played an essential role in the generation of behavior even if a particular individual is unaware of the role that pleasure seeking plays in his/her motivation. Aristotle (1962) wrote, “Perhaps they do not even pursue the pleasure which they think or would say they pursue, but they all pursue the same [thing], pleasure” (p. 209).

Aristotle considers it imperative that one come to associate pleasure and pain to the right things because it is the underlying, automatic, and habituated associations of pleasure and pain and the consequent responses that actively
shapes or constitutes one’s character, phenomenology, and behavior.

Therefore, “…every study both of virtue and of politics must deal with pleasures and pains, for if man has the right attitude toward them, he will be good; if the wrong attitude he will be bad” (Aristotle, 1962, p. 38). In Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle (1984) wrote:

> Again, it [pleasure] has grown up with us all from our infancy; this is why it is difficult to rub off this passion, engrained as it is in our life. And we measure even our actions, some of us more and others less, by pleasure and pain. For this reason, then, our whole inquiry [regarding character, virtue, and vice] must be about these [pleasure and pain]; for to feel delight and pain rightly or wrongly has no small effect on our actions. (p. 1745)

The following quote from Aristotle (1962) illustrates several important aspects of his dynamic conceptualization of the roles of pleasure and pain:

> An index to our characteristics is provided by the pleasure or pain which follows upon the tasks we have achieved. A man who abstains from bodily pleasures and enjoys doing so is self-controlled; a man who endures danger with joy, or at least without pain, is courageous; if he endures it with pain he is a coward. For moral excellence is concerned with pleasure and pain; it is pleasure that makes us do base actions and pain that prevents us from doing noble actions. For that reason, as Plato says, men must be brought up from childhood to feel pleasure and pain at the proper things; for this is correct education. (pp. 36-37)

The first important point that Aristotle made, in the above quotation, is that the pain and/or pleasure that accompanies various actions can reveal the condition of one’s character. Secondly, pleasure is identified as the reason why people tend to do base acts, and pain is identified as a reason why people avoid doing noble
deeds. The third point that Aristotle (1962) made in the above citation is that it is important to educate children how to, “feel pleasure and pain at the proper things” (p. 37). It is important to note that Aristotle believed that some pleasures and pains are intrinsic to our natures and that some are learned or habituated. It is the learned or habituated pleasures and pains that are open to being “educated.”

Aristotle, like many modern theorists, emphasized the importance of society and culture in the shaping of a person’s character. He taught that culture has a significant impact on character development and advocated taking steps to create the social conditions (e.g., laws) that foster or facilitate the development of healthy character, by helping individuals come to associate pain and pleasure to the right things from their youth. Right education, for Aristotle, involves the training or conditioning of both one’s affective faculties and one’s intellectual faculties (e.g., practical reason, deliberative ability), so that one’s affective responses and cognitive processes are in line with what right reason would dictate.

The dynamics of pleasure and pain underlie or form the basis of an individual’s subjective appraisal of an object being an apparent good or an apparent evil. Apparent goods are associated with pleasure, and apparent evils are associated with pain, or as Aristotle put it, “…pleasure and pain are the principal end in
respect of which we say that this is an evil, and that a good…” (as cited in Aquinas, 1915, p. 1435).

Aristotle (1984) identified several ways that an individual’s character can be adversely impacted by an association of pleasure and/or pain that does not conform with right reason and objective reality when he wrote:

…every state of soul has a nature relative to and concerned with the kind of things by which it tends to be made worse or better; but it is by reason of pleasures and pains that men become bad, by pursuing and avoiding these—either the pleasures and pains they ought not or when they ought not or as they ought not, or by going wrong in one of the other similar ways that reason can distinguish. (p. 1745)

In the above quotation, Aristotle identified three ways that one can go wrong in regards to pain and pleasure: (a) an individual can pursue or avoid pleasures or pains that he or she should not pursue or avoid; (b) an individual may pursue or avoid pains or pleasures when they should not; and (c) an individual may pursue or avoid pleasure or pain in a manner that they ought not. This was not an exhaustive list of ways that pleasure and pain can lead one astray, and Aristotle makes a point of stating that reason can distinguish similar ways that man can go wrong in regards to habituated responses to pleasures and pains. Here we see the connection between pleasure and pain and approach and avoidance.

Aristotle formulated a dynamic understanding of the relationship between pain and pleasure. Aristotle (1962) wrote that,
pleasure drives out pain. When men experience an excess of pain, they pursue excessive pleasure and bodily pleasure in general, in the belief that it will remedy the pain. These remedial (pleasures) become very intense—and it is the very reason why they are pursued—because they are experienced in contrast with their opposite. (pp. 210-211)

This understanding of how engaging in pleasurable activities can be a form of mood regulation or self-medication has similarities with modern models of psychology and constructs such as negative reinforcement and secondary gain.

Aristotle also believed that one’s temperament could significantly influence one’s use of pleasurable activities to modulate one’s mood, which in turn influences one’s character:

people of excitable nature always need relief; for even their body is ever in torment owing to its special composition, and they are always under the influence of violent desire; but pain is driven out both by the contrary pleasure, and by any chance pleasure if it be strong; and for these reasons they become self-indulgent… (Aristotle, 1984, p. 1824)

For Aristotle, characterological health or virtue involves the congruence of affective experience (pleasure and pain), right reason, action, and objective truth. Incongruence or conflict between or among one’s emotion, cognition, or behavior is considered to be opposed to virtue and hence, opposed to characterological health. In the virtuously ordered character, one’s emotional dynamics, rooted as they are in pleasure and pain, habitually provide the emotional impetus for virtuous behavior and against vice. In fact, character itself refers both the emotional and behavioral life of man. According to Aristotle, all behavior is
initiated by emotion, consequently, character, which shapes and regulates the affective experience of man, is also responsible for initiating, constituting, and regulating behavior. Regarding the unity of emotion, behavior, and reason that is characteristic of virtue, Aristotle (1984) wrote:

…just acts are pleasant to the lover of justice and in general excellent acts to the lover of excellence. Now for most men their pleasures are in conflict with one another because these are not by nature pleasant, but the lovers of what is noble find pleasant things that are by nature pleasant; and excellent actions are such, so that these are pleasant for such men as well as in their own nature. Their life, therefore, has no further need of pleasure as a sort of adventitious charm, but has its pleasure in itself. For, besides what we have said, the man who does not rejoice in noble actions is not even good; since no one would call a man just who did not enjoy acting justly, nor any man liberal who did not enjoy liberal actions; and similarly in all other cases.

If this is so, excellent actions must be in themselves pleasant. But they are also good and noble, and have each of these attributes in the highest degree, since the good man judges well about these attributes and he judges in the way we have described. (p. 1737)

According to Aristotle learned behavior is shaped, generated, and perpetuated by the dynamics of pleasure and pain. Sherman (1989) wrote:

On Aristotle’s view, practice is neither necessary nor sufficient for acquiring states and abilities if it did not yield derivative pleasures. For it is the pleasure proper to a particular activity that impels us to perform that activity the next time with greater discrimination and precision [she then provides the following quotation from Aristotle]: “For the pleasure proper to an activity increases that activity. For those who perform their activities with pleasure judge better and discern with greater precision each thing, e.g., those finding pleasure in geometry become geometers, and understand the subject-matter better; and similarly also, lovers of music, lovers of building and so on, make progress [epididoasin] in their appropriate function when they enjoy it.” (p. 184)
Aristotle’s Biopsychosocial and Dynamic Conceptualization of Character, Virtue & Vice

Aristotle’s conceptualization of character, virtue and vice is based upon his model of psychology. In his conceptualization of character, he weaves together the various constitutive elements of human experience such as sensation, temperament, pleasure, pain, habit, and reason to formulate a model of character, virtue and vice that can be considered as an ancient model of psychology. Aristotle’s conceptualization of the dynamics of character and character development can be thought of as an ancient model of personality that has several points of congruence with modern conceptualizations of personality.

Aristotle’s Moral Philosophy: the Good, Happiness, Character and Virtue

Aristotle’s account of character, virtue, and vice can be found in his works concerning moral philosophy. *Eudemian Ethics*, *Nicomachean Ethics*, *Magna Moralia*, and *Virtue and Vice* are the four works that are traditionally included in the corpus aristotelicum that are devoted to the subject matter of moral philosophy; however, the *Magna Moralia* is considered to be of questionable authenticity and *On the Virtues and Vices* is considered spurious (Aristotle, 1984). *Eudemian Ethics* is thought to have been written prior to *Nicomachean Ethics* by as many as fifteen years; consequently, the writer focuses on *Nicomachean*
Ethics because it is thought to represent Aristotle’s mature thinking on the

To understand the overlapping nature of the subject matter of moral
philosophy and psychology it is helpful to take a brief look at Aristotle’s
classification of the sciences. According to Aristotle, there are three forms of
what he referred to as scientific knowledge that correspond to his three types of
sciences: theoretical (theōrētikē), productive (poiētikē), and practical (praktikē)
sciences. (Aristotle, 1962, p. xiv) According to Aristotle, the aim or end of the
theoretical sciences (metaphysics, physics, and mathematics) is to study truth for
its own sake. The aim or end of a productive science (art) is the production of
some object (e.g., the shoemaker art has the end of making shoes). In the case of
the practical sciences (politics, moral philosophy), the end is the good. Martin
Oswald offers a concise explanation of Aristotle’s classification of the sciences, in
his introductory notes to Nicomachean Ethics, where he makes the following
observations regarding the nature of the practical sciences:

For it is practical science that deals with the use of reason for the
organization of life itself, or better for living a good life. This means that
the practical sciences, ethics and politics, resemble the productive in that
the initiating motive (archē) is in man himself and not external to him, as in
the theoretical sciences. But in practical sciences man is the moral agent
rather than a producer. His end is not the creation of a product which will
exist independent of him once it is completed, but rather the living of a
certain kind of life. In other words, in the practical sciences the end is
neither the study (theōria) or knowledge (gnōsis) of something external to
man as it is in the theoretical sciences, not is it the creation of a product that will exist apart from him as soon as it is completed. It is the very activity of living a good life that is in itself the end. (Aristotle, 1962, p. xvii)

According to Aristotle’s classification system, moral philosophy is considered to fall under the discipline of politics. The term politics has a broader meaning for Aristotle than is commonly associated with the term today. Aristotle considered politics to be the master science of the good, and that the aim of politics as being the actualization of the good for the people of the city-state (polis). It is considered a master science because it utilizes the ends of the other sciences (e.g., economics, military science) for the actualization of the good of the citizenry.

According to Aristotle (1962), “…the main concern of politics is to engender a certain character in the citizens and to make them good and disposed to perform noble actions” (p. 23). This shows that one of Aristotle social and cultural influences on character and the overall phenomenological experience of the individual. Regarding the relationship between law and character Aristotle (1962) wrote:

Lawgivers make citizens good by inculcating (good) habits in them, and this is the aim of every lawgiver; if he does not succeed in doing that, his legislation is a failure. It is in this that a good constitution differs from a bad one. (p. 34)
In other words, not only did Aristotle think that social influences, such as the law, had an important influence on the inculcation of the habits that constitute character. It is also clear that he believed that these influences should be consciously utilized for the cultivation and benefit of the citizenry.

To illustrate the relevance of Aristotle’s moral philosophy to our investigation of character, virtue and vice, we will now take a closer look at the purpose that moral philosophy had for Aristotle and for ancient Greek philosophy in general. The first sentence of Aristotle’s (1984) *Nicomachean Ethics* reads, “Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim” (p. 1729). Aristotle’s moral philosophy, his model of psychology, and his conceptualization of character and virtue is permeated by this teleology of the good.

Aristotle identified happiness as that end that we seek for its own sake. In *Nicomachean Aristotle* (1984) wrote:

Now we call that which is in itself worthy of pursuit more complete than that which is worthy of pursuit for the sake of something else, and that which is never desirable for the sake of something else more complete than the things that are desirable both in themselves and for the sake of that other thing, and therefore we call complete without qualification that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else.

Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this we choose always for itself and never for the sake of something else, but
honour, pleasure, reason, and every excellence we choose indeed for themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still choose each of them), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness, judging that through them we shall be happy. Happiness, on the other hand, no one chooses for the sake of these, nor, in general, for anything other than itself. (p. 1734)

Elsewhere Aristotle (1962) wrote, “All the other goods are either necessary prerequisites for happiness, or are by nature co-workers with it and useful instruments for attaining it” (pp. 22-23). Therefore, the purpose of moral philosophy is to understand that which leads to happiness in order to act in a manner that is productive of happiness. As was previously stated, for Aristotle, moral philosophy or ethics is a practical science. And as a practical science the focus is not on the knowledge of the good for its own sake, but, rather knowledge of the good has the end of actualizing the good life.

It is important to note that Aristotle (1962) identified the end of moral philosophy as the actualization of the good in an individual’s character through the actions that are constitutive of character:

The purpose of the present study is not, as it is in other inquiries, the attainment of theoretical knowledge: we are not conducting this inquiry in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good, else there would be no advantage in studying it. For that reason it becomes necessary to examine the problem of actions, and to ask how they are to be performed. For, as we have said, the actions determine what kind of characteristics [character traits] are developed. (p. 35)
The preceding quotation illustrates an important aspect of Aristotle’s model of psychology—the character creating role of one’s actions. According to Aristotle (1962), “…actions determine what kind of characteristics [character traits] are developed” (p. 35). This is of no small significance, considering how character has a profound influence on one’s emotional experience, behaviors, perceptions, cognitions and overall phenomenological experience. The character-creating role that Aristotle attributes to actions makes Aristotle’s model of psychology and conceptualization of character non-deterministic or quasi-deterministic, and highlights the roles freedom and its consequence responsibility. Aristotle’s moral philosophy examines a wide range of phenomenon that are relevant to psychology. We will examine some of these in the light of modern empirical findings in the discussion section.

*The Character Continuum: Virtue and Vice*

Character is a term and concept familiar to both students and scholars of psychology. The word character has, at times, been used synonymously with the term personality. For example, the personality disorders of the *DSM—IV*’s Axis II disorders are also referred to as character disorders. But what is exactly is character, and what is it that is disordered in a character disorder? If character can be characterized as disordered, what are constituents of an ordered character? Character, as it is typically used, refers to enduring and relatively stable aspects of
an individual’s emotions, thinking, and behavior. Character is a topic of considerable interest in a variety of disciplines (e.g., Albizadeh, 2002; Cawley, Martin, & Johnson, 2000; Chang & Sanna, 2003; Combs, 2001; Dahlsgaard, Peterson, & Seligman, 2005; Dillon, 1995; Golluber, 1999; Inglis, 1999; Kateb, 2004; Killberg, 1997; Leonard, 1997; Lickona, 1991; London, 2001; McKinnon, 1999; Nicholson, 1998; Oates, 1936; Oderberg, 1999; Park, Peterson, & Seligman, 2004; Vaillant, 1994, 2000).

In English translations of Aristotle’s works, the word character is traditionally used as the English translation of the Greek word ἔθικης. Character typically refers to the relatively stable set or constellation of characteristics or traits that individuals have. According to Martin Oswald’s introduction to his translation of *Nicomachean Ethics* (Aristotle, 1962), “Virtue will…be a firmly established characteristic of the person, and the aggregate of all his characteristics will constitute his character” (p. xxiii).

In many ways, the terms character and character traits are synonymous with the terms personality and personality traits. Nancy Sherman (1989), a noted scholar of Aristotle’s works, wrote:

For Aristotle, as for us, the term [character] has to do with a person’s enduring traits; that is, with the attitudes, sensibilities, and beliefs that affect how a person sees, acts, and indeed lives. As permanent states, these will explain not merely why someone acted this way now, but why someone can be counted on to act in certain ways. (p. 1)
The virtues or excellences are strengths, habits, and/or characteristics that facilitate an individual’s successful pursuit of the good and the happiness for which he/she strives to achieve. According to Aristotle, the virtues help to regulate the affective, behavioral, and cognitive domains to facilitate the attainment of the good and the happiness for which an individual strives.

Aristotle’s use of the Greek word *aretē* has traditionally been translated as the English word virtue; however, the most recent version of *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation* uses the English word excellence for the Greek *aretē*. The English word virtue has its etymological origin in the Latin words *virtūt* & *virtus* meaning manliness, valor, or worth (Oxford, 2003). In Martin Oswald’s introduction to his translation of Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle, 1962) he wrote that, “The somewhat straight-laced and prudish connotations which “virtue” so often has in English are totally absent from the Greek [*aretē*]. The word denotes a functional excellence or virtue not only in Aristotle’s usage but throughout ancient Greek literature…” (p. xxii). It is interesting to note that the term virtue has had something of a comeback due to the resurgence of interest in virtue ethics and the use of the term virtue in positive psychology (Peterson, C. & Seligman, M., 2004).
Two Types of Virtue: Moral Virtues & Intellectual Virtues

Aristotle identified two types of virtue: moral virtue and intellectual virtue. The differentiation of the moral and intellectual virtues follows elements of human nature: the irrational (the nutritive and sensitive) and the rational (intellectual). Aristotle (1962) wrote, “Virtue, too, is differentiated in line with this division of the soul. We call some virtues ‘intellectual’ and others ‘moral’: theoretical wisdom, understanding, and practical wisdom are intellectual virtues, generosity and self-control moral virtues” (p. 32). According to Aristotle, the moral virtues regulate/shape the irrational or nonrational dimension of human nature and intellectual virtues regulate/shape the rational or intellectual dimension of human nature.

Moral virtue according to Aristotle involves the generation and/or regulation of the emotions that arise from the sensitive domain of the irrational dimension of human nature. In Aristotle’s model of psychology, both the nutritive and the sensitive domains are considered to be subdivisions of the irrational part of human nature. Regarding the nutritive faculty and its relationship to virtue Aristotle (1984) wrote, “…let us leave the nutritive faculty alone, since it has by its nature no share in human excellence [virtue]” (p. 1741). Aristotle did believe that the sensitive domain played an important and dynamic role in the emotional experience of human beings. In the following quotation, Aristotle (1984)
described some of the dynamics that occur between the emotions that originate from the sensitive domain and those that are either shaped by or originate from rational thought:

There seems to be also another irrational element in the soul--one which in a sense, however, shares in a rational principle. For we praise the reason of the continent [morally strong] man and of the incontinent [morally weak], and the part of their soul that has reason, since it urges them aright and towards the best objects; but there is found in them also another natural element beside reason, which fights against and resists it. For exactly as paralyzed limbs when we choose to move them to the right turn on the contrary to the left, so is it with the soul; the impulses of incontinent people move in contrary directions. But while in the body we see that which moves astray, in the soul we do not. No doubt, however, we must none the less suppose that in the soul too there is something beside reason, resisting and opposing it. In what sense it is distinct from the other elements does not concern us. Now even this seems to have a share in reason, as we said; at any rate in the continent man it obeys reason and presumably in the temperate and brave man it is still more obedient; for in them it speaks, on all matters, with the same voice as reason.

Therefore the irrational element also appears to be two-fold. For the vegetative [nutritive] element in no way shares in reason, but the appetitive and in general the desiring element in a sense shares in it, in so far as it listens to and obeys it; this is the sense in which we speak of paying heed to one's father or one's friends, not that in which we speak of 'the rational' in mathematics. That the irrational element is in some sense persuaded by reason is indicated also by the giving of advice and by all reproof and exhortation. And if this element also must be said to have reason, that which has reason also will be twofold, one subdivision having it in the strict sense and in itself, and the other having a tendency to obey as one does one's father. (pp. 1741-1742)

In the preceding quotation, Aristotle identifies three different dynamics that occur between the emotions that originate out of the sensitive domain and reason.
which originates out of the intellect: a.) The emotions elicited from the irrational element may be opposed to the dictates of reason; b.) the emotions elicited from the irrational element may be in conflict with the dictates of reason, initially, but then are modified in response to the dictates of the rational element as an obedient son would respond to his father’s instruction; or c.) the emotions elicited from the irrational element may be in congruence with the dictates of right reason. These dynamics between emotion, reason, and behavior represent an important aspect of Aristotle’s dynamic understanding of virtue, which posits that there are unique emotional dynamics behind different character traits, as well as behind all behavior. According to Aristotle, the moral virtues shape the emotions that originate from the sensitive dimension of human nature. The unique emotional dynamics of both virtue and vice will be examined later in the section that examines particular virtues and vices found in Aristotle’s model.

Habit, Responsibility Character, Moral Virtue and Vice

In the first lines of the second book of *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle (1962) described how both moral and intellectual virtues are cultivated or obtained, when he wrote,

Virtue, as we have seen, consists of two kinds, intellectual virtue and moral virtue. Intellectual virtue or excellence owes its origin and development chiefly to teaching, and for that reason requires experience and time. Moral virtue, on the other hand, is formed by habit, *ethos*, and its name, *ēthikē*, is therefore derived by a slight variation, from *ethos*. (p. 33)
As is indicated in the preceding quotation, Aristotle believed that moral and intellectual virtues are developed in different ways. He indicated that the origin of moral virtue is alluded to in the etymology of the Greek word for moral virtue, ἔθικη, which is derived from the Greek word for habit. Intellectual virtue, on the other hand, is primarily the result of teaching, experience, and time. Aristotle believed that moral virtue is developed through repeatedly engaging in certain activities. Aristotle (1984) wrote,

…excellences [virtues] we get by first exercising them, as also happens in the case of the arts as well. For the things we have to learn before we can do, we learn by doing, e.g. men become builders by building and lyre-players by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts. (p. 1743)

Aristotle’s assertion that moral virtues are cultivated through repeatedly acting in a virtuous manner is a significant feature of his model of psychology, one that makes his model of psychology a nondeterministic conceptualization of human nature without denying the influence of such things as temperament and socioeconomic factors. The idea that character traits or virtues can be cultivated through practice or repeated acts means that as human beings we play an important and constructive role in the creation of our character and character traits, which in turn profoundly shapes or constitutes our unfolding phenomenological experience. Aristotle’s belief in the constructive role that
human beings play in the creation of their character traits is a concept that has several important points of congruence with several modern models of psychology (e.g., humanistic, cognitive-behavioral, existential, and individual psychology).

It is interesting to note that Aristotle believed that how one treats others in their daily interpersonal interactions is constitutive of the individual’s emerging character traits and phenomenological experience. In Aristotle’s model of psychology, the choices and consequent actions that human beings make play an important and constructive role in the creation of their characters and consequent experience. Aristotle (1962) wrote,

Moreover, the same causes and the same means that produce any excellence or virtue can also destroy it, and this is also true of any art. It is by playing the harp that men become both good and bad harpists, and correspondingly with builders and all other craftsmen: a man who builds well will be a good builder, one who builds badly a bad one. For if this were not so, there would be no need for an instructor, but everybody would be born as a good or a bad craftsman. The same hold true of the virtues: in our transactions with other men it is by action that some become just and others unjust, and it is by acting in the face of danger and by developing the habit of feeling fear or confidence that some become brave men and others cowards. The same applies to the appetites and feelings of anger: by reacting in one way or in another to given circumstances some people become self-controlled and gentle, and others self-indulgent and short-tempered. In a word, characteristics develop from corresponding activities. For that reason, we must see to it that our activities are of a certain kind, since any variation them will be reflected in our characteristics. Hence it is no small matter whether one habit or another is inculcated in us from early childhood; on the contrary, it makes a considerable difference, or rather, all the difference. (pp. 34-35)
Aristotle was very clear that he believed that character, excepting for the influences of nature, environmental factors outside of one’s control, and cases of physical deformation and insanity, is self-constituted and that the actions we engage in become etched in our characters. Regarding the self-constituting nature of character Aristotle (1984) wrote:

…excellence also is in our own power, and so too vice. For where it is in our power to act it is also in our power not to act, and vice versa; so that, if to act, where this is noble, is in our power, not to act, which will be base, will also be in our power, and if not to act, where this is noble, is in our power, to act, which will be base, will also be in our power. Now if it is in our power to do noble or base acts, and likewise in our power not to do them, and this was what being good or bad meant, then it is in our power to be virtuous or vicious. (p. 1758)

It is important to keep in mind that by character traits or virtues Aristotle meant much more than the merely engaging in certain behaviors caused by the elicitation of certain emotions. Virtue, as it is conceptualized by Aristotle, is a multifaceted phenomena that plays a central role in the shaping of an individual’s overall phenomenological experience. Different character traits produce different emotions, cognitions, and behaviors. A particular virtue or character trait shapes not only what a person does, but also how he/she feels, perceives, and thinks. Sherman (1989) wrote that, “…the descriptions of the virtues of character are in all cases descriptions of character states which are at once modes of affect, choice, and perception” (p. 5). In other words, a virtue shapes what the individual
does, how he/she does it, and even why he/she does a particular act. In other words, character constitutes the subjective experience of the individual.

Aristotle’s emphasis on the self-constituting aspects of character and of one’s overall phenomenological experience is a significant point of congruence with existential psychotherapy’s perspective that existence precedes essence. In other words, Aristotle, existential psychotherapy, and constructivist approaches in general posit that an individual plays an important and constructive role in the creation of both his/her character and consequent phenomenological experience. Aristotle’s model includes both the character creating role of an individual’s actions, as well as acknowledging the roles of environmental influences, education, physiology, culture, family, early childhood experiences and economic givens. Aristotle positions on these matters are similar to Rollo May’s (1981) conceptualization of the interaction between freedom and destiny, where freedom refers to the self-determining role of the individual and destiny refers to various existential givens that are not within the individual’s control (e.g., where one is born, one’s parents, genes, etc.).

Aristotle indicated that one’s character shaped one’s overall phenomenological experience. This includes such things as desires, emotions, thinking, and actions. Aristotle (1962) wrote:
In the above quotation, it is clear that Aristotle is indicating that we have responsibility for our characters, but of no small significance is how he indicated that the ends that we set up for ourselves are influenced by the kind of person we are (i.e., character). This means that our character colors our view of the ends that are up for consideration. In fact, colors may be too weak of a word. Character actually shapes what the individual sees as good and what he/she sees as being bad. In other words, character shapes both what we pursue and what we avoid. It may even be that an individual may be unable to conceive of certain ends as being possible, rewarding or good because of his/her state of character.

Suto (2004) described how Aquinas indicated that there are two processes or paths by which individuals come to sound judgments regarding the good and its contrary. The first path is through the use of perfect reason and the second process was through what Aquinas alternatively called connatural judgment, judgment by inclination, affective cognition, and experiential cognition (Suto, 2004). The second path toward judgments regarding the good and its contrary refers to how the emotional aspect of character shapes one’s cognitive experience.
Virtues...play a crucial role in our attainment of moral and religious cognition; only those who have particular virtues have dispositions for cognition of the things related to the virtues. Thanks to the dispositions, one can come to know these things rightly and more perfectly. Whether the cognizer has a connaturality brought by some virtue makes a difference in the mode of his cognition and, furthermore, according to Aquinas's account..., this connaturality is a sort of love (amor). He also says that love brings desire (desiderium) to the thing loved and also joy (gaudium) when desire is fulfilled....Moreover, connatural knowledge can be characterized as noninferential since it is contrasted with "the perfect use of reason" or "inquiry by reason."

In the above quotation where Suto (2004) indicated that the term connatural refers to a sort of love that brings desire and joy when the desire is fulfilled, he is referring to Aristotle’s conceptualization of the object relations of love. Keeping in mind that one of the main elements of character is the felt or emotional “object relations” that result from what one has come to associate or cathect with pain and/or pleasure. This template of automatic pain and pleasure responses are also described as being varying degrees of hate and love that correlate to pain and pleasure respectively speaking. This forms a basis of automatic pain (some degree of hate or aversion) and pleasure (some degree of love or desire). In other words, some degree of pain, hate or aversion is involved in all avoidant behaviors and some degree of pleasure, love, attraction, and desire is involved in all approach behaviors. What Suto (2004) is indicating is that, according to Aquinas, an individual’s cognitions are influenced by the characterological associations to pain (hate) and pleasure (love).
The Psychodynamics of Character, Virtue, and Vice: The Role of Pleasure and Pain

The dynamics of pleasure and pain figure prominently in Aristotle’s model of character, virtue and vice. We will now examine the following aspects of Aristotle’s conceptualization of the dynamics of pleasure and pain: (a.) how pleasure and pain accompanies all emotions and behavior; (b.) how pleasure and pain are involved in the generation of approach and avoidance behaviors; (c.) the characterological dimensions of pleasure or pain; and, (d.) how the pleasure and pain that accompanies actions experiences reveals the state or condition of his/her character.

According to Aristotle, the dynamics of pleasure and pain are involved in all emotion and behavior, for according to Aristotle (1984), “…every passion and every action is accompanied by pleasure and pain” (p. 1744). In Aristotle’s model of psychology, what one comes to associate pain and pleasure to is an important constitutive element of character because the pleasure and/or pain that an individual feels in relation to different activities or objects determines the resulting approach or avoidance behaviors. It is the pleasure or pain that an individual experiences in relation to various objects or activities that provides the emotional or felt impetus for action.
The capacity to feel pleasure and pain is, according to Aristotle, common to all animals including humans. In fact, according to Aristotle, movement is the *differentia* that differentiates animal life from plant life and movement is generated by the felt impetus to action that is provided by either pleasure or pain.

According to Aristotle, animals possess the sensitive soul. Aristotle’s understanding of movement as being central to the concept of animal is embedded in the English words animal and animate, along which both share the Latin root of *Anima* which means soul.

According to his model of psychology, both pleasure and pain are involved in generating behavior toward or away from objects. According to Aristotle (1962), “…all beasts and all men pursue pleasure…” (p. 209). However, “…since no single nature and no single characteristic condition is, or is regarded, as the best [for all], people do not all pursue the same pleasure, yet all pursue pleasure” (Aristotle, 1962, p. 209). In other words, different people find different things to be pleasurable, but all people still seek that which they find to be pleasurable. According to Aristotle, pleasure-seeking is involved in approach behaviors. Aristotle believed that pleasure-seeking plays an essential role in the generation of behavior even when an individual is unaware of the role that pleasure-seeking plays in his/her motivation. He wrote, “Perhaps they do not even pursue the pleasure which they think or would say they pursue, but they all pursue the same
[thing], pleasure” (Aristotle, 1962, p. 209). Aristotle (1984) is also clear that pain is involved in the generation of avoidant behavior when he wrote, “We therefore choose the pleasant as a good, and avoid pain as an evil” (p. 1758).

**Pleasure & Pain: The Importance of Childhood**

According to Aristotle’s model of psychology and conceptualization of character, what one comes to experience pain and pleasure to, from infancy onward, is of no small significance. He believed that, from infancy onward, what one comes to associate to pleasure and pain is character creating. Aristotle described a developmental process that creates a characterological template of habituated pleasure and pain associations or reactions. In other words, we come to experience different degrees of pleasure (e.g., delight or joy) or pain (e.g., sorrow) to different objects or activities. These habituated associations of pleasure and pain form an automatic template of pain and pleasure responses that are triggered by different objects or activities. These habituated pain and pleasure responses shape the felt experience (pain or pleasure) of an individual in an automatic and characterological manner. These habituated responses of pain and pleasure shape the subjective felt experience of the individual, which in turn elicits characteristic behaviors.

What one comes to associate pain and pleasure to is, according to Aristotle, a significant issue. According to Aristotle, what we link pain and pleasure to
shapes what we do and what we avoid. Once these associations to pain and pleasure are established, they are difficult to change and tend to be self-perpetuating. In *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle (1984) wrote:

> Again, it [pleasure] has grown up with us all from our infancy; this is why it is difficult to rub off this passion, engrained as it is in our life. And we measure even our actions, some of us more and others less, by pleasure and pain. For this reason, then, our whole inquiry [regarding character, virtue, and vice] must be about these [pleasure and pain]; for to feel delight and pain rightly or wrongly has no small effect on our actions. (p. 1745)

For Aristotle, a virtuous character is one in which the habituated associations of pleasure and pain are formed in a manner that is congruent with virtuous action. For, “…every study both of virtue and of politics must deal with pleasures and pains, for if man has the right attitude toward them, he will be good; if the wrong attitude he will be bad” (Aristotle, 1962, p. 38). According to Aristotle, the virtuous individual feels delight in acting virtuously and pain in failing to act virtuously or acting in a base manner. In other words, virtue represents a condition of character in which emotion, thinking, and behavior are in congruence with each other.

Individuals who follow through on good actions and/or succeed in avoiding base actions only after overcoming their own emotional struggles are considered by Aristotle to be morally strong. The following quote from Aristotle (1962)
illustrates several important aspects of his dynamic conceptualization of the roles of pleasure and pain:

An index to our characteristics is provided by the pleasure or pain which follows upon the tasks we have achieved. A man who abstains from bodily pleasures and enjoys doing so is self-controlled; a man who endures danger with joy, or at least without pain, is courageous; if he endures it with pain he is a coward. For moral excellence is concerned with pleasure and pain; it is pleasure that makes us do base actions and pain that prevents us from doing noble actions. For that reason, as Plato says, men must be brought up from childhood to feel pleasure and pain at the proper things; for this is correct education. (pp. 36-37)

The first important point that Aristotle makes is that the pain and/or pleasure that accompanies various actions reveals the condition of one’s character. Secondly, pleasure is identified as the reason why people tend to do base acts and pain is identified as a reason why people avoid doing noble deeds. The third point that Aristotle (1962) made in the above citation is that it is important to educate children how to, “feel pleasure and pain at the proper things” (p. 37). It is important to note that Aristotle believed that some pleasures and pains are intrinsic to our natures (e.g., thirst due to dehydration) and that some are learned or habituated. It is the learned or habituated pleasures and pains that are able to be educated or habituated.

Pleasure and Pain: The Physiological Dimension

Aristotle believed that there is a physiological dimension of character, virtue, and vice. According to Aristotle, the physiological dimension of character also
operated according to the dynamics of pleasure and pain. Aristotle’s conceptualization of character includes both the natural (unlearned) and habituated or unnatural (learned) pleasure and pain responses that individuals experience in relation to various objects and activities. Natural pleasure and pain refers to the pleasure and pain that is rooted in one’s physiology, while unnatural pleasures and pains are the result of the habituation process. For example, according to Aristotle’s conceptualization of character, the influence of one’s temperament can significantly influence an individual’s use of pleasurable activities to modulate one’s mood, which in turn shapes the individual’s character. Aristotle (1984) wrote,

…people of excitable nature always need relief; for even their body is ever in torment owing to its special composition, and they are always under the influence of violent desire; but pain is driven out both by the contrary pleasure, and by any chance pleasure if it be strong; and for these reasons they become self-indulgent… (p. 1824)

There are a few important points that Aristotle illustrates in the immediately preceding quotation that warrant additional examination. First of all, he points out how an individual’s temperament, which he conceptualizes as being physiological in nature, can cause them to experience torment (which is a degree of pain) and violent desires for which they seek relief in pleasures. Aristotle (1984) indicated that these tormented individuals may seek relief, “…by any chance pleasure if it be strong; and for these reasons they become self-indulgent”
What Aristotle is describing here is the interaction between one’s physiologically-based temperament, environmental factors (chance pleasures), the dynamics of pleasure and pain (pleasure drives out pain), and the character trait (self-indulgent) that emerges from the confluence of these factors. Using psychological terminology, what Aristotle has provided here is an example of his multi-factorial understanding of the etiology of character. He described the interaction of biologically-based temperament the use of a mood-regulation strategy that gives rise to the character trait of being self-indulgent.

The physiological sources of pleasure and pain correspond to the pleasures and pains that arise out of the natural appetite; however, according to Aristotle’s model of psychology, disease, deformity, and/or insanity can cause an individual to experience unnatural pleasures and pains.

*Pleasure & Pain: Points of Congruence with Behavioral Perspectives*

There are certain aspects of the habituation of pleasure and pain that can be thought of as being similar to what behavioral psychology refers to as conditioned emotional responses. Aristotle’s description of the dynamics of pleasure and pain has several similarities with behavioral perspectives and what could be thought of as the emotional or felt dynamics of reinforcement (e.g., Skinner, 1986). In fact, in Aristotle’s model of psychology, learned behavior is generated, shaped, and perpetuated by the dynamics of pleasure and pain. In Aristotle’s model of
psychology, the pleasure and/or pain that an individual experiences is both an effect of behavior that has been engaged in previously and a cause of behavior. In both, Aristotle’s model and in behaviorism, pleasure can be thought of as being both a cause and an effect of behavior and can serve as a primary factor in reinforcement (Skinner, 1986). According to Sherman (1989):

On Aristotle’s view, practice is neither necessary nor sufficient for acquiring states and abilities if it did not yield derivative pleasures. For it is the pleasure proper to a particular activity that impels us to perform that activity the next time with greater discrimination and precision: ‘For the pleasure proper to an activity increases that activity. For those who perform their activities with pleasure judge better and discern with greater precision each thing, e.g., those finding pleasure in geometry become geometers, and understand the subject-matter better; and similarly also, lovers of music, lovers of building and so on, make progress in their appropriate function when they enjoy it.’ (p. 184)

From the preceding quotation it is clear, pleasure can be a reinforcer in a process similar to what behaviorism describes as positive reinforcement. Aristotle also described pain as being a source of avoidant behavior in a manner that is consistent with how behaviorism describes as negative reinforcement.

Pleasure and Pain: Points of Congruence with Cognitive Models

Aristotle, like many modern theorists, emphasized the importance of society and culture in the shaping of a person’s character. He taught that culture has a significant impact on character development and advocated taking steps to create the social conditions (e.g., laws) that foster or facilitate the development of
healthy character, by helping individuals come to associate pain and pleasure
to the right things from their youth. Right education, for Aristotle, involves the
training or conditioning of both one’s affective faculties and one’s intellectual
faculties (e.g., practical reason, deliberative ability), so that one’s affective
responses and cognitive processes are in line with what right reason would
dictate.

The dynamics of pleasure and pain underlie or form the basis of an
individual’s subjective appraisal of an object being an apparent good or an
apparent evil. Apparent goods are associated with pleasure, and apparent evils are
associated with pain. For as Aristotle wrote, “…pleasure and pain are the
principal end in respect of which we say that this is an evil, and that a good…” (as

Aristotle (1984) identified several ways that an individual’s character can be
adversely impacted by an association of pleasure and/or pain that does not
conform with right reason and objective reality:

…every state of soul has a nature relative to and concerned with the kind of
things by which it tends to be made worse or better; but it is by reason of
pleasures and pains that men become bad, by pursuing and avoiding these--
either the pleasures and pains they ought not or when they ought not or as
they ought not, or by going wrong in one of the other similar ways that
reason can distinguish. (p. 1745)
In the above quotation, we see Aristotle’s basic understanding of the role of pleasure/pain and approach/avoidance. He identified three ways that one can go wrong in regards to pain and pleasure: (a) an individual can pursue or avoid pleasures or pains that he or she should not pursue [e.g., pedophilia] or avoid [e.g., exercise]; (b) an individual may pursue or avoid pains or pleasures when they should not [e.g., while on duty]; and (c) an individual may pursue or avoid pleasure or pain in a manner that they ought not [e.g., shoplifting]. This was not an exhaustive list of ways that pleasure and pain can lead one astray, and Aristotle makes a point of stating that reason can distinguish similar ways that man can go wrong in regards to pleasures and pains.

Aristotle formulated a dynamic understanding of the relationship between pain and pleasure. Aristotle (1962) wrote:

…pleasure drives out pain. When men experience an excess of pain, they pursue excessive pleasure and bodily pleasure in general, in the belief that it will remedy the pain. These remedial (pleasures) become very intense—and it is the very reason why they are pursued—because they are experienced in contrast with their opposite. (pp. 210-211)

This understanding of how engaging in pleasurable activities can be a form of mood regulation or self-medication has similarities aspects of behaviorism such as negative reinforcement and secondary gain (Delprato & Midgley, 1992). The use of pleasure to remove unpleasant or painful emotional states also points of congruence with some modern explanations for substance abuse and overeating.
For Aristotle, characterological health or virtue involves the congruence of affective experience (pleasure and pain), right reason, action, and objective truth. Incongruence or conflict between or among one’s emotion, cognition, or behavior is considered to be opposed to virtue and hence, opposed to characterological health. In the virtuously ordered character, one’s emotional dynamics, rooted as they are in pleasure and pain, habitually provide the emotional impetus for virtuous behavior and against vice. In fact, character itself refers both the emotional and behavioral life of man. According to Aristotle, all behavior is initiated by emotion, consequently, character, which shapes and regulates the affective experience of man, and is also responsible for initiating, constituting, and regulating behavior. Regarding the unity of emotion, behavior, and reason that is characteristic of virtue, Aristotle (1984) wrote:

...just acts are pleasant to the lover of justice and in general excellent acts to the lover of excellence. Now for most men their pleasures are in conflict with one another because these are not by nature pleasant, but the lovers of what is noble find pleasant the things that are by nature pleasant; and excellent actions are such, so that these are pleasant for such men as well as in their own nature. Their life, therefore, has no further need of pleasure as a sort of adventitious charm, but has its pleasure in itself. For, besides what we have said, the man who does not rejoice in noble actions is not even good; since no one would call a man just who did not enjoy acting justly, nor any man liberal who did not enjoy liberal actions; and similarly in all other cases.

If this is so, excellent actions must be in themselves pleasant. But they are also good and noble, and have each of these attributes in the highest degree, since the good man judges well about these attributes and he judges in the way we have described. (p. 1737)
Various Factors Necessary for Virtue

For Aristotle, being virtuous and acting virtuously involves much more than merely experiencing certain emotions and performing certain actions or behaviors that are considered to be good. In order for an act to be considered to be virtuous, Aristotle believed, that in addition to the emotional experience and the outward behavior, being consistent with virtue there are additional cognitive factors that are also required:

…the factors involved in the arts and in the virtues are not the same. In the arts, excellence lies in the result itself, so that it is sufficient if it is of a certain kind. But in the case of the virtues an act is not performed justly or with self-control if the act itself is of a certain kind, but only if in addition the agent has certain characteristics as he performs it: first of all, he must know what he is doing; secondly, he must choose to act the way he does, and he must choose it for its own sake; and in the third place, the act must spring from a firm and unchangeable character. (Aristotle, 1962, p.39)

These requirements for virtue involve more than merely an automatic emotional and behavioral response that has been conditioned by repeatedly engaging in the types of behavior that are considered virtuous. These criteria require the involvement of the whole person, which includes use of the intellect and cognition. Acts done without knowledge, for personal gain, or from an inconsistent character are not actually considered to be virtuous.

Aristotle is also very clear that for an individual to be considered as virtuous, he/she must act virtuously. In this regard, Aristotle’s model of psychology and
conceptualization of character could be said to be similar to Alfred Adler’s individual psychology (Ansbacher & Ansbacher, 1956), in that Aristotle’s psychology is a psychology of use rather than a psychology of possession. In other words, knowledge of what is virtuous and the capacity to perform virtuous actions does not make one virtuous. What is necessary is that the individual act in a virtuous manner. According to Aristotle (1984),

…to excellence belongs activity in accordance with excellence. But it makes, perhaps, no small difference whether we place the chief good in possession or in use, in state or in activity. For the state may exist without producing any good result, as in a man who is asleep or in some other way quite inactive, but the activity cannot; for one who has the activity will of necessity be acting, and acting well. And as in the Olympic Games it is not the most beautiful and the strongest that are crowned but those who compete (for it is some of these that are victorious), so those who act rightly win the noble and good things in life. (p. 1736)

According to Aristotle (1984), “Excellence [virtue], then, is a state [characteristic/habit] concerned with choice, lying in a mean relative to us, this being determined by reason and in the way in which the man of practical wisdom would determine it” (p. 1748). With this statement two important aspects of virtue are identified: (a.) that the mean relative to us is determined by reason (which requires the use of the intellectual faculty), and (b.) the mean relative to us is determined, “in the way in which a man of practical wisdom would determine it” (Aristotle, 1964, p. 1748).
It is important to note that even if an individual’s emotional and behavioral response is at the virtuous intermediate between the vice of defect and the vice of excess, it is still not considered to be virtuous unless certain additional criteria are met. Aristotle (1962) wrote:

But in the case of the virtues an act is not performed justly or with self-control if the act itself is of a certain kind, but only if in addition the agent has certain characteristics as he performs it: first of all, he must know what he is doing; secondly, he must choose to act the way he does, and he must choose it for its own sake; and in the third place, the act must spring from a firm and unchangeable character. (p. 39)

These additional criteria for moral virtue have a variety of significant implications. First of all, it makes moral virtue something that is uniquely human because these additional criteria require the involvement of the intellectual faculty. It also means that moral virtue can never be the result of merely good biology, genetics, environment, or behavioral conditioning. The inclusion of these criteria means that moral virtue, by definition, must involve knowledge, freedom, love of the good, and must be characterological in nature.

Moral virtue, according to Aristotle, involves that which is the most human—the intellect. In a certain sense, Aristotle’s definition of moral virtue means that an individual must be the author of himself to be virtuous, for without freedom of choice, knowledge, and love of the good, the criteria for moral virtue are not met. Aristotle’s account of these aspects of virtue has distinctly humanistic overtones
and points of congruence with Maslow’s (1943) concept of self-actualization. It is also interesting to note that while virtue requires freedom, knowledge of truth and understanding, vice tends to enslave, involves ignorance, and distorts or acts against truth.

Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Virtuous Mean

The doctrine of the virtuous median refers to a significant aspect of Aristotle’s conceptualization of virtue and vice. According to Aristotle, the moral virtues represent a median or intermediate that falls between a vice of deficit or defect and a vice of excess. A vice of defect refers to a characteristic of an individual who does not experience enough of a particular emotion and behaves in a deficient manner in regards to the what would be warranted in the situation. A vice of excess refers to a characteristic that involves excessive emotion and behavior that goes beyond what would be considered appropriate. For example, in regards to anger, an individual with the vice of apathy (a vice of defect), characteristically does not experience enough anger in situations where anger is justified. Conversely, an individual with the vice of excess (short-tempered), in regards to anger, will characteristically experience too much anger, and will act in an overly angry manner.

The terms “characteristic” or “characteristically” are important when referring to either virtue and vice because the emotional and behavioral responses
associated with the characteristic are characterological in nature and reflect stable habits or dispositions to respond to situations with predictable affective and behavioral responses. When an individual acts in a manner that can be described as “out of character”, the emotions and behaviors are likely to be due to transient influence(s), extenuating circumstance(s), or morbidity (mental illness). The point is that vices of defect and vices of excess represent characteristic or characterological ways of emoting and behaving that involve either excessive or deficient emotions and behaviors.

The virtuous median is a characteristic that represents the intermediate between too much and too little of an emotion and/or behavior. Aristotle (1984) wrote:

…moral excellence [virtue]; for it is this that is concerned with passions and actions, and in these there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. For instance, both fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in general pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and too little, and in both cases not well; but to feel them at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right aim, and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of excellence. Similarly with regard to actions also there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. Now excellence is concerned with passions and actions, in which excess is a form of failure, and so is defect, while the intermediate is praised and is a form of success; and both these things are characteristics of excellence. Therefore excellence is a kind of mean, since it aims at what is intermediate. (pp. 1747-1748)

In Aristotle’s conceptualization of character, a particular characteristic (e.g., irascible) is constituted by the presence of a particular emotion (e.g., anger), of a
particular intensity (excessive anger), which results in consequent behaviors of a particular kind (e.g., quarrelsome behaviors). According to Aristotle’s model of psychology, character traits, and the emotions and behaviors which constitute the character traits, are viewed as falling on a continuum. The moral virtues allow an individual to characteristically experience the emotions and behaviors, “…at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right aim, and in the right way…” (Aristotle, 1984, p. 1747). Vices of defect or excess, on the other hand, do the opposite.

Aristotle did not think that the virtuous median represented a mathematical median between too much or too little of a particular characteristic. Nor did he view the virtuous median as some kind of static set of emotional and behavioral responses. Rather, he believed that there are numerous relative factors and considerations that come into play and that the virtuous median is relative to a particular individual. Aristotle (1984) pointed out the relative aspects of the virtuous median in the following:

For instance, if ten is many and two is few, six is intermediate, taken in terms of the object; for it exceeds and is exceeded by an equal amount; this is intermediate according to arithmetical proportion. But the intermediate relatively to us is not to be taken so; if ten pounds are too much for a particular person to eat and two too little, it does not follow that the trainer will order six pounds; for this also is perhaps too much for the person who is to take it, or too little--too little for Milo [a famous wrestler who lived in ancient Greece], too much for the beginner in athletic exercises. The same is true of running and wrestling. Thus a master of any art avoids excess and
defect, but seeks the intermediate and chooses this--the intermediate not in the object but relatively to us. (p. 1747)

It is clear from the preceding quotation that Aristotle believed that what is actually considered to be the virtuous intermediate is relative in several respects to the individual in question. This means that Aristotle’s view of what is actually the virtuous intermediate is determined by the particulars of a unique individual and his/her life circumstances. In other words, what is considered the virtuous intermediate is different for different individuals with different capacities and different life circumstances. There will also be variability in what is considered to be the intermediate, deficient, or excessive within the same individual according to the particulars of a given situation.

In fact, Aristotle goes into considerable detail at the beginning of Nicomachean Ethics to make it clear that determining what is good or right is difficult to determine. Aristotle (1984) wrote, “Now fine and just actions…exhibit much variety and fluctuation, so that they may be thought to exist only by convention, and not by nature” (p. 1730). Aristotle (1962) also wrote that, “…the term ‘good’ has as many meanings as the word ‘is’…” (p. 10). Aristotle’s (1984) understanding of the relative aspects of determining the best course of action is illustrated in the following:

But this must be agreed upon beforehand, that the whole account of matters of conduct must be given in outline and not precisely, as we said at the very
beginning that the accounts we demand must be in accordance with the subject-matter; matters concerned with conduct and questions of what is good for us have no fixity, any more than matters of health. The general account being of this nature, the account of particular cases is yet more lacking in exactness; for they do not fall under any art or set of precepts, but the agents themselves must in each case consider what is appropriate to the occasion, as happens also in the art of medicine or of navigation. (pp. 1743-1744)

Aristotle acknowledges the importance relative factors that are involved in determining the virtuous median have, but he also clearly states that some actions and passions do not have an appropriate mean. In other words, some actions and passions are considered inappropriate in and of themselves rather than being inappropriate due to an excess or deficit. Aristotle’s ethical model contains an appreciation of the need for relative considerations without denying the existence of valid objective or normative ethical considerations. Aristotle (1962) wrote:

But not every action nor every passion admits of a mean; for some have names that already imply badness, e.g. spite, shamelessness, envy, and in the case of actions adultery, theft, murder; for all of these and suchlike things imply by their names that they are themselves bad, and not the excesses or deficiencies of them. It is not possible, then, ever to be right with regard to them; one must always be wrong. Nor does goodness or badness with regard to such things depend on committing adultery with the right woman, at the right time, and in the right way, but simply to do any of them is to go wrong. It would be equally absurd, then, to expect that in unjust, cowardly, and self-indulgent action there should be a mean, an excess, and a deficiency; for at that rate there would be a mean of excess and of deficiency, an excess of excess, and a deficiency of deficiency. But as there is no excess and deficiency of temperance and courage because what is intermediate is in a sense an extreme, so too of the actions we have mentioned there is no mean nor any excess and deficiency, but however
they are done they are wrong; for in general there is neither a mean of excess and deficiency, nor excess and deficiency of a mean. (p. 44)

Table 4.9 illustrates the English words for the virtues and vices which have been used in Aristotle (1962, 1984).
Table 4.9  Aristotle’s (1962, 1984) Conceptualization of the Virtuous Mean and Taxonomy of Moral Virtue and Vice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regarding</th>
<th>Vice of Deficiency</th>
<th>Virtuous Mean</th>
<th>Vice of Excess</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feelings of fear and confidence</td>
<td>Cowardice</td>
<td>Courage</td>
<td>Reckless Rashness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleasure and pain</td>
<td>Insensible</td>
<td>Temperance Self-Controlled</td>
<td>Intemperance Self-Indulgence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giving and taking money</td>
<td>Stinginess Illiberality</td>
<td>Generous Liberality</td>
<td>Extravagance Prodigality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending on a grand scale</td>
<td>Niggardliness Pettiness</td>
<td>Magnificence</td>
<td>Gaudiness Vulgarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regarding honor and dishonor</td>
<td>Small-Mindedness Undue Humility</td>
<td>High-Mindedness Proper Pride</td>
<td>Vanity Vaingloriousness Empty Vanity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regarding Anger</td>
<td>Apathetic</td>
<td>Gentle</td>
<td>Short-Tempered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleasantness in our daily life</td>
<td>Quarrelsome Grouchy</td>
<td>Friendliness</td>
<td>Obsequious Flattery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regarding truth</td>
<td>Self-Depreciation Mock-Modest</td>
<td>Truthful Truthfulness</td>
<td>Boastfulness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleasantness in amusements</td>
<td>Boorishness</td>
<td>Wittiness</td>
<td>Buffoonery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modesty</td>
<td>Shameless</td>
<td>Modest</td>
<td>Abashed Overly Bashful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pain and pleasure we feel in regard to the fortunes of others</td>
<td>Envy Callousness</td>
<td>Righteous Indignation Just Resentment</td>
<td>Spite</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Courage, Cowardice, and Rashness/Recklessness

Courage, according to Aristotle, is the virtue that is involved in the regulation of fear and confidence in the face of that which may cause one to suffer a noble death. Aristotle (1984) wrote the following:

With regard to feelings of fear and confidence courage is the mean; of the people who exceed, he who exceeds in fearlessness has no name (many of the states have no name), while the man who exceeds in confidence is rash, and he who exceeds in fear and falls short in confidence is a coward. (p. 1748)

It should be kept in mind that ancient Greece was a place of near constant warfare, and that Aristotle was writing within a particular historical context teaching the young men who had the distinct possibility of being called upon to fight, lead and rule. Courage and valor in battle was prominent in the literature and religion of ancient Greece. But fearlessness can be demonstrated in a variety of ways in different situations in response to different threats. The following paragraph is worth examining in its entirety because in it Aristotle (1984) provided a highly nuanced description of what he was referring to when he wrote of the virtue courage:

That it is a mean with regard to fear and confidence has already been made evident; and plainly the things we fear are terrible things, and these are, to speak without qualification, evils; for which reason people even define fear as expectation of evil. Now we fear all evils, e.g. disgrace, poverty, disease, friendlessness, death, but the brave man is not thought to be concerned with all; for to fear some things is even right and noble, and it is base not to fear them--e.g. disgrace; he who fears this is good and modest, and he who does
not is shameless. He is, however, by some people called brave, by an extension of the word; for he has in him something which is like the brave man, since the brave man also is a fearless person. Poverty and disease we perhaps ought not to fear, nor in general the things that do not proceed from vice and are not due to a man himself. But not even the man who is fearless of these is brave. Yet we apply the word to him also in virtue of a similarity; for some who in the dangers of war are cowards are liberal and are confident in face of the loss of money. Nor is a man a coward if he fears insult to his wife and children or envy or anything of the kind; nor brave if he is confident when he is about to be flogged. With what sort of terrible things, then, is the brave man concerned? Surely with the greatest; for no one is more likely than he to stand his ground against what is dreadful. Now death is the most terrible of all things; for it is the end, and nothing is thought to be any longer either good or bad for the dead. But the brave man would not seem to be concerned even with death in all circumstances, e.g. at sea or in disease. In what circumstances, then? Surely in the noblest. Now such deaths are those in battle; for these take place in the greatest and noblest danger. And this agrees with the ways in which honours are bestowed in city-states and at the courts of monarchs. Properly, then, he will be called brave who is fearless in face of a noble death, and of all emergencies that involve death; and the emergencies of war are in the highest degree of this kind. Yet at sea also, and in disease, the brave man is fearless, but not in the same way as the seamen; for he has given up hope for safety, and is disliking the thought of death in this shape, while they are hopeful because of their experience. At the same time, we show courage in situations where there is the opportunity of showing prowess or where death is noble; but in these forms of death neither of these conditions is fulfilled. (pp. 1760-1761)

What appears to be a virtuous action from the level of behavioral observation may not actually be virtuous due to such factors as the agent’s intent and the dynamics which produced or influenced the action. Aristotle indicated that sometimes what may appear to be a demonstration of courage may actually be a vice. For example, Aristotle (1984) wrote:
But to die to escape from poverty or love or anything painful is not the mark of a brave man, but rather of a coward; for it is softness to fly from what is troublesome, and such a man endures death not because it is noble but to fly from evil. (p. 1762)

Moral virtue for Aristotle involves the production of emotion, behavior, cognition and intention. These various elements of virtue are produced by moral virtue and are characterological in nature, reflecting as they do habits of feeling, thinking, and behavior. The production of the various constituents of a particular virtue is caused by such things as temperament, the habituation of pleasure and pain, and the beliefs and cognitions of the individual. Regarding the various constituents of courage Aristotle (1984) wrote the following:

Now the brave man is as dauntless as man may be. Therefore, while he will fear even the things that are not beyond human strength, he will fear them as he ought and as reason directs, and he will face them for the sake of what is noble; for this is the end of excellence. But it is possible to fear these more, or less, and again to fear things that are not terrible as if they were. Of the faults that are committed one consists in fearing what one should not, another in fearing as we should not, another in fearing when we should not, and so on; and so too with respect to the things that inspire confidence. The man, then, who faces and who fears the right things and with the right aim, in the right way and at the right time, and who feels confidence under the corresponding conditions, is brave; for the brave man feels and acts according to the merits of the case and in whatever way reason directs. Now the end of every activity is conformity to the corresponding state. This is true, therefore, of the brave man as well as of others. But courage is noble. Therefore the end also is noble; for each thing is defined by its end. Therefore it is for a noble end that the brave man endures and acts as courage directs. (p. 1761)
Aristotle identifies five patterns that produce what are called courage, but lack some key factor required for true virtue: (a) political courage, (b) confidence due to experience, (c) fearlessness and confidence caused by passion, (d) the confidence of sanguine individuals, and (e) people who appear brave because they are ignorant of the danger. Aristotle (1984) wrote:

First comes political courage; for this is most like true courage. Citizens seem to face dangers because of the penalties imposed by the laws and the reproaches they would otherwise incur, and because of the honours they win by such action; and therefore those peoples seem to be bravest among whom cowards are held in dishonour and brave men in honour. (p. 1762)

According to Aristotle, what makes political courage fall short of the virtue of courage is how it is motivated for the external honors or to avoid the reproach of others. What is missing is the intrinsic love of the noble as an end in itself. Aristotle (1984) also thought that political courage was similar to those who are forced by leaders to fight under the threat of punishment and that this lacked the requirements of virtue for, “...one ought to be brave not under compulsion but because it is the noble thing to do” (p. 1762).

Experience produces confidence in the face of dangers, but Aristotle taught that this kind of confidence dissipates and courage is replaced by cowardice when disadvantage is discerned. According to Aristotle, this happens because the confidence was rooted in the assumption of superiority and not in the love of the noble and detestation of dishonor. Aristotle (1984) wrote:
experience makes them most capable of doing without being done to, since they can use their arms and have the kind that are likely to be best both for doing and for not being done to; therefore they fight like armed men against unarmed or like trained athletes against amateurs; for in such contests too it is not the bravest men that fight best, but those who are strongest and have their bodies in the best condition. Soldiers turn cowards, however, when the danger puts too great a strain on them and they are inferior in numbers and equipment; for they are the first to fly, while citizen-forces die at their posts, as in fact happened at the temple of Hermes. For to the latter flight is disgraceful and death is preferable to safety on those terms; while the former from the very beginning faced the danger on the assumption that they were stronger, and when they know the facts they fly, fearing death more than disgrace; but the brave man is not that sort of person. (p. 1763)

Passion too is able of producing actions and feeling states that have the appearance of courage; however, according to Aristotle’s conceptualization of virtue, there are several necessary constituents of virtue. Among these necessary constituents is choice which involves the intellect and the aim or intent needs to be noble. According to Aristotle (1984), confidence due to passion, although similar to the virtue courage, lacks the necessary requirements:

Passion also is sometimes reckoned as courage; those who act from passion, like wild beasts rushing at those who have wounded them, are thought to be brave, because brave men also are passionate; for passion above all things is eager to rush on danger, and hence Homer's 'put strength into his passion' and 'aroused their spirit and passion' and 'bitter spirit in his nostrils' and 'his blood boiled'. For all such expressions seem to indicate the stirring and onset of passion. Now brave men act for the sake of the noble, but passion aids them; while wild beasts act under the influence of pain; for they attack because they have been wounded or because they are afraid, since if they are in a forest they do not come near one. Thus they are not brave because, driven by pain and passion, they rush on danger without foreseeing any of the perils, since at that rate even asses would be brave
when they are hungry; for blows will not drive them from their food; and lust also makes adulterers do many daring things. Those creatures are not brave, then, which are driven on to danger by pain or passion. The courage that is due to passion seems to be the most natural, and to be courage if choice and aim be added. (p. 1763)

In the preceding quotation we see the emphasis that Aristotle placed on virtue being something that is freely chosen and that has a noble aim or end. Without choice and aim, the actions and feeling states that are produced by passion are only considered similar to actual virtue, according to Aristotle’s model. The aim, end, or objective of virtuous acts are for noble causes and are done as reason directs, but this is not the case for individuals who act out of passion. Aristotle (1984) wrote,

Men, then, as well as beasts, suffer pain when they are angry, and are pleased when they exact their revenge; those who fight for these reasons, however, are pugnacious but not brave; for they do not act for the sake of the noble nor as reason directs, but from feeling; they have, however, something akin to courage. (p. 1763)

Aristotle indicated that sanguine people may act in a manner that approximates the virtue of courage; however, he indicated that their seemingly courageous acts are due to their confidence. Sanguine individuals may be disposed toward confidence due to their physiologically based temperaments (i.e., predominance of blood according to ancient understanding of the physiological influences), past victories that instills confidence, or due to the more transient effects of an alcohol induced sanguine state, rather than to an accurate assessment of the dangers that
they are facing and a noble intention to stand their ground. Aristotle (1984) wrote,

Nor are sanguine people brave; for they are confident in danger only because they have conquered often and against many foes. Yet they closely resemble brave men, because both are confident; but brave men are confident for the reasons stated earlier, while these are so because they think they are the strongest and can suffer nothing. (Drunken men also behave in this way; they become sanguine). When their adventures do not succeed, however, they run away; but it was the mark of a brave man to face things that are, and seem, terrible for a man, because it is noble to do so and disgraceful not to do so. (p. 1762)

Aristotle also indicated that individuals who are ignorant of the dangers that are present appear to be confident; however, their confidence dissipates with their ignorance. For example, According to Aristotle (1984), individuals with the virtue of courage understand the danger that they are confronted with, “…but those who have been deceived [about the danger] fly if they know or suspect that things are different…” (p. 1764).

Aristotle (1984) believed that the virtuous individual actually had more to lose in face of a noble death, and that it is not death that the brave man fears but the loss of life:

…death and wounds will be painful to the brave man and against his will, but he will face them because it is noble to do so or because it is base not to do so. And the more he is possessed of excellence in its entirety and the happier he is, the more he will be pained at the thought of death; for life is best worth living for such a man, and he is knowingly losing the greatest goods, and this is painful. But he is none the less brave, and perhaps all the more so, because he chooses noble deeds of war at that cost. It is not the
case, then, with all the excellences that the exercise of them is pleasant, except in so far as it reaches its end. But it is quite possible that the best soldiers may be not men of this sort but those who are less brave but have no other good; for these are ready to face danger, and they sell their life for trifling gains. (p. 1764)

*Insensibility, Temperance, and Self-indulgence*

The virtue of temperance is a mean regarding pleasures of food, drink, and sex. The virtue of temperance falls between the vice of insensibility (vice of defect) and self-indulgent (vice of excess).

Aristotle indicated that the vice of defect doesn’t really have a name, and indicated that it is not very commonly found amongst men. The vice of defect could be referred to as insensibility and involves an individual who does not have enough desire for pleasures of food, drink, and/or sex. Aristotle (1984) wrote the following about the vice of defect in regards to pleasure of food, drink, and/or sex:

People who fall short with regard to pleasures and delight in them less than they should are hardly found; for such insensibility is not human. Even the other animals distinguish different kinds of food and enjoy some and not others; and if there is any one who finds nothing pleasant and nothing more attractive than anything else, he must be something quite different from a man; this sort of person has not received a name because he hardly occurs. (p. 1766)

Aristotle (1984) indicated that, “Of the appetites some seem to be common, others to be peculiar to individuals and acquired” (p. 1766). In other words, some of the desire we experience is common to all human beings and are part of our
animal nature, while other types of appetite or desire are learned or conditioned. Aristotle taught that the desires or appetites for food, drink, and sex represent both natural desires and unnatural or learned desires. Regarding natural and unnatural desires Aristotle (1984) wrote:

Now in the natural appetites few go wrong, and only in one direction, that of excess; for to eat or drink whatever offers itself till one is surfeited is to exceed the natural amount, since natural appetite is the replenishment of one's deficiency. Hence these people are called belly-gods, this implying that they fill their belly beyond what is right. It is people of entirely slavish character that become like this. But with regard to the pleasures peculiar to individuals many people go wrong and in many ways. For while the people who are fond of so and so are so called because they delight either in the wrong things, or more than most people do, or in the wrong way, the self-indulgent exceed in all three ways; they both delight in some things that they ought not to delight in (since they are hateful), and if one ought to delight in some of the things they delight in, they do so more than one ought and than most men do. (p. 1766)

One important dynamic that Aristotle articulated in regards to temperance and self-indulgence is that the self-indulgent man experiences excess pain at not fulfilling his desires and when he is craving food, drink, and/or sex. Aristotle (1984) wrote:

...the self-indulgent man is so called because he is pained more than he ought at not getting pleasant things (even his pain being caused by pleasure), and the temperate man is so called because he is not pained at the absence of what is pleasant and at his abstinence from it…. The self-indulgent man, then, craves for all pleasant things or those that are most pleasant, and is led by his appetite to choose these at the cost of everything else; hence he is pained both when he fails to get them and when he is craving for them (for appetite involves pain); but it seems absurd to be pained for the sake of pleasure. (p. 1766)
Self-indulgence then is a vice that involves considerable disquietude that is caused by a tempestuous appetite that doesn’t serve or follow the dictates of reason, but rather places priority on the dictates of desire. Aristotle (1984) described the differences between the dynamics associated with self-indulgence and temperance in the following:

The temperate man occupies a middle position with regard to these objects. For he neither enjoys the things that the self-indulgent man enjoys most—but rather dislikes them—nor in general the things that he should not, nor anything of this sort to excess, nor does he feel pain or craving when they are absent, or does so only to a moderate degree, and not more than he should, nor when he should not, and so on; but the things that, being pleasant, make for health or for good condition, he will desire moderately and as he should, and also other pleasant things if they are not hindrances to these ends, or contrary to what is noble, or beyond his means. For he who neglects these conditions loves such pleasures more than they are worth, but the temperate man is not that sort of person, but the sort of person that right reason prescribes. (p. 1766)

An essential aspect of Aristotle’s conceptualization of temperance and self-indulgence is the relationship between the appetite or desires that an individual experiences and his/her reason. As we have discussed previously, Aristotle’s conceptualization of virtue involves a congruence or unity of emotion, thinking, and behavior. In Aristotle’s conceptualization of the virtuously ordered character, the appetites and behaviors of an individual are in congruence with the dictates of right reason. In fact, it is a requirement of Aristotle conceptualization of virtue that an individual’s reason be involved in the in the free and knowing choice of
the good. This is not the case in the disordered state of the self-indulgent. In the self-indulgent, desire is the guiding principle that runs the show, rather than reason. Aristotle (1984) compares the condition of the self-indulgent to that of child when he wrote, “…these characteristics [of the self-indulgent] belong above all to appetite and to the child, since children in fact live at the beck and call of appetite, and it is in them that the desire for what is pleasant is strongest” (p. 1767).

For Aristotle, the virtue of temperance represents a condition of character in which the desires and appetites for food, drink, and sex are in harmony with and obedient to right reason. The right ordering or habituation of desire is important because Aristotle believed that indulgence of desires can strengthen desire to the point of expelling one’s reason. Aristotle (1984) wrote:

If, then, it is not going to be obedient and subject to the ruling principle, it will go to great lengths; for in an irrational being the desire for pleasure is insatiable and tries every source of gratification, and the exercise of appetite increases its innate force, and if appetites are strong and violent they even expel the power of calculation. Hence they should be moderate and few, and should in no way oppose reason--and this is what we call an obedient and chastened state--and as the child should live according to the direction of his tutor, so the appetitive element should live according to reason. Hence the appetitive element in a temperate man should harmonize with reason; for the noble is the mark at which both aim, and the temperate man craves for the things he ought, as he ought, and when he ought; and this is what reason directs. (p. 1767)
Meanness/Illiberality, Generous/Liberality, Extravagance/Prodigality

The virtue of liberality or generosity has to do with the giving and taking of wealth. Liberality is the mean between stinginess and illiberality, which is the vice of defect, and extravagance or prodigality, which is the vice of excess. As with all of the moral virtues, in order for actions to be considered virtuous, they need to meet the various necessary requirements that have been previously identified and discussed. Aristotle (1984) described the various nuances that are involved in his conceptualization of the virtue of liberality in the following:

…the liberal man will give for the sake of the noble, and rightly; for he will give to the right people, the right amounts, and at the right time, with all the other qualifications that accompany right giving; and that too with pleasure or without pain; for that which is excellent is pleasant or free from pain—least of all will it be painful. But he who gives to the wrong people or not for the sake of the noble but for some other cause, will be called not liberal but by some other name. Nor is he liberal who gives with pain; for he would prefer the wealth to the noble act, and this is not characteristic of a liberal man. But no more will the liberal man take from wrong sources; for such taking is not characteristic of the man who sets no store by wealth. Nor will he be a ready asker; for it is not characteristic of a man who confers benefits to accept them lightly. But he will take from the right sources, e.g. from his own possessions, not as something noble but as a necessity, that he may have something to give. Nor will he neglect his own property, since he wishes by means of this to help others. And he will refrain from giving to anybody and everybody, that he may have something to give to the right people, at the right time, and where it is noble to do so. (p. 1768)

According to Aristotle, meanness is the vice of deficit in regards to the taking and giving of wealth. Meanness, according to Aristotle, involves an excess in
taking and a deficit in giving. Regarding meanness, Aristotle (1984) indicated, “It also extends widely, and is multiform, since there seem to be many kinds of meanness” (p. 1770). In other words, meanness is a common characteristic and can manifest itself in a variety of ways. Aristotle (1984) described the dynamics of some of the various manifestations of meanness in the following two paragraphs of *Nicomachean Ethics*:

> For it consists in two things, deficiency in giving and excess in taking, and is not found complete in all cases but is sometimes divided: some men go to excess in taking, others fall short in giving. Those who are called by such names as 'miserly', 'close', 'stingy', all fall short in giving, but do not covet the possessions of others nor wish to get them. In some this is due to a sort of honesty and avoidance of what is disgraceful (for some seem, or at least profess, to hoard their money for this reason, that they may not some day be forced to do something disgraceful; to this class belong the cheeseparer and every one of the sort; he is so called from his excess of unwillingness to give anything); while others again keep their hands off the property of others from fear, on the ground that it is not easy, if one takes the property of others oneself, to avoid having one's own taken by them; they are therefore content neither to take nor to give.

> Others again exceed in respect of taking by taking anything and from any source, e.g. those who ply sordid trades, pimps and all such people, and those who lend small sums and at high rates. For all of these take more than they ought and from wrong sources. What is common to them is evidently sordid love of gain; they all put up with a bad name for the sake of gain, and little gain at that. For those who make great gains but from wrong sources, and not the right gains, e.g. despots when they sack cities and spoil temples, we do not call mean but rather wicked, impious, and unjust. But the gamester and the footpad belong to the class of the mean, since they have a sordid love of gain. For it is for gain that both of them ply their craft and endure the disgrace of it, and the one faces the greatest dangers for the sake of the booty, while the other makes gain from his friends, to whom he ought to be giving. Both, then, since they are willing to make gain from
wrong sources, are sordid lovers of gain; therefore all such forms of taking are mean. (pp. 1770-1771)

According to Aristotle, meanness is more opposed to liberality than is prodigality; however, he is clear that prodigality is still a vice. In *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle (1984) outlines several dynamics that can be involved with the vice of prodigality. The prodigal may take from the wrong sources, give more than he can afford, to people who are undeserving, for the wrong reasons or intentions. Regarding the prodigal, Aristotle (1984) wrote:

…because they care nothing for honour, they take recklessly and from any source; for they have an appetite for giving, and they do not mind how or from what source. Hence also their giving is not liberal; for it is not noble, nor does it aim at nobility, nor is it done in the right way; sometimes they make rich those who should be poor, and will give nothing to people of respectable character, and much to flatterers or those who provide them with some other pleasure. Hence also most of them are self-indulgent; for they spend lightly and waste money on their indulgences, and incline towards pleasures because they do not live with a view to what is noble. (p. 1770)

Aristotle’s conception of the virtue of liberality is multifaceted and includes such things as the intent of the giver, the felt experience of the giver, and the capacity to discern worthy beneficiaries. In his conceptualization of the virtue of liberality, Aristotle described the liberal man as one who possesses a view toward wealth that transcends the mere accumulation of wealth. Aristotle clearly indicated in one’s attitude toward wealth, there needs to be a concern for the common good and that wealth is not something to be used exclusively for self-
indulgence. Aristotle made it clear that the virtue of liberality was relative to the individual and didn’t require the possession of great wealth. Aristotle (1984) wrote, “The term 'liberality' is used relatively to a man's substance; for liberality resides not in the multitude of the gifts but in the state of the giver, and this is relative to the giver's substance” (p. 1769).

Pettiness/Niggardliness, Magnificence, and Gaudiness/Vulgarity

Magnificence is the virtuous mean in regards to the spending of wealth on a large scale. According to Aristotle, the virtue of magnificence is different than liberality in terms of the scale of the expenditure, or as Aristotle (1984) put it:

For this [magnificence] also seems to be an excellence [virtue] concerned with wealth; but it does not like liberality extend to all the actions that are concerned with wealth, but only to those that involve expenditure; and in these it surpasses liberality in scale. For, as the name itself suggests, it is a fitting expenditure involving largeness of scale. But the scale is relative; for the expense of equipping a trireme is not the same as that of heading a sacred embassy. It is what is fitting, then, in relation to the agent, and to the circumstances and the object. The man who in small or middling things spends according to the merits of the case is not called magnificent (e.g. the man who can say 'many a gift I gave the wanderer'), but only the man who does so in great things. For the magnificent man is liberal, but the liberal man is not necessarily magnificent. (p. 1771)

Unlike liberality, magnificence requires substantial wealth in order to be able to spend on projects of a grand scale. It should be kept in mind that Aristotle was teaching aristocrats who would be the future leaders of ancient Greece. Two recent examples of magnificence would be the 30 billion dollars that Warren
Buffet and the 30 billion that Bill and Melinda Gates have pledged to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to be spent on such things as curing diseases that are typically found in third-world countries.

A key aspect of magnificence is that what is paid for is something that is done in good taste. Aristotle (1984) indicated that the vice of excess (gaudiness), which is opposed to the virtue of magnificence, includes such things as, “…vulgarity, lack of taste, and the like, which do not go to excess in the amount spent on right objects, but by showy expenditure in the wrong circumstances and the, wrong manner…” (p. 1771).

Small-mindedness, High-mindedness/Magnanimity, and Vanity

According to Martin Oswald’s notations in his translation of Nicomachean Ethics, the virtue of high-mindedness was translated from the Greek term megalopsychia which literally means ‘greatness of soul’ and was translated into the English word magnanimity (Aristotle, 1962). Additionally, the Oswald notations indicate that, “…the connotations of megalopsychia are much wider than the modern meaning of ‘magnanimity,’ ‘high mindedness’ seems better suited to rendering the pride and confident self-respect inherent in the concept” (Aristotle, 1962, p. 93).

High-mindedness or magnanimity is a virtue falling on the mean between small-mindedness, which is a vice of defect, and vanity, which is a vice of excess.
The virtue of high-mindedness or magnanimity encompasses a variety of characteristics. According to Aristotle (1962), this virtue involves having a right attitude toward getting what one justly deserves, “A man is regarded as high-minded when he thinks he deserves great things and actually deserves them…” (p. 93). Aristotle is clear that for an individual to possess the virtue of being great-souled they must be deserving of great things. Aristotle (1962) wrote, “High mindedness thus is the crown as it were, of the virtues: it magnifies them and it cannot exist without them. Therefore, it is hard to be truly high-minded and, in fact, impossible without goodness and nobility” (p. 95).

However, Aristotle also is clear that megalopsychia or high mindedness also refers to the kinds of attitudes that a high-minded individual has regarding a variety of issues. For example, regarding the high-minded man’s attitudes Aristotle (1962) wrote:

A high-minded man, as we have stated, is concerned primarily with honors. But he will of course also have a moderate attitude toward wealth, power, and every manner of good or bad luck that may befall him. He will not be overjoyed when his luck is good, nor will bad luck be very painful to him. (pp. 95-96)

Aristotle’s (1962) conceptualization of high-mindedness also involves the manner in which a high-minded individual relates with others, “He will show his stature in his relations with men of eminence and fortune, but will be unassuming toward those of moderate means” (p. 97). Aristotle also indicated that high-
minded individuals are congruent and express themselves in a forthright manner except when they are self-effacing when interacting with people of a lower social status. Aristotle (1962) wrote:

He [i.e., the high-minded man] must be open in hate and open in love, for to hide one’s feelings and to care more for the opinion of others than for the truth is a sign of timidity. He speaks and acts openly: since he looks down upon others his speech is free and truthful, except when he deliberately depreciates himself in addressing the common run of people. (p. 97)

Aristotle described the high-minded individual as being inner directed and rather autonomous. Aristotle (1962) wrote that, “He cannot adjust his life to another, except for a friend, for to do so is slavish...” (p. 97). Aristotle’s conceptualization of the high minded man even extends to the individual’s aesthetic sensibilities. For example, Aristotle (1962) wrote that, “He [i.e., the high-minded man] is a person who will rather possess beautiful and profitless objects than objects which are profitable and useful, for they mark him as more self-sufficient” (p. 97).

One of the characteristics of the high-minded individual is the noble nature of their interests and pursuits. Regarding the high-minded individual Aristotle (1962) wrote, “He will not go in for the pursuits that the common people value...” (p. 97). Regarding the wide range of characteristics that Aristotle attributed to the high-minded individual Aristotle (1962) wrote:
He is not given to admiration...bears no grudges, for it is not typical of a high-minded man to have a long memory, especially for wrongs, but rather to overlook them...He is not a gossip for he will neither talk about himself or others, since he is not interested in hearing himself praised, or others run down. (p. 98)

In Aristotle’s conceptualization of the virtue of high-mindedness, the high-minded individual is not concerned with trivialities or even many of the necessities of living and because of this, is not concerned with many things. Aristotle believed that this aloofness from common concerns actually manifested itself in the individual’s mannerisms, style of walk, emotional tone, and tone of voice. Aristotle (1962) wrote:

Further, we think of a slow gait as characteristic of a high-minded man, a deep voice, and a deliberate way of speaking. A man who takes few things seriously is unlikely to be in a hurry, and a person who regards nothing as great is not one to be excitable. But a shrill voice and a swift gait are due to hurry and excitement. (p. 98)

The aloofness of the high-minded individual is not due to the kind of detachment that one might see in depression, schizoid personality disorder, or autistic individuals. The aloofness of the high-minded individual is the result of his/her valuation of the good as the being the primary object of concern or contemplation.

Small-mindedness (the vice of defect) is the underestimation of the honor or respect that one is entitled to receive. Small-mindedness also refers to the underestimation of one’s ability, talents, or skills. For, “One who underestimates
himself is small-minded” (Aristotle, 1962, p. 94). Small-mindedness is an English translation for Aristotle’s use of the Greek word *mikropsychia*. According to Oswald’s notations, “*Mikropsychia*, meaning, ‘smallness of soul,’ is of course diametrically opposed to ‘greatness of soul.’ The term also includes a tone of false humility” (Aristotle, 1962, p. 94). Regarding the dynamics of small-mindedness Aristotle (1984) wrote:

…the unduly humble man, being worthy of good things, robs himself of what he deserves, and seems to have something bad about him from the fact that he does not think himself worthy of good things, and seems also not to know himself; else he would have desired the things he was worthy of, since these were good. Yet such people are not thought to be fools, but rather unduly retiring. Such an estimate, however, seems actually to make them worse; for each class of people aims at what corresponds to its worth, and these people stand back even from noble actions and undertakings, deeming themselves unworthy, and from external goods no less. (p. 1775)

Vanity is the vice of excess and involves believing that one deserves more than one actually does. Regarding vanity, Aristotle (1962) wrote, “A man who thinks he deserves great things but does not deserve them is vain…” (p. 94). This characteristic involves such things as an over-estimation of one’s abilities and a sense of entitlement in one’s interactions with others. Regarding the dynamics of vanity Aristotle (1984) wrote:

Vain people, on the other hand, are fools and ignorant of themselves, and that manifestly; for, not being worthy of them, they attempt honourable undertakings, and then are found out; and they adorn themselves with clothing and outward show and such things, and wish their strokes of good
fortune to be made public, and speak about them as if they would be honoured for them. (p. 1775)

Unambitious, Right Ambition, Ambitious

In *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle indicated that individuals have varying degrees of desire for honor and therefore, one can desire honor less than one should, as one should, or more than one should; therefore, the doctrine of the mean applies to the desire for honor. According to Aristotle (1984), being ambitious is the vice of excess in regards to the desire for honor. Lack of ambition, right ambition, and overly ambitious refers to the desire for honor, while small-mindedness, high-minded, and vanity all refer to the estimation of what one deserves and/or the focus is on what is honorable. Regarding the desire for honor Aristotle (1984) wrote:

We blame both the ambitious man as aiming at honour more than is right and from wrong sources…But sometimes we praise the ambitious man as being manly and a lover of what is noble, and the unambitious man as being moderate and temperate as we said in our first treatment of the subject. Evidently, since people are said to be fond of such and such in more than one way, we do not assign the term 'ambition' always to the same thing, but when we praise the quality we think of the man who loves honour more than most people, and when we blame it we think of him who loves it more than is right. (p. 1776)

Unirræcible, Good Tempered, Irracible

In regards to anger, Aristotle identified the characteristic of unirræcible as the vice of defect, good tempered as the virtuous mean, and irascible as the vice of
excess. It is important to note that anger in and of itself is not considered to be a problem. In fact, it is considered a vice of defect if a person does not get mad when the situation warrants anger. Good-temper then is the virtue that regulates or shapes what causes one to become angry, the intensity of the anger, and the behavioral responses to anger in a manner that is neither too much, too little, too long, or over things that one should not become angry about. Regarding the dynamics of good temper, Aristotle (1984) wrote:

The man who is angry at the right things and with the right people, and, further, as he ought, when he ought, and as long as he ought, is praised. This will be the good-tempered man, then, since good temper is praised. For the good-tempered man tends to be unperturbed and not to be led by passion, but to be angry in the manner, at the things, and for the length of time, that reason dictates; but he is thought to err rather in the direction of deficiency; for the good-tempered man is not revengeful, but rather tends to forgive. (pp. 1776-1777)

It is clear from the preceding quotation that Aristotle clearly attributes the ability to be forgiving and not vengeful to the good-tempered individual; however, he also wrote that it is important to be able to experience anger in an appropriate manner. According to Aristotle, experiencing anger when it is appropriate, to an intensity that is appropriate, handling one’s anger in an appropriate manner, and only being anger for as long as is warranted, these are the types of phenomena of the virtue of good temper.
Aristotle (1984) indicated that individuals can get angry over things that they shouldn’t, they can experience an excessive degree of anger, they can act on their anger in the wrong manner, and they can hold on to their anger longer than they should. In *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle (1984) identified four different dynamics that can be involved in irascibility which is the vice of excess in regards to anger: (a) hot-tempered, (b) quick-tempered (c) sulky people, and (d) bad-tempered.

Hot-tempered individuals are described by Aristotle as being quick to get angry, quick to respond in an angry manner, and quick to be relieved of their anger after it is discharged. Regarding the hot-tempered Aristotle (1984) wrote:

> Now hot-tempered people get angry quickly and with the wrong persons and at the wrong things and more than is right, but their anger ceases quickly—which is the best point about them. This happens to them because they do not restrain their anger but retaliate openly owing to their quickness of temper, and then their anger ceases. (p. 1777)

According to Aristotle, the dynamics involved in quick-tempered individuals can be related to choleric temperaments. Aristotle (1984) wrote, “By reason of excess choleric people are quick-tempered and ready to be angry with everything and on every occasion; whence their name” (p. 1777). Quick-tempered individuals have physiologically-based choleric temperaments that cause them to be quick tempered. In other words, Aristotle taught that there is a physiological dimension of character, which in this case is the biologically-based choleric
temperament. This can be thought of as a kind of natural vice to the extent that the phenomena is rooted in one’s physiology.

According to Aristotle (1984), “We call bad-tempered those who are angry at the wrong things, more than is right, and longer, and cannot be appeased until they inflict vengeance or punishment” (p. 1777). Aristotle does not go into more detail regarding the dynamics of bad-tempered individuals, but from his description of the characteristics of bad-tempered individuals we can infer that there could be multiple dynamics involved. For example, how one thinks about events or circumstances can give rise to one’s getting angry about things when one shouldn’t, but getting upset about what one shouldn’t could also be a habituated response that once habituated is automatic in nature. There could also be a combination of habituated factors and beliefs that cause an individual to view his honor or masculinity as contingent upon obtaining revenge. Aristotle (1984) described some of the dynamics of catharsis, emotional expression, and repression in the following:

Sulky people are hard to appease, and retain their anger long; for they repress their passion. But it ceases when they retaliate; for revenge relieves them of their anger, producing in them pleasure instead of pain. If this does not happen they retain their burden; for owing to its not being obvious no one even reasons with them, and to digest one's anger in oneself takes time. Such people are most troublesome to themselves and to their dearest friends. We call bad-tempered those who are angry at the wrong things, more than is right, and longer, and cannot be appeased until they inflict vengeance or punishment. (p. 1777)
One should not think of Aristotle’s conceptualization of good-tempered as involving a static response that would be appropriate to all situations. As has been shown, Aristotle did not think anger, or the actions arising from anger, as being inappropriate or appropriate for all situations. Aristotle’s approach recognizes the relative dimension of such evaluations within a context that also allows reference to objective moral norms. From Aristotle perspective, one can say that there are things that we should get angry about and things that we shouldn’t get angry about, however, these things are relative to particulars that are unique to the individual, the context of the situation at hand, and a myriad of other factors. The ideal manifestation of emotion and behavior is not easy to determine in terms of what to get angry over, how angry, with whom, how intensely and for how long, etc. Regarding the difficulty of discerning the best course regarding these issues Aristotle (1984) wrote:

It is not easy to define how, with whom, at what, and how long one should be angry, and at what point right action ceases and wrong begins. For the man who strays a little from the path, either towards the more or towards the less, is not blamed; since sometimes we praise those who exhibit the deficiency, and call them good-tempered, and sometimes we call angry people manly, as being capable of ruling. How far, therefore, and how a man must stray before he becomes blameworthy, it is not easy to determine by reason; for the decision depends on the particular facts and on perception. But so much at least is plain, that the middle state is praiseworthy—that in virtue of which we are angry with the right people, at the right things, in the right way, and so on… (p. 1777)
Obsequiousness, Friendliness, and Contentiousness

In *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle (1984) indicated that the virtuous mean regarding giving pleasure or pain in one’s social or interpersonal interactions doesn’t actually have a name, but he indicated that it is something like friendship or friendliness. This virtue without a name involves the giving of pleasure and/or pain in one’s interactions with others. This virtue without a name, that shapes an individual’s social interactions with others and lies on the mean between contentious, which is the vice of defect, and obsequiousness, which is the vice of excess. If one considers that contentiousness is the vice of defect and obsequiousness is the vice of excess, then this virtue without a name, that falls on the mean between contentiousness and obsequiousness aims at a balanced approach to social interactions. This nameless virtue is then an admixture of good social graces and authentic, congruent, and direct communication that is characterological in nature.

Contentiousness is the vice of defect that is considered the contrary to the virtue that has no name. According to Aristotle (1984), the contentious individual tends to, “…oppose everything and care not a whit about giving pain…” (p. 1778). Different translations of *Nicomachean Ethics* use different English words, such as grouchy and quarrelsome, for the vice of defect (Aristotle, 1962). It is obvious how contrariness and contentiousness could cause interpersonal
difficulties, especially if one is characterologically contentious and quarrelsome. Millon (1999) described how being characterologically contentious and quarrelsome is a characteristic that is found in more than one of the personality disorders. For example, in Millon’s (1999) conceptualization of both the sadistic and negativistic personality disorders there is an irksome contrariness that is considered to be characterological in nature.

Aristotle identified obsequiousness as the vice of excess. He described the obsequious individual as someone who is excessively focused on being pleasant and characteristically acts in an overly friendly manner. The obsequious individual excessively acquiesces to the wishes or desires of others, and is overly concerned with trying to avoid offending others. Aristotle (1984) wrote:

In gatherings of men, in social life and the interchange of words and deeds, some men are thought to be obsequious, viz. those who to give pleasure praise everything and never oppose, but think they should give no pain to the people they meet… (p. 1778).

Obsequiousness is a vice of excess in that the individual focuses excessively on trying to be polite, nice, or friendly. Aristotle (1984) also indicated that, “…the man who aims at being pleasant with no ulterior object is obsequious, but the man who does so in order that he may get some advantage in the direction of money or the things that money buys is a flatterer…” (p. 1778). Obsequiousness is a vice because it aims at bringing pleasure rather than aiming at doing what is noble or
best in one’s interactions with others. Being obsequious doesn’t allow for the
flexibility that is required for more authentic and adaptive interpersonal conduct.

Regarding the virtue that has no name that gives shape to the social
interactions of individuals in regards to giving of pleasure and pain Aristotle
(1984) wrote the following:

…that in virtue of which a man will put up with, and will resent, the right
things and in the right way; but no name has been assigned to it, though it
most resembles friendship. For the man who corresponds to this middle
state is very much what, with affection added, we call a good friend. But
the state in question differs from friendship in that it implies no passion or
affection for one's associates; since it is not by reason of loving or hating
that such a man takes everything in the right way, but by being a man of a
certain kind. (p. 1778)

When one reads the preceding quotation it is important to keep in mind that
Aristotle was writing about the virtue of friendliness; consequently, the a man
with the virtue of friendliness responds to things the way he does because of his
caracter. The virtue of friendliness refers to that which produces and shapes the
wide array of emotions, cognitions, and behaviors that are involved in adaptive
interpersonal interactions. The characteristic or virtue of friendliness produces
and/or regulates emotion, thinking, and behavior in a manner that is adaptive to
the unique set of factors present in a particular situation with a particular
individual or group of individuals. Regarding the adaptive nature of the virtue of
friendlinesss, Aristotle (1984) wrote,
For he will behave so alike towards those he knows and those he does not
know, towards intimates and those who are not so, except that in each of
these cases too he will behave as is befitting; for it is not proper to have the
same care for intimates and for strangers, nor again to pain them in the
same ways. Now we have said generally that he will associate with people
in the right way; but it is by reference to what is noble and expedient that he
will aim at either giving pain or at contributing pleasure. For he seems to be
concerned with the pleasures and pains of social life; and wherever it is not
noble, or is harmful, for him to contribute pleasure, he will refuse, and will
choose rather to give pain; also if his acquiescence in another's action
would bring disgrace, and that in a high degree, or injury, on the agent,
while his opposition brings a little pain, he will not acquiesce but will
decline. He will associate differently with people in high station and with
ordinary people, with closer and more distant acquaintances, and so too
with regard to all other differences, rendering to each class what is
befitting, and while for its own sake he chooses to contribute pleasure, and
avoids the giving of pain, he will be guided by the consequences, if these
are greater, i.e. the noble and the expedient. For the sake of a great future
pleasure, too, he will inflict small pains. (p. 1778)

From the preceding quotation, it is clear that Aristotle believed that there are
important yet, at times, subtle nuances to social interactions. Aristotle identified
some of these nuanced interpersonal dynamics when he described how individuals
with this virtue adapt their social style or interpersonal behavior in a manner
suited to such things as social status, role, the degree of intimacy that one has with
the individual(s), and the nature of the issues being communicated about.

Aristotle’s description of the dynamics of emotion, thinking, and behavior
associated with the virtue of friendliness evidences his appreciation for the
various dynamics that are involved in such things as interpersonal
communication, nonverbal communication, role, social status, etc.
Aristotle’s conceptualization of the virtue of friendliness involves the adaptation of one’s communication and bearing to the people at hand. The emotion, cognition, and behavior that the virtue with no name shapes are frequently the subjects of study by social psychology and sociology (e.g., social norms, memes, nonverbal aspects of communication, self-presentation, etc.).

Self-Deprecation/Mock-Modest, Truthfulness/Humility, Boastfulness

According to Aristotle, the virtuous mean regarding truth in how one presents oneself also does not have a name. This set of character traits differentiates, “those who pursue truth or falsehood alike in words and deeds and in the claims they put forward.” (Aristotle, 1984, p. 1779) The character continuum in this case is thought of as having mock-modest as the vice of defect in regards to truthfulness about one’s abilities or strengths and boastfulness as the vice of excess (the continuum being degree if boasting). Both of these characteristics involve telling falsehoods. Aristotle (1984 wrote:

The boastful man, then, is thought to be apt to claim the things that bring repute, when he has not got them, or to claim more of them than he has, and the mock-modest man on the other hand to disclaim what he has or belittle it, while the man who observes the mean is one who calls a thing by its own name, being truthful both in life and in word, owning to what he has, and neither more nor less. (p. 1779)

Aristotle taught that being honest in one’s interactions was a matter of character and that truthfulness was a virtue and both forms of untruthfulness are
Aristotle (1984) wrote that, “…falsehood is in itself mean and culpable, and truth noble and worthy of praise…” (p. 1779). Due to the connotations frequently associated with the term character, one may overlook the significance of Aristotle’s assertion that truthfulness or untruthfulness is a matter of character. Aristotle was not merely making an assertion that people who tell the truth are good and people who lie are bad. It is important to note that Aristotle indicated that truthfulness and untruthfulness are matters of character, and that honesty and dishonesty are characterological phenomenon. This has significant implications when one considers the complicated dynamics that constitute characterological phenomenon. The *DSM—IV* (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) also indicated that dishonesty can have characterological dimensions as is evidenced by the criteria of antisocial personality disorder (American Psychological Association, 2000).

Aristotle (1984) described several of the dynamics of the virtue of truthfulness and differentiated it from the virtue of justice when he wrote:

> We are not speaking of the man who keeps faith in his agreements, i.e. in the things that pertain to justice or injustice (for this would belong to another excellence), but the man who in the matters in which nothing of this sort is at stake is true both in word and in life because his character is such. But such a man would seem to be as a matter of fact equitable. For the man who loves truth, and is truthful where nothing is at stake, will still more be truthful where something is at stake; he will avoid falsehood as something base, seeing that he avoided it even for its own sake; and such a
man is worthy of praise. He inclines rather to understate the truth; for this seems in better taste because exaggerations are wearisome. (p. 1779)

In Aristotle’s conceptualization of the vice of boastfulness, he indicated that some individuals lie because they enjoy lying, while others lie to obtain some kind of gain (e.g., honor or money). In the following paragraph from *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle (1984) described the dynamics of the vice of boastfulness:

He who claims more than he has with no ulterior object is a contemptible sort of fellow (otherwise he would not delight in falsehood), but seems futile rather than bad; but if he does it for an object, he who does it for the sake of reputation or honour is (for a boaster) not very much to be blamed, but he who does it for money, or the things that lead to money, is an uglier character (it is not the capacity that makes the boaster, but the choice; for it is in virtue of his state and by being a man of a certain kind that he is a boaster); as one man is a liar because he enjoys the lie itself, and another because he desires reputation or gain. Now those who boast for the sake of reputation claim such qualities as win praise or congratulation, but those whose object is gain claim qualities which are of value to one's neighbours and one's lack of which is not easily detected, e.g. the powers of a seer, a sage, or a physician. For this reason it is such things as these that most people claim and boast about; for in them the above-mentioned qualities are found. (p. 1779)

Again it is important to keep in mind that a vice, such as boastfulness, is by definition characterological in nature; therefore, untruthfulness, when it is a vice represents a tendency, habit, or character trait that produces the emotion, thinking, and behavior that are manifestations of the characteristic. An excellent illustration of the characterological nature of untruthfulness can be found in
Millon’s (1996, 1999, & 2000) description of the characterological dynamics operative in individuals that warrant the diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder. Dishonesty is a criteria for the disorder, and the disorder is an Axis II disorder, making it a clinical diagnosis that is characterological in nature.

Aristotle considered mock-modest individuals as being self-effacing individuals who may actually gain positive regard from others due to their self-deprecation. Regarding the dynamics of the self-deprecating or mock-modest, Aristotle (1984) wrote the following:

Mock-modest people, who understate things, seem more attractive in character; for they are thought to speak not for gain but to avoid parade; and here too it is qualities which bring reputation that they disclaim, as Socrates used to do. Those who disclaim trifling and obvious qualities are called humbugs and are more contemptible; and sometimes this seems to be boastfulness, like the Spartan dress; for both excess and great deficiency are boastful. But those who use understatement with moderation and understate about matters that do not very much force themselves on our notice seem attractive. And it is the boaster that seems to be opposed to the truthful man; for he is the worse character. (p. 1780)

**Boorishness, Tactful/Ready-Witted/ Wittiness, and Buffoonery**

Having a tactful, pleasant, inoffensive sense of humor was considered by Aristotle to be a virtue. In other words, Aristotle believed that one’s sense of humor has characterological dimensions or features. Aristotle (1984) wrote that:

…life includes rest as well, and in this is included leisure and amusement, there seems here also to be a kind of intercourse which is tasteful; there is such a thing as saying--and again listening to--what one should and as one should. (p. 1780) According to Aristotle boorishness is the vice of defect,
wittiness is the virtuous mean, and buffoonery is the vice of excess in regard to humorous amusements. Regarding the development of one’s sense of humor, Aristotle taught that we are influenced by the company we keep. He wrote that, “The kind of people one is speaking or listening to will also make a difference [i.e., in the kind of sense of humor we develop]. (p. 1780).

It is interesting to note that Aristotle thought that engaging in relaxation and amusement are important aspects of the good life. Aristotle (1984) wrote that, “…relaxation and amusement are thought to be a necessary element in life” (p. 1780). Regarding individuals who fall short or are deficient in terms of a sense of humor, Aristotle (1984) wrote, “…those who can neither make a joke themselves nor put up with those who do are thought to be boorish and unpolished…” (p. 1780). These individuals are thought of as having a vice of defect in regards to a good sense of humor. A good sense of humor and ready wit are part of social life and contribute to relaxation and amusement for oneself and for others. According to Aristotle (1984), “The boor, again, is useless for such social intercourse; for he contributes nothing and finds fault with everything” (p. 1780). It is not hard to imagine how boorishness may be a significant social liability or how being humorless would work against the ultimate goal of happiness.

One can also have the vice of excess in regards to one’s sense of humor. According to Aristotle, being a vulgar buffoon and buffoonery are considered to be issues of a characterological nature. A characteristic proclivity or disposition
to engage in buffoonery is considered, by Aristotle, to be the vice of excess in regards to one’s sense of humor. According to Aristotle, there are many ways that one can go wrong in trying to be humorous. Inappropriate attempts at humor include such things as carrying things too far, trying to be funny at the wrong times or in an inappropriate manner, and offending or giving pain to others. Aristotle (1984) wrote,

Those who carry humour to excess are thought to be vulgar buffoons, striving after humour at all costs, and aiming rather at raising a laugh than at saying what is becoming and at avoiding pain to the object of their fun. (p. 1780)

The virtue of wittiness of wittiness, on the other hand, involves a sense of humor that avoids both defect and excess. The virtue of wittiness refers to an individual having a humorous agility that is executed with both tact and taste. The virtue of wittiness refers to the characterological proclivity or disposition to engage in humor that is tactful, tasteful, and inoffensive. The virtue of wittiness involves both what one does to be humorous and what one finds to be humorous. In *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle (1984) described the dynamics of the virtue of ready-witted in the following paragraph:

To the middle state belongs also tact; it is the mark of a tactful man to say and listen to such things as befit a good and well-bred man; for there are some things that it befits such a man to say and to hear by way of jest, and the well-bred man's jesting differs from that of a vulgar man, and the joking of an educated man from that of an uneducated. One may see this even from the old and the new comedies; to the authors of the former indecency
of language was amusing, to those of the latter innuendo is more so; and these differ in no small degree in respect of propriety. Now should we define the man who jokes well by his saying what is not unbecoming to a well-bred man, or by his not giving pain, or even giving delight, to the hearer? Or is the latter, at any rate, itself indefinite, since different things are hateful or pleasant to different people? The kind of jokes he will listen to will be the same; for the kind he can put up with are also the kind he seems to make. There are, then, jokes he will not make; for the jest is a sort of abuse, and there are things that lawgivers forbid us to abuse; and they should, perhaps, have forbidden us even to make a jest of such. The refined and well-bred man, therefore, will be as we have described, being as it were a law to himself. (p. 1780)

Aristotle (1984) belief that one’s sense of humor or wittiness is characterological in nature is illustrated in the following:

…those who joke in a tasteful way are called ready-witted, which implies a sort of readiness to turn this way and that; for such sallies are thought to be movements of the character, and as bodies are discriminated by their movements, so too are characters. (p. 1780)

In the preceding quotation, Aristotle highlighted the characterological nature of ready-wittedness and how it involves the readiness to spin (i.e., “turn this way or that”) in a tasteful manner, that which creates a humorous effect. This readiness refers to both the speed and the intuitive manner with which the humorous sallies are responded to and produced. The ready-witted can respond to and produce the witty exchanges so rapidly because it is the nature of habit, dispositions, virtues, vices, and character in general to produce rapid and automatic responses involving emotion, cognition, and behavior. That is why
Aristotle considers boorishness, buffoonery, and ready-wittedness to be characterological in nature.

At first glance, some may discount Aristotle account of the characterological nature of boorishness, ready-wittedness, and buffoonery as the kind of analysis of humor that is more appropriate in a manual regarding proper etiquette than for serious students of psychology. Granted, the relevance of the characterological nature of one’s sense of humor falls within the purview of psychological investigation, but what about all of his prescriptive advice regarding what is considered good in these matters? Doesn’t passing judgment about the appropriateness of humor appears to violate the scientific neutrality of psychology? Questions such as these are important if the relevance of Aristotle’s work to psychology is to be discerned. We will now examine significant points of congruence that exist among concepts found in modern psychology and Aristotle’s understanding of the characterological aspects of one’s sense of humor and how these characterological aspects of humor can be adaptive or maladaptive.

The idea of a characterological dimension of humor is not new to psychology. In fact, humor has been identified as one of the adaptive defense mechanisms and is listed in the *DSM—IV* on the Defensive Functioning Scale (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Aristotle was clear that the virtue of ready-wittedness involves both interpersonal and intrapersonal dimensions. Ready-
wittedness as a virtue involves optimal or adaptive functioning in the interpersonal and intrapersonal. Aristotle’s conceptualization of ready-wittedness as a virtue means that it is a characterological trait that is related to the attainment of happiness and optimal functioning. The characterological aspects of humor and the conceptualization that these characteristics can be adaptive or maladaptive is in congruence with the adaptive defense mechanism of humor (Vaillant, 2000; American Psychological Association, 2000).

What Aristotle outlines in his analysis of boorishness, ready-wittedness, and buffoonery is how character traits can be adaptive or maladaptive on an interpersonal and intrapersonal basis. The character traits that he identifies as maladaptive are maladaptive because they do not serve the individual well. The vices of boorishness and buffoonery are likely to cause the individual interpersonal difficulties. However, if we examine the following quotation closely, we can discern some insight into Aristotle’s conceptualization of vice.

Aristotle (1984) wrote:

The buffoon, on the other hand, is the slave of his sense of humour, and spares neither himself nor others if he can raise a laugh, and says things none of which a man of refinement would say, and to some of which he would not even listen. (p. 1780)

In the preceding quotation, when Aristotle indicated that the buffoon is a slave to his sense of humor, he is referring to a key aspect of his conceptualization of
virtue and vice. Virtue requires freedom and that the aim be noble, and the actions be good and well suited to the individual and the situation. However, vice is the opposite, it tends to enslave, does not have noble intent, and produces acts that are often base and inappropriate to the individual and/or the particulars of the situation. In Aristotle’s description of the buffoon being a slave to his sense of humor, there is a reference to the usurping of the hierarchical and harmonious order that is found in the virtuous individual. What Aristotle is saying here is that there is an inordinate desire to be humorous in the buffoon and that this desire has become the master of the man who has become its slave. This characterological state of affairs causes him to pursue laughs at the expense not only of others, but also of himself.

The Virtue of Justice

Justice is an overarching virtue that involves being fair, equitable, just, righteous, upright, forthright, honest, and anything else that is required to meet the demands of justice. The virtue of justice and the vice of injustice are overarching in that for the just to be just, they need to have the other virtues, and the various vices are what lead to unjust behaviors. The virtue of justice involves our interactions with other individuals and with society as a whole. Justice is involved with such things as honoring contracts, paying one’s debts, respecting the property and rights of others, and fulfilling one’s obligations to the state,
family, and friends. Justice, as a moral virtue, involves all of the requirements of a moral virtue and will impact the just individual’s emotion, choice, freedom, thinking, and behavior. Aristotle (1962) highlights the behavioral and emotional dimension of justice and injustice when he wrote:

We see that all men mean by “justice” that characteristic which, makes them performers of just actions, which makes them act justly, and which makes them wish what is just. The same applies to “injustice”: it makes people act unjustly and wish what is unjust. (p. 111)

It is important to note that in the preceding quote, Aristotle indicated that the virtue of justice produces both just acts and the wish to act justly. This congruence between one’s wish and the virtuous action is an essential dynamic that is involved in the harmonious organization of the virtuous character. It is also important to note that unlike the morally weak individual, the unjust individual wishes to do what is unjust. The morally weak person succumbs to his/her weakness, while the unjust individual is acting congruently with his emotion, values, and thinking when he/she acts unjustly.

Aristotle (1962) highlighted the relationship between the virtue of justice and the law when he wrote:

We regard as unjust both a lawbreaker and also a man who is unfair and takes more than his share, so that obviously a law-abiding and a fair man will be just. Consequently, ‘just’ is what is lawful and fair, and ‘unjust’ is what is unlawful and unfair. (p. 112)
According to Aristotle, one of the purposes of the law was to engender virtue in the citizenry, in which case law is viewed as an embodiment of virtue. If law is the embodiment of what would be virtuous then lawlessness, in a variety of circumstances, can be considered to be the embodiment of vice. Serious crimes such a rape and murder can be traced to various forms of vice and the viciousness that it produces. Aristotle (1984) wrote about how good laws are an embodiment of virtue and justice when he wrote:

Since the lawless man was seen to be unjust and the law-abiding man just, evidently all lawful acts are in a sense just acts; for the acts laid down by the legislative art are lawful, and each of these, we say, is just. Now the laws in their enactments on all subjects aim at the common advantage either of all or of the best or of those who hold power, or something of the sort; so that in one sense we call those acts just that tend to produce and preserve happiness and its components for the political society. And the law bids us do both the acts of a brave man (e.g. not to desert our post or take to flight or throw away our arms), and those of a temperate man (e.g. not to commit adultery or outrage), and those of a good-tempered man (e.g. not to strike another or speak evil), and similarly with regard to the other excellences and forms of wickedness, commanding some acts and forbidding others; and the rightly-framed law does this rightly, and the hastily conceived one less well. (pp. 1782-1783)

Both justice and injustice are broad characteristics that encompass our interactions with others. A just individual must have the other virtues as well in order to be able to acquit him/herself in a just manner. Aristotle (1962) wrote about the overarching aspect of justice as a moral virtue:

Thus, this kind of justice is complete virtue or excellence, not in an unqualified sense, but in relation to our fellow men. And for that reason
justice is regarded as the highest of all virtues, more admirable than morning and evening star, and, as the proverb has it, “In justice every virtue us summed up.” It is complete virtue and excellence in the fullest sense, because it is the practice of completer virtue. It is complete because he who possesses it can make use of his virtue not only by himself but also in his relations with his fellow men; for there are many people who can make use of their virtue in their own affairs, but who are incapable of using it in their relations with others. (p. 114)

In Aristotle’s conceptualization of Justice as a moral virtue, the teleological aim of virtue is expanded beyond what is best for oneself as an individual and aims at the greater good of society or humanity in general. According to Aristotle, the virtue of justice is one that regulates our interactions with others. Due to Aristotle’s understanding of justice being a virtue, Aristotle’s conceptualization of the interpersonal aspect of justice is characterological in nature, meaning that the virtue of justice shapes the cognition, emotion, and behavior of the individual in an automatic manner. Aristotle (1962) highlighted the interpersonal, transcendent and all encompassing aspect of the virtue of justice when he wrote:

…justice alone of all the virtues is thought to be the good of another, because it is a relation to our fellow men in that it does what is of advantage to others, either to a ruler or to a fellow member of society. Now, the worst man is he who practices wickedness toward himself as well as his friends, but the best man is not the one who practices virtue toward himself as well as his friends, but who practices it toward others, for that is a hard thing to achieve. Justice in this sense, then, is not a part of virtue but the whole of excellence or virtue, and the injustice opposed to it is not part of vice but the whole of vice. (p. 114)
The preceding quotation illustrates the importance that Aristotle placed upon the virtue of justice. According to Aristotle, the virtue of justice is the whole of virtue. In other words, for something to be virtuous it is also just and when something is a vice or of the vicious it is opposed to justice.

It should be kept in mind that according to Aristotle’s the city-state (polis) provided the necessary context in which a cultured, civilized life of virtue could be pursued; therefore, that which produces and preserves happiness for the social and political community also facilitates happiness for the individual. Aristotle (1962) wrote, “Accordingly, in one sense we call those things ‘just’ which produce and preserve happiness for the social and political community” (p. 113). This is a significant aspect of Aristotle’s biopsychosocial conceptualization of the human person. Aristotle conceptualization of the importance of social interactions is reflective of his beliefs regarding the interrelated relationship that exists between social influences upon an individual and the individual’s impact upon the social context. Aristotle’s model of psychology has several points of congruence with modern social psychology and sociology regarding how human beings live out their lives in a social context that has profound influences that shape the characters of the individuals who live in a particular society and who in turn become shapers of the social context. In fact, as was indicated earlier, Aristotle’s writings regarding character fall under his ethics or moral philosophy.
which he considered to be a sub-discipline of politics or political philosophy. This is another aspect of Aristotle’s model that illustrates how his model of psychology and conceptualization of character integrates the interactive, interdependent relationship between society and the individual.

The Intellectual Virtues

Aristotle utilized his model of psychology to develop his conceptualization of character, virtue, and vice. In his model of psychology, he differentiated the irrational domain from the rational domain, and he uses this division to assign virtues for both the irrational and rational dimension of human beings. Regarding this he wrote, “We divided the excellences of the soul and said that some are excellences of character and others of intellect.” (Aristotle, 1984, p. 1798) The irrational domain includes such things as biologically-based temperamental factors and habituated or leaned emotional associations.

The intellectual faculties or powers involve that which is unique to humans— their ability to reason. Aristotle differentiates deliberative thought from what he refers to as scientific thought. He differentiates these two forms of thinking according to the nature of their respective objects. Deliberative thinking involves deliberation or ratiocinative thought about that which is indeterminate and can be otherwise, and scientific thinking is thinking about what is determinate or
unchangeable. Aristotle (1984) provided a succinct overview of his thinking regarding the differentiation of the two modes of thinking when he wrote:

We divided the excellences of the soul and said that some are excellences of character and others of intellect…We said before that there are two parts of the soul—that which possesses reason and that which is irrational; let us now draw a similar distinction within the part which possesses reason. And let it be assumed that there are two parts which possess reason—one by which we contemplate the kind of things whose principles cannot be otherwise, and one by which we contemplate variable things; for where objects differ in kind the part of the soul answering to each of the two is different in kind, since it is in virtue of a certain likeness and kinship with their objects that they have the knowledge they have. Let one of these parts be called the scientific and the other the calculative; for to deliberate and to calculate are the same thing, but no one deliberates about what cannot be otherwise. Therefore the calculative is one part of the faculty which possesses reason. We must, then, learn what is the best state of each of these two parts; for this is the excellence [virtue] of each. (p. 1798)

In the preceding selection from *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle clearly indicated that each of these types of thought (i.e., calculative and scientific) has its own associated virtues. These virtues or excellences of the intellectual or rational part of man are referred to as intellectual virtues. While the moral virtues primarily regulate or constitute the emotions and behavior that is involved in human action, the intellectual virtues regulate and constitute the intellectual dimension of virtue and contribute to the optimal functioning of the intellect. In other words, the intellectual virtues are characteristics or dispositions involved in the functioning of the intellect. On Aristotle’s (1984) account of virtue, “The
excellence [virtue] of a thing is relative to its proper function” (p. 1798). And according to Aristotle (1984), “The function of both the intellectual parts, then, is truth. Therefore the states that are most strictly those in respect of which each of these parts [i.e., deliberative and scientific] will reach truth are the excellences [virtues] of the two parts” (p. 1799). In other words, in Aristotle’s model, the purpose or function of the intellect is to attain knowledge of truth; consequently, his conceptualization of intellectual virtues will involve that which helps human beings to reach truth. Aristotle (1984) indicated that, “…the states by virtue of which the soul possesses truth by way of affirmation or denial are five in number, i.e. art, knowledge, practical wisdom [prudence], philosophic wisdom, [and] comprehension [understanding]; for belief and opinion may be mistaken” (p. 1799). Table 4.10 below illustrates Aristotle’s differentiation of deliberative and scientific parts of the intellect and the associated intellectual virtues.
Table 4.10  Aristotle’s Differentiation of Two Types of Operations of the Intellect and the Five Intellectual Virtues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scientific/Speculative Intellect</th>
<th>Deliberative/Practical Intellect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contemplation of that which cannot be otherwise</td>
<td>Contemplation of that which is variable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intellectual Virtues of the Scientific/Speculative Intellect</th>
<th>Intellectual Virtues of the Deliberative/Practical Intellect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pure Science/Knowledge</td>
<td>Practical Wisdom or Prudence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intuitive Wisdom/Intelligence</td>
<td>Arts/Applied Sciences (e.g., carpentry, shoemaking)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical Wisdom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Choice, Deliberative Desire, and Right Reason

We will now examine the following paragraph from *Nicomachean Ethics* in which Aristotle makes clear a foundational dynamic of his model of psychology and conceptualization of virtue and vice. Aristotle (1984) wrote,

> What affirmation and negation are in thinking, pursuit and avoidance are in desire; so that since moral excellence [virtue] is a state concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the reasoning must be true and the desire right, if the choice is to be good, and the latter must pursue just what the former asserts. Now this kind of intellect and of truth is practical; of the intellect which is contemplative, not practical nor productive, the good and the bad state are truth and falsity (for this is the function of everything intellectual); while of the part which is practical and intellectual the good state is truth in agreement with right desire. (p. 1798)

There are several important dynamics that Aristotle identifies in the preceding paragraph that warrant close scrutiny. First of all, he described how affirmation and negation in an individual’s thinking corresponds to pursuit and avoidance in one’s desire. What he means by this is that the affirmation of something in one’s intellect produces desires of pursuit or approach, while the negation of something in one’s intellect produces the desire to avoid. He then indicated, “…since moral excellence [virtue] is a state concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the reasoning must be true and the desire right, if the choice is to be good, and the latter must pursue just what the former asserts.” (Aristotle, 1984, p. 1798) What Aristotle is saying here is that moral virtue is a state concerned with choice and that choice is a deliberate desire (pursuit or avoidance)
that results from deliberative thinking (i.e., affirmation and negation), and in order for the choice to be good, both the reason and the desire must be good. What Aristotle is illustrating here is the harmonious interrelatedness of the intellect (thinking), the appetite (emotions), and objective truth. For example, when a virtuous individual performs a virtuous act, there is congruence among what the deliberative thought affirms, what the deliberative desire arising from the appetite desires, and what is actually good. This is not the case when the act is not virtuous.

Regarding the points made in the preceding paragraph about how a virtuous act requires both moral and intellectual virtues which produce or constitute the harmonious congruence between thinking, feeling, action, and objective truth, Aquinas (1993) in his *Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics* wrote:

> Since then reason and appetitive faculty concur in choice, if choice ought to be good—this is required for the nature of moral virtue—the reason must be true and the appetitive faculty right, so that the same thing which reason declares or affirms, the appetitive faculty pursues. In order that there be perfection in action it is necessary that none of the principles be imperfect. (p. 360)

It should be kept in mind that there are multiple paths to imperfection and error, or as Aristotle (1984) wrote, “Again, it is possible to fail in many ways (for evil belongs to the class of the unlimited, as the Pythagoreans conjectured, and good to that of the limited)… For men are good in but one way, but bad in many”
Consider, for example, one pattern of imperfection that happens when an individual’s deliberative thinking about a particular good is flawed due to the lack of the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom or prudence. If the flawed thinking elicits from the appetitive faculty deliberative desires of pursuit or avoidance based upon the flawed thinking, the choice (which is deliberative desire) will likewise be flawed. The choice in this example would not actually be a good, but only an apprehended good from the individual’s subjective perspective. This is not a virtuous sequence of cognition, emotion, and action. The function of the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom (prudence) is to facilitate the proper functioning of the deliberative intellect, which is the discernment of truth. Another example of imperfection would be a lack of moral virtue. For example, an individual’s deliberative reasoning may be congruent with the objective good in a particular situation, however, if the individual is lacking in moral virtue, his/her appetite may not cooperate with the conclusions of reason as happens in the case of *akrasia* or weakness of the will. The emotions may actually be in revolt against the dictates of right reason as is the case in temptations to do what one knows is not in one’s best interest (e.g., overindulging in White Castle hamburgers despite awareness of the gastrointestinal distress that is sure to follow). What is clear is that Aristotle’s formulation of virtue requires
both the intellectual virtues and the moral virtues because these are
interdependent and necessary dimensions of virtue.

*The Intellectual Virtue of Knowledge (Pure Science)*

The intellectual virtue of knowledge has a specific meaning according to
Aristotle. Knowledge, according to Aristotle, is about that which cannot be
otherwise. He indicated what knowledge or pure science pertains to when he
wrote:

We all suppose that what we know is not capable of being otherwise; of
things capable of being otherwise we do not know, when they have passed
outside our observation, whether they exist or not. Therefore the object of
knowledge is of necessity. Therefore it is eternal; for things that are of
necessity in the unqualified sense are all eternal; and things that are eternal
are ungenerated and imperishable….Knowledge, then, is a state of capacity
to demonstrate, and has the other limiting characteristics which we specify
in the Analytics; for it is when a man believes in a certain way and the
principles are known to him that he has knowledge, since if they are not
better known to him than the conclusion, he will have his knowledge only
incidentally. (Aristotle, 1984, p. 1799)

*The Intellectual Virtue of Intuitive Wisdom (Intelligence)*

Aristotle identified intuitive wisdom or intelligence as an intellectual virtue.
As with the other intellectual virtues, intuitive wisdom perfects the intellects
ability to apprehend truth. The object of intuitive wisdom is the apprehension of
the first principles or ultimate premises. It is called intuitive wisdom because of
the intuitive nature of the manner in which the first principles are apprehended or
comprehended. Aristotle indicated that, “…”[theoretical] wisdom is knowledge,
combined with comprehension, of the things that are highest by nature.”

(Aristotle, 1984, p. 1802)

*The Intellectual Virtue of Theoretical Wisdom*

Aristotle thought that theoretical wisdom was the highest and most noble type of knowledge. The intellectual virtue of theoretical wisdom allows one to attain truth in regards to that which does not admit to being otherwise. Aristotle provides an example of what he means when he indicated that the objects of the deliberative intellect are open to being otherwise and that the objects of the scientific intellect cannot be other than they are when he wrote, “. Now if what is healthy or good is different for men and for fishes, but what is white or straight is always the same…” (Aristotle, 1984, p. 1801)

Aristotle indicated that a man might have theoretical wisdom which is the comprehension of universal principles, but if he does not have practical wisdom, he will not be able to apply the universal principles to everyday life. According to Aristotle (1984):

This is why we say Anaxagoras, Thales, and men like them have wisdom but not practical wisdom, when we see them ignorant of what is to their own advantage, and why we say that they know things that are remarkable, admirable, difficult, and divine, but useless; viz. because it is not human goods that they seek. (p. 1802)

And elsewhere he wrote:
This is why some who do not know, and especially those who have experience, are more practical than others who know; for if a man knew that light meats are digestible and wholesome, but did not know which sorts of meat are light, he would not produce health, but the man who knows that chicken is wholesome is more likely to produce health. (Aristotle, 1984, p. 1802)

The Arts as Intellectual Virtues: Deliberative Thought & the Productive Sciences

Deliberative thought arises from what is referred to as the deliberative intellect or the practical intellect. In the terminology of Greek philosophy, the arts refer to everything from the art of the shipbuilder to the art of the shoemaker. An art is considered to be a productive science and has the objective of producing some object. The arts utilize deliberative thought in the creation the objects of production. The artisan or craftsman possesses the knowledge to make the objects of his art. The practical or deliberative intellect is involved in producing the deliberative thought that is necessary for the creation of the objects of production. All of the arts require the involvement of the intellect to produce the objects produced by the arts.

An art as an intellectual virtue refers to the ability of the deliberative intellect to function in a manner necessary for proper production of the objects of the art.

Regarding art as an intellectual virtue Aristotle (1984) wrote:

Now since building is an art and is essentially a reasoned state of capacity to make, and there is neither any art that is not such a state nor any such state that is not an art, art is identical with a state of capacity to make, involving a true course of reasoning. All art is concerned with coming into
being, i.e. with contriving and considering how something may come into being which is capable of either being or not being, and whose origin is in the maker and not in the thing made; for art is concerned neither with things that are, or come into being, by necessity, nor with things that do so in accordance with nature (since these have their origin in themselves). (pp. 1799-1800)

On the other hand, if a carpenter, shipbuilder, or shoemaker lacks the knowledge required to produce the objects of the art he/she does not have the intellectual virtue of his/her particular art. Aristotle’s differentiation of art as an intellectual virtue includes both aspects of what Squire (1986), from the perspective of cognitive psychology, differentiated as two kinds of knowledge; namely, *declarative knowledge* and *procedural knowledge* (as cited in Powell, 1987). Declarative knowledge would be the artisan’s ability to describe the process to another using word based thought and procedural knowledge allows the craftsman’s body to execute the art’s required actions with the requisite somatomotor responses to build the object of the art. Aristotle (1984) pointed out how the intellectual virtue of an art involves the capacity for true reasoning of the deliberative intellect regarding the production of the object of an art when he wrote:

Art, then, as has been said, is a state concerned with making, involving a true course of reasoning, and lack of art on the contrary is a state concerned with making, involving a false course of reasoning; both are concerned with what can be otherwise [i.e., the object of deliberative cognition]. (p. 1800)
The intellectual virtue of practical wisdom or prudence involves the use of the deliberative intellect and considers things that can admit to being otherwise. Aristotle indicated that the object of prudence is to actualize the good that is attainable through human action. It is a human good that prudence seeks to actualize through human actions. Regarding the dynamics of prudence Aristotle (1984) wrote:

Practical wisdom on the other hand is concerned with things human and things about which it is possible to deliberate; for we say this is above all the work of the man of practical wisdom, to deliberate well, but no one deliberates about things that cannot be otherwise, nor about things which have not an end, and that a good that can be brought about by action. The man who is without qualification good at deliberating is the man who is capable of aiming in accordance with calculation at the best for man of things attainable by action. Nor is practical wisdom concerned with universals only--it must also recognize the particulars; for it is practical, and practice is concerned with particulars. (p. 1802)

It should be kept in mind that all of the intellectual virtues help to fulfill the function of the intellect which is the attainment of truth. Prudence as an intellectual virtue seeks out what is best in an objective sense for the attainment of various practical ends. Prudence is one of the two intellectual virtues that involves deliberation. In order to identify the best course of action, prudence requires excellence in deliberation. The following paragraph was included in its
entirety because it illustrates how prudence involves correctness of deliberation and the relationship between prudence and truth. Aristotle (1984) wrote:

But excellence in deliberation is a certain correctness of deliberation; hence we must first inquire what deliberation is and what it is about. And, there being more than one kind of correctness, plainly excellence in deliberation is not any and every kind; for the incontinent man and the bad man will reach as a result of his calculation what he sets himself to do, so that he will have deliberated correctly, but he will have got for himself a great evil. Now to have deliberated well is thought to be a good thing; for it is this kind of correctness of deliberation that is excellence in deliberation, viz. that which tends to attain what is good. But it is possible to attain even good by a false deduction and to attain what one ought to do but not by the right means, the middle term being false; so that this too is not yet excellence in deliberation--this state in virtue of which one attains what one ought but not by the right means. Again it is possible to attain it by long deliberation while another man attains it quickly. Therefore in the former case we have not yet got excellence in deliberation, which is rightness with regard to the expedient--rightness in respect both of the conclusion, the manner, and the time. Further it is possible to have deliberated well either in the unqualified sense or with reference to a particular end. Excellence in deliberation in the unqualified sense, then, is that which succeeds with reference to what is the end in the unqualified sense, and excellence in deliberation in a particular sense is that which succeeds relatively to a particular end. If, then, it is characteristic of men of practical wisdom to have deliberated well, excellence in deliberation will be correctness with regard to what conduces to the end of which practical wisdom is the true apprehension. (p. 1804)

The preceding paragraph warrants additional examination because it contains several foundational features of Aristotle’s model of virtue. Aristotle identified five kinds of correctness associated with deliberation and required by prudence:

(a) correct beliefs regarding the nature of the good, (b) the ability to actualize in
action the conclusions of one’s deliberation, (c) that the good conclusions are reached in a correct manner, (d) the deliberation needs to be timely, and (e) the deliberation needs to be correct in regards to both the identification of good ends and the choice of means must be in congruence with the objective good that is object of practical wisdom.

Aristotle (1984) identified what he thought were necessary constituents of prudence. Prudence or practical wisdom is considered to be one of the intellectual virtues, and as such it involves the optimal functioning of the intellect. The function of the intellect is to apprehend or attain truth; therefore, if faulty deliberation is involved in the deliberation then it is not considered to be the result of practical wisdom. One of the aspects of virtue is the efficiency that it brings to the process of pursuing the good; consequently if the deliberation takes an inordinate amount of time then it is not considered to be practical wisdom. Finely, in order for practical deliberation to be considered prudence or practical wisdom both the means and the ends that are decided upon must be good. Aristotle (1984) indicated the imprudent man does not err in terms of deliberation, but rather in terms of the principles that guide his deliberation.

Temperance, Continence, Incontinence, & Self-Indulgence

In Book VII of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle (1984) identified several characteristics that he analyzed in considerable detail; namely, temperance (self-
controlled), intemperance (self-indulgent), continence (morally strong),
incontinence (morally weak), softness, effeminacy, tenacity (endurance). It is in
this chapter that Aristotle spells out in considerable detail the cognitive,
emotional, and behavioral dynamics involved in each of these characteristics. In
this same chapter, Aristotle also clearly articulates a biopsychosocial
conceptualization of character and a highly detailed examination of the
phenomenological experience associated with each of these characteristics.

According to Aristotle’s conceptualization of virtue and vice, brutishness,
moral weakness, softness, effeminacy, moral strength, and tenacity are
differentiated from virtue and vice. These characteristics do not meet the full
criteria of virtue or vice, but they do fall under the categories of things to be
sought and things to be avoided. Aristotle (1962) wrote,

We must now discuss moral weakness, softness, and effeminacy, and also
moral strength and tenacity. We will do so on the assumption that each of
these two sets of characteristics is neither identical with virtue or with
wickedness nor generically different from it, but different species
respectively of the covering genera [namely, qualities to be sought and
qualities to be avoided]. The opposite of two of these are obvious: one is
called virtue or excellence and the other moral strength. The most fitting
description of the opposite of brutishness would be to say that it is
superhuman virtue, a kind of heroic and divine excellence… (p. 175)

The characteristics of temperate, intemperate (self-indulgent), continent
(morally strong), and incontinent (morally weak) can be thought of as falling on a
continuum of character that goes from the virtuous to the vicious (temperate,
continent, incontinent, intemperate). The characteristics of continent (morally strong) and incontinent (morally weak) are, respectively speaking, neither a virtue nor a vice, but rather intermediate characteristics. The virtue of temperance (self-controlled) is the contrary characteristic of the vice of intemperance (self-indulgent), and continence (morally strong) is the contrary of incontinence (morally weak). The various English words used to translate from the Greek can be somewhat confusing, so the following Table 4.11 has been included to help clarify the terms used for these four characteristics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.11</th>
<th>Intemperate, Incontinent, Continent, and Temperate On the Continuum of Character</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Virtue</strong></td>
<td><strong>Intermediate Characteristics</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sōphrōn Temperate</td>
<td>Enkratēs Morally Strong Continent Self-controlled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Indulgent Intemperate</td>
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*The Virtue of Temperance Considered Specifically*

The virtue of temperance regulates or shapes both a temperate individual’s experience of pleasure and the sorrow which is associated with the privation of pleasure. Aristotle used the Greek adjective sōphrōn to describe the temperate or self-controlled individual. Temperance is the virtue that regulates or shapes an
individual’s appetites or desires for pleasures of various kinds. Temperance includes what a person associates with pleasure and how intense the desires are, “…for a temperate man will have neither excessive nor bad appetites.” (Aristotle, 1984, p. 1810) Temperance is also involved in the regulation or shaping of the pain that one feels due to the privation from pleasure.

It is hard to overemphasize the importance that the virtue of temperance has in Aristotle’s dynamic conceptualization of virtue. The importance of temperance becomes clear when one considers the pervasive and dynamic role that pleasure plays in Aristotle’s model of psychology. The dynamic role of pleasure and pain has been discussed previously in some detail, for now it will be enough to recall some key points regarding the pervasive role of pleasure to illustrate the functional role of the virtue of temperance. According to Aristotle: (a) all emotion and behavior is accompanied by pleasure and/or pain; (b) pleasure and pain is involved in the generation of all animal behavior including human; (c) what one associates pleasure and pain to is characterological in nature; (d) the habituated associations of pleasure and pain shape an individual’s emotional experience, behavior and overall phenomenological experience; and, (e) temperance is the virtue that regulates an individual’s desires and appetites for pleasure as well as the sorrow due to a privation of pleasure.
Temperance regulates or shapes an individual’s desires for pleasure of all kinds, but especially pleasures of taste and touch. The virtue of temperance refers to the associations or habituated automatic reactions of pleasure that an individual experiences in relation to objects, activities, thoughts, situations, people, etc. The virtue of temperance involves the various mechanisms or phenomena that cause individuals to associate or experience varying degrees of pleasure in relation to objects of all kinds. From the perspective of behaviorism, this would include all the conditioned emotional associations of a pleasurable nature.

An important and dynamic role that temperance plays is the ordering of one’s desires, so that they are in congruence with the conclusions of practical wisdom and what is actually good. Aquinas (1915) wrote, “…temperance withdraws man from things which seduce the appetite from obeying reason, while fortitude incites him to endure or withstand those things on account of which he forsakes the good of reason” (p. 1760). Aristotle believed that human beings have both a rational and an irrational part, and that the irrational part of human beings is shared with the other animals. In other words man has two natures, one that is held in common with the animals and one that is distinctly human (i.e., the intellect and reasoning). According to Aristotle, temperance regulates both the natural desires (i.e., unlearned and innate) and the unnatural desires (i.e., learned, habituated desires) to bring them into congruence with the conclusions of reason. In the
temperate individual, this process is done without the tempestuous storm of desire that is experienced by the continent (morally strong) individual. Regarding the dynamics of temperance plays Aquinas (1915) wrote:

Nature inclines everything to whatever is becoming to it. Wherefore man naturally desires pleasures that are becoming to him. Since, however, man as such is a rational being, it follows that those pleasures are becoming to man which are in accordance with reason. From such pleasures temperance does not withdraw him, but from those which are contrary to reason. Wherefore it is clear that temperance is not contrary to the inclination of human nature, but is in accord with it. It is, however, contrary to the inclination of the animal nature that is not subject to reason. (p. 1759)

Temperance also refers to the optimal state, ordering or operation of the dynamics of natural pleasures that are innate, unlearned and operative in instincts and biological processes. Nature in Aristotle model, as was mentioned previously, has equipped human beings with instincts that utilize natural pleasures and pains to generate the movement required to obtain nature’s ends of survival and reproduction. Natural pleasures are innate pleasures that generate movement toward objects that are associated with either survival or reproduction. For example, consuming water when one is dehydrated is pleasurable. This natural pleasure that one experiences when consuming fluids when one is dehydrated generates movement to maintain proper hydration in an automatic manner. Temperance refers to the optimal operation of all of nature’s use of pleasure for the purpose of reproduction and survival. Physical disease and deformity, which
can lead to continence, incontinence, intemperance, and brutishness can, therefore, preclude the characteristic of temperance.

The virtue of temperance requires other virtues such as practical wisdom because the operations of the intellect also generate desires. These desires are called rational desires or rational love and they involve some degree of pleasure. The intellect apprehends an apparent good, which in turn generates desire for the good that leads to movement. Temperance requires practical wisdom in order to have right reason regarding what is actually good relative to the individual and the various particulars place, situation, time, etc. Therefore, the temperate individual knows of the good (intellectual virtues) and wants to pursue it (moral virtues). In other words, the conclusions of the temperate individual’s deliberation (practical reasoning) regarding the various goods to pursue are in congruence with both his/her desires and consequent behaviors; furthermore, the deliberation, desires, and behaviors are all in congruence with what is objectively good relative to the individual and the particulars of the context, situation, etc. Aquinas (1915) wrote, “Hence tranquility of soul is ascribed to temperance by way of excellence, although it is a common property of all the virtues” (p. 1760). The temperate individual represents an individual in full possession of the moral and intellectual virtues, and the virtuous harmony of his emotions, thinking, and behavior is the actualization of the good life and the happiness of which Aristotle spoke and
wrote. Regarding happiness as the end or goal of temperance Aquinas (1915) wrote, “…the end and rule of temperance itself is happiness” (p. 1763).

All of the virtues that involve some kind of regulation of desire are considered to be related to temperance. For example, the virtue of humility is considered to be part of temperance because it regulates one’s desires for vainglory or pride and, the desire for revenge is thought to be moderated by the virtue of meekness.

**Intemperance (Self-indulgence) Considered Specifically**

The intemperate individual is of a different sort altogether. Intemperance is the contrary of temperance and as such it deals with all of the types of pleasures as temperance does; however, while temperance involves the virtuous regulation, formation, and expression of these pleasures, the opposite is the case for intemperance. Intemperance is a vice, and as such it refers to many ways in which pleasure and the sorrow associated with the deprivation of pleasures can be viciously ordered. Regarding the results of virtue and vice Aristotle (1984) wrote, “…virtue, being concerned with pleasure and pain…makes us act in the best way in matters involving pleasure and pain, and that vice does the opposite” (p. 38).

There is more variation in regards to the association, regulation, formation, and/or production of pleasure and the sorrow associated with the deprivation of pleasure in intemperance than there is in temperance. This is due to the multiplicity of ways that one can go wrong in regards to emotion and behavior.
Regarding this dynamic, Aristotle (1984) wrote, “Again, it is possible to fail in many ways (for evil belongs to the class of the unlimited, as the Pythagoreans conjectured, and good to that of the limited)… For men are good in but one way, but bad in many” (1748). Regarding the ways in which an intemperate or self-indulgent individual can go wrong in regards to pleasure and the sorrow associated with the deprivation of pleasure, Aristotle (1984) wrote:

…it is by reason of pleasures and pains that men become bad, by pursuing and avoiding these--either the pleasures and pains they ought not or when they ought not or as they ought not, or by going wrong in one of the other similar ways that reason can distinguish. (p. 1745)

Notice that in the above quotation how open ended Aristotle was in pointing out ways that individuals can go wrong in regards to pleasures and pains. If we apply the above quotation to intemperance, it becomes clear how wide an array of pleasures and behaviors can be influenced by intemperance. There are many pleasures that one should not experience or even be susceptible to experiencing such as the pleasures associated with child pornography or pedophilia. Even to be susceptible to these kinds of pleasures or the pleasures that would lead to these pleasures is a sign of vice, as Aristotle (1984) indicated, “We must take as a sign of states the pleasure or pain that supervenes on acts…” (p. 1744). It is also clear that there are perfectly fine pleasures that one should not experience at certain times such as sleeping on while on guard duty, drinking while consuming
alcoholic beverages, or reciting poetry while Rome burns to the ground. It is also rather easy to think of various ways that an individual can go about obtaining pleasures as they ought not, not to mention the other similar ways that reason can distinguish.

Intemperance regulates or shapes how, and to what, the intemperate individual experiences both pleasure and the sorrow that is associated with the deprivation of pleasure. This two-fold dynamic, which intemperance shares with temperance is important. The self-indulgent individual is not in a state of conflict. The thinking of the self-indulgent individual is congruent with vice and vicious actions. Unlike the morally strong and morally weak man, the self-indulgent man does not have a troubled conscience. However, it is important to note that the characteristic of being self-indulgent is not just a vicious path to a different kind of happiness. The self-indulgent individual is enslaved by his own desires to the point that the desires don’t serve the individual; the self-indulgent individual serves his desires and often at great cost. For example, the self-indulgent individual experiences excessive pain/sorrow when he/she does not fulfill his/her desires. Rather than being satiated by the excessive self-indulgence, the desires grow more powerful and the pain associated with not fulfilling the desire also
It is interesting to note how vice, being the contrary of virtue, has several contrary characteristics. For example, while freedom is a necessary prerequisite of virtue, enslavement to one’s desires is both a cause and a necessary consequence of vice.

**Continence (Morally Strong) Considered Specifically**

The continent or morally strong individual (*enkratēs*) is an individual whose thinking is able to discern what is best to do and what is best to avoid; however, in the process of following through on the conclusions of his/her reason (i.e., what to do and what to avoid) he/she has to struggle to overcome both tempting and tempestuous passions and desires to do what he/she should not and/or to avoid what he/she should not avoid. Lacking the ordered unity of the *sōphrōn*’s emotional, cognitive and behavioral dynamics, the morally strong man is conflicted, in that he experiences powerful passions and desires that tempt him to act against the conclusions of his reason in regards to what is best to do or to avoid doing. The morally strong man succeeds in acting in accordance with the conclusions of his reason, but only by overcoming his own passions and desires.

There may be several characterological dynamics that create, constitute and/or perpetuate the characterological condition of the morally strong individual. For example, the character state of a morally strong individual may be considered to be a developmental stage on the way to virtue (e.g., patience), it may be due to a
physiological temperament that requires that the morally strong man work
hard to overcome his tempestuous passions and desires (e.g., the phlegmatic and
irascible temperaments), and regardless of other factors the habituated or learned
associations to pleasure and pain will also play a role. All of these factors come
into play because of the biopsychosocial and multifactorial nature of Aristotle’s
model of psychology and conceptualization of character.

Incontinence (Morally Weak) Considered Specifically

The morally weak or incontinent individual (akrátês) is able to deliberate
correctly in regards to what would be the best course of action in a particular
situation. The morally weak individual’s passions and desires conflict with the
conclusions of their reason in regards to what to pursue and what to avoid;
however, unlike the morally strong individual, the morally weak individual does
not succeed in following the conclusions of his/her reason an succumbs to the
passions and desires that he/she experiences. However, the morally weak
individual comes to regret that they did not follow the conclusion of his/her
reason after the passion and desire subsides.

Regarding the difference between morally weak and self-indulgent individuals
Aristotle (1962) wrote,

For a self-indulgent person is led on by his own choice, since he believes
that he should always pursue the pleasure of the moment. A morally weak
man, on the other hand, does not think he should, but pursues it nonetheless. (p. 180)

Brutishness, Disease, Mental Illness, Nature, Habit, and Issues of Human Responsibility

Aristotle (1984) wrote that of the, “… of moral states to be avoided there are three kinds--vice, incontinence, brutishness…[and] that of a brute is a different kind of state from vice” (p. 1809). Brutishness, according to Aristotle is a characteristic in men who are similar to the dumb brutes or animals. According to Aristotle, it is as if brutish individuals, like all animals except for humans, do not have an intellect, so they rely on only their senses. Regarding brutishness Aristotle (1984) wrote:

Now brutishness is less evil than vice, though more alarming; for it is not that the better part has been perverted, as in man,--they have no better part. Thus it is like comparing a lifeless thing with a living in respect of badness; for the badness of that which has no source of movement is always less hurtful, and thought is a source. Thus it is like comparing injustice with an unjust man. Each is in some sense worse; for a bad man will do ten thousand times as much evil as a brute. (p. 1817)

Aristotle was making a key point in the above passage regarding the responsibility that is to be attributed to brutishness. According to Aristotle, possession of the powers of the intellect is a prerequisite of moral responsibility; therefore, only human behavior can be considered morally responsible. The brutish individual, due to the lack of a functioning intellect, is not considered to
be acting as a human being and therefore, does not have the moral responsibility that results from the possession of the intellect.

In Book XVII of *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle articulates several important facets of the biopsychosocial nature of his model of psychology. Aristotle formulated a multi-factorial model of character and character development. As stated previously, according to Aristotle, an individual's character is shaped by such things as temperament, environmental influences, and habituated influences. In addition to these, he also identified such things as insanity, deformity, and disease as having profound impact on an individual's characteristics and overall phenomenological experience. According to Aristotle (1984), “the brutish type is rarely found among men, it is found chiefly among foreigners, but some brutish qualities are also produced by disease or deformity…” (p. 1809). The following two paragraphs are from Book XVII of *Nicomachean Ethics* and have been included in their entirety because in them Aristotle clearly articulates several important facets of his biopsychosocial model of psychology and conceptualization of character. Aristotle (1984) wrote:

Some things are pleasant by nature, and of these some are so without qualification, and others are so with reference to particular classes either of animals or of men; while others are not pleasant by nature, but some of them become so by reason of deformities, and others by reason of habits, and others by reason of bad natures. This being so it is possible with regard to each of the latter kinds to discover similar states; I mean the brutish states, as in the case of the female who, they say, rips open pregnant women
and devours the infants, or of the things in which some of the tribes about the Black Sea that have gone savage are said to delight—in raw meat or in human flesh, or in lending their children to one another to feast upon—or of the story of Phalaris.

These states are brutish, but others arise as a result of disease (or, in some cases, of madness, as with the man who sacrificed and ate his mother, or with the slave who ate the liver of his fellow), and others are morbid states resulting from custom, e.g. the habit of plucking out the hair or of gnawing the nails, or even coals or earth, and in addition to these paederasty; for these arise in some by nature and in others, as in those who have been the victims of lust from childhood, from habit. (pp. 1814-1815)

The preceding two paragraphs warrant additional examination. As was stated previously, what a person comes to associate pain and pleasure to is a very important matter, “…for to feel delight and pain rightly or wrongly has no small effect on our actions” (p. 1745). If we look at the first sentence of the first paragraph, we see that Aristotle differentiates natural pleasure from learned, habituated, or unnatural pleasure. He also identifies that what an individual comes to associate with pleasure can be influenced by a bad nature, disease, madness, deformity, childhood experience, and habit. In the above citation, Aristotle articulates some of the criteria for three of the disorders listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, (American Psychiatric Association, 1994): pica (e.g., eating of coal and dirt), tricotillomania (i.e., hair-pulling), and pedophilia. In the two paragraphs above,
Aristotle (1984) clearly differentiates states that are caused by disease, deformity, and madness from character states that are caused by habit.

Aristotle (1984) indicated that some characteristics can be caused by what he refers to as bad nature, which refers to the biological or temperamental aspects of character and overall human phenomenology. Aristotle clearly indicated that when disease, madness, and/or nature are involved, the resulting characteristics are not considered as vice. The reason that it is not considered being a vice when it is due to nature or disease is that the individual is not responsible for the creation of the characteristics that are due to nature, disease, or insanity. Aristotle (1984) differentiated two kinds of brutishness when he wrote:

…the man who is by nature apt to fear everything, even the squeak of a mouse, is cowardly with a brutish cowardice, while the man who feared a weasel did so in consequence of disease; and of foolish people those who by nature are thoughtless and live by their senses alone are brutish, like some races of the distant foreigners, while those who are so as a result of disease (e.g. of epilepsy) or of madness are morbid. Of these characteristics it is possible to have some only at times, and not to be mastered by them, e.g. Phalaris may have restrained a desire to eat the flesh of a child or an appetite for unnatural sexual pleasure; but it is also possible to be mastered, not merely to have the feelings. Thus, as the wickedness which is on the human level is called wickedness simply, while that which is not is called wickedness not simply but with the qualification 'brutish' or 'morbid', in the same way it is plain that some incontinence [moral weakness] is brutish and some morbid… (p. 1815)

It is clear then that Aristotle had an appreciation for the various factors that mitigate or absolve human responsibility regarding the development of character.
His model of psychology is not reductionistic, in that, he articulates a multifactorial view of human nature that includes the roles of both nature and nurture. Responsibility and the self-creative role of the individual is an important feature of Aristotle’s model of psychology. The emphasis that Aristotle places on responsibility and on how human beings play a self-creative role in the creation of their character and experience is a point of significant congruence with constructivist approaches. Aristotle’s model shares the emphasis on responsibility that is found in existential psychotherapy (May, 1981; Yalom, 1980). From Aristotle’s perspective, an individual’s repeated choices and actions shape the individual’s character. Aristotle, like May (1981) and the existentialists, viewed both freedom and destiny as being central to the development of who we are/become as human beings and how we experience things. Aristotle’s multifactorial understanding of the constituents of human emotion, behavior, and overall phenomenological experience includes the freedom of responsibility and choice, but he also recognizes the multifaceted role of destiny and the various givens of one’s existence.

Nature, disease, mental illness and social and cultural influences all can play significant and dynamic roles in constituting an individual’s character, which in turn constitutes the individual’s overall phenomenological experience. In Aristotle’s model of psychology and conceptualization of character, it is the
unique confluence of these various constituents that shapes the unique emotional experience, behavior, and character of an individual.

*Softness (Effeminacy) and Endurance (Perseverance)*

The character traits of softness and endurance are traits that shape how a person characteristically responds to the pains that are intrinsic to or inherent in such things as difficult tasks, work, toil or exercise. The pains that endurance and softness deal with are not the excessive pains that require heroic virtue. The pains that are the subject matter of the character traits of softness and endurance are ordinary pains commonly found in ordinary life circumstances.

Endurance or perseverance is necessary to overcome the pain associated with activities such as work or exercise. The term perseverance may do a better job at capturing certain nuances of this characteristic because endurance is frequently associated with physical conditioning that is biological or physiological in nature (e.g., the body’s ability to efficiently utilize oxygen). Perseverance or tenacity, on the other hand, captures the determination required to push through and resist giving in to the pain associated with something like exercise (e.g., no pain, no gain). Thus perseverance or tenacity allows an individual to accomplish objectives despite the difficulty that is intrinsic to their actualization. For example, there is a certain degree of pain involved in engaging in a physical
training regimen or in dieting. The individual will need to persevere through the pain in order to accomplish the objective of training or dieting.

Softness refers to the character trait of avoiding the pains that most people are able to endure and/or overcome. Aristotle (1984) indicated that, “…it is softness to fly from what is troublesome…” (p. 1762). Softness involves avoidance of pains that one should not avoid. Softness is a characteristic that involves wanting to avoid the pains or difficulties that is intrinsic to many activities. According to Aristotle (1933), “…one who can endure no pain, even if it is good for him, is soft…” (p. 1933). Softness is a significant characterological issue that triggers avoidant behaviors and prevents the soft individual from resisting the impulse to quit. One reason that softness is so problematic is that so many activities and objectives will involve difficulty and some degree of pain which will require perseverance to complete. The soft individual has an inordinate desire to avoid the pain that is common to even mundane activations as Aristotle (1984) indicated when he wrote:

Now the man who is defective in respect of resistance to the things which most men both resist and resist successfully is soft and effeminate; for effeminacy too is a kind of softness; such a man trails his cloak to avoid the pain of lifting it, and plays the invalid without thinking himself wretched, though the man he imitates is a wretched man. (p. 1817)

The fact that softness deals with pains that are common is one of the reasons why softness is so problematic. As with the other character traits, Aristotle
thought that softness had a biological or physical underpinning that can be inherited. Aristotle (1984) wrote:

…it is surprising if a man is defeated by and cannot resist pleasures or pains which most men can hold out against, when this is not due to heredity or disease, like the softness that is hereditary with the kings of the Scythians... (p. 1817)

According to Aquinas (1915) there are two different causes of softness:

…one way, by custom: for where a man is accustomed to enjoy pleasures, it is more difficult for him to endure the lack of them. In another way, by natural disposition, because, to wit, his mind is less persevering through the frailty of his temperament. (p. 1751)

Table 4.12 illustrates the two causes of softness according to Aquinas (1915).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.12</th>
<th>Aquinas On the Two Causes of Softness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Custom</td>
<td>“…one way, by custom: for where a man is accustomed to enjoy pleasures, it is more difficult for him to endure the lack of them.” (Aquinas, 1915, p. 1751)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temperament</td>
<td>“In another way, by natural disposition, because, to wit, his mind is less persevering through the frailty of his temperament.” (Aquinas, 1915, p. 1751)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Aristotle also indicated that an inordinate love of amusement was a significant character flaw that can adversely impact one’s overall functioning. Aristotle (1984) indicated that, “The lover of amusement, too, is thought to be self-indulgent, but is really soft. For amusement is a relaxation, since it is a rest; and
the lover of amusement is one of the people who go to excess in this” (p. 1818). What Aristotle is referring to here is that an individual can have an inordinate fondness of amusements that is characterological in nature and that can cause serious problems for the individual. For example, a college student may find that an inordinate love of amusements (e.g., parties, dating, sports, and video games) is significantly related to his/her poor academic performance.

It is important to keep in mind that the individual’s excessive fondness for amusements is characterological in nature, and as such will represent an automatic emotional and behavioral proclivity to overindulge in amusements of various kinds. The individual with this characteristic is overcome, and fails to resist giving in to the discomfort caused by the privation of pleasure that not engaging in amusements causes. One of the major problematic aspects of softness is that other priorities that are necessary for optimal functioning are neglected because of the inordinate and disordering influence that softness has on the functioning of the individual. Due to the avoidance of pain, the soft individual avoids the activities that are required for the actualization of the good life and the happiness it brings.
Chapter 5: Discussion

The writer had four basic objectives in writing this dissertation: (a) to use English translations of Aristotle’s work to illustrate his model of psychology and conceptualization of character; (b) to illustrate the biopsychosocial and dynamic nature of Aristotle’s model of psychology and conceptualization of character; (c) to identify points of congruence between Aristotle’s model of psychology and modern models of psychology that inform current clinical practice and (d) to contribute to the ongoing and fruitful dialogue between the disciplines of psychology and philosophy.

In this discussion section, the writer will summarize the findings of the results section which identified points of congruence between Aristotle’s model of psychology and material from the following perspectives and subject areas within psychology: biological/physiological perspectives, evolutionary psychology, behaviorism, cognitive-behavioral therapy, Adlerian therapy, emotional intelligence, positive psychology, and empirical research on self-regulation. It should be kept in mind that the writer focused on the identified points of congruence or “common ground” between Aristotle’s model and these modern models, rather than highlighting existent differences (of which there are many). Finally, the discussion section will end with the identification of future topics of inquiry into Aristotle’s model of psychology, particularly its potential for
providing a foundation for an interdisciplinary meta-theory capable of integrating the theoretical and empirical investigations of disparate disciplines involved with the study of human experience.

*Aristotle’s Multi-domain Model of Psychology*

Before progressing to a more detailed discussion of the points of congruence between Aristotle’s model of psychology and specific modern models of psychology, an examination of the multi-domain nature of Aristotle’s model will help to provide a context for the discussion that follows. As was discussed in detail in chapter 4, Aristotle’s biopsychosocial model of psychology is evident in his heuristic differentiation of the three types of soul (i.e., the nutritive, sensitive, and intellectual/rational). His conceptualization of the three types of soul is hierarchical in nature, in that the possession of each of the higher types of soul (i.e., sensitive and rational) requires the possession of the faculties/powers found in the lower types of soul (i.e., nutritive and sensitive). Aristotle’s differentiation of the three types of soul and their corresponding faculties/powers illustrated his multifactorial understanding of the constituents of human emotion, perception, cognition, behavior, and overall phenomenological experience.

What Aristotle produced was an ancient biopsychosocial model of psychology that illustrated how these various domains interact in the creation of human experience. The biopsychosocial nature of Aristotle’s model of psychology has
several significant points of congruence with modern multi-domain models of psychology (Lazarus, 1981; Millon & Davis, 1996; Millon, 1999; Millon, Davis, Escovar, & Meagher, 2000).

Table 5.1 provides an overview of the three domains of Aristotle’s model and points out some of the points of congruence and similarities with contemporary models of psychology. These points of congruence may tend to be obscured by the fact that Aristotle’s model of psychology utilized the antiquated and inaccurate biological/physiological model of his day that stressed the role of the four humors and temperature rather than brain structures, neurotransmitters and hormones; nevertheless, Aristotle’s model of psychology contains several surprisingly modern insights into the physiologically-based aspects of emotion and human behavior.
Points of Congruence Between Aristotle’s Model of Psychology and Modern Biological/Physiological Models of Psychology

There are several significant points of congruence between Aristotle’s model of psychology and modern biological/physiological findings and instinct theory.

Aristotle’s Conceptualization of the Role of Temperament: Points of Congruence with Contemporary Conceptualizations of Temperament

Aristotle accounted for the biological/physiological aspects of emotion, behavior, states, and traits in his conceptualization of the origins and dynamics of temperament. His conceptualization of the influence of a biologically/physiologically-based temperament, while being antiquated and erroneous in its explanation of the actual biological/physiological processes (i.e., the four humors and temperature), still posits temperament as being of the body.

According to Aristotle, temperament is an important dimension of human behavior, emotion, and overall phenomenological experience. In other words, Aristotle identified the characterological aspects of temperament. Aristotle’s emphasis on the physiological aspects of temperament as being an element of character is a significant point of congruence between his model and evolutionary psychology and models of psychology that include instincts.

### Table 5.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Points of Congruence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rational Domain</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Points of congruence with the cognitive aspects of the model of psychology found in cognitive-behavioral therapy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Explicates the dynamics involved in the production of emotion, mental imagery, and behavior that are produced through cognition, ratiocinative thought, and/or the operations of the intellect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unique to humans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Necessary for uniquely human activities such as reason, deliberation, understanding of universals, and the will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sensitive Domain</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Several points of congruence with the dynamics of behaviorism (e.g., unconditioned and conditioned responses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Explicates the dynamics involved in the production of emotion, mental imagery, and behavior that is produced through habituation, and both the learned and unlearned associations of pain and pleasure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Produces both natural and unnatural (i.e., learned and unlearned) desires, pleasures and pains that elicit behavior, accounting for a significant facet of one’s overall phenomenological experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appetitive faculty produces the natural and unnatural (i.e., learned and unlearned) passions (emotions) that generate approach or avoidance behaviors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nutritive Domain</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significant points of congruence with evolutionary psychology and models of psychology that include instincts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Explicates the dynamics involved in the production of emotion, natural pleasures and pains, and behavior that is produced through innate, automatic processes that have the teleological end of either survival or reproduction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
modern conceptualizations of temperament that posit biological, neurochemical, and physiological bases of temperament. For example, Cloninger, Prybeck, and Svrakic (1993) have developed a seven factor model of personality that posits neurotransmitters as a basis of temperamental differences. The model contains four temperament dimensions (harm avoidance, novelty seeking, reward dependence, and persistence) and three character domains (self-directedness, cooperativeness, and self-transcendence) (Cloninger, Prybeck, and Svrakic, 1993).

In Cloninger’s (1986) early conceptualization of the dimensions of temperament, there were only the three dimensions of novelty seeking, harm avoidance and reward dependence. Each temperament dimension was thought to be related to the activity of a specific neurotransmitter system. Novelty seeking was posited as being related to dopamine, harm avoidance to serotonin, and reward dependence to noradrenalin (Cloninger, 1986). Perseverance was added as the fourth dimension of temperament after additional empirical investigation provided feedback that warranted perseverance being differentiated from reward dependence (Cloninger, Prybeck, and Svrakic, 1993). The addition of the three character dimensions was made after empirical investigations indicated that temperament alone could not differentiate, identify or explain the personality disorders (Cloninger, Prybeck, and Svrakic, 1993).
Cloninger and his colleagues view personality as being comprised of both temperament and character (Cloninger, Svrakic & Prybeck, 1993). According to Svrakic et al. (2002) they have, “…conceptualized personality as a complex adaptive system composed of distinct but interacting domains of temperament and character (p. 190). The four temperament dimensions and the three character dimensions are conceptualized as being seven dimensions of personality.

Regarding their conceptualization of temperament Cloninger, Prybeck, and Svrakic, 1993 wrote:

Temperament (or the ‘emotional core’ of personality) is hypothesized to involve heritable neurobiological dispositions to early emotions (such as fear, anger, and attachment), and their related automatic behaviour reactions (such as inhibition, activation, and maintenance of behaviour) in response to specific environmental stimuli (danger, novelty, and reward, respectively). The term ‘heritable neurobiological dispositions’ refer to the pre-semantic perceptual processing of visuospatial information and affective valence regulated by the cortico-striato-limbic system (the so-called ‘procedural memory’). In other words, temperament traits are heritable biases in procedural learning leading to associative conditioning of automatic behaviour responses to danger, novelty, and reward. The four temperament traits have been shown to be relatively stable over lifetime and to be universal across different cultures and various political and ethnic groups. (p. 190)

Cloninger and his colleagues have developed the Temperament and Character Inventory (T.C.I.), which is a 226 item self-report instrument designed to evaluate individuals on the four temperament and three character dimensions. The temperament scales and subscales of the T.C.I. are listed in table 5.2 and illustrate
features of personality that Cloninger and his colleagues believe to be rooted in temperament, heritable and physiologically/neurochemically based. It is also interesting to note that both Aristotle and Cloninger posited that the tendencies to be easily fatigued, excitable, daring, and pessimistic were related to differences in temperament.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.2 Temperament Scales and Subscales of the Temperament and Character Inventory (TCI) (cited in Svrakic, Draganic, Hill, Bayon, Przybec and Cloninger, 2002)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Temperament Scales and Subscales</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harm Avoidance (HA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• HA1: worry and pessimism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• HA2: fear of uncertainty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• HA3: shyness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• HA4: fatigability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novelty Seeking (NS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• NS1: exploratory excitability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• NS2: impulsiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• NS3: extravagance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• NS4: disorderliness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reward Dependence (RD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• RD1: sentimentality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• RD2: openness to communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• RD3: attachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• RD4: dependence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persistence (PS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• PS1: eagerness of effort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• PS2: work hardened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• PS3: ambitiousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• PS4: perfectionism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cloninger and his colleagues also share with Aristotle the emphasis on the influence of character. Svrakic et al. (2002) wrote about their conceptualization of character and their understanding of the dynamic interaction between temperament and character in the following:

Character is postulated to involve individual differences in higher cognitive processes, such as logic, formal construction, symbolic interpretation, and invention (the so-called ‘propositional memory’). In contrast to temperament, character traits change with age and maturation. The final character outcome can be predicted as a non-linear function of antecedent temperament traits, sociocultural pressures, and random life events unique to the individual. Character optimizes adaptation of early temperament to the environment by modulating the salience of early percepts and affects regulated by temperament, thus reducing the maladaptive impact of ‘raw’ temperament traits. Through this bidirectional interaction, temperament regulates what we notice, and, in turn, character modifies its meaning, so that the salience and significance of all experience depends on both temperament and character. (pp. 190-191)

The character scales and subscales of the Temperament and Character Inventory (TCI) illustrate the types of personality domains that Cloninger and his colleagues believe to be related to character. Table 5.3 shows the character scales and subscales of the Temperament and Character Inventory (TCI).
Table 5.3  Character Scales and Subscales of the Temperament and Character Inventory (cited in Svrakic et al., 2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Character scales and subscales</th>
<th>High Score</th>
<th>Low Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-directedness (SD)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• SD1: responsibility</td>
<td>Responsible</td>
<td>Blaming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• SD2: purposefulness</td>
<td>Purposeful</td>
<td>Aimless</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• SD3: resourcefulness</td>
<td>Resourceful</td>
<td>Inept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• SD4: self-acceptance</td>
<td>Self-accepted</td>
<td>Vain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• SD5: congruent second nature</td>
<td>Disciplined</td>
<td>Undisciplined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperativeness (CO)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• C1: social acceptance</td>
<td>Tenderhearted</td>
<td>Intolerant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• C2: empathy</td>
<td>Empathic</td>
<td>Insensitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• C3: helpfulness</td>
<td>Helpful</td>
<td>Hostile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• C4: compassion</td>
<td>Compassionate</td>
<td>Revengeful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• C5: pure hearted</td>
<td>Principled</td>
<td>Opportunistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-transcendence (ST)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• ST1: self-forgetful</td>
<td>Intuitive</td>
<td>Contrived</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• ST2: transpersonal identification</td>
<td>Acquiescent</td>
<td>Controlling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• ST3: spiritual acceptance</td>
<td>Spiritual</td>
<td>Materialistic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Temperament and Character Inventory (T.C.I.) identifies both adaptive and maladaptive character features. For example, Svrakic, et. al., (2002) found that “…character traits efficiently diagnose the presence and the severity of personality disorder, whereas temperament traits are used for differential diagnosis” (Svrakic, et. al., p. 189). This emphasis on both adaptive and maladaptive character features has similarities with Aristotle’s conceptualization of character which included both virtue and vice.

Aristotle taught that the virtues are interrelated and that for an individual to be considered virtuous he/she needs to have a range of virtues (e.g., prudence,
fortitude, temperance, justice). This aspect of adaptive character structure (i.e., healthy character structure requiring a range of characterological features) has also been identified in the empirical investigation of Svrakic, et. al., (2002) which found that:

Self-transcendence correlated with borderline, narcissistic, and histrionic symptoms (accounting for dissociative tendencies in these cases) and schizotypal and paranoid symptoms (accounting for magical thinking and rich imaginary life in these patients)….In contrast, when coupled with high Self-directedness and Cooperativeness, high self-transcendence indicates maturity, spirituality, and creativity rather than psychopathology. (p. 193)

In other words, high scores on self-transcendence can be a maladaptive character feature in the absence of other essential character traits such as self-directedness and cooperativeness.

The points of congruence between Aristotle’s conceptualization of temperament and modern conceptualizations of temperament are illustrated in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4 Points of Congruence Between Aristotle’s Conceptualization of Temperament and Modern Conceptualizations of Temperament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Temperament considered physiologically based</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temperament influences emotion</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temperament influences behavior</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temperament is a factor that shapes both states and traits (character/personality)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Points of Congruence Between Aristotle’s Model of Psychology and Evolutionary Psychology

A particularly striking point of congruence between Aristotle’s model of psychology and contemporary models of psychology is Aristotle’s classification of human beings as belonging to the genus animal. Modern biological and physiological insights into psychology such as those that are found in instinct theory and evolutionary psychology also conceptualize human beings as belonging to the genus animal (Bereczkei, 2000; Cosmides & Tooby, 1999; Cosmides, Lieberman and Tooby, 2003; Siegert & Ward, 2002). Modern biology, instinct theory and evolutionary psychology also focus on such things as the role or function of instincts. It is interesting to note that Aristotle clearly articulated
the existence of instincts that he believed were part of the animal nature of human beings, and that these instincts played a role in the generation of both emotion and behavior.

Aristotle actually formulated nothing less than an ancient instinct theory when he posited the existence of unlearned or innate natural pleasures and pains. Additionally, as was presented in chapter 4, he clearly articulated a dynamic formulation of how these natural pleasures and pains operate in a teleological manner to generate movement to secure the ends of biology, which he indicated were survival and reproduction. What Aristotle did when he described the operating dynamics of the natural pleasures and pains is to articulate an ancient instinct theory that, excepting for the archaic physiological underpinnings, is in congruence with modern biological instinct theories and evolutionary psychology right down to the teleological nature of instincts and the aims or ends of survival and reproduction. Aristotle articulated this ancient instinct theory over 2400 years ago—well before the birth of Charles Darwin, and his proposal that survival and reproduction are the teleological ends of instincts. It is important to note, however, that Aristotle’s model did not include survival of the fittest or the process of evolution. Table 5.5 illustrates some of the points of congruence between Aristotle’s model and evolutionary psychology.
Table 5.5 Points of Congruence Between Aristotle’s Model of Psychology and Evolutionary Psychology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Points of Congruence Between Aristotle’s Model of Psychology and Evolutionary Psychology</th>
<th>Aristotle’s Model of Psychology</th>
<th>Evolutionary Psychology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human beings are a species of animal</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human beings have an animal nature</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instincts are unlearned/innate, but are also mutable</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instincts are teleological in nature and have the end of survival or reproduction</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instincts generate urges, desires, pain, pleasure, feeling states that generate approach or avoidance behavior</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instincts represent one of many factors that influence emotion and behavior</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Points of Congruence Between Aristotle’s Model of Psychology and Behaviorism*

Aristotle’s model of psychology has several significant points of congruence with behaviorism’s model of psychology. Behaviorism has been and continues to be an important perspective within modern clinical psychology (Delprato & Midgley, 1992; Fallon, 1992; Kimble, 1994; Lattal, 1992; Skinner, 1999). In fact, several modern perspectives within clinical psychology incorporate both theoretical and applied aspects of behaviorism into their theories and practices (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery 1979; Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985; Beck, Freeman, & Associates, 1990; Beck, 1999; Ellis, 1994; Lazarus, 1981).

According to the integrationalist perspective of personality-guided therapy,
behaviorism represents an important domain in a multi-domain model of personality, character, and human psychology (Millon & Davis, 1996; Millon, 1999; Millon, Davis, Escovar, & Meagher, 2000).

Aristotle’s conceptualization of the process and dynamics of habituation represents a dimension of his model of psychology that corresponds to some important dynamics found in modern behaviorism, and further illustrates his multifaceted understanding of the human person. Behaviorism includes the types of instinctual influences that are found in the biological, physiological and evolutionary models of psychology (Skinner, 1986; Alessi, 1992). These instincts can be found in behaviorism’s unconditioned stimuli and unconditioned responses. Unconditioned stimuli and unconditioned responses are unlearned, innate responses to unconditioned stimuli. Aristotle also posited the existence of unlearned responses to different stimuli in his conceptualization of the natural pleasures and pains. Both Aristotle and behaviorism posit that animals, including humans, have instincts that are innate/unlearned and which trigger behavior. The results section illustrated how Aristotle differentiated natural pleasures and pains from unnatural pleasures and pains. According to Aristotle the natural pleasures and pains were innate and had a teleological end of either survival or reproduction.
Behaviorism posits the existence of conditioned stimuli and conditioned responses, which are by definition learned responses. Aristotle’s model also contains learned emotional and behavioral responses. In Aristotle’s model, he posited the existence of learned reactions of pain and pleasure that result in either approach or avoidance behaviors. Aristotle referred to these learned automatic associations of pleasure and pain as *unnatural pleasures* and *unnatural pains*. According to Aristotle, unnatural pleasures and pains were not implanted by nature, but were instead shaped through a process that Aristotle referred to as *habituation*. Behaviorism mirrors Aristotle’s differentiation between learned and unlearned responses with behaviorism’s differentiation of unconditioned and conditioned stimuli and responses. Several points of congruence between Aristotle’s model of psychology and behaviorism are illustrated on the following page in Table 5.6.
Table 5.6 Comparison of Concepts Found in Aristotle’s Model of Psychology and Concepts found in Behaviorism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aristotle’s Model of Psychology</th>
<th>Behaviorism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Objects that elicit natural love/hate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Animal nature</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Instinctual</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Unlearned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Survival/Reproduction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Natural love/hate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Unlearned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Attraction/Aversion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Approach/Avoidance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Natural pleasure/pain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Survival/Reproduction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Habituation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Learned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Habituation takes place with pairing of object with associated pain/pleasure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Object that elicits habituated response/association</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Habituated response</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Learned responses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Habituated reactions of pain/pleasure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Approach/Avoidance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Animal nature</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Unconditioned stimuli</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Animal nature</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Instinctual</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Unlearned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Survival/Reproduction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Unconditioned responses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Unconditioned/Unlearned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Approach/Avoidance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Pleasure/Pain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Survival/Reproduction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Conditioning/Learning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Learned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Conditioning takes place with pairing of stimuli w/response</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Conditioned Stimuli</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Conditioned response</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Learned responses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Conditioned associations of pain/pleasure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Approach/Avoidance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Animal nature</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another of the key points of congruence between Aristotle’s model and aspects of behaviorism is Aristotle’s description of the process of habituation.
through which feeling states of pleasure and/or pain are learned or habituated through repeated actions. Habituated feeling states of learned pleasure and learned pain reactions operate in an automatic manner, which, in turn generates automatic approach and/or avoidance behaviors. This process of habituation, as described by Aristotle, is very similar to behaviorisms account of behavioral and emotional conditioning.

Habituated emotional responses figure prominently in Aristotle’s model of psychology. In the habituation process an individual’s learned emotional reactions are conditioned by the pain and pleasure that accompanies actions. It is through repeatedly engaging in certain activities with the attendant pleasure or pain that accompanies those activities that both emotional and behavioral patterns are established. According to Aristotle, a good portion of one’s character is shaped by this process of habituation because it is through the process of habituation that one establishes the automatic habituated pleasure and pain responses that one experiences in relation to various objects or activities. When Aristotle refers to the learned or habituated pleasure and pain responses, one needs to keep in mind that according to his model of psychology, pleasure and/pain initiate all movement toward or away from objects and that all emotional responses have some degree of pleasure or pain.
Aristotle’s understanding of natural and unnatural pleasures and pains has more in common with behaviorism than merely definitions of learned and unlearned responses. In fact, the dynamics of causation that are posited by both Aristotle and behaviorism also share multiple points of congruence. For example, several perspectives within behaviorism share the belief that pain and pleasure are the lowest common denominators that initiate all behavior (Higgins, 1997; Skinner, 1986). Thorndike, one of behaviorisms most influential writers, believed (along with Aristotle) that pleasure and pain play a central role in the dynamics of conditioning in animal learning (Higgins, 1997).

The formulation of basic approach or avoidance behaviors is also a point of congruence between the two models. Another point of congruence regarding the dynamics that initiate behavior is that both models indicate that it is not always the immediate pleasure or pain that is the motivating force, but that both proximate and distal pleasures and pains can and do impact behavior.

Aristotle asserted that human beings, as members of a species of the genus animal, both share and transcend the nature that is held in common with other animals. In other words, Aristotle agreed that human beings share with the other animals an animal nature which includes both the unconditioned (innate, unlearned, instinctual) and conditioned (learned) responses which are the subject of behaviorism; however, Aristotle’s model also posited that human beings
experience a wide range of feeling states, perceptions, dynamics, and
behaviors that are not caused by that which is shared with the other animals, but
by that which is unique to human beings—reason or ratiocinative thought.

*Points of Congruence Between Aristotle’s Model of Psychology and Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy & Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy*

Our analysis of the points of congruence between Aristotle’s model of
psychology and modern models of psychology has been hierarchically arranged in
the sense that each successive model has included much of the content of the
previous model; consequently, all of the points of congruence that have been thus
far identified are also points of congruence between Aristotle’s model of
psychology and the model of psychology that is found in cognitive-behavioral
therapy and rational emotive behavior therapy. The models of psychology that
are found in cognitive-behavioral therapy and rational emotive behavior therapy
integrate the empirical findings of biology, physiology, and behaviorism (Beck,
Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985; Beck, 1999; and
Ellis, 1995). Beck’s model of cognitive-behavioral therapy also explicitly
integrates the theory of evolution which opens it to the integration of theoretical
and empirical findings from evolutionary psychology (Beck, Rush, Shaw, &
Emery, 1979). Table 5.7 provides an illustration of points of congruence between
Aristotle’s model of psychology and the model of psychology found in cognitive-behavioral therapy.

Table 5.7 Points of Congruence Between Aristotle’s Model of Psychology and Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Points of Congruence</th>
<th>Aristotle’s Model of Psychology</th>
<th>Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humans are conceptualized as a species of animal</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instincts from animal nature influence both emotion and behavior</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instincts are considered to be teleological in nature and have the end of survival/reproduction</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental images play an important role in generating emotion and behavior</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model of psychology includes learned or conditioned emotional and behavioral responses</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognition, thinking, beliefs, and/or word-based reasoning significantly influence both emotion and behavior</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stresses the importance of logical reasoning</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deeply held beliefs have characterological ramifications</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is a model of psychology that is biopsychosocial in nature and acknowledges the biological, environmental, cultural, and social influences on such things as thinking, emotion, and behavior</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Aristotle’s model of psychology has several important points of congruence with the model of psychology that is found in Beck’s cognitive-behavioral
therapy. As mentioned above, both Aristotle and Beck integrate the previously discussed points of congruence (e.g., instincts, evolutionary psychology, and behaviorism), so there will be no need to cover that material again. One of the most direct points of congruence is that both Aristotle (1984) and Beck’s (1979) models of psychology emphasize the role of thinking or cognition in the generation of emotion and behavior. Aristotle’s belief that thinking or rational cognition plays a profound role in the generation of emotion and behavior is clearly articulated in his conceptualization of the dynamic role played by the intellectual faculty and the rational appetite, the definition and dynamics of the will, the differentiation of deliberative cognition from sense cognition, and his discussion of the cognitive and emotional dynamics of rhetoric. Aristotle and Beck both formulate models of psychology that are biopsychosocial in nature. Both models also posit that cognition plays a constructive role in the creation of experience.

Both Aristotle and Beck view right reason as an essential aspect of human functioning. Beck’s model includes patterns of negative thinking called cognitive distortions that contribute to depression (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979), anxiety (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985), anger (Beck, 1999), stress and a whole host of painful, maladaptive, and self-defeating patterns. Aristotle used concepts such as right reason, excellence in deliberation, and practical wisdom to
describe thinking that was in congruence with the reality concerning what is an individual’s best interest. The cognitive distortions also violate Aristotle’s careful application of the rules of logic that are designed to prevent such errors in reasoning.

According to Aristotle, attaining knowledge and understanding of truth or reality is the function of the intellect. It is interesting to note that cognitive—behavioral therapy posits that cognitive distortions are a significant cause of anxiety, depression, and anger. Cognitive distortions are patterns of thinking that are distortions of reality. Cognitive distortions such as all-or-nothing thinking, mind reading, the fortune teller error, magnification (catastrophizing) or minimization, emotional reasoning, and personalization are often demonstrably false. For example, an individual may think that someone is thinking negatively about them (fortune telling error) however, the objective reality may be quite different. Consider, for example, a child engaging in the cognitive distortion of personalization, who is convinced that if he/she was a better child and hadn’t caused so much trouble for his parents, maybe his parents wouldn’t be getting a divorce. Distortions such as these represent erroneous thinking patterns if in fact the other individual had not been thinking negatively and if the child is objectively wrong in his/her conclusions regarding responsibility for the divorce. Hence, the use of the term cognitive distortion.
In these examples, the distortion of reality is clear; however, not all distortions are due to a clearly identifiable distortion of reality. For example, an individual may be objectively accurate regarding an assessment of themselves on some trait, characteristic or factor (e.g., popularity, beauty, intelligence, wealth, or social status), but still engage in a cognitive distortion. For example, a person might come to the conclusion that he/she does not make as much money as his/her friends, and then begin to believe that he/she is a “loser” which would be an example of labeling. One cannot demonstrate an objective standard for loser without a leap of faith that endorses some principles regarding human worth, so this type of distortion would not be a violation of an objective norm, unless that is there is an objective moral norm regarding the intrinsic dignity of the human person. This latter kind of cognitive distortion, however, would violate several of the clear principles outlined in Aristotle’s conceptualization of virtue and Aristotle’s clear statements regarding a virtuous individual’s ability to weather the storms of fortune without loss of dignity.

The significance that Aristotle placed on the role that cognition plays in the generation of both emotion and behavior is also evidenced by his differentiation of the rational appetite. It is interesting to note that Aristotle’s differentiation of the three types of appetite is in congruence with the model of psychology found in cognitive-behavioral therapy. Both cognitive-behavioral therapy (Beck, Rush,
Shaw, & Emery, 1979) and Aristotle’s (1984) model of psychology accepts that there are physiological/instinctual aspects of emotion. Both models also acknowledge the existence of conditioned, learned, or habituated emotions and behaviors that once learned operate on an automatic basis. Both models also give prominence to the role of thinking, beliefs, and ratiocinative thought in the generation of emotions and behaviors. These points of congruence between Aristotle’s model of psychology and cognitive-behavioral therapy also illustrate the multi-domain nature of Aristotle’s biopsychosocial model of psychology and conceptualization of character.

**Points of Congruence Between Aristotle’s Model of Psychology and Adler’s Individual Psychology**

According to the findings in the results of this inquiry it becomes apparent that the models of psychology that were posited by Aristotle and Adler are in congruence on several important points. What follows is a brief examination of how Aristotle model contains several important similarities with aspects of Adler’s conceptualizations of the teleological nature of emotion and behavior, the role of cognition, common sense, basic mistakes, faulty values, and social interest.

*Aristotle & Adler: Teleological Models of Psychology & the Importance of Childhood*
A teleological conceptualization of emotions and behavior is an integral component of both Aristotle’s and Adler’s model of psychology. Aristotle used the Greek word *telos* which was the Greek word for *end*. It is this Greek word (*telos*) that is the etymological origin for the word teleology. Aristotle uses the word *telos* to refer to the end, goal, or purpose of a thing. As was illustrated in the results section, Aristotle’s model of psychology posits teleological dynamics for innate biological processes (e.g., natural pleasure and natural pain associated with hunger or thirst that is due to dehydration and/or nutrition), learned habituated processes (learned pleasure or pain responses that are elicited on an automatic basis but which nevertheless have teleological functions or aims), and volitional acts that involve the intellect (e.g., when a person desires to know the etymological origins of a word and then looks it up).

Adler also formulated a teleological model of psychology. According to Ansbacher & Ansbacher (1956), “Adler had…taken the observable forward orientation of the individual and his concern with the future as the center of his dynamic psychology” (p. 88). In Adler’s model of psychology, individuals are motivated to achieve their fictional goal, self-ideal, or personality-ideal (*persönlichkeitsideal*). According to Ansbacher & Ansbacher (1956), Adler’s conceptualizations of the “fictional goal” and “final factionalism” were
significantly influenced by the writings of Hans Vaihinger’s Idealistic Positivism (pp. 76-100). The models of psychology formulated by Adler and Aristotle are both considered to be teleological, and both models have a clearly articulated teleological understanding about the origin and dynamics of emotion and behavior.

In the teleological models of psychology espoused by Aristotle and Adler, the values of an individual shape his/her perception and motivations. The role attributed to values are integrated into both Aristotle’s and Adler’s models of psychology. Regarding Adler’s of the teleological model of psychology, Ansbacher & Ansbacher (1956) wrote,

Adler’s subjectivism, where values, goals, and secondary motives had replaced drives and primary motives in importance, was not a physiological reductionism. If mental events cannot be reduced to physiological events, systematization is possible only by establishing a hierarchy of values and goals. This leads to the philosophical position of teleology and finalism, the determination by final causes. (p. 88)

Embedded in both Aristotle’s and Adler’s models of psychology is the position that human actions have ends, which is why both models are considered to be teleological in nature. Aristotle and Adler use different terminology to describe the ends for which human beings strive. According to Aristotle, human beings seek the apprehended good and are motivated to seek pleasure and that which is perceived to lead to happiness. Adler’s thinking regarding fictional finalism and
moving from a felt minus to a felt plus is also rooted in the basic seeking of that which is perceived to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. The hedonic principle of pleasure vs. pain is present in both models. One could say that according to Adler, it is the perceived good or apprehended good, which is contained in the “fictional goal” that motivates the individual in both private logic and common sense.

Both Aristotle and Adler believed that emotions generate behaviors and that emotional dynamics are teleological in nature. According to Adler, an individual’s goals are constitutive of his/her emotional experience and overall phenomenology:

The feelings of an individual bear the impress of the meaning he gives to life and of the goal he has set for his strivings. To a great extent they rule his body and do not depend on it. They depend primarily on his goal and his consequent style of life. The feelings are never in contradiction to the style of life. We are no longer, therefore, in a realm of physiology or biology. The rise of feelings cannot be explained by chemical theory and cannot be predicted by chemical examination. In Individual Psychology, while we presuppose the physiological process, we are most interested in the psychological goal. It is not so much our concern that anxiety influences the sympathetic and parasympathetic nerves. We look, rather, for the purpose and end of anxiety. (as cited in Ansbacher & Ansbacher, 1956, p. 226)

Aristotle, as was discussed in the results section, believed that human beings play an important role in the creation of their character, and that character in turn contributes to the creation of an individual’s emotional,
cognitive, behavioral, and overall phenomenological experience. Adler also believed that individuals play an important role in the shaping of their character and that one’s character shapes an individual’s emotional experience which in turn elicits behavior. Regarding the relationship between an individual’s character and his emotional experience Adler wrote, “The emotions are accentuations of the character traits…” (as cited in Ansbacher & Ansbacher, 1956, p. 226).

Both Aristotle and Adler also shared the belief that early childhood experiences have a powerful impact on the teleological ends that are pursued by individuals. For example, in *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle (1962) wrote:

> An index to our characteristics is provided by the pleasure or pain which follows upon the tasks we have achieved….For moral excellence is concerned with pleasure and pain; it is pleasure that makes us do base actions and pain that prevents us from doing noble actions. For that reason, as Plato says, men must be brought up from childhood to feel pleasure and pain at the proper things; for this is correct education. (pp. 36-37)

Regarding the importance of early childhood on the shaping of an individual’s unique teleology Adler wrote,

> Every individual acts and suffers in accordance with his peculiar teleology, which has all the inevitability of fate, so long as he does not understand it [that is, so long as it remains unconscious] Its springs may be traced to his earliest childhood, and nearly always we find that they have been diverted into false channels by the pressure of the earliest situations in the child’s life. (as cited in Ansbacher & Ansbacher, 1956 p. 93)
The fact that Aristotle and Adler both posited teleological models of psychology that stressed the importance of early childhood experiences in the shaping of the ends for which an individual strives are points of considerable significance. These points of congruence make both Aristotle’s and Adler’s model of psychology teleological and nondeterministic.

_Aristotle & Adler: Right Reason, Prudence, Imprudence, Common Sense, Mistaken Beliefs and Private Logic_

Both Aristotle and Adler view human beings as playing an active role in a self-creative process in which thinking, reasoning, and freedom play significant roles in the shaping of one’s emotions, perceptions and behaviors. Both Aristotle and Adler created models of psychology that posit that different kinds of thinking cause different emotions and behaviors. Aristotle’s conceptualization of right reason (practical wisdom or prudent thinking) has several similarities with Adler’s conceptualization of common sense.

The concept of right reason figures prominently in Aristotle’s model of psychology and conceptualization of character. In his model of psychology, right reason refers to the type of reasoning found in an individual with practical wisdom (prudence). Aristotle (1984) wrote a description of what a virtue is and how the virtuous mean is determined, “Excellence [virtue], then, is a state concerned with choice, lying in a mean relative to us, this being determined by
reason and in the way in which the man of practical wisdom would determine it” (p. 1748). An important point that Aristotle is making in the preceding quotation is that the virtuous mean relative to a particular individual is determined by the use of reason in the way that a man of practical wisdom determines it. In other words, not only is reasoning necessary, but also a particular kind of reasoning (i.e., the kind used by individuals with practical wisdom). In *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle (1984) wrote:

> Now it is thought to be a mark of a man of practical wisdom to be able to deliberate well about what is good and expedient for himself, not in some particular respect, e.g. about what sorts of thing conduce to health or to strength, but about what sorts of thing conduce to the good life in general. (p. 1801)

In a similar manner, when Adler described his concept of common sense, he was describing a person’s ability and tendency to think about things in a particular manner, and when he described private intelligence, he is describing a kind of reasoning and thinking about things which is opposed to sound reasoning, social interest, and common sense. Regarding the difference between private intelligence and common sense Adler wrote, “We must distinguish between ‘private intelligence’ and ‘common sense,’ and must understand reason as being connected with common sense—sense that can be shared.” (as cited in Ansbacher & Ansbacher, 1956, p. 253) What Adler is referring to here is very similar to what Aristotle refers to as right reason. Both right reason and common sense are
constituted by particular kinds of thoughts, beliefs and attitudes that are conducive to human functioning and flourishing (e.g., the good life). Both imprudence and private logic involve types of thinking and reasoning; however, they are types of reasoning that do not serve the individual well or society in general. As was pointed out by Ansbacher & Ansbacher (1956) mistaken beliefs, mistaken opinions, and mistaken goals are central to Adler’s understanding of neurosis and behavior disorders:

Adler’s theory of neurosis and other behavior disorders is in essence the following: (1) An individual with a mistaken opinion of himself and the world, that is, with mistaken goals and a mistaken style of life, (2) will resort to various forms of abnormal behavior aimed at safeguarding his opinion of himself (3) when confronted with situations which he feels he cannot meet successfully, due to his mistaken views and the resulting inadequate preparation. (4) The mistake consists in being self-centered rather than taking the human interrelatedness into account. (5) The individual is not consciously aware of these processes. (p. 239)

Right reason, according to Aristotle, represents a particular kind of reasoning that is in congruence with that which will facilitate the good life. Adler’s conceptualization of the type of thinking that he refers to as common sense also has a particular type of content that serves both the individual and society well. Adler identified some of the ways that private logic differs from common sense when he wrote:

To speak, to read, and to write all presuppose a bridge with other men. Language itself is a common creation of mankind, the result of social interest. Understanding is a common matter, not a private function. To
understand is as we expect that everyone should understand. It is to connect ourselves in a common meaning with other people, to be controlled by the common sense of all mankind. There are some people who are seeking mainly their own interests and for personal superiority. They give a private meaning to life. They give a private meaning to life; life should exist for them alone. This is no understanding, however; it is an opinion which no one else in the whole wide world could share. We find, therefore, that such people are unable to connect themselves to their fellow men. Often when we see a child who has trained towards interest in himself, we find he has a hangdog or vacant look in his face; and we can see something of the same look in criminals or of the insane. They are not using their eyes to connect with others. They are not seeing in the same way. (as cited in Ansbacher & Ansbacher, 1956, p. 253)

Aristotle’s conceptualizations of the role of cognition and right reason have several important similarities with Adler’s conceptualization common sense and private logic. Adler made a point of highlighting the difference between his use of the terms intelligence and reason when he wrote, “This private intelligence is to be sharply differentiated from one must call reason, common sense. We find ‘intelligence’ in both cases, but we call reason only the kind of intelligence which is connected with social interest” (as cited in Ansbacher & Ansbacher, 1979, p. 45). In other words, a line of thinking may be logically consistent, but not reasonable if it violates social interest.

Aristotle’s model also shares significant points of congruence with what Dreikurs (1948) referred to as mistaken goals and what Mosak (1989) referred to as basic mistakes and faulty values. The existence of private logic, mistaken goals, basic mistakes, and faulty values can be seen in Aristotle’s description of
vicious character traits such as imprudence, irascibility, inordinate ambition, selfishness, and intemperance (self-indulgent). According to both Aristotle and Adler beliefs, values and goals are constituent factors of a person’s emotions, behaviors and perspectives, which is a position that is also shared by cognitive-behavioral therapy (Beck, A., Freeman, A., & Associates 1990), rational emotive behavioral therapy (Ellis, 1975) and personality-guided therapy (Millon, & Davis, 1996; Millon, 1999; Millon, Davis, Millon, Escovar, & Meagher, 2000).

Aristotle & Adler on the Prosocial Dimension of Characterological Health

In his work *Politics*, Aristotle (1984) wrote that, “A social instinct is implanted in all men by nature” (p. 1988). Indeed, it is important to be cognizant of the fact that Aristotle’s conceptualization of character, virtue and vice are found in his works on moral philosophy (i.e., *Eudemian Ethics* and *Nicomachean Ethics*) which he classified as a sub-discipline of politics. In other words, Aristotle’s conceptualizations of character, virtue, and vice emerge from and are grounded in an interpersonal, political and social context. Virtue, according to Aristotle, is teleological and has the end (*telos*) of the attainment of happiness and the good life on both an *individual* and *social* level. In Aristotle’s *Politics*, he described the city-state as a product of nature, which has the teleological or functional end of making the *good life* possible for the citizenry. Regarding man’s political nature and the natural emergence of the state Aristotle (1984) wrote:
When several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and the nature of a thing is its end. For what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family. Besides, the final cause and end of a thing is the best, and to be self-sufficing is the end and the best.

Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is either a bad man or above humanity; he is like the tribeless, lawless, hearthless one, whom Homer denounces—the natural outcast is forthwith a lover of war… (p. 1987)

Aristotle’s belief that the state is a natural social organization that has the function and end of obtaining the good life has some interesting parallels with Adler’s conceptualization of social interest and the communal life of being important elements of human nature. Adler wrote,

Individual Psychology accepts the viewpoint of the complete unity and self-consistency of the individual whom it regards and examines as socially embedded. We refuse to recognize and examine an isolated human being. (as cited in Ansbacher and Ansbacher, 1956, p. 126)

Both Aristotle and Adler define characterological health and characterological illness in terms of the quality and nature of interpersonal and social functioning. According to Aristotle, there are several virtues that directly shape aspects of interpersonal behavior and functioning (e.g., friendliness, generosity, wittiness); however, justice is the primary virtue that regulates our interpersonal thoughts, feelings, and actions. Justice orders our interactions with others, so that we
interact with others in a manner that gives them what they are due. The virtue of justice would later be referred to as one of the four cardinal virtues (i.e., justice, prudence, temperance, courage) from which all of the other virtues are derived (Aquinas, 1915). The virtue of justice is a pivotal character trait shaping a wide array of thoughts, beliefs, emotions, and behaviors. For example, one of the reasons suicide was considered to be wrong in the ancient world was because it deprived society of what it was due from the individual. The social dimension of justice involved such things as devotion and service to one’s parents, family members, and friends. There are clear and obvious parallels between Aristotle’s concept of justice and Adler’s conceptualization of social interest as being a hallmark of that which is adaptive and healthy. Adler made social interest an essential component of his understanding of virtue when he wrote:

We call virtuous, wise, reasonable, valuable only that which takes place on the side of general usefulness. Our judgment is also guided in this manner and every person in his full senses distinguishes approximately according to the same classification principle. Even one who moves on the useless side of life, such as a problem child, neurotic, criminal, suicide, alcoholic, pervert, etc., will be aware of the difference, will be able to distinguish between good and bad, and will attempt to defend his own work against reproaches from reason and from virtue. But he will continue on his useless path as long as he has not separated himself from his ideal goal of a personal superiority, useless for the community. He will separate himself from it only when he has comprehended the principle of reason with his private intelligence; i.e., when he has recognized the erroneous prototype from his childhood, his increased inferiority feeling, his striving for personal superiority, and the significance of social interest for the
Aristotle’s Conceptualization of the Character:

Points of Congruence with Emotional Intelligence

Emotional intelligence refers to a constellation of emotional and social skills or abilities that empirical research findings suggest play an important role in facilitating success or high functioning in a variety of areas such as emotional well-being, interpersonal relationships, academics, and work/career functioning and performance (Goleman, 1995). Emotional intelligence is a kind of intelligence that is different than that which is measured by traditional IQ tests, such as the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale—Third Edition (WAIS-III). Emotional intelligence refers to such phenomena as how much awareness one has about his/her own emotions and the emotions of other people, the ability to generate accurate self-appraisals, trustworthiness, adaptability, conscientiousness, self-control, optimism, drive for achievement, initiative, and empathy.

In Goleman’s (1995) influential bestseller, Emotional Intelligence: Why it can matter more than IQ, he explicitly mentions Aristotle as having had seminal insights into the importance of emotional intelligence. The introduction to the book is titled “Aristotle’s Challenge,” and starts with the following quotation from Aristotle, “Anyone can become angry—that is easy. But to be angry with
the right person, to the right degree, at the right time, for the right purpose, and in the right way—that is not easy” (cited in Goleman, 1995, p. ix). The quote is from Aristotle’s work on moral philosophy, *Nicomachean Ethics*, and illustrates the kinds of emotional issues that Aristotle thought were central to the living of the good life.

As was illustrated in the discussion section, emotions are the wind in the sails of *all behavior*; consequently, if one is going to behave in a virtuous manner, particular emotional experiences will be required to generate virtuous behavior. According to Aristotle, a great deal of emotional experience is characterological in nature. The virtuous character “produces” particular emotional experiences that occur at the appropriate times, to the appropriate degree of intensity, for the right reasons, and which generate virtuous behavior. Aristotle’s conceptualization of the interrelationships among emotion, character, behavior, and virtue has several concrete points of congruence with the contemporary conceptualization of emotional intelligence.

Goleman (1995) describes the following five domains associated with emotional intelligence: (a) knowing one’s own emotions and the ability to attend to one’s emotional experience as it happens; (b) the ability to manage or regulate one’s emotions; (c) the ability to motivate oneself (e.g., self-control, delaying
gratification, resisting impulsivity); (d) the ability to recognize emotions in others (empathy); and (e) handling relationships with social competence.

After additional empirical research, Goleman and Cherniss (2001) collapsed the five domains into the following four domains of emotional intelligence: (a) self-awareness, (b) self-management, (c) social awareness, and (d) relationship management. Each of the domains of emotional intelligence has associated emotional competencies. The emotional competencies are conceptualized as learned capabilities that result in outstanding work-related performance (Goleman & Cherniss, 2001). Table 5.8 provides an overview of the domains of emotional intelligence and the emotional competencies that are associated with each of the domains as found in Goleman and Cherniss (2001).
Table 5.8 Four Domains of Emotional Intelligence and Twenty Emotional Competencies (Goleman & Cherniss, 2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recognition</th>
<th>Personal Competence (Self)</th>
<th>Social Competence (Other)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-Awareness</td>
<td>• Emotional self-awareness</td>
<td>Social Awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Accurate self-assessment</td>
<td>• Empathy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Self-confidence</td>
<td>• Service orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Awareness</td>
<td>• Empathy</td>
<td>• Organizational awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Service orientation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Organizational awareness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulation</th>
<th>Self-Management</th>
<th>Relationship Management</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Self-control</td>
<td>• Developing others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Trustworthiness</td>
<td>• Influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Conscientiousness</td>
<td>• Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Adaptability</td>
<td>• Conflict management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Achievement drive</td>
<td>• Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Initiative</td>
<td>• Change catalyst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Initiative</td>
<td>• Building bonds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Teamwork &amp; collaboration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.8 also illustrates how there are both recognition and regulation aspects of emotional intelligence, each of which can be further differentiated by the focus on self (personal competence) or others (social competence). The recognition aspects of emotional intelligence include the self-awareness and social awareness domains, and refers to an individual’s ability to recognize such things as their own emotional experiences and the emotional experiences of others. The regulation aspects of emotional intelligence involves the shaping or regulation of such things as emotions, behavior, and communication with others.
Goleman (1995) indicated that the constituents of emotional intelligence are often referred to as character. It is interesting to note that, according to Aristotle, the moral virtues shape or regulate both emotional experience and behavior, and that much of what falls under the rubric of emotional intelligence is also the subject matter of virtue ethics. For example, Aristotle stressed the importance of accurate self-assessment in the virtue of humility, the importance of trustworthiness in the virtue of justice, achievement drive in the virtue of magnanimity/high mindedness, and adaptability in the virtue of practical reason. Self-awareness and emotional awareness would also fall under the Delphic exhortation of “Know thyself.” Another point of congruence is that Goleman and Cherniss (2001), like Aristotle, posit that there are biophysiological underpinnings to emotional intelligence.

Clearly, Aristotle’s conceptualization of virtue, as Goleman (1995) himself pointed out, has much in common with the concepts and constructs of emotional intelligence especially the focus on emotional and behavioral regulation. Another point of congruence is how the virtues, emotional intelligence, and the emotional competencies are posited as being productive of excellence in terms of functioning and how they are thought to facilitate the good life.

_Aristotle’s Conceptualization of the Virtues of Temperance and Fortitude:_
Points of Congruence with Contemporary Theory and Empirical Research

Regarding Self-Regulation

Self-regulation is a subject area of contemporary psychology that has several important points of congruence with Aristotle's conceptualization of the virtues of fortitude and temperance. This section first will provide a review of Aristotle's conceptualization of the virtues of temperance, continence, incontinence, and intemperance. Then points of congruence will be identified between Aristotle’s model and the theoretical and empirical work related to the topic of self-regulation.

Review of Aristotle’s Conceptualization of Temperance, Continence, Incontinence, and Intemperance

Self-regulation of both emotion and behavior was a central feature of Aristotle's conceptualization of character, virtue, and vice. In fact, character, virtue and vice refer to characteristics that shape or regulate an individual’s feelings and behaviors. A brief review of Aristotle's conceptualization of the virtues of fortitude and temperance will help to illustrate the self-regulatory function of these virtues.

Temperance, continence, incontinence, and intemperance are all involved in the shaping or regulation of the dynamics of pleasure (and pain insomuch as it results from the absence, forgoing, or delay of pleasure). In Aristotle’s
conceptualization of the dynamics associated with the intermediate states of continence (morally strong) and incontinence (morally weak) he posits some of the dynamics associated with self-regulation.

Temperance is the virtue that regulates or shapes a temperate individual’s appetites or desires for pleasures of various kinds. The virtue of temperance shapes both the intensity of desires and the objects of desires, “…for a temperate man will have neither excessive nor bad appetites” (Aristotle, 1984, p. 1810). Temperance is also involved in the regulation or shaping of the pain that one feels due to the privation of pleasure. The virtue of temperance brings an individual’s desires into harmony with his/her reason, judgment and practical wisdom. The temperate individual may still experience desires that are opposed to reason; however, these desires are able to be brought into line with the individual’s prudent judgment.

The continent or morally strong individual (ἦνκρατης) experiences intense conflict between his/her judgment and desires. These individuals are conflicted in that they experience strong desires to do things that are opposed to their judgment. Although it is a difficult struggle, the continent individual is able to overcome tempestuous desires and implement the conclusion of his/her judgment by acting in accord with their right reason. The conclusions of their deliberation, as well as their behavior are in congruence with practical wisdom. This is considered to be
an intermediate characteristic because the desires are in excess of what an individual with the virtue of temperance would experience, and the individual has more difficulty struggling against these desires.

The incontinent individual (*Akratēs*) experiences conflict between what he/she judges to be the right thing to do and his/her desires; however, the incontinent/morally weak individual succumbs to his/her desires and acts in a manner that is opposed to their judgment. Incontinent/morally weak individuals experience ego-dystonic desires and end up acting/behaving in an ego-dystonic manner.

The intemperate or self-indulgent individuals are not conflicted, in that, their beliefs and desires are in congruence; however, both the conclusions of their judgment and their consequent actions are incongruent with practical wisdom. Intemperate/self-indulgent individuals experience desires for things they should not (e.g., the sexual desires associated with acts of pedophilia) and reason in a manner that justifies both their desires and their actions. Intemperate individuals also experience excessively strong desires and experience inordinate pains at delaying or forgoing pleasures. The desires and actions of the intemperate/self-indulgent individual are ego-syntonic in nature.

Table 5.9 illustrates some of the dynamics of temperance, continence, incontinence, and self-indulgence, and how a continent individual is
characteristically successful at self-regulation, while the incontinent individual characteristically fails at self-regulation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.9</th>
<th>The Dynamics of Temperance, Continence, Incontinence, and Intemperance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Virtue</td>
<td><strong>Intermediate Characteristics</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sōphrōn</strong></td>
<td><em>Enkratēs</em> Morally Strong Continent Self-controlled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temperate</td>
<td><strong>Akratēs</strong> Morally Weak Incontinent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little or no conflict between judgment and desires</td>
<td>Conflict between judgment and desire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Struggles to overcome ego-dystonic desires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judgment and desires are congruent or are easily brought into congruence.</td>
<td>Successful Self-regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The individual successfully <em>overcomes</em> the desires to act contrary to his/her judgment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acts in accordance with judgment</td>
<td>Acts in accordance with judgment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judgment and actions in congruence</td>
<td>Acts against his/her judgment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Later comes to regret actions because they violated his/her judgment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acts in accordance with judgment</td>
<td>Acts in accordance with judgment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Judgment and actions in congruence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Vice**

Self-Indulgent Intemperate

Little or no conflict between judgment and desires

Judgment and desires are in congruence.
Pleasure and pain, according to Aristotle, are associated with all behavior. Pleasure is associated with desire and approach behaviors, and pain is associated with aversion and avoidance behaviors. Temperance refers to the characteristic that allows an individual to overcome the desires for pleasure that are contrary to his or her judgment, and fortitude refers to the characteristic that allows an individual to overcome the pain that is contrary to the judgment of his/her reason.

Fortitude and temperance are not the only virtues that are involved in regulatory processes. In fact, the dynamics of the intellectual and the moral virtues all have regulatory roles that bring an individual’s thinking, feeling, and subsequent behavior into alignment with truth and what is in accordance with practical reason. The following quotation from Aquinas (1915) does a good job of summarizing the self-regulatory dynamics of both the intellectual and moral virtues:

According to the Philosopher [i.e., Aristotle] (Ethic. ii, 6) "virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and renders his work good." Hence human virtue, of which we are speaking now, is that which makes a man good, and tenders his work good. Now man's good is to be in accordance with reason…Wherefore it belongs to human virtue to make man good, to make his work accord with reason. This happens in three ways: first, by rectifying reason itself, and this is done by the intellectual virtues; secondly, by establishing the rectitude of reason in human affairs, and this belongs to justice; thirdly, by removing the obstacles to the establishment of this rectitude in human affairs. Now the human will is hindered in two ways from following the rectitude of reason. First, through being drawn by some object of pleasure to something other than what the rectitude of reason requires; and this obstacle is removed by the virtue of temperance.
Secondly, through the will being disinclined to follow that which is in accordance with reason, on account of some difficulty that presents itself. In order to remove this obstacle fortitude of the mind is requisite, whereby to resist the aforesaid difficulty even as a man, by fortitude of body, overcomes and removes bodily obstacles. Hence it is evident that fortitude is a virtue, in so far as it conforms man to reason. (p. 1701)

Contemporary Empirical Research Regarding Self-regulation

Contemporary empirical research regarding self-regulation confirms the importance that Aristotle placed on self-regulation and offers insight into the processes involved in self-regulatory processes. For example, empirical research into self-regulation has shown that self-regulation, or the failure to self-regulate, plays an important role in many generally agreed upon factors associated with the good life, such as: diet (Herman & Polivy, 2004), spending and savings patterns (Faber & Vohs, 2004), the attainment of long-term goals (Trope & Fishbach, 2000), the selection and use of coping strategies (Aspinwall & Taylor, 1997; Baumeister, 1997; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1997), emotional regulation (Aspinwall & Diamond, 2003; Bratslavsky & Tice, 2000), academic performance/functioning (Boekaerts, 1996; Wolters, 2003); and work performance/functioning (Bateman & Porath, 2006).

Empirical research into self-regulation provides insights into continence and incontinence by showing why efforts to self-regulate succeed or fail. For example, Baumeister (1997) described how underregulation and misregulation are two causes of failed self-regulation. Baumeister (1997) wrote,
Underregulation typically involves a failure of the self to make the effort to change its response toward that which is likely to yield the best outcome. Misregulation may involve concerted and effective efforts at changing the self, but the changes do not bring about the desired external outcome, possibly because contingencies have not been understood properly. (p. 148) Underregulation and misregulation can be considered two reasons for Akrasia or the incontinent individual’s failure to implement the conclusions of his/her judgment. Baumeister (1997) also pointed out that both underregulation and misregulation can be sources of self-defeating behavior:

Self-defeating behavior means that the self is failing to pursue its enlightened self-interest. This can occur either because the self does not appraise its enlightened self-interest (and the means of pursuing it) correctly, or because the self neglects to exert itself so as to make itself do what will bring about the optimal results. These correspond to misregulation and underregulation, respectively. (p. 148)

The issues that come into play with the topic of self-regulation are profoundly significant in terms of the conceptualization of human nature because it brings to the forefront issues such as free will, the role of the self, and personal responsibility. These issues will be revisited in the concluding section that explores the possibility of using Aristotle’s model of psychology as a metatheory.

Positive Psychology and the Study of Character and Virtue

The relatively new discipline of positive psychology has brought a renewed interest to the study of character and virtue, and has the explicit intention of advancing the empirical study of character strengths and virtues (Csikszentmihalyi & Seligman, 2000; Peterson & Seligman, 2004). The terms
character, virtue, and vice had been intentionally excluded from use in psychology as part of an intentional effort to differentiate the emerging field of psychology from the discipline of philosophy (Nicholson, 1998; Kosits, 2004). The terms, character, virtue, and vice were also thought by some in the field of psychology to be judgmental and value laden; consequently, an effort was made to derive what were thought to be value-neutral terms to describe and define personality traits and features (Fowers, 2005; Kosits, 2004; Leonard, 1997). However, despite the intentional effort to avoid the use of character-related terminology in psychology, terms such as character disorder and characterological have continued to be used synonymously with personality-related terminology. A significant downside to the efforts to remove character-related terminology from psychology is that it inhibited the empirical study of character and virtue.

In their effort to provide positive psychology with a classification of character strengths and virtues, Peterson and Seligman (2004) indicated that, “The stance we take toward character is in the spirit of personality psychology, and specifically that of trait theory…” (p. 10). Adopting a stance toward character that is rooted in the spirit of personality psychology and trait theory in particular is of enormous value to the conceptualization and study of character and virtue. This stance allows for the integration of the theoretical work, empirical findings,
definitions, and methodologies of personality psychology to be brought to
bear on the study of character and virtue. It also avoids conceptualizing character
and virtue as reified constructs that have little or no connection with the existent
theoretical and empirical work of personality psychology.

The discipline of psychology has made great strides in furthering the
knowledge we have of the developmental, social, environmental, biological,
genetic, emotional, behavioral, and cognitive factors that constitute or contribute
to the development of mental illness. DSM—IV and the International
Classification of Disease (ICD) have provided a common language and set of
criteria that has allowed researchers from all over the world to conduct empirical
research on standardized definitions of mental illness. However, the discipline
has also been criticized for having focused far more on the constituents and
dynamics of pathology and what is wrong with people, than on the constituents
and dynamics of health and optimal functioning (Csikszentmihalyi & Seligman,

Nothing comparable to the DSM or ICD exists for the good life. When
psychiatrists and psychologists talk about mental health, wellness, or well-
being, they mean little more than the absence of disease, distress, and
disorder. It is as if falling short of diagnostic criteria should be the goal for
which we should all strive. Insurance companies and health maintenance
organizations (HMOs) reimburse the treatment of [some] disorders but
certainly not the promotion of happiness and fulfillment. The National
Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) should really be called the National
Institute of Mental Illness because it devotes but a fraction of its research budget to mental health. (p. 4)

The inordinate emphasis on pathology was one of the reasons that positive psychology was founded with the explicit goal to empirically study that which constitutes health, optimal functioning, well-being, strengths, character, and virtue. Peterson & Seligman (2004) wrote:

The classification of strengths...is intended to reclaim the study of character and virtue as legitimate topics of psychological inquiry and informed societal discourse. By providing ways of talking about character strengths and measuring them across the life span, this classification will start to make possible a science of human strengths that goes beyond armchair philosophy and political rhetoric. We believe that good character can be cultivated, but to do so, we need conceptual and empirical tools to craft and evaluate interventions. (p. 3)

The empirical and theoretical work that is being done on character, strengths, and virtues has important relevance to work in theoretical, empirical and applied clinical psychology. The knowledge of the constituents and dynamics of healthy and adaptive character traits, strengths and virtues is as important as understanding unhealthy character traits. It is likely to be of great clinical utility to have as comprehensive a body of theoretical and empirical work on the etiology, traits, and dynamics of strengths and virtues as we have of the personality disorders.

In order to empirically study character strengths and virtues, positive psychology identified character strengths and virtues will need to be
operationalized in order to conduct empirical investigations. According to

Dahlsgaard, Peterson and Seligman (2005):

Positive psychology needs an agreed upon way of classifying positive traits as a backbone of research, diagnosis, and intervention. As a 1st step toward classification the authors examined philosophical and religious traditions in China (Confucianism and Taoism), South Asia (Buddhism and Hinduism), and the West (Athenian Philosophy, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) for the answers each provided to questions of moral behavior and the good life. The authors found that 6 core virtues reoccurring in these writings: courage, justice, humanity, temperance, wisdom, and transcendence. This convergence suggests a nonarbitrary foundation for the classification of human strengths and virtues. (p. 203)

Four out of the six core virtues identified by the multicultural review that was conducted by Dahlsgaard, Peterson and Seligman (2005) are also identified as core virtues by Aristotle (i.e., wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice). The authors suggest that this supports the possibility that these core virtues are universal, in that they transcend both time and culture. Table 5.10 provides Peterson’s & Seligman’s (2004) classification of character strengths.
Table 5.10 Peterson & Seligman (2004) Classification of Character Strengths

- **Wisdom & Knowledge**
  - Creativity (originality, ingenuity)
  - Curiosity (interest, novelty-seeking, openness to experience)
  - Open-mindedness (judgment, critical thinking)
  - Love of learning
  - Perspective (wisdom)

- **Courage**
  - Bravery (valor)
  - Persistence (perseverance, industriousness)
  - Integrity (authenticity, honesty)
  - Vitality (zest, enthusiasm, vigor, energy)

- **Humanity**
  - Love
  - Kindness (generosity, nurturance, care, compassion, altruistic love, “niceness”)
  - Social intelligence (emotional intelligence, personal intelligence)

- **Justice**—civic strengths that underlie healthy community life
  - Citizenship (social responsibility, loyalty, teamwork)
  - Fairness
  - Leadership

- **Temperance**—strengths that protect against excess
  - Forgiveness and mercy
  - Humility/Modesty
  - Prudence
  - Self-regulation (self-control)

- **Transcendence**—strengths that forge connections to the larger universe and provide meaning
  - Appreciation of beauty and excellence (awe, wonder, elation)
  - Gratitude
  - Hope (optimism, future-mindedness, future orientation)
  - Humor (playfulness)
  - Spirituality (religiousness, faith, purpose)
An Aspirational Classification of Character Strengths and Virtues

Peterson and Seligman (2004), describe their classification as, “an aspirational classification of strengths and virtues” (p. 7). The authors originally were referring to their list of character strengths and virtues as a taxonomy; however, they decided to discontinue their use of the term taxonomy because taxonomies contain theoretical underpinnings and their aspirational classification of character strengths does not have a theoretical basis (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). The term aspirational classification is also appropriate because the list of character strengths and virtues is considered to be a work in progress, and it is expected that the list will be modified and refined as more empirical work focusing on character strengths and virtues becomes available (Peterson & Seligman, 2004).

The Need for a Theory and Taxonomy of Character, Virtue and Vice

Peterson and Seligman (2004) identified two potential pitfalls currently facing the science of good character. The first potential pitfall is that the science of good character, “…will not thrive if it generates only ho-hum findings that every Sunday school teacher or grandparent already knew” (p. 9). In other words the findings will need to be substantive and intriguing if positive psychology is to engage the attention and efforts of talented scientists in the future. And, “Second, we hope that the new science of character addresses
explicitly what is invigorating about the good life” (p. 10). Peterson and
Seligman (2004) speculated about potential solutions to these challenges in the
following:

The solutions to these potential pitfalls is not at hand. If it were, we would
have made it an integral part of our proposed classification. We suspect
that the solution lies in yet-to-be-articulated good theory that makes sense
of the classification entries, individually and collectively…positive
psychology will thrive when classifications like the one here evolve into
taxonomies—when there become available one or more deep theories of the
good life. (p. 9)

It is the writer’s contention that in the future Aristotle’s model of
psychology and conceptualization of character can be updated and integrated
with contributions from contemporary psychology to make meaningful
contributions to the articulation of theory of the character strengths and the
good life that will help to refine and make sense out of the classification
entries on an individual and collective basis. It is with this in mind that we
now turn to examine the possibility of using Aristotle’s model of psychology
and conceptualization of character as a metatheory to integrate contributions
from various disciplines.

Possible Use of Aristotle’s Model of Psychology as a Metatheory

To Help Integrate Contributions from Disparate Disciplines

The multiple points of congruence between Aristotle's model of psychology
and contemporary models of psychology raises the possibility of using an updated
version of Aristotle's model of psychology as a metatheory to integrate findings from various disciplines in a manner that is similar to how the theory of evolution is used as a metatheory (Bereczkei, 2000; Cosmides & Tooby, 1999; Cosmides, Lieberman & Tooby, 2003; Millon & Davis, 1996; Millon, 2000; Siegert & Ward, 2002).

As the data from empirical research findings in psychology and related fields continues to accumulate and to grow exponentially, it becomes increasingly clear that one of the major challenges facing modern psychology is how to integrate the empirical data in a meaningful and accessible way, so as to advance the science of psychology. The following highlights the nature of the challenge:

We have a surfeit of facts. What we do not have, and most of us in the quiet of our nights know it, is an overarching conception of context in which we can put these facts and, having done so, the truth then stands a chance of emerging. (S. B. Sarason, 1989, p. 279) (Cited in Henriques, 2003, p. 150)

As long as the data from empirical research in psychology and related fields remains unintegrated, it remains myopic and reductionistic at best. Part of the problem is that different researchers tend to use different terminology to describe similar or overlapping phenomena making the integration of empirical findings extremely difficult. Staats (1991) highlighted some of the challenges involved in the task of integrating both empirical and theoretical material into a unified model of psychology when he wrote:
Psychology has so many unrelated elements of knowledge with so much mutual discreditation, inconsistency, redundancy, and controversy that abstracting general meaning is a great problem. There is a crisis, moreover, because the disunification feeds on itself and, left unchanged, will continue to grow. (Staats, 1991, p. 899) (Cited in Henriques, 2003, p. 150)

Millon (2003) also stressed the need for greater integration of material from within psychology and with material from other scientific disciplines when he wrote:

If clinical psychological science is ever to become a fullfledged profession rather than a piecemeal potpourri of miscellaneous observations and ideas, the overall and ultimate architecture of the field must be comprehensively structured, that is, given a scaffold or framework within which its elements can be located and coordinated. Diagnostic systems (e.g., the DSM) should not stand alone, unconnected to other realms of relevant scientific discourse. They should be anchored to an empirically supportable theory, on the one hand, and prove instrumental for clinical assessment and pragmatic for therapeutic action, on the other. The overall arrangement of the field should seek to coordinate all of the separate realms that comprise its scientific and applied efforts, namely, a foundation in the universal laws of nature, a coordinated psychological theory, a derivable taxonomic classification, a series of operational assessment tools, and a flexible yet integrated group of remediation techniques. As recorded in Millon (2000), rather than developing independently and being left to stand as autonomous and largely unconnected functions… (p. 951)

Psychology has been shaped by the bidirectional and interrelated streams of inductive and deductive approaches to the attainment of knowledge. Theory, at times, represents the deductive aspects of psychology and often guides the research and practice of psychology. The inductive stream is the empirically driven aspects of psychology. A good example of the inductive stream is the
statistically derived approaches to personality such as the five-factor model (McCrae & John, 1992).

In the field of psychology, there is a reciprocal relationship and interdependent relationship between theory and empirical research where theory generates ideas that guide empirical research, and empirical research generates and modifies theory. The purpose of a metatheory is to provide a theoretical architecture that will help to integrate empirical and theoretical findings that may otherwise fail to be integrated or may appear to be contradictory in nature. For example, findings from neurochemistry do not have to be seen as contradictory to behaviorism if both are seen as representing different domains or levels of inquiry. An integrative approach can resolve apparent contradictions and lead to the integration of seminal insights and empirical findings.

A metatheory provides the theoretical architecture that can be used to integrate empirical findings from disparate disciplines in a meaningful and accessible manner. Aristotle’s work can be updated with information from modern psychology and utilized to provide a structural, integrative framework or metatheory that can be utilized to facilitate a multidisciplinary discussion on the topics of character, virtue and vice. For example, within the field of psychology, Aristotle’s model of psychology and conceptualization of character can be utilized to collect and integrate empirical findings that examine such things as the
biophysiological, temperamental, behaviorally conditioned, culturally influenced, and cognitive influences on emotion, behavior, cognition, character and the overall phenomenological experience of human beings. These contributions can be used to update the various aspects of Aristotle’s model (e.g., neurochemical aspects of temperament, an updated physiology, integration of additional findings from developmental and cognitive psychology, etc.).

One of the interesting and challenging things about psychology is that the same emotional, cognitive, and behavioral phenomena can have different and multiple causes. Aristotle’s model acknowledges the multidomain and multifactorial nature of emotion, behavior, and overall phenomenological experience, which makes it open to being used as a metatheory that can be used to provide a theoretical architecture that can integrate empirical findings from psychology into an emergent unified conceptualization of psychology.

It is the author’s contention that Aristotle's model of psychology can serve to accomplish much of what Millon (2003) indicated that good theoretical formulations can bring to a subject when he wrote:

…even a reasonable speculative framework can be a compelling instrument for helping coordinate and give consonance to complex and diverse observations—if its concepts are linked where possible to relevant facts in the empirical world. By probing beneath surface impressions to inner structures and processes, previously isolated facts and difficult-to-fathom data may yield new relationships and expose clearer meanings. Progress does not advance by “brute empiricism” alone, that is, by merely piling up
more descriptive and more experimental data. What is elaborated and refined in theory is understanding—an ability to see relations more plainly, to conceptualize categories more accurately, and to create greater overall coherence in a subject, that is, to integrate its elements in a more logical, consistent, and intelligible fashion.

The possibility of using Aristotle’s model of psychology to integrate contributions from disparate disciplines is further supported by the fact that Aristotle’s works are already used in contemporary investigations in multiple disciplines such as: philosophy (Abizadeh, 2002; Annas, 1993; Brickhouse, 2003; Connell, 2001; Gurtler, 2003; Kraut, 1979; Lillegard, 2002; London, 2001; Rorty, 1997; Sherman, 1989), psychology (Bukowski, Nappi, & Hoza, 1987; Carson, 1996; Gelso, 1991; Green, 1998; Harward, 1927; Hillerbrand, 1988; Jääskeläinen, 1998; Kafetsios & LaRock, 2005, Robinson, 1999; Silverstein, 1988; Tigner & Tigner, 2000; Waterman, 1993;), business (Dyck & Kleysen, 2001; Schall, 2004; Schundt, 2000), politics (Howland, 2002; Ward, 2001), education (Saugstad, 2002; Shaw, 2005; Ward, 2001), and theology (Wadell, 1991). The use of Aristotle’s works in philosophy, psychology, business, politics, theology, and education illustrates how Aristotle’s work, despite the passage of time (over 2400 years), continues to be actively studied, generation after generation, in a wide array of disciplines.

An updated version of Aristotle's model of psychology can complement the theory of evolution as another metatheory, rather than replacing the theory of
evolution as a metatheory. While the theory of evolution is posited to apply to all forms of life, Aristotle's model of psychology would be used as a metatheory that is unique to human beings. It would be unique to human beings because it addresses that part of human experience that is distinctive to human beings; namely, the use of reason, free will, personal agency, and responsibility.

It is the writer’s contention that use of the theory of evolution as a metatheory without the addition of a metatheory that accounts for what transcends biology and evolutionary processes is a form of biological reductionism. A significant problem with biological reductionism is that denies that which is often considered most human; the freedom of the will, the power of choice, and the ability of human beings to use their free will to shape themselves, their lives, and the cultures in which they live by rational thought, reflection and action that transcends even the most sophisticated evolutionary or biologically driven explanation.

This is not to say that biological proclivities that have been shaped by natural selection do not exist. Quite the contrary, Aristotle’s teachings about how instincts of the nutritive appetite have the ends of survival or reproduction and his teachings regarding natural pleasures, natural law, and natural virtue are all significant points of congruence with evolutionary psychology. These phenomena all have their place in a multifaceted understanding of human
experience; however, there are also other important and distinctly human factors that need to be taken into account. The ability to reason allows human beings to transcend the dynamics of natural selection and to strive to order one’s life according to one’s values, ethical beliefs, and faith perspectives. While natural selection is likely to have created biological proclivities toward altruism and cooperation with others (Ridley, 1996), there are also likely to be tendencies toward selfishness and aggression that need to be transcended (e.g., proclivities toward violence and rape).

Historical Use of Aristotle’s Model of Psychology and Conceptualization of Character as an Integrative Metatheory

Aristotle’s model of psychology has been used as an integrative theory in the past by Aquinas (1914), to develop a sophisticated and multifaceted understanding of human nature that drew upon both theology and philosophy. Aquinas (1914) was a Dominican theologian who integrated Aristotle’s conceptualization of virtue into Christian theology. He referred to Aristotle as “The Philosopher” in his writings and adopted Aristotle's differentiation of the intellectual and moral virtues.

Aquinas (1914) referred to the intellectual and moral virtues as human virtues. Aquinas differentiated another type of virtue in his conceptualization of what he referred to as the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love. According to
Aquinas, the human virtues were able to be developed through human efforts, but the theological virtues were initiated and sustained in human beings by the grace and activity of God. According to Aquinas (1914), the human virtues conform the emotions, behavior and phenomenological experience of human beings to reason, and the theological virtues, along with grace, and the gifts and fruits of the Holy Spirit transform the emotions, thinking, behavior and phenomenological experience of human beings to conform to the Divine.

**Summary/Concluding Comments**

As was discussed in detail in the results sections, Aristotle's model of psychology and conceptualization of character is a dynamic, biopsychosocial model of psychology that prefigured and is in congruence with several aspects of contemporary models of psychology. Points of congruence were identified between Aristotle's model of psychology and features of biological/physiological models, evolutionary psychology, behaviorism, cognitive-behavioral therapy, Adler’s individual psychology, developmental psychology, social psychology, and theoretical and empirical works on emotional intelligence, positive psychology, and self-regulation. The possibility of utilizing an updated version of his model of psychology as a metatheory was also explored.

Aristotle’s conceptualization of character covers the continuum of character from virtue to vice, and includes what he referred to as the intermediate states of
character. Aristotle’s conceptualization of character not only posits a list of character traits, but also describes developmental pathways to the development of virtues and vices and the various characterological dynamics and processes that are involved with each of the traits. His model of psychology described the relationship between desire/emotion and behavior and goes on to describe how behavior is elicited by desire/emotion that originates from a variety of sources such as temperament, innate/unlearned natural desires, learned or habituated desires, and desires/emotions that are related to rational cognitive functioning.

Aristotle's model of psychology shares with Adlerian therapy, positive psychology, the work being conducted on emotional intelligence, and the theory and research on self-regulation a focus on healthy characteristics. It is the writer’s contention that understanding the dynamics and constituents of characterological health is just as important as understanding the dynamics and constituents of characterological illness, and that psychotherapy is primarily concerned with helping people to obtain and maintain greater degrees of health and well-being. The work being done in positive psychology on character strengths and virtues, along with the work on emotional intelligence and self-regulation all have a great deal to offer practitioners of clinical psychology, as do the works of Aristotle.
References


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