

Data Appendix for

Power Sharing and Authoritarian Stability: How Rebel Regimes Solve the Guardianship Dilemma

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A DATA APPENDIX

A.1 CODING DEMOCRACIES AND AUTHORITARIAN STABILITY

To code a regime as democratic, we require that elections are free and fair, and also that at least one rotation in parties occurred after the first free and fair election. This resembles the rule used in Levitsky and Way (2010) to ensure that party turnover does not occur only to be replaced by a competitive authoritarian regime. In Africa since the Cold War, many countries have adopted nominally democratic institutions on paper, while managing to thwart true electoral competition by using a combination of opposition cooptation and coercion (Arriola et al. 2021). We therefore prefer a high threshold for democracy and include a requirement for party turnover, in order to avoid dropping cases of electoral authoritarianism. However, in Appendix Table B.2, we show that the results are qualitatively similar when using a less stringent standard for democracy (in which we exclude cases such as South Africa with free and fair elections that never experienced party turnover), or when we instead include all post-independence years (including transitional and warlord regimes).

We draw from the list of democracies in Cheibub et al. (2010) and Geddes et al. (2014), and consulted additional sources to assess party turnover after the first free and fair election. We code no democracies before the 1990s except Mauritius, and subsequently identify eleven countries that democratized and therefore drop out of the sample: Benin, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Tunisia.

To code the authoritarian regime breakdown variable described in the article, we consulted regime breakdown data from Geddes et al. (2014), coup data from McGowan (2003) and Powell and Thyne (2011), and data on irregular leadership turnover from Goemans et al. (2009).

A.2 CODING REBEL REGIMES

To code civil wars in which the rebels were victorious, we primarily used the Correlates of War dataset and their associated coding books (COW; Sarkees and Wayman 2010; Dixon and Sarkees 2015), while also consulting other widely used conflict datasets to verify questionable cases and to ensure we did not miss any (Fearon and Laitin 2003, or FL; Armed Conflict Database, or ACD,

Gleditsch et al. 2002). We included both intra-state wars as well as extra-state wars between African rebel groups and European colonizers (in COW, an extra-state war is one in which a member of the inter-state system fights a non-state actor outside its borders). We then matched these conflicts with regimes from Geddes et al. (2014), or GWF.

The three conflict datasets each use slightly different coding procedures which, in addition to possible measurement error, lead to slightly different lists of wars. FL provide one entry for each distinct war, and their main operational criterion is that at least 1,000 battle deaths occur during the course of the war (the same standard that we use). This is less stringent than COW's standard of 1,000 *annual* battle deaths. (However, FL assert that they doubt all of COW's conflicts meet this high standard, and hence the COW and FL list of conflicts are quite similar.) ACD codes whether each year of a conflict produces at least 25 battle deaths or at least 1,000 battle deaths.

Both FL and COW explicitly code whether rebels won a civil war. One problem, which necessitates complementing the coding procedure with reading descriptions of each case, is that in a small number of conflicts, a regime change occurs in the middle of the conflict. These cases are usually easier to discern from COW because they code distinct episodes within conflicts that FL code as a single civil war. For example, FL code a single civil war in Congo-Brazzaville from 1997 to 2002 that ended with government victory. By contrast, COW codes one conflict in 1997 and a second from 1998–99 (the discrepancy in end years comes from low-level fighting in 2000–02). The bout of fighting in 1997 ended in *rebel* victory, and the second in government victory. Thus, FL's dataset do not list Congo-Brazzaville as a case involving rebel victory because they code the entire period of fighting as a single civil war.

Colonial liberation wars:

- In almost all the following cases, the state gained independence following the liberation struggle. The only exception is South Africa; and possibly Zimbabwe, where white settlers had unilaterally claimed independence in 1965, which was not widely recognized internationally.
- Morocco 56–NA, Tunisia 56–11, Algeria 62–92, Mozambique 75–NA, Namibia 90–NA: COW codes outright rebel victory for the anti-colonial extra-state wars that preceded each regime.
- Angola 75–NA: COW codes the liberation struggle as ending with Portugal withdrawing (indicating a clear rebel victory) and the conflict transforming to a non-state war among the different rebel factions, in which the MPLA gained control.
- Guinea-Bissau 74–80: Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 534) assert that the launching rebellion for the regime does not meet the COW death threshold. However, according to the notes in FL's dataset, the total death toll was 15,000, hence meeting our threshold of 1,000.
- Eritrea 93–NA: COW codes outright rebel victory in an intra-state war within Ethiopia.
- South Africa 94–NA and Zimbabwe 80–NA: COW classifies the wars for majority rule as intra-state wars. The war that yielded the Zimbabwe 80–NA regime ended with a negotiated settlement in 1979, but it meets our standard of rebel victory because one of the rebel groups, ZANU, won the subsequent elections and took power. For South Africa 94–NA, the

only relevant entry from COW is an intercommunal war between the government-sponsored militia Inkatha and the African National Congress (ANC). However, other civil war datasets code a conflict as occurring between the South African government and ANC (FL, ACD), which is also reflected in standard narratives of the struggle (e.g., Reno 2011, 105–18). Thus, this case is similar to Zimbabwe: the war ended in a negotiated settlement, and we code the subsequent regime as a rebel regime because ANC gained control of the government.

Civil war winners:

- Chad 82–90, Uganda 86–NA, Chad 90–NA, Ethiopia 91–NA, Rwanda 94–NA, Congo-Brazzaville 97–NA, DRC 97–NA, Ivory Coast 11–NA, South Sudan 11–NA: COW codes outright rebel victory for the rebellions that launched each regime.
- South Sudan is a complicated case because the war ended in 2002 with a scheduled referendum in 2006 for southern independence. The referendum passed, which enabled South Sudan to gain independence five years later. Despite the delay, the independence of South Sudan resulted unambiguously from the Second Sudanese War, hence our coding of a rebel regime.
- Burundi 05–NA: COW codes the launching rebellion as ending in a compromise. We code this case as rebel regime for same reason as South Africa and Zimbabwe: the rebels’ political party, CNDD-FDD, won the post-settlement elections.
- Liberia 97–03: COW codes the launching rebellion as ending in a compromise. Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Party won the post-settlement election (with Taylor becoming president).

Not coded as rebel regimes. Two cases that do not meet our standards for a rebel regime deserve additional comment. First, Guinea-Bissau’s post-1999 regimes. For Guinea-Bissau, there is a “Military War” entry in COW for 1998–99. In this conflict, the incumbent president (João Bernardo Vieira) dismissed his military chief of staff, Ansumane Mané. When Vieira sent troops to arrest Mané, the army split into two; a year later, Mané’s troops won. This case violates our requirement that the rebel leader is excluded from the government when the war begins. Instead, this case is a purge/coup (i.e., involving insiders) that generated war-level casualties, but unlike our rebel regime cases, Mané did not have to build a private military.

An informative contrast for Guinea-Bissau is the civil war in Chad from 1989–90, which brought to power the Chad 90–NA regime. In that case, the incumbent president Hissène Habré purged his senior advisor Idriss Déby, who fled the capital along with two other senior advisors and seventy-four soldiers into Sudan. After organizing there and in Libya, they built up a new army of 2,000 troops that defeated Habré’s army in 1990. Thus, the key difference is that a *privately organized force* rather than existing units of the military defeated the incumbent ruler.

Second, Sierra Leone 97–98. Sierra Leone’s first civil war ended in 1996 with a compromise, and the rebel group RUF lost in the subsequent elections. However, the democratically elected president was overthrown in a coup in 1997, and the coup leader invited RUF to join the government. This case fails our standard for a rebel regime for two reasons. First, RUF gained power in the central government because of a coup rather than from winning a civil war. Second, unlike the cases

listed above in which the war ended in a negotiated settlement (South Africa, Zimbabwe, Liberia, Burundi), RUF did not win the subsequent elections nor did they control the presidency.

Cases outside our sample. The scope conditions for our sample are to exclude years with democracies, warlord regimes, or transitional regimes. These restrictions enable us to analyze cases that are homogeneous in the sense that the ruling organization presides over a state that actually exists and that elections are not the main mode by which leaders gain power. In such circumstances, we explain how delegating control to high-ranking military elites can stabilize the regime. However, these scope conditions exclude several cases in which a government fell to rebels. As we show in Table B.2, when we expand the sample to include these additional rebel regimes, the core findings are qualitatively unchanged.

In two cases, Liberia 05–NA and Sierra Leone 02–NA, the regime following rebel victory was democratic (free and fair elections with turnover among parties). In four cases, rebel defeat of the incumbent government led to a period of warlordism, state collapse, or a transitional regime (Geddes et al. 2014; Polity IV, Marshall and Jagers 2002; Ethnic Power Relations, Vogt et al. 2015): Chad 79–82, Somalia 91–NA, Libya 2011–NA, and Central African Republic 2014–NA. (The other two cases of state collapse identified by these datasets are Uganda 85–86 and Liberia 90–97, each of which occurred during an ongoing civil war but without rebels gaining control over the government.) We consulted Archigos (Goemans et al. 2009) and other sources to determine the length of regime survival in each case to code the dependent variable for Table B.2, with the caveat that it is difficult to measure this concept in circumstances where the basic scope condition of having a state is not met.

A.3 CODING MILITARY TRANSFORMATION IN REBEL REGIMES

Complete Military Transformation

Algeria 62–92. The main rebel group that fought for independence in Algeria was the FLN (French: Front de Libération Nationale; English: National Liberation Front). Its armed wing was the ALN (French: Armée de Libération Nationale; English: National Liberation Army). In 1962, it was renamed the ANP (French: Armée Nationale Populaire; English: People’s National Army). “As the new Algerian national army grew out of the anti-colonial resistance organization, this organization is coded rather than the colonial army. In 1957, a brutal French counter-insurgency campaign broke down the organization of the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN) . . . The military units inherited at independence combined units from the internal and external armies as well as the French colonial army” (Harkness 2018 appendix). Entelis (1994, 206) reiterates that the Algerian military consisted “primarily” of the ANP.

Angola 75–NA. Three main rebel groups fought for independence in Angola: MPLA (Portuguese: Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola; English: People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola), FNLA (Portuguese: Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola; English: National Front for the Liberation of Angola), and UNITA (Portuguese: União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola; English: National Union for the Total Independence of Angola). MPLA gained control of the capital at independence as the liberation struggle transformed into a civil war with FNLA and UNITA. MPLA’s anti-colonial military became the state military upon independence. “In the early 1960s, the MPLA named its guerrilla forces the People’s Army for the Liberation of

Angola (Exercito Popular de Libertacao de Angola—EPLA) . . . [In 1974,] the MPLA announced the formation of the People’s Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (Forças Armadas Populares de Libertacao de Angola—FAPLA), which replaced the EPLA. By 1976 FAPLA had been transformed from lightly armed guerrilla units into a national army capable of sustained field operations. This transformation was gradual until the Soviet-Cuban intervention and ensuing UNITA insurgency, when the sudden and large-scale inflow of heavy weapons and accompanying technicians and advisers quickened the pace of institutional change” (Smaldone 1991, 210-11). See also Harkness (2018 appendix).

Chad 82–90. The main rebel group that fought to overthrow the regime of Goukouni Oueddei was FAN (French: Forces Armées du Nord; English: Armed Forces of the North). COW describes three important antecedent events:

1. The Chadian government faced a rebellion by FROLINAT (French: Front de libération nationale du Tchad; English: National Liberation Front of Chad) that ended in 1971. However, FROLINAT remained intact, and later split into two factions: FAN and FAP (French: Forces Armées Populaires; English: People’s Armed Forces).
2. FAP fought a rebellion against the government from 1977 to 1978, and the government allied with FAN to help end the rebellion. President Malloum named the leader of FAN, Hissène Habré, as prime minister, although the government’s accord with FAN also called for military integration, which was not implemented.
3. In 1979, FAN (later joined by FAP) attacked government troops, leading to international mediation and the creation of a coalition government. The leader of FAP, Oueddei, became president; the leader of the (former) government armed forces, Wadel Abdelkader Kamougue, became vice president (this organization was known as FAT; French: Forces Armées Tchadiennes; English: Chadian Armed Forces); and Habré became defense minister. This begins a three-year warlord period in GWF’s dataset.

The rebellion that engendered the rebel regime of 1982–90 began in 1980, when Habré’s troops attacked FAT and FAP troops. Despite Habré’s nominal position in the government, we code this conflict as an outsider rebellion rather than an insider coup because Habré’s forces were never integrated into the state military. This distinguishes this case from one such as Guinea-Bissau’s 1998–99 conflict, which began when two factions of the state military fought each other following a failed coup attempt.

Following FAN’s overthrow of Oueddei in 1982, “After Habré consolidated his authority and assumed the presidency in 1982, his victorious army, the Armed Forces of the North (Forces Armées du Nord—FAN), became the nucleus of a new national army. The force was officially constituted in January 1983, when the various pro-Habré contingents were merged and renamed FANT [French: Forces Armées Nationales Tchadiennes; English: Chadian National Armed Forces] . . . At the time of its official establishment in 1983, FANT consisted primarily of FAN troops, the well-disciplined and hardened combat veterans who had been the original followers of Habré. FANT gradually expanded, recruiting members of the former national army, FAT, who were predominantly southerners of the Sara ethnic group. Later, additional southerners, the commandos or codos who had opened a guerrilla campaign against the government in 1983, were won over after two and one-

half years of negotiations. Assigned to rehabilitation camps for retraining, the physically fit among them were also inducted into FANT. Finally, in the latter half of 1986, after FAP, the largest component of Goukouni's northern rebel army, had revolted against its Libyan ally, FAP soldiers were merged into FANT to join the campaign against the Libyan bases in Chad . . . Only the Presidential Guard, a select force mostly drawn from Habré's own ethnic group, retained its separate identity" (Tartter 1990, 175, 179-80, 172).

Congo-Brazzaville 97–NA. The main rebel group that fought to overthrow the regime of Pascal Lissouba was the Cobra militia organized by ex-president Denis Sassou Nguesso (he lost an election in 1992). "Northern and Mbochi dominance in the postdemocratic Congolese army is somewhat hard to document but at the same time widely acknowledged. At the highest levels of army leadership, the pattern is clear. Upon his return to power, Sassou immediately brought back all of the northern officers who had been sidelined by Lissouba. Sassou put northern officers in charge of five of the country's eight military zones. He appointed General Yves Mutondo Mungonge, from Likouala, as his chief of staff soon after seizing power. In January 1999, shortly after the start of the 1998–1999 war, Sassou replaced him with Brigadier General Jacques Yvon Ndolou, another northerner who later became minister of defense. Although Sassou's military representatives have claimed that the integration of former militiamen into the army forces was neutral and open to all, no one takes this claim seriously. Virtually all southern Congolese aver that former Cobra militiamen were gradually integrated into the army, whereas militiamen from the other groups were not. A larger number of former Cobras were taken into the reorganized gendarmerie, as well as into the police forces of southern cities. Some junior officers who abstained from the fighting during the war of 1997 were allowed to retain their posts if they occupied technical posts and if the regime did not consider them a security risk. In these cases, however, they retained limited access to arms and intelligence. The army now appears to be much more uniformly northern than it was before 1991, though the claim would be impossible to document" (Clark 2008, 262-3).

Eritrea 93–NA. One of EPRDF/TPLF's allies in the struggle against the Mengistu regime (see the coding notes for Ethiopia) was EPLF (Eritrean People's Liberation Front). Eritrea's post-independence military is the Eritrean Defense Forces (EDF). "The EDF grew directly out of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), which was reorganized to serve this function in the 1990s" (Connell 2019, 73). See also Harkness (2018 appendix).

Ethiopia 91–NA. The regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam faced numerous armed challengers. The main rebel group that defeated his regime in 1991 was EPRDF (Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front), which was created in 1989 as a coalition of anti-Mengistu rebels, most importantly TPLF (Tigray People's Liberation Front). "After the defeat of the military government in 1991, the provisional government disbanded the former national army and relied on its own guerrilla fighters for national security. In 1993, however, the Tigrayan-led government announced plans to create a multi-ethnic defense force. This process entailed the creation of a new professional army and officer class and the demobilization of many of the irregulars who had fought against the military government, although many Tigrayan officers remained in command positions" (Library of Congress 2005).

Guinea-Bissau 74–80. The main rebel group that fought for independence in Guinea-Bissau was

PAIGC (Portuguese: Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde; English: African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde), whose armed wing was FARP (Portuguese: Forças Armadas Revolucionárias do Povo; English: Revolutionary Armed Forces of the People). “What happened to the ‘guerrilla army’ after independence? The foundation and evolution of the state of Guinea-Bissau was strongly linked to the FARP. Consisting of former freedom fighters, the FARP was the political and military structure of the one-party state regime” (Embaló 2012, 259). See also Harkness (2018 appendix).

Ivory Coast 11–NA. The main rebel group that fought against the regime of Laurent Gbagbo was FN (French: Forces Nouvelles de Côte d’Ivoire; English: New Forces of Ivory Coast). “On 17 March 2011, President Ouattara combined the former rebel Forces Nouvelles (FN) with cooperating elements of the Defense and Security Forces (FDS), the former government’s security forces, into the Republic Forces of Cote d’Ivoire (FRCI - Force Republicaines de Cote d’Ivoire), the country’s new official military” (GlobalSecurity.org n.d.). “Many headaches have been caused by attempts to amalgamate the two armies that were fighting each other a year ago—the Forces de Défense et de Sécurité (FDS) from the Gbagbo camp and the former rebels from the north, the Forces Nouvelles (FN), who supported Ouattara—into a new army, the Forces Républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI), which was formed on 17 March. So far, the integration process is proving to be very difficult. One of the main stumbling blocks has been the lack of hierarchy and integration within the command structure of the FRCI. The former rebels of the Forces Nouvelles (FN), who made a significant contribution to Ouattara’s military victory, are disproportionately represented and currently make up the bulk of the soldiers. This makes it more difficult to integrate the formerly hostile FDS soldiers. . . . The decision to give so many top positions in the new armed forces to former rebel leaders has attracted widespread criticism” (Zandt 2012, 35-36).

Liberia 97–03. The main rebel group that fought to overthrow the Liberian government was NPFL (National Patriotic Front of Liberia), led by Charles Taylor. The NPFL began fighting in 1989 against President Samuel Doe, leading to his death in 1990 and the installation (via international involvement) of Amos Sawyer as president. The NPFL never disarmed, and large-scale fighting resumed in 1992. It ended in 1996 with a compromise peace accord that called for elections the next year, which Taylor’s National Patriotic Party won. “The question of SSR [security sector reform] in Liberia first came up at the end of what Liberians call the ‘first war.’ In 1997, following a return to tentative peace, Charles Taylor was elected as president of Liberia. While some complained of electoral irregularities, many saw the victory of Taylor as the only means of preventing him from going back to war. A key component of the effort to ensure sustained peace and stability was the reform of the security sector by ECOMOG [West African regional troops]. Unsurprisingly, Taylor prevented ECOMOG from carrying out the reforms. He instead transformed his NPFL into the national army and avoided creating a truly national force. Abusive forces fiercely loyal to him, such as the Anti-Terrorism Unit, dominated the security landscape as Taylor continued to pillage the country’s resources” (Onoma 2014, 146).

Toire (2002, 20) provides additional detail: “The international community’s preoccupation with the holding of elections as a means of peacefully resolving the Liberian civil war resulted in the neglect of the restructuring of the army—one of the most critical areas and pre-conditions to peace-building and in ensuring a stable post-war environment in Liberia. On being elected president in

July 1997, Charles Taylor refused to allow ECOMOG to supervise the restructuring of his security services. The failure of the international community to give equal importance to the restructuring plan and to support the process gave Taylor overwhelming and unrestrained control and influence over the state security services. Taylor succeeded in creating a private army largely consisting of former fighters of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). He appointed NPFL operatives to head key state security agencies. The domination of the state security apparatus by former NPFL fighters and the ruthlessness with which these agencies have operated, continue to pose a significant threat to peace in Liberia.”

Mozambique 75–NA. The main rebel group that fought for independence in Mozambique was FRELIMO (Portuguese: Frente de Libertação de Moçambique; English: Mozambique Liberation Front). Their armed wing was FPLM (Portuguese: Forças Populares de Libertação de Moçambique; English: People’s Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique). “The new state had to create a new national army drawn from the guerrilla forces, and this had to be accomplished quickly. As a result the new Forças Armadas de Moçambique/Forças Populares de Libertação de Moçambique (FAM/FPLM) had to resolve a number of fundamental issues: first, whether the transition would entail an incorporation of the thousands of Mozambicans who had served in the colonial forces; and second, whether the new army would follow either an essentially Western (Portuguese) institutional arrangement with “traditional’ rank structure and administration, or the guerrilla administrative structures and command-and-control typologies. Following on this issue of operational doctrine—and as sub-themes—were issues regarding the new army’s size and capabilities . . . Some 30,000 Mozambicans (or three times Frelimo’s guerrilla force) who had served in the colonial army were purposely marginalised. According to Paulino Macaríngue: ‘the records show that during the negotiations, the Portuguese delegation proposed that all Mozambicans within the colonial army should be integrated into the new post-independence army. Frelimo rejected the proposal on grounds that they were part of the colonial machinery which had to be dismantled’” (Malache et al. 2005, 161, 163). See also Harkness (2018 appendix).

Rwanda 94–NA. The main rebel group that fought to overthrow the regime of Juvénal Habyarimana/Théodore Sindikubwabo was RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front). Its armed wing was the RPA (Rwandan Patriotic Army), which it renamed the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) in 1999. Following its military victory, the RPA “assumed the role of a national army, and has reportedly accepted 4,000 ex-members of FAR [*Forces armées rwandaises*, the former state military]. But the overwhelming bulk of both the command and the rank-and-file remain affiliated with the RPF. Moreover, because virtually all members of the RPF had military experience, many of those taking senior posts in the civil service are former members of the RPA” (Reed 1996, 498).

Prior to the RPF’s military victory, there was a failed attempt at military integration (the Arusha Agreement of 1993) on which the government reneged. Despite military victory, the RPF implemented some aspects of the accord, including the integration of Hutu soldiers in the army to guard against both an internal security threat (Hutus were an overwhelming majority of the population) and external security threat (particularly the DRC, where Rwandan forces invaded in 1997 to overthrow Mobutu). “Once the Rwandan Patriotic Front and Army (RPF/RPA) took power, its leaders were determined to build a capable force that could defend the country from formidable guerrilla forces. The regime controlled the process so that recruits, including ancien régime soldiers from

the FAR and rebel guerrillas, were integrated in waves over the span of a decade into the RPA and, after 1999, into the RDF” (Burgess 2014, 88). However, because the RPA replaced the existing state military and integrated Hutu troops from a clear position of strength, we code this as a case of complete military transformation rather than military integration.

Uganda 86–NA. The main rebel group that fought to overthrow the regimes of Milton Obote/Tito Okello was NRM (National Resistance Movement), whose armed wing was the NRA (National Resistance Army). “Upon taking power, the NRM controlled the civilian state apparatus and could also transform itself from a guerrilla movement to a government equipped with a defense force. All the leading personnel in the UPDF (Uganda People’s Defense Force), the various police forces, and the presidential guard came from the Movement” (Makara et al. 2009, 191).

Zimbabwe 80–NA. The main rebel group in Zimbabwe was ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) with its armed wing ZANLA (Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army). The secondary rebel group was ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People’s Union) with its armed wing ZIPRA (Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army). Major fighting in the 1970s engendered a negotiated settlement with the white government (the Lancaster House Agreement). Elections with mass African participation occurred in 1980, which ZANU won. The settlement did not explicitly call for military integration, but this “was seen as a means of facilitating cooperation among all involved” (Jackson 2014, 49), in particular among ZANLA, ZIPRA, and the former Rhodesian state army, the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF). However, Mugabe deliberately undermined military integration and instead elevated ZANLA above the other organizations: “This case is one in which an initial integration was deliberately undermined for political reasons. The initial integration produced a superficially effective military, but real control lay with Mugabe” (61). Thus, we code this as a code of complete military transformation, rather than military integration.

More details on the RSF: “Almost as soon as the election result was announced [in 1980], various units of the RSF began to melt away . . . The exodus of senior and middle-ranking white officers, along with many professional soldiers, weakened the ZNA (Zimbabwean National Army)” (57).

More detail on ZIPRA: new officers “were selected from within their own organizations and therefore had some internal credibility. There were, however, political considerations, and after a time it was noted that the minority ZIPRA was being underrepresented, even before ZANLA launched a purge of the security services and effectively took control . . . The new military had been created fairly successfully in a short period, although obvious problems remained. However, the Mugabe government soon took control of the institution, pushing out former ZIPRA personnel and bringing senior military officers into its political alliance in return for economic benefits . . . [I]n a departure from the initial aims of integrating the factions, but in keeping with his Marxist principles, Mugabe established military units outside the integration structure. By 1983, Mugabe had arrested virtually all the senior military leadership of ZIPRA, and in March 1983 all the senior leadership of ZAPU, including Nkomo, went into exile. The unrelenting harassment of ZIPRA cadres led many to leave the APs [assembly points], which were still functioning. This led to widespread violence against former ZIPRA cadres within the ZNA, coupled with segregation, disarmament, disappearances, and an overall downplaying of ZIPRA’s role in the liberation struggle that continues to date. These moves meant that of the initial triumvirate designated to share power in the 1980 agreement, only

ZANLA senior officers remained. This effectively cleared the way for the creation of a ZANU-led, politicized security policy that, as in the Chinese model, emphasized the political role of the military. A number of new units then emerged, undermining much of the integration that had taken place. . . . The creeping politicization coincided with the creation of two sets of security units outside the integration structure: the Fifth Brigade (5B) and the Zimbabwe People’s Militia (ZPM).” (54, 57, 58).

Military Integration

Burundi 05–NA. The main (predominantly Hutu) rebel groups that fought to overthrow the Tutsi-dominated regime of Pierre Buyoya were FDD (French: Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie; English: Forces for the Defense of Democracy) and FNL (French: Force Nationale de Libération; English: National Forces of Liberation). The war ended in a negotiated settlement, although this occurred in phases: FDD signed a ceasefire with the government in 2003, and FNL in 2006. The peace settlement called for military integration and a 50-50 balance rule between Hutus and Tutsis. Thus, Hutus did not *dominate* the officer corps of the revamped army, and post-war Ministers of Defense were Tutsi officers (see Table B.10). We consider FDD as the main rebel group because they gained control of the executive following the war settlement.

“The FDD forces were largely successful on the battlefield, although the FAB forces [i.e., the government military] were not defeated outright. Rebel successes are reflected in the agreements, whose provisions constitute a near-revolution in the country’s distribution of power, including the creation of a new military integrating FAB and rebel forces. This outcome was consolidated when the CNDD-FDD (the party formed from the politico-military movement) won large majorities in the national assembly and local councils in the 2005 elections . . . The accords provided extensive guidance on military reform. They established a rule of ethnic balance that posts would be allocated equally to Hutus and Tutsis; the overall composition of the security forces was to be balanced in this way ‘in view of the need to achieve ethnic balance and to prevent acts of genocide and coups d’état’ . . . With the Arusha Accords in the background, the creation of an integrated military occurred through power sharing among the CNDD-FDD, the transitional government, and the high officer corps of FAB . . . At the dawn of integration, ex-FAB officers constituted the bulk of the officership, although former CNDD-FDD members were placed in key positions and have been elevated over the years. The new military operates under the scrutiny of foreign officers temporarily reassigned from the Netherlands and Belgium to Burundi’s Defense Ministry. The authority of these foreign officers is boosted by the substantial aid that their countries provide to Burundi. This balance of ex-FAB presence and CNDD-FDD presence, and of domestic presence and international presence, reduces the risk of any one political group’s gaining what Huntington (1957) calls ‘subjective’ control of the military institutions” (Samii 2014, 215, 217, 218, 223).

Chad 90–NA. The main rebel group that fought to overthrow the regime of Hissène Habré was MPS (French: Mouvement Patriotique du Salut; English: Patriotic Salvation Movement), which began as the April 1 Movement. Idriss Déby led both organizations, which he merged during the rebellion. Habré and Déby were former allies, and Déby served as army chief of staff until Habré purged him and two other senior advisors on April 1, 1989. “The three supposed rebels gathered a column of seventy-four loyal soldiers, fought their way out of the capital (N’Djamena), and fled toward Sudan, pursued by a contingent of Habré’s troops” (Dixon and Sarkees 2015, 643).

Déby's two other collaborators died, but he eventually amassed an army of about 2,000 people that captured various cities in Chad and, in December 1990, the capital city.

This case is unambiguously a rebellion because Déby needed to build a private army and win battles to capture the capital. However, his rebel group was relatively small. Upon taking power, he operated from a relatively weak bargaining position vis-a-vis other factions of the existing state army, which did not dissolve during the fighting despite Déby's outright victory. He also had to contend with various other rebel groups operating in the country. "Déby, taking a page from Habré's playbook, pursued a policy of reconciliation with rebel factions, and in the early 1990s, various groups abandoned their struggle and joined the Déby regime. His first cabinet was larger than Habré's last, with 33 ministers, including a few holdovers from the previous regime. Yet, particularly in the early years of his rule, Déby had problems with his own allies; ironically, the grievances against Déby were similar to those the April 1st Group had against Habré. Members of Déby's own Zaghawa tribal group also became resentful of Déby's power sharing. Even though he 'elevated many Zaghawa to key ministerial positions,' and the Zaghawa dominated Déby's rebel army at the time of the overthrow, they had since 'felt sidelined by the president, who had committed himself to introducing multiparty democracy,' even if at the expense of Zaghawan interests" (Atlas and Licklider 1999, 45-46).

Democratic Republic of the Congo 97–NA. The main rebel group that fought to overthrow the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko was AFDL (French: Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre; English: Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire). The AFDL replaced Mobutu's former state military, FAZ (French: Forces Armées Zaïroises; English: Armed Forces of Zaire), which largely disintegrated during the war. "[O]n May 17, 1997, all resistance collapsed. DSP [Special Presidential Division/*Division Spéciale Présidentielle*/Mobutu's elite security force] and FAZ troops took off their uniforms and tried to cross the Congo into Brazzaville or hide among the population. The Mobutist state finally received its formal obituary. The war of liberation was complete" (Roessler and Verhoeven 2016, 229).

Despite defeating the government, organizationally, the AFDL was very weak because of its heavy reliance on Rwandan military assistance and "[t]he speed with which the AFDL moved through the DRC also meant that it had little time to establish organizational structures to administer its new territory, relying instead on Mobutu-era officials. It did hold referenda to identify particularly corrupt officials, who were removed, but unlike other movements, the remaining officials had no organizational, ideological, or military links to either the AFDL or the RPA [the Rwandan military]" (Reed 1998, 20).

The new state military was the FAC (French: Forces Armées Congolaises; English: Armed Forces of the Congo). After gaining power and facing attacks from new foreign-sponsored rebel groups, the weakness of the FAC "forced Kabila to eventually accept a political and military power-sharing deal," specifically, the Lusaka Cease-Fire Agreement in 1999 (Verweijen 2014, 140). Kabila repeatedly sought to undermine the military integration provisions, instead favoring his personally controlled presidential guard, which "constituted a parallel power network in the armed forces" (Verweijen 2014, 143).

Despite these heavily personalist elements of the state military, the weakly organized rebel group

that launched the regime did not dominate the military. Neither of the two Ministers of Defense that served at least three years (see Table B.10) came from the rebellion. Although not fully implemented, the quota system for personnel selection is also consistent with the non-domination by FAC: “The division key followed a quota system roughly based on the numbers of combatants that each faction had declared in Sun City, leading to the following division: 35 percent FAC, 17 percent MLC, 28 percent RCD-G, 8 percent Mai-Mai, and 12 percent other groups” (Verweijen 2014, 145). The partial nature of the military integration also enabled rival groups to avoid domination by the FAC. “[F]actions which agreed to dismantle their military structures did not necessarily abstain from militarized power politics. The ex-belligerents adopted two main strategies to offset the potential loss of influence caused by army integration: First, they tried to maintain economic and political control by building up power bases within the political and administrative institutions—for example, by entrenching themselves locally or provincially in unelected administrative positions or by forging alliances with factions that were likely to have good electoral results. Second, they attempted to maintain military spheres of influence by building up client networks both within and outside the military” (Verweijen 2014, 148-9).

Namibia 90–NA. The main rebel group that fought for independence was SWAPO (South West African People’s Organization), whose armed wing was PLAN (People’s Liberation Army of Namibia). “Since Namibia had no army at independence, one of the priorities of the new government was the establishment of an integrated Namibian Defense Force (NDF)” (Dzinesa 2012, 279). Indicating PLAN’s ascendancy in the new military, “The overall commander of the Namibian Defence Force is the former PLAN leader, Dimo Hamaambo” (Grotmeter 1994, 405), and every post-independence Minister of Defense was a member of SWAPO during the rebellion (see Table B.10). However, unlike most other colonial liberation cases, PLAN did not directly transition to become the national military upon independence. Instead, the 10,000-strong PLAN army and the 8,000-strong SWATF army were each demobilized before creating the new NDF, overseen by a British Military Advisory and Training Team (Mills 1992). Harkness (2018 appendix, 103) reiterates: “On independence, the new national army was formed by integrating the armed wing of the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) with the colonial South West African Territorial Force (SWATF).” The integration of these two military forces into the new state military leads us to code this case as military integration.

South Africa 94–NA. The main rebel group that fought for African majority rule was ANC (African National Congress), whose armed wing was uMkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation, or MK). Other armed African groups were the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA), the military arm of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), and the Kwa Zulu Self Protection Force (KZSPF) of the Inkatha Freedom Party. The war ended in a negotiated settlement that called for elections with mass African participation and military integration. There were eight separate forces in total to integrate: the state military (South African Defence Force; SADF), separate militaries for the four “homelands,” MK, APLA, and KZSPF (Licklider 2014, 122). Whereas SADF and the homeland forces were organized for conventional warfare, the three African groups were organized for guerrilla warfare. The absence of outright rebel victory was important for shaping the negotiations. “The NSF troops [those from MK/ALPA/KZSPF] saw themselves as having won the war against the SADF and the homeland forces, so it was not obvious to them why they should adapt to the SADF model. SADF personnel, conversely, felt that they had never been defeated and resented the

insertion of former enemies whom they regarded as unprepared ... Over time, agreement began to emerge. The new military would be modern, which in practice meant that it would adopt the SADF model in many ways ... Some MK leaders would be given high-level positions, and its rank and file would be given training and fair opportunities for promotion. ... The initial results of the negotiations suggest that the SADF had definitely done better than its opponent, but this impression is deceptive because the inevitable political victory of the African National Congress meant that many of the subsidiary agreements were simply overridden later. The SADF was compelled to accept the full integration of forces and such programs as affirmative action and the fast-tracking of members of the NSF. The NSF were compelled to accept a new SANDF initially led and very much controlled by members of the old SADF ... The four homeland armies were all small and composed of SADF ethnic units, usually led by white South African officers. These groups played no significant role in the negotiations and were fairly easy to integrate into the new military. The Pan-Africanist Congress stayed out of the negotiations until the end but finally agreed to be integrated; the KZSPF Party militias were not brought into the process until 1996, and then only as new recruits. Interestingly enough, the PAC cadres, although fewer in numbers and with less combat experience, fared somewhat better in the integration process proportionately than those from MK” (122, 123, 126).

Over the next decade as the merger occurred: “the proportion of Africans in the SANDF went from about 40 percent to almost 70 percent, while the white proportion dropped from 47 percent to 18 percent. However, these figures conceal important differences. Blacks dominate both the enlisted personnel (of whom only about 2 percent are white) and the highest ranks (brigadier general and up), where a majority are MK veterans; whites still occupy more than half the officer and non-commissioned officer positions, the so-called operational positions. That most lower-level officers and noncommissioned officers are white in part reflects major educational differences resulting from the apartheid educational system ... There is also some concern that the current military is becoming increasingly politicized, because it is closely linked to the ANC” (128, 129). As our biographical data show, the first Minister of Defense was a former MK fighter, indicating ANC’s ascendancy in the military. Williams (2002) provides details about a shift in the balance of power that occurred among the top generals in 1998 following the forced resignation of the white chief-of-staff of the SANDF (he had disseminated unsubstantiated rumors of a coup plot by senior MK officers). This shift “signalled the demise of the so-called ‘old guard’ within the new SANDF” and created a transition to more liberal white officers and a “grouping consist[ing] mainly of former MK officers located largely in the SANDF” (23, 24).

South Sudan 11–NA. The main rebel group that fought against the northern-dominated Sudanese regime was the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (in particular the faction led by John Garang after a split in 1991; SPLM-Garang), whose armed wing was the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). Following a ceasefire in 2002 and a referendum in 2006, South Sudan gained independence in 2011. Despite creating a new country with no incumbent state military, the new South Sudan People’s Defence Forces amalgamated various rebel groups and factions of SPLM that emerged during the war. “South Sudan’s current defense force is composed of the SPLA, the rebel movement that liberated the country; various militia forces that had opposed the SPLA during the war but were absorbed into it after the 2005 peace agreement; and a large number of military personnel that were part of the northern Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), but who were also absorbed into

the SPLA. This composition has made for a very volatile relationship among the senior command officers” (Jok 2011, 11).

No Military Transformation

Morocco 56–NA. The main rebel group that fought for independence was the Army of Liberation (Jaish-al-tahrir). However, neither the monarch Muhammad V nor the Istiqlal party (who led the broader independence movement) controlled these forces. “The main body of the Moroccan army was recruited by French officers among Berber-speaking mountain tribes in a country that is predominantly Arab in language and culture. After independence in 1956, this army, though still largely commanded by French-trained Berber officers, was enlarged from 20,000 to 30,000 men by the addition of guerrilla fighters of the Moroccan Army of Liberation. It is under the control of the King instead of being responsible to a civilian cabinet” (Halpern 1963, 269). “With the establishment of the Royal Army, however, the Liberation Army became an anomaly to the new Moroccan administration as well as an obstacle to negotiation with the French on conventions for economic aid, etc. The absorption of the irregular army also posed peculiar problems for the Istiqlal. Many of the officers and non-commissioned officers were Moroccans of French Army background who had had little or no connection with the party before independence. Those coming from the urban resistance were very likely cell members of the Istiqlal, but none were acknowledged party leaders prior to independence. The troops were recruited mostly from local tribes, who had never been in contact with the Istiqlal for the most part and who recognized only the King as their leader” (Ashford 1959, 16).

Tunisia 56–11. The main rebel group that fought for independence was the *fellagha* guerrillas. However, the guerrillas “were not organized by Neo-Destour [the main independence movement], which claimed it did not approve of violence” (Sarkees and Wayman 2010, 315). Instead, in 1954, leaders of Neo-Destour used “all their influence” to induce the *fellagha* to lay down their arms in 1954 (Perkins 2014, 131). Ben Youssef led the *fellagha*; he had earlier developed a rivalry with Habib Bourguiba, the leader of Neo-Destour. Prior to the first independence elections, Bourguiba engineered the electoral rules to deny seats to supporters of Youssef (136), who “opposed the agreement with the French and French actions in Algeria [and] continued guerrilla activities in southern Tunisia in 1956” (Dixon and Sarkees 2015, 316). “Because the Tunisian army consisted of only a few thousand men, many of them former guerrillas lacking adequate training, ending the rebellion required the assistance of the former colonizer. With some reluctance, the French army and police cooperated with the Bourguiba government . . . and by June 1956 the last of the *fellagha* were killed or captured” (Perkins 2014, 136).

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